On The Principles of Political Economy, and Taxation Part 9
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The landlord's capital might indeed be really employed for that purpose; it might be nominally expended by the tenant, the landlord furnis.h.i.+ng him with the means, either in the shape of a loan, or in the purchase of an annuity for the duration of the lease. Whether distinguished or not, there is a real difference between the nature of the compensations which the landlord receives for these different objects; and it is quite certain, that a tax on the real rent of land falls wholly on the landlord, but that a tax on that remuneration which the landlord receives for the use of his stock expended on the farm, falls on the consumer of raw produce. If a tax were laid on rent, and no means of separating the remuneration now paid by the tenant to the landlord under the name of rent were adopted, the tax, as far as it regarded the rent on the buildings and other fixtures, would never fall for any length of time on the landlord, but on the consumer. The capital expended on these buildings, &c., must afford the usual profits of stock; but it would cease to afford this profit on the land last cultivated, if the expenses of those buildings, &c. did not fall on the tenant; and if they did, the tenant would then cease to make his usual profits of stock, unless he could charge them on the consumer.
CHAPTER IX.
t.i.tHES.
t.i.thes are a tax on the gross produce of the land, and, like taxes on raw produce, fall wholly on the consumer. They differ from a tax on rent, inasmuch as they affect land which such a tax would not reach; and raise the price of raw produce, which that tax e of raw produce, which that tax would not alter. Lands of the worst quality, as well as of the best, pay t.i.thes, and exactly in proportion to the quant.i.ty of produce obtained from them; t.i.thes are therefore an equal tax.
If land of the last quality, or that which pays no rent, and which regulates the price of corn, yield a sufficient quant.i.ty to give the farmer the usual profits of stock, when the price of wheat is 4_l._ per quarter, the price must rise to 4_l._ 8_s._ before the same profits can be obtained after the t.i.thes are imposed, because for every quarter of wheat the cultivator must pay eight s.h.i.+llings to the church.
The only difference between t.i.thes and taxes on raw produce, is, that one is a variable money tax, the other a fixed money tax. In a stationary state of society, where there is neither increased nor diminished facility of producing corn, they will be precisely the same in their effects; for in such a state corn will be at an invariable price, and the tax will therefore be also invariable. In either a retrograde state, or in a state in which great improvements are made in agriculture, and where consequently raw produce will fall in value comparatively with other things, t.i.thes will be a lighter tax than a permanent money tax; for if the price of corn should fall from 4_l._ to 3_l._, the tax would fall from eight to six s.h.i.+llings. In a progressive state of society, yet without any marked improvements in agriculture, the price of corn would rise, and t.i.thes would be a heavier tax than a permanent money tax. If corn rose from 4_l._ to 5_l._, the t.i.thes on the same land would advance from eight to ten s.h.i.+llings.
Neither t.i.thes nor a money tax will affect the money rent of landlords, but both will materially affect corn rents. We have already observed how a money tax operates on corn rents, and it is equally evident that a similar effect would be produced by t.i.thes. If the lands, No. 1, 2, 3, respectively produced 180, 170, and 160 quarters, the rents might be on No. 1, twenty quarters, and on No. 2, ten quarters; but they would no longer preserve that proportion after the payment of t.i.thes: for if a tenth be taken from each, the remaining produce will be 162, 153, 144, and consequently the corn rent of No. 1 will be reduced to eighteen, and that of No. 2 to nine quarters. But the price of corn would rise from 4_l._ to 4_l._ 8_s._ 10-2/3_d._; for nine quarters are to 4_l._ as ten quarters to 4_l._ 8_s._ 10-2/3_d._, and consequently the money rent would continue unaltered; for on No. 1 it would be 80_l._, and on No. 2, 40_l._
The chief objection against t.i.thes is, that they are not a permanent and fixed tax, but increase in value, in proportion as the difficulty of producing corn increases. If those difficulties should make the price of corn 4_l._ the tax is 8_s._, if they should increase it to 5_l._, the tax is 10_s._, and at 6_l._, it is 12_s._ They not only rise in value, but they increase in amount: thus, when No. 1 was cultivated, the tax was only levied on 180 quarters; when No. 2 was cultivated, it was levied on 180 + 170, or 350 quarters; and when No. 3 was cultivated, on 180 + 170 + 160 = 510 quarters. Not only is the amount of the tax increased from 100,000 quarters, to 200,000 quarters, when the produce is increased from one to two millions of quarters; but, owing to the increased labour necessary to produce the second million, the relative value of raw produce is so advanced, that the 200,000 quarters may be, though only twice in quant.i.ty, yet in value three times that of the 100,000 quarters which were paid before.
If an equal value were raised for the church by any other means, increasing in the same manner as t.i.thes increase, proportionably with the difficulty of cultivation, the effect would be the same. The church would be constantly obtaining an increased portion of the net produce of the land and labour of the country. In an improving state of society, the net produce of land is always diminis.h.i.+ng in proportion to its gross produce; but it is from the net income of a country that all taxes are ultimately paid, either in a progressive or in a stationary country. A tax increasing with the gross income, and falling on the net income, must necessarily be a very burdensome, and a very intolerable tax.
t.i.thes are a tenth of the gross, and not of the net produce of the land, and therefore as society improves in wealth, they must, though the same proportion of the gross produce, become a larger and larger portion of the net produce.
t.i.thes however may be considered as injurious to landlords, inasmuch as they act as a bounty on importation, by taxing the growth of home corn, while the importation of foreign corn remains unfettered. And if in order to relieve the landlords from the effects of the diminished demand for land, which such a bounty must encourage, imported corn were also taxed one tenth, and the produce paid to the state, no measure could be more fair and equitable; since whatever were paid to the state by this tax, would go to diminish the other taxes which the expenses of government make necessary: but if such a tax were devoted only to increase the fund paid to the church, it might indeed on the whole increase the general ma.s.s of production, but it would diminish the portion of that ma.s.s allotted to the productive cla.s.ses.
