Christianity - The First Three Thousand Years Part 16

On the other side of the world, another situation combining rapid social change and political oppression provoked the development in the 1970s of a different variety of Protestant liberation theology: the minjung minjung theology of South Korea. The word means 'ordinary people', but this simple concept changed focus with the bewilderingly fast development of the republic, from factory workers through to the flexibility of the information technology industry: eventually more what might be termed a 'cognitariat' of educationally skilled workers than a 'proletariat'. Jesus was minjung and the friend of the minjung, teaching forgiveness and love of enemies, but Moses was also minjung, political leader of his people against oppression. Minjung theologians were proud of their Korean past, and saw a complex struggle not only with the authoritarian South Korean government, but with the global strategies of the United States, which maintained that regime. Those involved faced torture, imprisonment and execution from South Korea's military dictators. Given the trauma of the Korean War, with nearly a million refugees from the Communist North in their midst, even self-consciously reformist Korean theologians had little inclination to explore the terminology of Marxism in the fas.h.i.+on of South American liberation theologians. Although opposed to the strange dynastic Communism of Kim Il Sung in the North, minjung theologians still sought to show proper respect for the Korean ideal of self-sufficiency which lay behind North Korea's cruelty and inhumanity. theology of South Korea. The word means 'ordinary people', but this simple concept changed focus with the bewilderingly fast development of the republic, from factory workers through to the flexibility of the information technology industry: eventually more what might be termed a 'cognitariat' of educationally skilled workers than a 'proletariat'. Jesus was minjung and the friend of the minjung, teaching forgiveness and love of enemies, but Moses was also minjung, political leader of his people against oppression. Minjung theologians were proud of their Korean past, and saw a complex struggle not only with the authoritarian South Korean government, but with the global strategies of the United States, which maintained that regime. Those involved faced torture, imprisonment and execution from South Korea's military dictators. Given the trauma of the Korean War, with nearly a million refugees from the Communist North in their midst, even self-consciously reformist Korean theologians had little inclination to explore the terminology of Marxism in the fas.h.i.+on of South American liberation theologians. Although opposed to the strange dynastic Communism of Kim Il Sung in the North, minjung theologians still sought to show proper respect for the Korean ideal of self-sufficiency which lay behind North Korea's cruelty and inhumanity.24 As Korean democracy gradually came to maturity after three hectic decades of economic development which had taken Europe two centuries to complete, there arose a new problem for minjung theology: how to reinvent for the 'cognitariat' this movement born in political struggle. The movement contributed to the social activism of a society whose needs and problems outran the administrative capacity of government, but it found it difficult to compete with Korean Pentecostalism. Pentecostals celebrated the success of the new society, and in their vehement anti-Communism they gladly adopted a conservative evangelical style from the United States, especially the 'prosperity' message of the 'Word of Faith' movements, while scorning the 'idolatry' to be found in the Korean past. Minjung's roots were in Presbyterianism, long accustomed to respecting and exploring Korean tradition and culture. So minjung theologians in recent years have explored the Korean past to find appropriate forms for a fully involved citizens.h.i.+p. They look with interest to the revolutionary Donghak movement, which, in the same era as the Taiping in China, sought to synthesize religion and reform for Korea. They offer people who are in danger of being too proud of their own new success Jesus's call to principled action, which can be seen as a praxis praxis for Korea: 'If any man would come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me'. for Korea: 'If any man would come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me'.25 For at the heart of all these movements was a meditation on the powerlessness of the crucified Christ, and on the paradox that this powerlessness was the basis for resurrection: freedom and transformation. Christian art created in the twentieth century (beyond run-of-the-mill devotional objects) has interestingly s.h.i.+fted away from old priorities: even in Catholic art, the Madonna and Child appear less often, and there is a greater stress on Christ on the Cross. Against the background of power struggles which had laid empires low and ruined so many lives in two world wars and beyond, much Christian experience thus resonated with the themes of crucified weakness and the tiny scale of the mustard seed before it becomes a great tree. Protestants had discovered ec.u.menism in their relative failures in small villages in India. Catholics discovered liberation theology in small communities of ordinary people in Latin America. They were often facing as dire threats from military power as the Mexican Cristeros Cristeros before them, and with what little schooling the Church could provide, they turned to the Bible to help them understand their situation. They have come to be described by the inelegant terms (which have not translated well from Iberian languages) 'basic ecclesiastical communities' or 'base groups/ communities'. before them, and with what little schooling the Church could provide, they turned to the Bible to help them understand their situation. They have come to be described by the inelegant terms (which have not translated well from Iberian languages) 'basic ecclesiastical communities' or 'base groups/ communities'.

