A Series of Letters, in Defence of Divine Revelation Part 10

"If, however, you have meant nothing more by all this than to point out the use you shall make of the miracles, &c. (which have been granted for the sake of the argument) when those miracles, &c. shall have been either proven, or else acknowledged true, in relation to the main question, then I have no fault to find; but otherwise, your argument in this place seems to be a little premature.

"You say, 'the known facts, such as the miracles, &c. I used as proof of the divine mission of the servants of G.o.d. This divine mission being proved gives the ground on which I contend for the merit of their testimony, concerning a future state.'

"Here you will perceive, sir, that, according to your own statement, to prove this divine mission, you must first prove the certainty of those miracles, &c. on which the truth of the divine mission is predicated. And these are things about the truth of which, as I indicated all along, there may be serious doubts.

"I am at a loss also to understand, what you mean by a 'divine mission.' You inform me that I misapprehended you 'in supposing that'

you 'mean to contend, that what the apostles have said respecting a future state, was spoken by way of _conclusions_ from certain known facts.' Here, I must confess, I am really at a loss to understand you: how that either Jesus, or his apostles, could understand a divine mission, even if they had received one, unless it were by _conclusions_ from _certain known facts_, that is, facts well known to them, I cannot conceive; and therefore must have some further explanation on this subject before I can fully answer you. For I must be better informed than I am at present, what you mean by a _divine mission_, before I can see the necessity of 'denying the reality of those miracles--or of granting the authority of their (Christ and his apostles) testimony;' that is, in regard to a future state. But even if I should be made to see this, it would be of no use for the present; because as it respects the final issue of the argument, I have not, neither do I now admit the reality of those miracles: as you must have seen by my seventh number.

"The next particular which demands notice is the quoted pa.s.sage which I p.r.o.nounced _Most excellent_!

"Here a serious query suggests itself to my mind. I ask myself: am I, or am I not, as capable of writing my sentiments, so as to be understood by a rational man, as those plain illiterate men who wrote the gospels? And yet if my words are so wrested by logical _twisticisms_ (if I may be allowed to use that expression) so as to mean what never entered my heart, and all this with apparent serious candor too, what may have been the fate of the writings of the evangelists? Now this is something in which I cannot be deceived, i.

e. as it respects myself; for any man of common sense does know his own meaning, whether his words fully express his meaning or not, or whether they may be made to mean something else or not.

"Permit me therefore once more to explain. The expression, _Most excellent_! was not so much intended to have been applied to the sentence preceding it, as to the author of that sentence, whose goodness, in stating so explicitly what he understands by the christian faith, I commended. And you must excuse me for not being able to see any inconsistency, absurdity, or contradiction in my words which follow that expression. Suppose a case. You have a good and faithful servant, who feels happy in your service, and is perfectly contented with his fare. You promise him with some favours which you had never before made known to him. He is elated with the idea of your goodness, which he has never doubted, but did not know till now that it was to be manifested in this particular way. You tell him that a knowledge of this, with his former knowledge, 'is as much as his present welfare requires.' He very readily a.s.sents to the truth of the proposition; and further adds, it is even 'more than is necessary for his present welfare,' for he was contented and happy before. Would any rational man say that your servant talked unreasonably? Would he say that such reasoning was absurd? I think not. Your servant does not despise either your goodness or your bounty; he considers that his master knows best, what is best for his servant; and he receives with grat.i.tude whatever is bestowed. Your argument would have appeared to me more just, if, after fully understanding me, which I perceive, by the use you have made of the quotation from my sixth number, you now do, you had proved from well known facts, or from conclusive argument, the absolute necessity of the hope of a christian in order for the 'present welfare' of mankind. In doing this you would have ingenuously refuted the proposition which I say would have been _exactly right_.

"You do not seem, sir, yet to have fully understood me as to my object in searching for truth. You ask, saying, 'Do you not appear to be solicitous to have your doubts removed, without expecting the least advantage by it?' You must know, sir, that this is only on supposition, that my doubts are founded in error; in which case I should reap the advantage, as my object is truth. You will recollect that my first object was to search for _moral truth_; without being at all solicitous where, or on what ground it shall be found. Truth _only_ is my object. In this _only_ I feel at all interested in this argument. Hence I shall be just as much obliged to you to _confirm_ me in my doubts, admitting they are founded in truth, as I shall to _remove_ them, admitting they are founded in error.

