Gallipoli Diary Volume II Part 12

during an indeterminate period.

"(No. 7315, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton.

Your No. 578. You will, I hope, fully discuss the situation described by you with Birdwood and the Generals who have just joined you, and, when a thorough examination on the ground of the whole state of affairs has been made, give me the opinion at which you arrive.

"It has been a sad disappointment to me that the troops have not been able to do better, and that the drafts and reinforcements sent out to you and Egypt, excluding any you have drawn from Egypt, amounting from 6th August to 47,000, have not proved sufficient to enable you to contemplate holding your positions."

Braithwaite and I have been electrified by this reference to 47,000 drafts and reinforcements: it is so much Greek to us here: had there been any question of reinforcements coming to us on that scale, my 578 of 23rd August would never have been sent.

On the heels of this has followed another:--

"(No. 7319, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton. My No. 7315. I hope that the result of your deliberations will reach me by Friday morning, as the decision to be taken is one of considerable importance."

I have replied off the reel:--

"(No. M.F. 588). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. With reference to your telegrams Nos. 7315 and 7319. I feel sure you cannot think I would be capable of sending a telegram of such import as my No.

M.F. 578 without the deepest consideration and sense of my personal responsibility which remains unaffected by any amount of conferences with my subordinate commanders. I was careful in this instance, however, to discuss the situation on the spot with both Corps Commanders concerned and I then cabled you my considered opinion. I constantly visit both Suvla and Anzac and have personally thoroughly examined the state of affairs. In view of your telegram No. 7172, cipher, I do not understand your allusion to 47,000 drafts and reinforcements from 6th August as we have not been advised of any such number as 47,000. I felt bound to lay the case plainly before you as to what might have to be undertaken, though I do not contemplate giving up any position one hour before I need. If the present wastage from sickness continues, however, and if my cadres are allowed to fall below their present attenuated strength I may be compelled to undertake such a step as I have indicated."

Bailloud arrived at tea time. Away from Piepape he is another person. At dinner, he cracked jokes even about serious things like the guns of Asia.

Brodrick was carried off to the Hospital s.h.i.+p. The doctors think there should be no real danger. We shall all miss him very much; as an aide he has been A.1.; sympathetic and thoughtful.

Braithwaite dined to meet Bailloud.

_26th August, 1915._ After clearing my table and taking early lunch, started off in the _Arno_ with C.G.S., Pollen, Freddie and Val. Sailed for Suvla and went up straight to see Byng, brought by the whirl of Fortune's wheel from a French chateau to a dugout. During the two days he has been here, he has been working very hard. I hope he may not too regretfully look back towards _la belle France_. Our old "A" Beach was being briskly sh.e.l.led as we walked down to our boats. Between Hill 10 and the sea there were salvoes of shrapnel falling and about every thirty seconds a big fellow, probably a six incher, made a terrible hullaballoo. The men working at piling up stores "carried on."

[Ill.u.s.tration: GENERAL BAILLOUD _"Exclusive News" phot._]

When we got back to G.H.Q. there was a heavy thunderstorm in progress.

Mail bag closed 9.30.

During our inspection at Suvla this "Personal" from K. to myself has been deciphered:--

"(No. 7337, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton.

Personal. I considered it advisable, that as the decision the Government may have to come to on your No. 578 is one of grave importance, the Generals out there should previously fully consider the situation on the Gallipoli Peninsula; hence my No. 7315. It was intended to obviate any possibility of overlooking points and in such cases two or more heads sometimes elucidate matters that might otherwise be missed or not given due weight to. It was in no way intended thereby to detract from the importance of your views on the subject or to minimise your personal responsibility for them.

"I have no idea of the French Generals' views on the matter, and you were apparently not fully considering the drafts and reinforcements that were being sent out.

"A detailed telegram is being sent you from the office of the 47,000 men mentioned in my No. 7315.

"I hope that the return of Younghusband's Brigade from Aden to Egypt will still further increase these in a day or two (less one battalion).

"But you should look on the forces in Egypt and your own as a whole, allowing, of course, for the proper defence of Egypt, when you take the general situation at the Dardanelles into consideration.