Poor people throughout the global south recognized the experiences of Latin Americans and civil rights marchers in their own. They likewise looked for political liberation, but the historic context in Africa and Asia was very different from that in Latin America. From Dakar to Djakarta, the 1940s and 1950s had witnessed rapid disintegration in the enormous colonial empires built up by European colonial powers in the nineteenth century - Africa's decolonization was a particular surprise. Although the United States was initially very ready to encourage Europe's shattered powers to shed their colonies after 1945, no one expected the virtually universal withdrawal which emerged at the end of the 1950s, postponed only by special circ.u.mstances in southern Africa. When one young liberal Catholic Belgian academic in 1956 published a work proposing that the Belgian Congo might suitably be given independence on the centenary of its cession to King Leopold in 1885, his book provoked a storm of ridicule and fury in Belgium. In fact the Congo's independence came four years after its publication. Rome had given so little consideration to providing an autonomous future for Catholicism in the vast Belgian territory that an indigenous hierarchy of bishops was only hastily established in the months between the King of Belgium announcing imminent independence in 1959 and the actual handover. The political authorities had shown no more forethought than the Church. This short-sightedness was the prelude to immeasurable human misery in the self-styled Democratic Republic of the Congo which has not yet ceased.26 Elsewhere, it seemed that more potential existed for a delivery of state machines into the hands of responsible politicians. The precedent was the independence won by the British Gold Coast as Ghana only three years before the Belgian Congo, but after infinitely more careful local preparation. The British government, despite major blunders like its brutally inept and demoralizing handling of the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya through the 1950s, was generally prepared to listen to anglophone Christian missionary organizations which understood the realities of anti-colonial movements and saw positive possibilities. Max Warren, an exceptionally able secretary of the Church Missionary Society and in many ways the successor to J. H. Oldham as an international Protestant statesman, played an important role as a mediator between British officialdom and the new leaders.h.i.+p, especially in the CMS's long-standing areas of activity in East and West Africa.27 Some observers in Europe and in nationalist circles in Africa confidently expected that Africans would think Christianity too closely a.s.sociated with colonialism to let it flourish in the newly independent states. This was the reverse of the truth.28 As we have seen (see pp. 963-5), beyond the European-initiated Churches there was now an extraordinary variety of African-initiated Christian practice which made Christianity even beyond its ancient north-eastern African heartlands at least as indigenous a religion as the great alternative, Islam. Moreover, the political inst.i.tutions left by colonial powers at independence produced widespread disappointment. Artificially created chunks of colonial territory had been set up with democratic forms, civil services and judiciaries. Even in European society, these worked only when sustained by widespread prosperity and painfully acquired consensual norms and national ident.i.ties. They rarely functioned effectively in Africa, and the generation of liberation politicians who became rulers at independence frequently succ.u.mbed to the corruption of power. People let down by government turned to the Churches for their welfare, self-expression and a chance to exercise control over their own lives. Nowhere was this more true than in the one region which did not readily succ.u.mb to decolonization, the Portuguese and British southern territories dominated by the Union of South Africa. As we have seen (see pp. 963-5), beyond the European-initiated Churches there was now an extraordinary variety of African-initiated Christian practice which made Christianity even beyond its ancient north-eastern African heartlands at least as indigenous a religion as the great alternative, Islam. Moreover, the political inst.i.tutions left by colonial powers at independence produced widespread disappointment. Artificially created chunks of colonial territory had been set up with democratic forms, civil services and judiciaries. Even in European society, these worked only when sustained by widespread prosperity and painfully acquired consensual norms and national ident.i.ties. They rarely functioned effectively in Africa, and the generation of liberation politicians who became rulers at independence frequently succ.u.mbed to the corruption of power. People let down by government turned to the Churches for their welfare, self-expression and a chance to exercise control over their own lives. Nowhere was this more true than in the one region which did not readily succ.u.mb to decolonization, the Portuguese and British southern territories dominated by the Union of South Africa.

The Union was an amalgam of British colonies and two former republics dominated by 'Afrikaner' descendants of colonists from the Netherlands. Afrikaners were proud of more than two centuries of struggle to establish themselves in a wilderness, buoyed up by a militant Reformed Protestantism which told them that G.o.d had delivered them this land, and determined to resist any extension of power to non-whites, whether African or Asian. Indeed, as the twentieth century wore on, the Afrikaners turned their military defeat by the British in the second Boer War (1899-1902) into a gradual rebuilding of Afrikaner ascendancy, removing what political rights had existed for non-whites in some parts of the new Union. Most British settlers, and successive British governments anxious to avoid confrontation, connived at the process, which culminated in the victory of an Afrikaner Nationalist party in the 1948 all-white general election. In the intervening years, Africans had quit white-initiated Churches on a ma.s.sive scale to lead their own Christian lives; the segregation of races widened inexorably. After the Nationalist victory, successive governments, with cabinets stuffed with Dutch Reformed pastors and elders, turned this de facto situation into a system with its own crazy and cruel logic, known by the Afrikaans word apartheid apartheid, separateness. This was often glossed by the South African government as 'separate development'. The separation of blacks, whites, Asians and 'Coloureds' was small-mindedly real; the development entirely one-sided.29 At the heart of apartheid was a great act of theft from the Churches: the entire ma.s.s-education system which they had built up from primary level to higher education, a beacon for Africa that had benefited students from as far away as Uganda. From 1953 all this was delivered into the hands of the government and became an instrument to hold black Africans back rather than advance them. The Roman Catholic Church resisted the confiscation the longest, but it too was eventually defeated by the effort of financing its independent schools.30 Around the world, as the cruelty and arbitrariness of apartheid became apparent, a chorus of protest went up. From Western governments it was muted, because South Africa had a strategic importance in the 'Cold War' against Communism which had been in operation from the late 1940s (a card played to the full by the Nationalist government, which talked much of Communism as the enemy of Christian civilization). The Soviet government did indeed use the struggle against apartheid to further its own interests, but on the Western side the bulk of opposition had to come from the Churches. They alone among the coalition of activists could effectively draw on their international fellows.h.i.+p to keep open overseas links for South Africans and help the beleaguered liberationist political party which Christians dominated, the African National Congress. Around the world, as the cruelty and arbitrariness of apartheid became apparent, a chorus of protest went up. From Western governments it was muted, because South Africa had a strategic importance in the 'Cold War' against Communism which had been in operation from the late 1940s (a card played to the full by the Nationalist government, which talked much of Communism as the enemy of Christian civilization). The Soviet government did indeed use the struggle against apartheid to further its own interests, but on the Western side the bulk of opposition had to come from the Churches. They alone among the coalition of activists could effectively draw on their international fellows.h.i.+p to keep open overseas links for South Africans and help the beleaguered liberationist political party which Christians dominated, the African National Congress.