"I once thought just as you, viz. that the idea and contemplation of enjoying future life was absolutely necessary to present enjoyment; but I am now fully convinced, yea, more, it is absolutely known to be a fact, that the idea is altogether visionary and illusive. I admit that a knowledge of the truth, so far as the truth may be known, is perfectly _congenial_ with the present happiness of mankind: though it is often the case that a partial knowledge of the truth, in relation to any particular subject, produces distress and misery rather than enjoyment. I now am very happy in knowing some things, which, once, only the idea of their being true would have given me pain. I am inclined to think that the idea of _now_ enjoying the pleasures, or _now_ enduring the pains of a future life is altogether chimerical. I can enjoy the life or lives of others in a future tense just as well as I can _now_ enjoy my own future life. I have as much reason to believe that rational intelligence always did exist, as I have to believe it always will; yea, one idea is just as certain to me as the other, and no more so. And as I cannot reflect on the idea of eternity past, only with a kind of reverential _awe_ mingled with sublime pleasure; so the idea of eternity to come produces in me the same sensation; yea, feeling myself equally ignorant of both, (which must be the case on the supposition that revelation is not true.) I can perceive no difference. I feel anxious to know, however, every thing which can be known on this subject; and yet, at the same time, I am inclined to think I should _doubt_ of every revelation of which I can have any conception, unless it should be so made that I could see its truth, (or at least the evidences of its truth) over and over again, and that they should still remain by me at all times, so that I could examine them, and re-examine them, the same as I now look at the stars in the firmament.

"Thus I have opened my mind to you, more fully than I have ever done before, on this subject; and notwithstanding your writings may be very beneficial to others (as well as mine, for some may stand in need of one, and some of the other) yet, here comes up my doubts again, if I am benefited by them, I expect it will be in a different way than that of being any more persuaded of the truth of divine revelation.

Nevertheless, I am no less anxious to continue the correspondence on this account.

"Your address to TRUTH, which you are pleased to put into the mouth of my argument, is closed with an idea which does not grow out of my hypothesis. 'The joyous expectation of soon losing sight of thee (i.

e. truth) forever in the ellysium of non existence!' _Non-existence_, sir, does not _exist_! Neither does the term convey an idea to my understanding of any thing. I know of no existence, neither can I conceive of any, except that which I believe to be eternal in its nature. And the idea of _something_ being formed or made out of _nothing_, or of something's returning to nothing again, I have long since exploded. Every thing, however, excepting first principles, is liable to _change_. Hence arises the various modes, states, circ.u.mstances, conditions and situations in beings and things: also their different properties, relations and dependences.

"I know not whether consciousness is a being, or whether it be only a mode of being. If it be the former, it always did, and always will exist, in some state or other; if the latter, the state of the being may be so changed that although ident.i.ty exists, yet consciousness is not there. And there is no more absurdity in this idea than there is in supposing that the same matter which forms a _cube_, may become a _globe_. I can as well conceive of a conscious being to day, becoming unconscious to-morrow, as I can conceive of a person in a sound sleep.

But _non-existence_ (strictly speaking) sounds to my understanding something like the _falsity of truth_!

"I now come to your reply to my sixth number; and in my remarks, which will be but few, I shall follow the arrangement which you have made.

"1st. The candid concessions which you have made, and the charity which you have extended towards doubting Christians, or candid unbelievers (for such I conceive there may be) is honourable both to yourself and to the cause which you have espoused, and your writing, of course gains a much more favourable reception than the writings of those who appear to be filled with a spirit of acrimony, and are ready at once to deal out anathemas against every thing of which they cannot approve. But, sir, you will permit me to say, we ought to be cautious, lest our personal attachment to an author, and his charitable feelings towards us be such, as imperceptibly to blind us to correct reason, and cause us to imbibe his errors, merely because they are his, and mistake them for truth.

"I am well aware that I should find it difficult to prove that I now believe what I do without a miracle, as you have suggested; for if miracles have existed they may have, indirectly, more influence in my mind than I am at present sensible of; and therefore I will not undertake to say that I am not princ.i.p.ally indebted to them for my present views of the character of the supreme Being. I am disposed to acknowledge in humble grat.i.tude all the blessings which I have received, and am made sensible of, let them come to me by what means, or through what channel soever. But I do not see how you had a right to expect that I should either _refute_, or else _acquiesce_ in your opinion on this subject.--What! must I either prove that there have been no such things as miracles, or else admit their truth! Must I either refute your notion that they have had great influence on my faith and practice, or else '_express my acquiescence_' that such is the fact! Hard lines! I choose to take the easier course, and confess that I am too ignorant to do either. I am willing, however, still to be instructed.