"Do you think the Navy could do anything more than they are already doing to help the situation? I hear it is thought that they could land heavy naval 6-inch guns on positions such as those in square 92 M and other points, and might threaten from Aja Liman the main road of Turkish supplies between Karna Bili and Solvili (by gunfire from s.h.i.+ps) and also bring a heavy and effective sh.e.l.l fire on the Turkish positions at and behind Anafarta. There is a cabinet to-morrow."

I would much like to sleep over this cable--so plain seemingly; really so obscure. At face value, how splendidly it simplifies the Dardanelles problem! Had I been, all along, as this cable seems to make me, the C.-in-C. of the Eastern Mediterranean with Maxwell administering my Egyptian Base, then, humanly speaking, this entry would have been dated from Constantinople. But am I? I can't believe it even now, with the words before me. Anyway, whether by my own fault or those of others, one thing is certain, namely, that up to date there has been misunderstanding. Now, the Cabinet of to-morrow forces me to send a momentous wire without too much time to think it over. To clear my brain let me set down the sequence of facts as they have so far appeared to me:--

Less than a week ago--20th inst.--K. cables me he is sending certain units to Egypt and certain other units to the Dardanelles. The units and their s.h.i.+ps are named. He says there is going to be a big push in France and that I must look to these troops, earmarked for the Dardanelles, plus any I "can obtain from Egypt" to carry on. He winds up by saying, "It is hoped the troops going to Egypt will enable Maxwell to send you more fighting men on your demand."

This same a.s.sumption that the G.O.C., Egypt, and myself are two equals each having equal command over his own troops, is fully borne out by another cable of the 21st August. My cable of 23rd August is based on these messages; i.e. on the idea that we must carry on here for a good long time to come with very little to help us. Then comes K.'s of the 25th telling me he is sorry 47,000 drafts and reinforcements he has sent to Maxwell and myself since 6th August are not going to be enough to enable me to hold on. But no one can make head or tail of these 47,000 drafts and reinforcements; no one can run them to ground. He has notified me the units and the s.h.i.+ps, but the total coming to Maxwell _and_ myself don't tot up to that figure, much less the portion of them detailed for the Dardanelles.[11] Now comes to-day's cable in which Egypt is spoken of as being mine, and the fatness thereof. Taking this message _per se_, any one might imagine I could draw any troops I liked from that country provided that _I_ thought _I_ was leaving enough to defend the Suez Ca.n.a.l: and, apparently, the 47,000 men are about to make an effort to materialize inasmuch as we are told that details are being wired us. Finally, Younghusband's Brigade sails to help us!

_27th August, 1915. Imbros._ As there is a Cabinet to-day I had to get off my answer last night. In it I have made a desperate effort to straighten out the tangle:--

"(No. M.F. 589). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. On returning from Suvla I have just found your No. 7337, cipher. I hope there may be no misunderstanding as to meaning or intention of my No.

M.F. 578. I asked in my No. M.F. 562 for such drafts and reinforcements as I considered necessary for the campaign to be brought to a conclusion before the winter began. You told me in your No. 7172 that you could spare no more reinforcements beyond those mentioned therein, and that if I could not achieve success with these I must remain on the defensive for some considerable time. I explained situation in my No. M.F. 578, and said that the question was one of arithmetic and measurement. I was anxious to hold all I had got and to gain more, but I required all my available force at the present time merely to hold what I had got. I pointed out that meanwhile a large proportion of my troops were urgently in need of rest, and sickness was so great that unless reinforcements were sent out my force would soon be too small for the number of yards of front to be held. In that case, i.e., if reinforcements could not be spared, but in that case only, it would be necessary to contract my line. This welcome news of 47,000 reinforcements, however, alters the whole situation. Such a number will do much to complete my diminished cadres, and should materially lessen sick rate by giving more chance of taking tired troops out of the trenches. Byng can certainly remain where he is at present, and will even be able to rest some of the tired XXIXth Division, while the arrival of the Australian Brigade will give General Birdwood a similar chance of resting some of his troops.

"General Birdwood meanwhile is to make a further advance to-morrow on the left flank, to gain possession of important tactical feature, which will eventually help an advance when the time arrives. Byng is getting everything in order and has infected all around him with his own energy and cheeriness and has quickly grasped the whole situation.