Given the almost blanket support of the South African Dutch Reformed Church for apartheid, and its withdrawal or expulsion from ec.u.menical activities in worldwide Church bodies, the Anglican Church was best placed to lead the struggle in South Africa. For all the Nationalist government's efforts to shut down any sphere of cooperation between whites and non-whites, Anglicans led the Churches' resistance, and had the capacity from time to time to intimidate the ostentatiously Christian Nationalist regime - admittedly often against the wishes of many in their prosperous white congregations. Throughout all the Anglican Communion's centuries of involvement with politics and social change, its role in the liberation struggle in South Africa should perhaps give it most pride. It is a story of heroic individuals who turned what was often a personal singularity and craggy awkwardness into a stubborn refusal to compromise with evil. Exemplary was the monk Trevor Huddleston, sent out to South Africa by his Community of the Resurrection: he was tireless in his anti-apartheid work alongside the ANC and then, after a reluctantly obeyed recall from his order, he spent a lifetime in helping the struggle from afar, as an Anglican bishop and eventually archbishop. Desmond Tutu, another exceptional Anglican priest of the next generation who rose to be Archbishop of Cape Town - perhaps Anglicanism's greatest primate in the twentieth century - recalled his astonishment as a boy at witnessing Father Huddleston, the picture of Anglo-Catholic authority in his black hat and white ca.s.sock, showing an automatic English courtesy to Tutu's mother: 'I couldn't understand a white man doffing his hat to a black woman, an uneducated woman ... it made, it appeared later, a very deep impression on me and said a great deal about the person who had done this.'31 Perhaps most important of all for the eventual defeat of apartheid was an English Anglican priest who briefly visited South Africa only once: John Collins. Like Huddleston, Collins was an example of a type which Anglicanism has traditionally been good at fostering: an undisciplined, extrovert rebel member of England's solid middle cla.s.s, for whom the Church's untidy historic legacy of niches for eccentrics provided a perch in a canonry of London's St Paul's Cathedral. Canon Collins ruined the breakfasts of many a choleric Tory reader of the Daily Telegraph Daily Telegraph by his p.r.o.nouncements as chairman of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, but his contribution to South Africa's future was the International Defence and Aid Fund, an umbrella organization which, after the South African government banned it in 1967, managed to avoid journalistic scrutiny for another quarter-century. The fund gathered money from across the northern European and North American world via a host of personal contacts; it provided a cleverly disguised financial lifeline for those struggling in the most dangerous of circ.u.mstances to resist apartheid, to fight lawsuits or survive the disappearance of their loved ones into South African jails. The South African security services, so adept at penetrating and subverting such organizations, never succeeded in infiltration here, nor did they unmask the agents who were distributing the funds: tens of thousands of people were given around PS100 million. Collins's IDAF remains one of the greatest achievements of twentieth-century liberal Protestantism. by his p.r.o.nouncements as chairman of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, but his contribution to South Africa's future was the International Defence and Aid Fund, an umbrella organization which, after the South African government banned it in 1967, managed to avoid journalistic scrutiny for another quarter-century. The fund gathered money from across the northern European and North American world via a host of personal contacts; it provided a cleverly disguised financial lifeline for those struggling in the most dangerous of circ.u.mstances to resist apartheid, to fight lawsuits or survive the disappearance of their loved ones into South African jails. The South African security services, so adept at penetrating and subverting such organizations, never succeeded in infiltration here, nor did they unmask the agents who were distributing the funds: tens of thousands of people were given around PS100 million. Collins's IDAF remains one of the greatest achievements of twentieth-century liberal Protestantism.32 Churchmen like Huddleston, Tutu and Collins played a major part alongside the imprisoned Nelson Mandela in ensuring that the African National Congress remained firmly committed to an effort to establish a genuine and all-inclusive democracy when the white minority regime eventually lost the will to resist. The liberation struggle in South Africa remained much more closely linked than elsewhere to the concerns of liberal Western Christianity for other freedoms - h.o.m.os.e.xual rights, the ordination of women - and that has been an important factor in recent travails of the Anglican Communion. Moreover, Archbishop Tutu was at the forefront of the movement to seek national healing rather than sectional revenge after the eventual defeat of apartheid and the coming of universal democracy in 1994. He headed a Truth and Reconciliation Commission which has been imitated in other places riven by long-term hatreds and atrocities. Nelson Mandela as president symbolized the commitment to a Christian reconciliation when he proclaimed that the old Afrikaner national anthem Die Stem Die Stem ('The Call') should continue to stand alongside the serene Xhosa Christian hymn written in 1897 by a Methodist schoolteacher, ('The Call') should continue to stand alongside the serene Xhosa Christian hymn written in 1897 by a Methodist schoolteacher, Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika: 'Lord, bless Africa . . . Descend, O Spirit; Descend, O Holy Spirit'.33 Not the least dramatic aspect of this reconciliation was the repentance shown by the official bodies of the South African Dutch Reformed Church for their part in providing ideological blessing for the lunacy of apartheid. As recently as 1982 they had responded angrily to their exclusion from the World Alliance of Reformed Churches with an emphatic a.s.sertion of their constant testing of 'the demands of Holy Scripture . . . to strive for the best practical way in which to fulfil our apostolic calling to be the Church of Jesus Christ giving due consideration to our experience within the unique South African ethnic situation'. Only eight years later, the year that Nelson Mandela was freed after twenty-seven years in jail, the Church in a declaration at Rustenburg took practical steps to restore property to the 'relocated' and provide funds for renewal and resettlement of exiles, since 'Confession and forgiveness necessarily require rest.i.tution. Without it, a confession of guilt is incomplete.'34 On the other side of the Atlantic five years later, in 1995, another Church actually born in racism gradually and painfully came to a similar realization. The Southern Baptists, by now America's largest Protestant denomination, in a charged and emotional meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, expressed repentance for their historic origins in a movement to oppose the abolition of slavery: twenty thousand delegates overwhelmingly pa.s.sed a resolution to repudiate what they had once said on slavery and to make an official apology to African-Americans. They quoted the Bible to prove their new case for condemning slavery, albeit with more good-heartedness than profound scriptural exegesis - and it has to be said that they remain an almost entirely white denomination.35 Other mainstream American Churches, such as the Episcopal Church of the USA, are also aware of their often inglorious role in the story of slavery and its accompanying racism. That is why they may be more sensitive to other liberation struggles than Churches elsewhere which do not have that past story. Other mainstream American Churches, such as the Episcopal Church of the USA, are also aware of their often inglorious role in the story of slavery and its accompanying racism. That is why they may be more sensitive to other liberation struggles than Churches elsewhere which do not have that past story.

These statements of penitence are as resonant as those made by European Churches conscious of their tarnished part in the n.a.z.i crimes of the Second World War. They betoken a new humility in Western Christianity born of experience. Such turnarounds in the Church may encourage wariness in those inclined to make confident dogmatic p.r.o.nouncements intended to lay down unchangeable truths for the future. But humility is by no means the only mood among the Churches worldwide in recent decades. Afrikaner South Africa saw the defence of its special racial system as part of a more general defence of traditional Christian values against a G.o.dless liberalism, intent on demolis.h.i.+ng the Christian family and all the inst.i.tutions dependent on it. Conservative Christians everywhere have continued to echo this wider theme: even now that apartheid is only a sour memory, a cultural battle continues. It began at the end of the 1950s, and has now become the widest fault line within Christianity - Chalcedonian, non-Chalcedonian, Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Pentecostal alike - casting more ancient conflicts into the shade.

A CULTURAL REVOLUTION FROM THE SIXTIES.