"2d. I have nothing at present to say on the subject of prophecy; i.e.

to reconcile the pretensions to it with the honesty of the prophets, without admitting divine inspiration, better than what I have written in my seventh number. When I have received your answer to that I may have something more to write. I would suggest, however, here, that as you frequently make use of the expression 'divine inspiration,' I want the expression more fully defined and explained. I have no distinct idea, that I know of, of _divine inspiration_. I suppose you mean the same by it which you did by the 'divine mission,' given to the apostles, or at least something similar; but still I am ignorant of the subject. You have sometimes spoken of divine revelation, as though it was something distinct from this divine mission, and which was a proof of it; but, you must excuse me, I am still all in the dark about it. Do be so good as to inform me how you suppose the prophets, or apostles, or even Jesus, could know for a certainty that they were divinely inspired?

"3. When I acknowledged that there are evidences in favour of divine revelation, I did not suppose it necessary to state what those evidences are; because some of them, to say the least, are very apparent. The bare report of any thing, I conceive to be evidence of the report's being true; and would be sufficient to acquire belief should nothing arise in the mind to counterbalance it: and as I had repeatedly promised to give you the reasons for my doubts I expected to have been indulged a little longer before I should have been again faulted on this subject. But as it respects this matter I am all patience and submission, if it may be so that truth shall finally come to light.

"Under this article you have gone into a very lengthy discussion to shew that the evidence by which the apostles believed in the resurretion could not be counterbalanced, &c. And if I understand what you have written it amounts in my mind to about the following, viz.

the apostles could not have been convinced of the fact of the resurrection by any evidence short of the fact itself. 2dly. If the fact did exist there is no evidence which can conterbalance it.

_Ergo_. As the apostles were convinced of the truth, the fact did exist. This is pretty much like saying, if the fact were _true_, it could not have been _false_! But I spoke of the evidence in relation to _ourselves_ rather than the _apostles_: we believe or disbelieve for ourselves, and by such evidence as _we_ have. You think if twelve men should testify in favour of a resurrection, and the body could not be found, 'various opinions would result from such evidence.' If so, some might believe the account true; and they might persuade others to believe it; and only let it be reported and believed that some one had died for the truth of it, and it would make no difference after this, as it respects the influence of faith, whether the account was true or false.

"You will excuse me for making no further remarks on what you have written under this article till you have answered my seventh number, and also given me a more clear definition of _divine inspiration_.

"4. What you have written under the fourth article, generally speaking, is satisfactory, till I come to the last sentence; and even with that I have not much fault to charge you with. It is true we may be mistaken as to our ideas of the eternity or immutability of any thing; but then, as it respects argument, it is just as well as though we were correct, as no one can prove us otherwise; no, nor even raise a reasonable doubt on the subject. But even if it could be demonstrated that there is not a rational being now in the universe who existed two centuries ago, or one who will exist two centuries hence, I conceive, as the fact could not, so the knowledge of the fact ought not to make any difference in the relation, dependence and moral obligation between man and man. Man learns by his own experience, as well as from the experience of others; and _vice versa_; hence we profit by the experience of those who have gone before us.

"When man shall universally learn this great moral truth that much of his happiness is inseparably connected with the happiness of his fellow beings, which is one of the immutable principles of moral nature, then each individual will strive to the utmost to promote the general welfare; for in so doing he increases his own individual happiness, and also the happiness of posterity.

"5. What you have said under the fifth article, for reasons already given, will be considered in my next number, when I hope I shall he furnished with more light on the subject.

"I will only observe here that a miracle, as I conceive, must be performed agreeable to, or else it must be a violation of the laws of nature. If the former, whatever it might be to others, to those who understood the means of its operation, it could be, strictly speaking, no miracle; and if no miracle, no evidence, to them, of divine inspiration: but if the latter, and those who performed the same were ignorant of the power by which they were performed, I do not see how that the performance of a miracle could give them any knowledge of futurity. And if not, what did give it to them, and in what way was it given?

"It will still be recollected that I do not admit the existence of miracles, although I speak of them as though they were true, merely to shew that even if they were true I should still have my difficulties respecting the truth of divine revelation.

"6th. Your remarks under the sixth article are satisfactory, though they have not convinced me of the incorrectness of my opinion; because that which is founded in _truth_ is, after all the only thing that is 'good and nouris.h.i.+ng' to the understanding. The sound mind pants only after truth; and as he knows eternal truth is unalterable, he is not foolish enough even to desire, it should be what it is not. The reason why we often desire that which we cannot have is because, not knowing the whole truth, we do not know but that we may have the things we desire.

