Herzegovina Part 11

Presupposing, for the sake of argument, a strong military spirit to be rife among the people, the financial condition of the country would render the idea untenable, since it is with difficulty that the 1,800 soldiers who const.i.tute the regular army can be maintained. Granting even the willingness to serve, and the ability of the government to pay them, the population of the country would not, according to ordinary statistics, furnish so large a force. The greatest number that could be calculated on in the event of war would be about 40,000 men, and these only in a war in which the national sympathy might be deeply enlisted.

How many of this number would remain in arms, would probably depend on the amount of plunder to be obtained, and the nature of the resistance which they might encounter.

The material of the existing force is about on an equality with that of most continental armies. A portion of the troops are armed with rifles, and the remainder with unbrowned muskets. One battery of artillery forms the aggregate of that arm of the service. There are 70 guns at the a.r.s.enal at Kragiewatz, but they are all old and unfit for field service.

A French Colonel has lately been imported to fill the combined offices of War-Minister and Commander-in-Chief. This, and, indeed, the whole of the recent internal policy, leaves very little doubt of the source whence emanate these high-flown ideas. It cannot be better expressed than as a _politique d'ostentation_, which is, if we may compare small things with great, eminently French. The oscillation of French and Russian influence, and the amicable manner in which their delegates relinquish the field to each other alternately, implies the existence of a mutual understanding between them. Whether this accord extends to a wider sphere and more momentous questions, time alone will show.

Meanwhile, the Prince continues to indulge in dreams of a Panslavish kingdom, and of the crumbs which may fall to his own share, while he neglects the true interests of his country, with which his own are so intimately blended. Let him apply himself to the developement of her internal resources, to the promotion of education and civilisation among the people, and, above all, let him root out that spirit of indolence which has taken such firm hold upon all cla.s.ses. It is his policy to do all this, that Servia may be in a position to a.s.sume that leading place among the Slavonic races which she arrogates to herself, should unforeseen circ.u.mstances call upon her to do so. With her he must stand or fall; therefore, setting aside more patriotic motives, self-interest renders it imperative on him to apply himself zealously to her regeneration.

With regard to his foreign policy, he cannot do better than act up to the conviction which he has himself more than once expressed, that 'the interests of Servia are identical with those of Turkey.' For, should the disruption of the Ottoman empire take place--the probability of which is at any rate no greater than in the time of our grandfathers--it will not be effected by internal revolution, but by foreign intervention; and credulous must he be who can believe in the disinterestedness of those who would lend themselves to such a measure. Thus, in the part.i.tion which would ensue, Servia might find even her former independence overlooked.

Let me add, that if I have alluded in strong terms to the condition of the people, I have done it in all sincerity, regretting that Servia should thus cast away the sympathy which, were she bent on self-advancement, would pour in upon her from every side. If, again, I may appear presumptuous in dictating the duties which devolve upon her Prince, I am prompted to it by the supineness which he has as yet evinced in promoting the desire for civilisation. Let him delay no longer, for, should events so dispose themselves that Servia should be weighed in the balance, she will, unless an amendment takes place, be indeed found miserably wanting.

CONCLUSION.

In conclusion, I would venture to call attention to the fact that the preceding pages were written before events had a.s.sumed the aspect which they now wear. Actual hostilities had not then commenced against Montenegro; the Turkish Government had not then contracted the loan which has opened up new prospects for the finances of the country.

That Omer Pacha has not already brought the war to a close is to be regretted, but let those who criticise the slowness of his movements weigh well all the disadvantages against which he has to contend.

It would be useless to enumerate these again, as they are alluded to more than once in the course of this volume. Suffice it to say, then, that if Cettigne be taken and Montenegro occupied before the end of the present year, Omer Pacha will have placed another feather in his cap, and will have materially increased the debt of grat.i.tude to which he is already ent.i.tled.