The nemesis of Pope Paul VI as Church reformer was a pair of issues in human s.e.xuality. In his reaffirmation of universal clerical celibacy and ban on contraception, he had not understood the profound cultural revolution which had been occurring in the West from the early 1960s, in which new understandings and expressions of human relations.h.i.+ps played a central role. Alongside s.e.x was a phenomenon which began by affecting European liberal Protestantism, but which quickly spread throughout all the Churches of Western Europe, and beyond them, into their cognates in Canada and European-origin Australasia: steep falls in the number of those actively involved in corporate religious practice. The process was labelled 'secularization' by students of the sociology of religion, and during the 1970s and even early 1980s, it was confidently expected to set patterns for the whole world. The United States was also part of the cultural revolution - in fact it provided most of the symbolism of the changes, not least through the Hollywood film industry, but also through a veritable industry of youth protest centring on popular anger about America's war in Vietnam. Yet the USA has behaved differently from Europe in the matter of churchgoing and religious activism, if not in the s.e.xual revolution. The divergence was perceptible from the early 1970s and emphatically gathered pace in the 1980s.36 What had happened? A starting point which may seem paradoxical is the exceptionally healthy state of the inst.i.tution of marriage and the weakness of alternatives in mid-century European and American society. More people married, and they married younger. In 1960, 70 per cent of American women aged 20-24 were married. In the Republic of Ireland, extramarital births then accounted for a mere 1.6 per cent of all births, and lest it be thought that Ireland's exceptional levels of Catholic piety were responsible, comparable figures for the religiously pluralistic Netherlands were 1.4 per cent and 3.7 per cent for Lutheran Norway.37 Clearly people were opting for the nuclear family; but this was not just a traditional Christian family. It put a great deal more emphasis on emotional and s.e.xual fulfilment, and traditional male superiority was eroded in favour of a 'companionate' partners.h.i.+p of equals, where husband and wife made decisions about how many children they were willing to bring up, with the aid of artificial contraception. Clearly people were opting for the nuclear family; but this was not just a traditional Christian family. It put a great deal more emphasis on emotional and s.e.xual fulfilment, and traditional male superiority was eroded in favour of a 'companionate' partners.h.i.+p of equals, where husband and wife made decisions about how many children they were willing to bring up, with the aid of artificial contraception.

The march of contraception can be instanced not only in the low rate of extramarital births, but in statistics for marriage like those of Canadian families, where the mean number of children per mother fell 3.77 to 2.33, merely through the decade of the 1960s. Fewer children exercised proportionately more emotional power; it has been said that the post-war American family has been increasingly run by and for the benefit of children. Families were getting smaller, more intimate and involved with each other. They had more possessions, more spare cash, more leisure - more choice.38 It was personal choice which defeated It was personal choice which defeated Humanae vitae. Humanae vitae. There are echoes of that earlier emergence of social choice which in the 1690s had seen the emergence in England and the Netherlands of open companionate h.o.m.os.e.xuality in the face of every possible public social force discouraging it (see pp. 791-2). There are echoes of that earlier emergence of social choice which in the 1690s had seen the emergence in England and the Netherlands of open companionate h.o.m.os.e.xuality in the face of every possible public social force discouraging it (see pp. 791-2).

The new-style family was not good news for Churches, whose rhetoric of support for the family had not envisaged that it might be a compet.i.tor for rather than a mainstay of Church life. An unexpected result was beginning to be felt in the United Kingdom even amid the post-war boom in churchgoing. A perceptive curate in the English Midlands, for instance, noted in 1947 that parents on his newly built housing estate in Dudley were not sending their children along to Sunday School, reluctant 'to interfere with the freedom of young people's choice'. Elsewhere in the same district, a Free Church magazine complained seventeen years later, 'Many of the newly married couples on the estates [are] concerned first and foremost with their their pay-packets, pay-packets, their their housing comforts, housing comforts, their their interior decorations . . . interior decorations . . . their their standing in the eyes of their workmates and neighbours.' There were cars for Sunday family jaunts instead of morning church; there was television around which the whole family could sit after tea instead of evening church. standing in the eyes of their workmates and neighbours.' There were cars for Sunday family jaunts instead of morning church; there was television around which the whole family could sit after tea instead of evening church.39 These findings could endlessly be reproduced through European society from the early 1960s. In particular, that mainstay of Protestant Church practice from the eighteenth century, the children's Sunday School, melted away. In 1900, 55 per cent of British children attended Sunday School; the figure was still 24 per cent in 1960, but 9 per cent in 1980 and 4 per cent in 2000. These findings could endlessly be reproduced through European society from the early 1960s. In particular, that mainstay of Protestant Church practice from the eighteenth century, the children's Sunday School, melted away. In 1900, 55 per cent of British children attended Sunday School; the figure was still 24 per cent in 1960, but 9 per cent in 1980 and 4 per cent in 2000.40 Around the family, other s.h.i.+fts occurred. 'Companionate' marriage created high expectations which were all too frequently disappointed. In the 1970s, divorce rates began rising across Europe, and against furious protests from the Roman Catholic Church, the possibility of divorce was introduced into the law codes of Catholic countries where it had previously been outlawed - in Italy, for instance, in 1970. That was a remarkable s.h.i.+ft from the moment in 1947 when the const.i.tution of the new Italian Republic had only missed affirming the indissolubility of marriage by three votes in the Const.i.tuent a.s.sembly.41 Rates of extramarital births soared: in the nations already cited over four decades from 1960, twentyfold in Ireland, sixteenfold in the Netherlands and thirteenfold in Norway. Rates of extramarital births soared: in the nations already cited over four decades from 1960, twentyfold in Ireland, sixteenfold in the Netherlands and thirteenfold in Norway.42 Taboos around abortion broke down, in the face of the reality of death and physical damage in clandestine illegal abortions. In country after country there was legislation to legalize abortion, most famously in the United States through a judgement of the Supreme Court in 1973, Taboos around abortion broke down, in the face of the reality of death and physical damage in clandestine illegal abortions. In country after country there was legislation to legalize abortion, most famously in the United States through a judgement of the Supreme Court in 1973, Roe Roe v. v. Wade Wade. h.o.m.os.e.xuality became less a subject of public paranoia. The first stage was its decriminalization in law, a measure not designed to make h.o.m.os.e.xuality acceptable or moral in the eyes of Christians, simply to remove a major catalyst for blackmail or suicide.