"7th. As it respects 'not even deserving a future existence,' I was not fully understood. I only meant an _anxious_ desire, as I expressed a little before, and as also I expressed _anxious concern_ a little after; that is a desire which is incompatible with reconciliation to truth whether that truth gives us little or much. Had not truth been favourable to our existence we certainly should not have existed; and I can see no reason to fear a truth which has been so favourable as to give us being. It is true, a desire to exist as long as we can enjoy life seems to be inseparably connected with our moral nature; and yet I can see no terror in that which takes away our sensibility, whether it be for a night, for ages, or for eternity. I should just as soon think of being terrified at the idea of a sound and sweet sleep. If the truth be what I suspect it is, I see no good reason why it should be revealed to us, any more than the hour of our death! This truth is wisely concealed from us.

"8th. You have seen me so long in the dark that I begin to doubt whether you would be willing to own me correct, even if I should come fully into the light; i. e. according to your understanding. Is it possible sir, that you should suppose me capable of writing so great a solecism as the following, viz.: If a revelation were ever necessary, it was necessary only to convince mankind that a revelation is not true! But it seems that such must have been your construction, or very near it, or else you could not have found the error of so great magnitude, of which you speak. Although I did not express my idea so full and explicit as I might, and perhaps ought to have done, yet I can a.s.sure you that, by reconciling man to his present state, I meant nothing less than what you have expressed in a former letter; and I meant to include all for which you have contended in the article now under consideration. For 1st. If divine revelation were necessary, the thing revealed is undoubtedly true. 2d. If true, I am fully satisfied with your views on the subject.

"9th. Your explanation relative to what you suggested in a former letter (i. e. _that I must mean that the apostles stated falsehood_) is satisfactory; though what you now say you meant, as I have already informed you, was not exactly my meaning. The fact is, I did not mean to express any opinion as to the truth or to the falsity of the apostles' testimony. I very readily grant, however, that, if I 'do not _believe_ that they stated the truth' 'I must believe that they stated falsehood;' unless (which would be very extraordinary) the weight of evidence be so exactly balanced in my mind that it is impossible for me to form an opinion on the subject.--But supposing I disbelieved their testimony altogether; what could I do more than to give my reasons for not believing it? Would it be reasonable to call on me to prove their testimony false? It is a very hard thing to prove a negative!

"You will have already perceived by my seventh number that I have no idea that the facts on which the Christian religion is said to have been founded can now be proved false. No, whatever might have been the case in the time of it, they were neglected too long before any attempt of this kind was made, though the accounts should have been supposed ever so erroneous as to promise any success in their refutation. And I am inclined to think that one century _then_ would involve facts in as much obscurity as five centuries would _now_. But I have already expressed my doubts whether the facts on which the religion of the _Shakers_ is said to be predicated, although not half a century standing, can now be proved false; and yet if they are true they are nothing short of miraculous.

"The Christian religion therefore, true or false, undoubtedly will stand, in some shape or other, and be believed more or less, as long as man remains upon the earth. For if it was introduced without any violations of the laws of nature, i. e. without miracles, which probably was the case, if false, we cannot expect any such violations for the sake of destroying it; and without such violations I do not see how it could be destroyed, because the believers of it, invariably, believe it to be established on such mysterious supernatural principles; and I expect but very few, comparatively, will ever have sufficient strength of mind to throw off the mystic veil.

"Yours, &c.

A. KNEELAND."

LETTER VII.

_Dear sir, and brother_--Desiring to bring our present correspondence to a close as soon as the merits of its subject will admit, I propose in replying to your 8th number, to remark only on the most essential particulars, taking no particular notice of two cla.s.ses contained in your communication, viz. that which seems to grow out of a misconstruction of my arguments and that in which you appear to agree with them. Indulging in this liberty, the subjects to which I will endeavour to confirm myself are the following.

1st. Your method of accounting for the absence of the crucified Jesus, from the sepulchre where it was laid and guarded by the Roman soldiers.

2d. What you suggest respecting the divine mission of Christ and his apostles, the miracles which were wrought by them in attestation of the Messiah, and the credibility of their testimony regarding a future state.

3d. What you contend for respecting the _utility_, or _inutility_ of the christian hope of future felicity.

4th. Something on the instructions of Jesus to his disciples respecting their conduct toward their enemies.

5th. What you suggest respecting Jesus' not being known to the two disciples, &c.

6th. Your criticism on my argument respecting the evidences of the resurrection, &c.

1st. You propose to account for the absence of the body of Jesus, by supposing, that some persons by frightening the guards were enabled thereby to convey the body away, which they did being willing that Jesus should be thought to have risen from the dead, whereby he would be deified, according to the notions of the Greeks respecting deifying men after they were dead, &c. Those who thus stole the body were not the disciples of Jesus, but some persons who were desirous thereby to punish the Jews for so cruelly putting Jesus to death.