"In communication with Maxwell I find I can have seven Territorial Force units and the Scottish Horse, and now I have your welcome news of Younghusband's Brigade. Please believe I am the last man in the world to give up anything we have gained except under direct necessity, which I trust may now never arise. The Navy is supporting me to its full capacity. The guns of the four s.h.i.+ps in Suvla Bay take on the Turkish positions you mention almost as well as and certainly more safely than if they were landed and placed where you suggest. Moreover, Navy cannot lend those guns unless I supply the detachments to work them from the Naval Division, and the latter is fully employed at present and cannot spare the men. We are constantly sending s.h.i.+ps round to Aja Liman to fire at enemy positions from there, but I know you realize that one must not rely too much upon effective fire on land targets from s.h.i.+ps which are not moored, as is the case in Suvla Bay.

"I have not consulted the French General about the situation in the North as he is at the Southern end and on the right of the line there.

He thinks more of Asia than of these operations in which he has no troops engaged, but I discussed the matter with him only last night.

Before I sent my No. M.F. 578 I discussed every point closely for two hours with the Corps Commanders."

In the evening my A.G. brought me the promised details of the 47,000 drafts and reinforcements. He has gone into the detail in proper A.G.

spirit, namely, as an arithmetician rather than a tactician. The result has given us a shock! 10,000 men of the 54th Division and 4,000 drafts are shown in the War Office cable as being still due to come to me as reinforcements whereas they had actually landed on the Peninsula; had, indeed, been shown in my total fighting strength of 68,000 in my original cable, M.F. 578 of 23rd August, and are, too many of them, alas already _hors de combat_. Here is the pa.s.sage sent four days ago:--"The total casualties including sick since 6th August amount to 40,000, and my total force is now only 85,000 of which the fighting strength is 68,000." In this 68,000 were included 14,000 of the men shown in _subsequent_ War Office cables as being drafts and reinforcements on their way to the Dardanelles!

So my A.G. has become a bit suspicious about the balance of the 47,000.

On paper, he says, it looks as if I might expect to draw from Egypt and England 30,000 reinforcements, but--he remarks sententiously--"we know by now that paper is one thing and men are different." As to Younghusband's Brigade, it turns out they cannot be employed here: too many Mahomedans. Have sent the following reply:--

"(No. M.F. 595). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Secretary of State for War. With reference to your telegram No. 7337, cipher. Have now received details of the 47,000 drafts and reinforcements in your No. 7354 cipher, and I find that this figure includes nearly 10,000 men of the LIVth Division and 4,234 drafts, all of whom had been landed on the peninsula when I wrote my No. M.F. 578, and were reckoned in the total fighting strength of 68,000 mentioned in that telegram. The statement, however, shows that I can expect from England and Egypt during the next six weeks a total of some 29,000 reinforcements, including new formations and two battalions of non-fighting lines of communication troops.

"This is a better situation than I was led by your 7172, cipher, to expect, and you may rely on me to do the best I can with this addition to my present very depleted strength. I hope, however, you realize that whereas my British Divisions are now more than 55,000 rifles below their establishment only 17,000 of these 29,000 are drafts, and before the last of the drafts can arrive these divisions will have lost another 25 per cent. of their remaining number by normal wastage.

"In regard to Younghusband's Brigade, I learn that the three battalions are practically half Mahomedans, and I am advised that it is better if it can be avoided not to use Mahomedans so near the heart of Islam.

Would it not be possible to exchange these for some Hindu regiments in France?"

These cables give us an uncomfortable feeling that the people at home wish to regard us as stronger than we are--a different thing from wis.h.i.+ng to add to our strength.

On the other hand, another sort of message has come in which sheds a ray of hope across our path so darkened at many other points:--

"(No 7372, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton.

Although it is understood that we do not at present see our way to change the recent decision not to send any fresh complete divisional units, we wish to have all the material possible on which to form a judgment from time to time. Therefore, will you please telegraph me your opinion, from the point of view of the military and strategical situation now existing on the peninsula, as to the prospects there are, after the experience you have recently had, of our achieving the main objective of turning the Turks out and what force you would consider would be required to do this."

Taylor of the G.S. lunched. A big parcel mail came in. Brodrick is to be sent to Alexandria.

_28th August, 1915. Imbros._ Braithwaite and I both feel we must take time to think over last night's last cable and I have wired to say so.