It is often forgotten that in Britain, in contrast to the European-wide Catholic opposition to changes in divorce legislation, change came about in the highly contentious field of h.o.m.os.e.xuality largely through the Church. Elite liberal English Protestants, chiefly Anglicans, were at the forefront of a hard-fought struggle, way in advance of popular opinion, which led eventually to the limited decriminalization of male same-s.e.x activity in 1967. Central to their work was the patient scholars.h.i.+p and advocacy of a canon of Wells Cathedral, Derrick Sherwin Bailey, a genial family man with an enthusiasm for railways which suggested the normal harmless eccentricity of Anglican clergy rather than a dangerous revolutionary spirit. Members of the British establishment beyond the Church's theological or clerical circles found all this agitation very odd, but were caught sufficiently off guard to allow the change in the law.43 What liberal English Christians were seeking to do was actively to separate the law of the land from Christian moral prescriptions. Many, especially clergy of Anglo-Catholic sympathies, had been disgusted by the debacle caused by the Church's established status in its attempted Prayer Book revision of 1927-8, and wanted to liberate the Church in its divine mission by disentangling it from official power structures. What liberal English Christians were seeking to do was actively to separate the law of the land from Christian moral prescriptions. Many, especially clergy of Anglo-Catholic sympathies, had been disgusted by the debacle caused by the Church's established status in its attempted Prayer Book revision of 1927-8, and wanted to liberate the Church in its divine mission by disentangling it from official power structures.44 They were acknowledging, even furthering and celebrating, the death of Christendom, with a conviction that beyond it there lay better prospects for Christianity. They were acknowledging, even furthering and celebrating, the death of Christendom, with a conviction that beyond it there lay better prospects for Christianity.

Behind this optimism, which might now seem quixotic, there echoed texts of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, in letters and papers written during his imprisonment before his execution in 1945: not a theological system but a series of fugitive observations about the future of Christianity, conceived in circ.u.mstances of dire isolation and in fear of death, with German society collapsing around him. Bonhoeffer antic.i.p.ated themes of liberation theology such as the suffering G.o.d and the transformed Church, but with a different thrust, in seeing humanity as 'coming of age': 'G.o.d is teaching us that we must live as men who can get along very well without him . . . G.o.d allows himself to be edged out of the world and on to the cross.' Bonhoeffer criticized his friend and mentor Karl Barth for 'a positivist doctrine of revelation which says in effect "take it or leave it" ', but he still offered his own prophecy of hope and affirmation to Christianity cut loose from its practice of religion: 'The day will come when men will be called again to utter the word of G.o.d with such power as will change and renew the world. It will be a new language, which will horrify men, and yet overwhelm them by its power.'45 Bonhoeffer, a prophet of a renewal whose outlines were not clear to him, bequeathed this idealism and antic.i.p.ation to the theology of the 1960s, with a mult.i.tude of effects and fractures to come. Bonhoeffer, a prophet of a renewal whose outlines were not clear to him, bequeathed this idealism and antic.i.p.ation to the theology of the 1960s, with a mult.i.tude of effects and fractures to come.

One notes that Bonhoeffer and his English translators in the 1950s still unselfconsciously used the language of maleness when describing the future. Part of the coming revolution would render that idiom quaintly old-fas.h.i.+oned, because above all the 1960s in Europe and America witnessed a profound s.h.i.+ft in the balance of power between the s.e.xes. It became the expectation that girls would receive as good an education as boys; indeed, over the next decades, it became apparent that in many circ.u.mstances girls achieved better results at school. Women began discovering past generations of female writers often then languis.h.i.+ng unpublished and unstudied, and found that such pioneers as Mary Astell more than two centuries before (see pp. 793-4) had already provided the arguments which they were discovering from themselves. A word had been coined in 1882 for this consciousness: feminism.46 Its inventor, Hubertine Auclert, had campaigned in France for women's political rights at a time when women were a.s.serting their right to take initiatives and exercise leaders.h.i.+p in a variety of ways, largely within the context of the Christian Church (see pp. 818-20 and 828-30). Auclert herself had left behind her family's Catholic piety for a French Republican anticlericalism. Now, a century later, feminism was decisively moving beyond its Christian roots to a 'second wave', a more general a.s.sertion, not of particular spheres of action such as prophecy or temperance campaigning, but of equality of opportunity and activity in society. Its inventor, Hubertine Auclert, had campaigned in France for women's political rights at a time when women were a.s.serting their right to take initiatives and exercise leaders.h.i.+p in a variety of ways, largely within the context of the Christian Church (see pp. 818-20 and 828-30). Auclert herself had left behind her family's Catholic piety for a French Republican anticlericalism. Now, a century later, feminism was decisively moving beyond its Christian roots to a 'second wave', a more general a.s.sertion, not of particular spheres of action such as prophecy or temperance campaigning, but of equality of opportunity and activity in society.

Since it was becoming less easy to see why women and men should not pursue the same occupations in later life, surely that must apply in the Church as well as beyond it? What would happen to the formation of Christian theology if women joined in what had overwhelmingly been a male task for twenty centuries? We have observed that at intervals the Holy Spirit has been described in female terms through Christian history, but it was rare for the other persons of the Trinity to be conceived without the language of Fatherhood and Sons.h.i.+p. Authority in the Church seemed to have been concentrated in the male gender - although careful scrutiny of the early Church's history now revealed significant exceptions to this generalization.47 It had been difficult enough for many Churches to get past St Paul's admonitions against women holding positions of leaders.h.i.+p or even speaking in church, but now there gathered strength a movement to open the ordained ministry of Churches to women, an impulse which had previously only appeared in the most resolutely unhierarchical of Churches, such as Quakers and Congregationalists. It had been difficult enough for many Churches to get past St Paul's admonitions against women holding positions of leaders.h.i.+p or even speaking in church, but now there gathered strength a movement to open the ordained ministry of Churches to women, an impulse which had previously only appeared in the most resolutely unhierarchical of Churches, such as Quakers and Congregationalists.

Even the episcopal Anglican Communion became involved in the struggle, following a precocious precedent in 1944: in the extraordinary circ.u.mstances of the j.a.panese occupation of China, the Bishop of Hong Kong first conferred priestly orders on a woman, Florence Lee Tim Oi, to much worldwide Anglican surprise and episcopal scolding. With great self-abnegation, Lee Tim Oi ceased to exercise her orders and bided her time until the world and the Church changed.48 New Zealand, a conservative, inward-looking society which has nevertheless repeatedly displayed a remarkable capacity to create social change without a great deal of fuss, first took matters further than priestly orders. Dr Penny Jamieson, ordained priest in 1983, was Anglicanism's first woman diocesan bishop, elected by the faithful in a very traditional-minded Anglo-Catholic diocese, Dunedin, in 1989. New Zealand, a conservative, inward-looking society which has nevertheless repeatedly displayed a remarkable capacity to create social change without a great deal of fuss, first took matters further than priestly orders. Dr Penny Jamieson, ordained priest in 1983, was Anglicanism's first woman diocesan bishop, elected by the faithful in a very traditional-minded Anglo-Catholic diocese, Dunedin, in 1989.49 In Geneva in 2001, the Rev. Isabelle Graessle became successor to John Calvin, the first woman Moderator of the Reformed Church of Geneva's Company of Pastors and Deacons. She has spoken to me of her delight after her election in laying a rose on the cenotaph which commemorates Calvin's unknown grave, and telling him gently, 'It's my turn now.' Graessle was also responsible for a significant addition to Geneva's monumental Wall of the Reformers: the first female name engraved on it, that of a feisty former abbess, Marie Dentiere, whose contribution to the Genevan Reformation had not given Calvin any pleasure. In Geneva in 2001, the Rev. Isabelle Graessle became successor to John Calvin, the first woman Moderator of the Reformed Church of Geneva's Company of Pastors and Deacons. She has spoken to me of her delight after her election in laying a rose on the cenotaph which commemorates Calvin's unknown grave, and telling him gently, 'It's my turn now.' Graessle was also responsible for a significant addition to Geneva's monumental Wall of the Reformers: the first female name engraved on it, that of a feisty former abbess, Marie Dentiere, whose contribution to the Genevan Reformation had not given Calvin any pleasure.50