Here you have proposed two subjects as forming the cause, in the mind of those who stole the body, of their undertaking so hazarduous an enterprise, neither of which appears to me to wear the necessary marks of probability.--1st. If they wished to have Jesus deified according to the notions of the Greeks, there was no need of establis.h.i.+ng the belief of his having rose from the dead. This was not the case with those who among the Greeks were deified after their death. The tombs of their heroes whom they placed among the G.o.ds, remained among the people.

2d. Who that then lived in Jerusalem or its vicinity could look on the crucifixion of Jesus as an act of cruelty? Others than Jews would not feel very much interested in this affair, as Jesus had confined his ministry to the Jews, and directed his disciples not to enter into any of the cities of the Gentiles, this matter was a case which seemed to concern the Jews only. Now look at the case. The Jews expected a Messiah, a deliverer, one who should become their prince, and deliver them from the bondage of the Romans. Jesus pretended to be sent of G.o.d as their Messiah of whom the ancient prophets had spoken; he pretended to work miracles in confirmation of his divine mission; but in room of delivering the Jews from the Roman yoke, he prophecied of their destruction by the Romans. Now, sir, if Jesus made all these pretensions without divine authority for so doing, if he caused to be reported that he wrought miracles when he never wrought one in his life, if he kept the people in a continual uproar driving about the country from one extreme of Palestine to another all by his frauds and fascinating deceptions; and in order to quiet the people, and have things go on in a regular order, those who were charged with the public concerns brought about the crucifixion of this impostor, who knowing all these things, being a Jew would think of accusing these G.o.dly pharisees and rulers of cruelty for so doing? If Jesus did not do the works which he pretended to do, he certainly was an impostor, and it is in vain to attempt to save him from such a charge. And if he were such a _blasphemous_ impostor as to pretend to work miracles by the power of G.o.d, when he knew he had no such power, it appears very plain that he deserved to die according to Jewish customs. If the miracles of Jesus had been of a different description, there might have been some deception. That is, if such miracles had been pretended as you state of the Shakers; in such a case n.o.body would trouble their heads about the matter. Some would say, the good woman perhaps was badly hurt, and she thought her ribs were broken, when in fact they were not, and with a little good nursing she was able to join the dance; others might be extravagant enough to suppose that something marvelous had taken place, but who would know? Or, I will add, who would care? But will you undertake to argue that the most learned and artful could impose on people by pretending to have power from G.o.d to open the eyes of the blind, to heal all manner of diseases with a word, and to raise the dead from their graves? No, sir, if Jesus did not perform the miracles which he pretended to perform, there is no propriety in believing that any body was disposed to charge the Jews with cruelty for ridding community of such an impostor. But after all, even allowing your proposed method of accounting for the absence of the body, which by no means is half as probable a story as that reported by the Jews, as this does not account for the disciples'

believing that Jesus had actually arose from the dead. What is to be done with this circ.u.mstance? Are we to suppose that as soon as the disciples found that the body was missing, they took it into their heads that he had actually arose from the dead without any further evidence? Well if they really believed it they could honestly state their belief to the people. You will remember that you have agreed that the apostles were honest men. But then the apostles go further, they a.s.sert that they were certified of the real resurrection of Jesus by many _infallible_ proofs, that they saw him, conversed with him, ate with him, heard his discourses in which he expounded the scriptures of the law, of the prophets, and of the psalms which respected his pa.s.sion and resurrection. Will you allow these men to have been honest men, and still suppose that somebody stole the body of Jesus from the sepulchre? The boldness of the disciples in declaring the resurrection, their willingness to suffer all manner of persecutions for the name of Jesus, show plainly that they did believe in his resurrection. Here I refer you to my former arguments in which I have attempted to make it appear that the disciples could not have been deceived.

But even allowing, that the body was stolen, and that the disciples were deceived, there is still, if possible, a greater difficulty to account for, viz. the success of the preaching of Jesus and him crucified. Here I wish, in a special manner, to call your attention.

The four evangelists and the acts of the apostles were written in the life time of the disciples of Jesus; this, Paley, in his Evidences of Christianity, fully proves. He likewise proves beyond any reasonable doubt that they were written by the men whose names they bear. These historians then relate all the miracles recorded in the four gospels, and inform us that Jesus actually performed them. They give each of them an account of the crucifixion and resurrection of their divine master. They relate the things of which they were eye witnesses. But supposing they were deceived, which I humbly conceive, is not supposable, can we reasonably believe that these gospels in which such barefaced falsehoods were recorded would ever gain credit among a people whose religious education was to be all overthrown by coming into the belief of those writings?