OLD-TIME RELIGION: AFFIRMATIONS.

It is not surprising that such frighteningly rapid changes in society and the Church have provoked a strong reaction, which in fact extends beyond Christianity to all major world faiths. A sequence of political events at the end of the 1970s came to reveal over time that the narrative of advancing secularization, which during the previous decade had seemed so convincing in the seminar rooms of European and American universities, needed some modification. In 1977 the United States presidential election was a triumph for Jimmy Carter, a Southern Baptist Democrat who had openly declared himself born-again; in 1978 there came the election of Karol Wojtyla as Pope John Paul II; in 1979 s.h.i.+'ite ayatollahs seized control of the revolution which had overthrown the Shah of Iran. Throughout the world at the present day, the most easily heard tone in religion (not just Christianity) is of a generally angry conservatism. Why? I would hazard that the anger centres on a profound s.h.i.+ft in gender roles which have traditionally been given a religious significance and validated by religious traditions. It embodies the hurt of heteros.e.xual men at cultural s.h.i.+fts which have generally threatened to marginalize them and deprive them of dignity, hegemony or even much usefulness - not merely heteros.e.xual men already in positions of leaders.h.i.+p, but those who in traditional cultural systems would expect to inherit leaders.h.i.+p. It has been observed by sociologists of religion that the most extreme forms of conservatism to be found in modern world religions, conservatisms which in a borrowing from Christianity have been termed 'fundamentalism', are especially attractive to 'literate but jobless, unmarried male youths marginalized and disenfranchised by the juggernaut of modernity' - in other words, those whom modernity has created, only to fail to offer them any worthwhile purpose.51 That victory of Jimmy Carter in 1977 marked the return to national American politics of Evangelicals self-exiled over the previous half-century (see pp. 961-3). But the road to their political self-a.s.sertion was not straightforward: Carter quickly proved a sore disappointment to them. The problem was that Carter came from that progressive side of Southern Evangelicalism exemplified, as we have seen, in the career of Belle Harris Bennett, and Carter's instincts leaned dangerously towards Protestant liberalism and ec.u.menism (both of which were rapidly becoming part of the Evangelical repertoire of hate words). Carter was equivocal on abortion, a matter which Evangelicals were increasingly seeing as a litmus test of doctrinal soundness. On one issue he fatally alienated the Evangelical const.i.tuency: faith schools, which Evangelicals had founded, among other reasons, to avoid the teaching of s.e.x education now on offer in the public (state) system. In 1978, through a bureaucratic decision which was in fact quite independent of the new Carter administration, the US Internal Revenue Service withdrew the tax-exempt status of independent faith schools, claiming (on the whole unfairly) that many were deliberately practising racial discrimination. This was an ironic result of the civil rights campaigns which once had involved so many Evangelicals.

Already two legal judgements had infuriated Evangelical voters: the banning of school prayer in America's public schools in 1962, the result of the courts trying to enforce the principle of the American const.i.tutional separation of Church and State, and the Roe Roe v. v. Wade Wade judgement effectively legalizing abortion in 1973. Only now did they begin to make the connection to the power of their vote. s.e.x clinched their feelings: Carter's long-promised White House Conference on the Family pluralized its subject to 'Families', and made thoughtful statements about gay relations.h.i.+ps which were beyond the Evangelical pale. Angry Evangelical leaders met in 1979 and stumbled across a resonant t.i.tle for an organization to do something about their anger: the 'Moral Majority'. By the end of Carter's troubled period in office, he had lost the conservative Evangelical const.i.tuency. In 1980 it helped to eject him, voting instead for Ronald Reagan. There was plenty of irony here, for as a Republican Reagan was - in terms of inst.i.tutional politics - the heir to the party which had defeated the South in the civil war. Moreover, he was a social libertarian of cosily amorphous religious views and his wife regularly consulted an astrologer. In all this, the Reagans were not untypical products of Hollywood, in contrast with the deeply pious Southern Democrat Carter. judgement effectively legalizing abortion in 1973. Only now did they begin to make the connection to the power of their vote. s.e.x clinched their feelings: Carter's long-promised White House Conference on the Family pluralized its subject to 'Families', and made thoughtful statements about gay relations.h.i.+ps which were beyond the Evangelical pale. Angry Evangelical leaders met in 1979 and stumbled across a resonant t.i.tle for an organization to do something about their anger: the 'Moral Majority'. By the end of Carter's troubled period in office, he had lost the conservative Evangelical const.i.tuency. In 1980 it helped to eject him, voting instead for Ronald Reagan. There was plenty of irony here, for as a Republican Reagan was - in terms of inst.i.tutional politics - the heir to the party which had defeated the South in the civil war. Moreover, he was a social libertarian of cosily amorphous religious views and his wife regularly consulted an astrologer. In all this, the Reagans were not untypical products of Hollywood, in contrast with the deeply pious Southern Democrat Carter.

Nevertheless the alliance between Republicans and conservative Evangelicals had been struck, and the Republican Party saw the huge electoral advantage of hanging on to it. The Evangelical televangelist turned politician Pat Robertson declared in 1980, 'We have enough votes to run the country . . . and when the people say, "We've had enough" we are going to take over.'52 So far that has not happened, partly thanks to the sheer variety and perennial fissiparousness of American Evangelicalism. Yet the effect of Evangelicalism in American politics hardly needs demonstrating, baffling though it is to Europeans, who overwhelmingly disapprove of their own politicians making a public fuss of their personal religious convictions. On no political issue has this been more significant than American policy towards the State of Israel - the source of so much Arab and Muslim fury and frustration with the West. So far that has not happened, partly thanks to the sheer variety and perennial fissiparousness of American Evangelicalism. Yet the effect of Evangelicalism in American politics hardly needs demonstrating, baffling though it is to Europeans, who overwhelmingly disapprove of their own politicians making a public fuss of their personal religious convictions. On no political issue has this been more significant than American policy towards the State of Israel - the source of so much Arab and Muslim fury and frustration with the West.

For some years after the founding of a state of Israel in 1948, American relations with Israeli governments were dominated by power-political considerations. They were not even particularly cordial, especially at the time of the 1956 crisis, in which the Israelis aligned themselves militarily with the British and French around Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Ca.n.a.l. When the decisive American swing towards an alliance with Israel came in 1962, it was still motivated by power politics, and was not a.s.sociated with Republicans but with President John F. Kennedy's liberal Democratic administration, which was furious at the aggressive policies adopted by President Na.s.ser of Egypt.53 At that stage, of course, American politicians were not generally keeping a worried eye on Evangelical political opinion. When in the 1980s they did, they discovered a large const.i.tuency emphatically in favour of Israel, for reasons related to the apocalypse. It was the same longing to bring on the Last Days which back in the 1840s had enthused the newly founded Evangelical Alliance and the promoters of the Jerusalem Bishopric (see pp. 836-7), and which derived its particular premillennialist roots from the Millerites and the dispensationalism of John Nelson Darby. At that stage, of course, American politicians were not generally keeping a worried eye on Evangelical political opinion. When in the 1980s they did, they discovered a large const.i.tuency emphatically in favour of Israel, for reasons related to the apocalypse. It was the same longing to bring on the Last Days which back in the 1840s had enthused the newly founded Evangelical Alliance and the promoters of the Jerusalem Bishopric (see pp. 836-7), and which derived its particular premillennialist roots from the Millerites and the dispensationalism of John Nelson Darby.54 Millenarianism routed the widespread contrary impulse in American Protestant circles to anti-Semitism, historically seen at its worst in the racism of the Ku Klux Klan. Millenarianism routed the widespread contrary impulse in American Protestant circles to anti-Semitism, historically seen at its worst in the racism of the Ku Klux Klan.

Now American Evangelicals made common cause with the Jewish community in the United States, and they seemed to care little if at all for the opinions or the sufferings of their fellow Christians in the ancient Churches of the Middle East. Israeli politicians were not slow to exploit this political windfall, caring little for the fact that Evangelical apocalypticism expected the conversion of the Jews to Christianity. Likewise the Amsterdam Jews who had encouraged philo-Semitism in Puritan England in the 1650s had not been too worried about Protestant motives when Oliver Cromwell had readmitted the Jewish community to his country (see pp. 773-4). American foreign policy has for decades seemed locked into hardly questioning its support for the State of Israel, even though the consequences for its relations with the Arab and Muslim world, and with others, are almost entirely negative.55 They have been particularly dire for the traditional Christianities of the Middle East. With the exception of Lebanon and a remarkable if complex official fostering of religious pluralism in the Syrian Republic, Christian communities are generally in steep decline in numbers through the region, and Israel/Palestine in particular. Caught between the animosities of a politics which has other concerns, Christians have every incentive to leave, whenever they can, for exile in less dangerous lands, ending a connection with homelands which goes directly back to the first generations of the followers of Christ. It is easy for them to feel abandoned and betrayed by the Christian-based cultures of the West. They have been particularly dire for the traditional Christianities of the Middle East. With the exception of Lebanon and a remarkable if complex official fostering of religious pluralism in the Syrian Republic, Christian communities are generally in steep decline in numbers through the region, and Israel/Palestine in particular. Caught between the animosities of a politics which has other concerns, Christians have every incentive to leave, whenever they can, for exile in less dangerous lands, ending a connection with homelands which goes directly back to the first generations of the followers of Christ. It is easy for them to feel abandoned and betrayed by the Christian-based cultures of the West.56 During the presidency of George W. Bush, the first president since Jimmy Carter to declare himself born-again, the nexus between the Republican Party and conservative Evangelical Christianity reached unprecedented proportions. It extended across the range of apocalyptic Evangelical concern (chiefly s.e.x) and also lack of concern (chiefly the environment). Faced with the continuing world crisis over the twentieth century's newly emerged s.e.xually transmitted disease, HIV/AIDS, the Bush administration diverted funds for prevention into abstinence-only programmes. President Bush's Pentecostal Christian Attorney-General John Ashcroft promised after his nomination to wind up a task force established by the Clinton administration to protect abortion clinics from violent protests; he had to abandon that commitment after much public alarm, but as attacks on clinics escalated, continued government protection for them was noticeably slow to materialize. In an interview with the New York Times New York Times just before his first victorious presidential election, George W. Bush also identified himself with that century-old fundamentalist angst, the status of the creation stories in the Book of Genesis, when he commented that 'the jury is still out' on evolution. just before his first victorious presidential election, George W. Bush also identified himself with that century-old fundamentalist angst, the status of the creation stories in the Book of Genesis, when he commented that 'the jury is still out' on evolution.57 It has been common for those expecting the imminent Last Days to deny the reality of global climate change or its connection with human agency. In any case, given the imminent reign of Christ, attempts to fortify humanity against such signs of the times would be pointless, not to say disrespectful to G.o.d (as well as unhelpful to some of the financial backers of the Republican Party in industry). Senator James Inhofe of Oklahoma, an Evangelical Republican who opined to the Senate on 4 March 2002 that Al Qaeda's destruction of New York's World Trade Center in 2001 was divine punishment for the inadequacy of America's support for Israel, on 28 July 2003 described global warming to the Senate as 'the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American people' and the Federal Environmental Protection Agency as a 'Gestapo'.58 Nevertheless, religious movements at the moment of success tend to fragment and diversify, especially when they are already as diverse as American conservative Evangelicalism, and there have been signs that a new generation within the movement is less inclined to sign up to the agenda which won the Republicans electoral success in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Environmental concerns are one of the chief issues on which fragmentation is perceptible. What seems unlikely to s.h.i.+ft is the vigorous presence of Evangelicalism in American public life, in a form unimaginable before 1977. Nevertheless, religious movements at the moment of success tend to fragment and diversify, especially when they are already as diverse as American conservative Evangelicalism, and there have been signs that a new generation within the movement is less inclined to sign up to the agenda which won the Republicans electoral success in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Environmental concerns are one of the chief issues on which fragmentation is perceptible. What seems unlikely to s.h.i.+ft is the vigorous presence of Evangelicalism in American public life, in a form unimaginable before 1977.

If Jimmy Carter's election marked a new phase in American politics and public religion, so did the unexpected election of Pope John Paul II the following year. His election was in a hasty conclave, subdued by the sudden death of John Paul I only a month after enthronement (a tragedy so ineptly handled by the Vatican as to give rise to a great deal of silly conspiracy theory). The choice of a Polish pope broke with more than four centuries of choices from among the Italian episcopate, and it could be taken as a fitting symbol of the rapid changes now occurring within the Catholic Church. The youngest pope at election since Pius IX in 1846, and destined to have the second-longest pontificate in the papacy's history so far, Karol Wojtyla was a heroic figure, survivor of struggles against two tyrannical regimes which were conscious enemies of the Church. He was also extrovert, articulate and a born actor. His qualities were never better demonstrated than in an a.s.sa.s.sination attempt on him in 1981, which he not only survived but turned into a notable example of forgiveness.59 John Paul's election was a catalyst for a renewed joyful self-confidence in the Polish Catholic Church, already the most vigorous in the Soviet bloc in its confrontation with Communism. His insistence on returning to his native country in 1979, made possible by a fatal irresolution in the Polish government, remains a moment to savour in the history of resistance to oppression as ecstatic crowds, up to a third of the population, met him in an outpouring of self-expression. Without that visit, the formation of the Solidarity movement and the process which within a decade led to a peaceful establishment of real democracy in Poland, and indeed throughout Eastern Europe, could not have happened. It is an achievement to celebrate and admire. Moreover, it was coupled with John Paul's personal ability to rise above chauvinist Polish nationalism. As the Greek Catholic Church emerged from the shadows after the fall of Communism (see pp. 1001-2), the Pope was a good deal more generous towards its efforts to rebuild its inst.i.tutions and regain its church buildings than some of his fellow Polish Catholic clergy and laity. In one Galician Polish city called Przemysl, they not only ignored his order for the rest.i.tution of a church to the Greek Catholics, but saw to the demolition of its dome on the grounds that it was unacceptably 'eastern' - it was in fact modelled on St Peter's in Rome.60 That incident ill.u.s.trates that the Poland which Wojtyla represented was a very different country from the pluralist Commonwealth of the early modern age. Its Jews had been wiped out, its Protestantism reduced to the margins and its Catholic Church had long forgotten the st.u.r.dy conciliarism and suspicion of Rome which had characterized the medieval kingdom.61 The Pope's very rock-like strength, so precious an a.s.set in confronting tyranny, became less unambiguously valuable in dealing with the nuances of other cultures and societies. He took to a pa.s.sionate, joyfully reckless extreme the bleak commitment expressed by Paul VI: 'my duty is too plain: decide, a.s.sume every responsibility for guiding others, even when it seems illogical and perhaps absurd'. The Pope's very rock-like strength, so precious an a.s.set in confronting tyranny, became less unambiguously valuable in dealing with the nuances of other cultures and societies. He took to a pa.s.sionate, joyfully reckless extreme the bleak commitment expressed by Paul VI: 'my duty is too plain: decide, a.s.sume every responsibility for guiding others, even when it seems illogical and perhaps absurd'.62 John Paul II had a liking for the word ' John Paul II had a liking for the word 'magisterium', which, though not in the repertoire of biblical writers, had since the nineteenth century stealthily acquired a technical theological meaning as 'authoritative teaching', particularly thanks to Pius XII's propensity to deploy it. Now it peppered Vatican p.r.o.nouncements; John Paul used it in a way which almost suggested that magisterium magisterium was a person, like the Holy Spirit. was a person, like the Holy Spirit.63 The Pope was determined to teach Catholics what Catholicism was about, and was also determined to stop anyone else telling them something different. So within a year of John Paul's enthronement, the Swiss theologian Hans Kung, exponent of a dynamic development of the teaching of Vatican II, was deprived of his licence to teach as a Catholic. Kung's former university colleague Josef Ratzinger, his own explorations of such views long behind him, arrived in the Vatican in 1981 as Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith - a t.i.tle which was a further creative rebranding of the Roman Inquisition. The Pope was determined to teach Catholics what Catholicism was about, and was also determined to stop anyone else telling them something different. So within a year of John Paul's enthronement, the Swiss theologian Hans Kung, exponent of a dynamic development of the teaching of Vatican II, was deprived of his licence to teach as a Catholic. Kung's former university colleague Josef Ratzinger, his own explorations of such views long behind him, arrived in the Vatican in 1981 as Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith - a t.i.tle which was a further creative rebranding of the Roman Inquisition.

The Pope's instinctive anti-Communism made him react with hostility towards liberation theology, whose expression he had encountered directly at the Puebla episcopal conference early in his papacy in 1979. He had difficulties even with those Latin American clergy who had found themselves drawn, through their pastoral experiences, to campaigning for the poor. One of the most difficult cases was that of Oscar Romero, Archbishop of San Salvador, a priest of conservative instincts who nevertheless had come into increasingly bitter confrontation with the authoritarian and exploitative regime of El Salvador, to the point that he excommunicated members of the government after the murder of priests and nuns. There were representations to the Vatican from El Salvador, and Romero was about to be moved elsewhere when, in 1980, a right-wing gunman murdered him while he was celebrating Ma.s.s in his own cathedral.

The Pope could hardly ignore this outrage, so parallel to the fate of the Church's cla.s.sic archiepiscopal martyr Thomas Becket (see pp. 375-6), yet he could not bring himself to use the martyr-word itself when addressing the Conference of Latin American Bishops in 1992 - he removed it from the prepared text of his speech.64 He showed himself to be in deep conflict over the Latin American situation, because he could also recognize in it the malign work of the unbridled capitalism which he deplored as much as Communism. Notably, he was able to show respect for the Afro-Portuguese syncretism of He showed himself to be in deep conflict over the Latin American situation, because he could also recognize in it the malign work of the unbridled capitalism which he deplored as much as Communism. Notably, he was able to show respect for the Afro-Portuguese syncretism of Candomble Candomble, even submitting on his visit to Brazil in 1980 to a ritual cleansing conducted by a Candomble Candomble priest, a priest, a pai de santo pai de santo. Evidently ordinary people's construction of their own religion could be tolerated, while it was dangerous to allow the same lat.i.tude to intellectuals or clergy (see Plate 53).65 Behind the long papacy of John Paul II was a programme which could never be made too explicit: to reverse a raft of changes launched by Vatican II. As we have seen, Wojtyla had