If the trade of cloth were left perfectly free, our manufacturers might be able to sell cloth cheaper than we could import it. If a tax were laid on the home manufacturer, and not on the importer of cloth, capital might be injuriously driven from the manufacture of cloth to the manufacture of some other commodity, as it might then be imported cheaper than it could be made at home. If imported cloth should also be taxed, cloth would again be manufactured at home. The consumer first bought cloth at home, because it was cheaper than foreign cloth; he then bought foreign cloth, because it was cheaper untaxed than home cloth taxed: he lastly bought it again at home, because it was cheaper when both home and foreign cloth were taxed. It is in the last case that he pays the greatest price for his cloth, but all his additional payment is gained by the state. In the second case, he pays more than in the first, but all he pays in addition is not received by the state, it is an increased price caused by difficulty of production, which is incurred, because the easiest means of production are taken away from us, by being fettered with a tax.
CHAPTER X.
LAND-TAX.
A land-tax, levied in proportion to the rent of land, and varying with every variation of rent, is in effect a tax on rent; and as such a tax will not apply to that land which yields no rent, nor to the produce of that capital which is employed on the land with a view to profit merely, and which never pays rent, it will not in any way affect the price of raw produce, but will fall wholly on the landlords. In no respect would such a tax differ from a tax on rent. But if a land-tax be imposed on all cultivated land, however moderate that tax may be, it will be a tax on produce, and will therefore raise the price of produce. If No. 3 be the land last cultivated, although it should pay no rent, it cannot, after the tax, be cultivated, and afford the general rate of profit, unless the price of produce rise to meet the tax. Either capital will be withheld from that employment until the price of corn shall have risen, in consequence of demand, sufficiently to afford the usual profit; or if already employed on such land, it will quit it, to seek a more advantageous employment. The tax cannot be removed to the landlord, for by the supposition he receives no rent. Such a tax may be proportioned to the quality of the land and the abundance of its produce, and then it differs in no respect from t.i.thes; or it may be a fixed tax per acre on all land cultivated, whatever its quality may be.
A land-tax of this latter description would be a very unequal tax, and would be contrary to one of the four maxims with regard to taxes in general, to which, according to Adam Smith, all taxes should conform.
The four maxims are as follow:
1. "The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the Government, as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities.
2. "The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain and not arbitrary.
3. "Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner in which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it.
4. "Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible, over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the state."
An equal land-tax, imposed indiscriminately and without any regard to the distinction of its quality, on all land cultivated, will raise the price of corn in proportion to the tax paid by the cultivator of the land of the worst quality. Lands of different quality, with the employment of the same capital, will yield very different quant.i.ties of raw produce. If on the land which yields a thousand quarters of corn with a given capital, a tax of 100_l._ be laid, corn will rise 2_s._ per quarter to compensate the farmer for the tax. But with the same capital on land of a better quality, 2,000 quarters may be produced, which at 2_s._ a quarter advance, would give 200_l._; the tax, however, bearing equally on both lands will be 100_l._ on the better as well as on the inferior, and consequently the consumer of corn will be taxed, not only to pay the exigencies of the state, but also to give to the cultivator of the better land, 100_l._ per annum. during the period of his lease, and afterwards to raise the rent of the landlord to that amount. A tax of this description then would be contrary to the fourth maxim of Adam Smith, it would take out and keep out of the pockets of the people, more than what it brought into the treasury of the state. The taille in France before the Revolution, was a tax of this description; those lands only were taxed, which were held by an ign.o.ble tenure, the price of raw produce rose in proportion to the tax, and therefore they whose lands were not taxed, were benefited by the increase of their rent. Taxes on raw produce as well as t.i.thes are free from this objection: they raise the price of raw produce, but they take from each quality of land a contribution in proportion to its actual produce, and not in proportion to the produce of that which is the least productive.
From the peculiar view which Adam Smith took of rent, from his not having observed that much capital is expended in every country, on the land for which no rent is paid, he concluded that all taxes on the land, whether they were laid on the land itself in the form of land-tax or t.i.thes, or on the produce of the land, or were taken from the profits of the farmer, were all invariably paid by the landlord, and that he was in all cases the real contributor, although the tax was in general, nominally advanced by the tenant. "Taxes upon the produce of the land,"
he says, "are in reality taxes upon the rent; and though they may be originally advanced by the farmer, are finally paid by the landlord.
When a certain portion of the produce is to be paid away for a tax, the farmer computes as well as he can, what the value of this portion is, one year with another, likely to amount to, and he makes a proportionable abatement in the rent which he agrees to pay to the landlord. There is no farmer who does not compute before hand what the church t.i.the, which is a land-tax of this kind, is, one year with another, likely to amount to." It is undoubtedly true, that the farmer does calculate his probable outgoings of all descriptions, when agreeing with his landlord concerning the rent of his farm; and if for the t.i.the paid to the church, or for the tax on the produce of the land, he were not compensated by a rise in the relative value of the produce of his farm, he would naturally deduct them from his rent. But this is precisely the question in dispute: whether he will eventually deduct them from his rent, or be compensated by a higher price of produce. For the reasons which have been already given, I cannot have the least doubt but that they would raise the price of produce, and consequently that Adam Smith has taken an incorrect view of this important question.
Dr. Smith's view of this subject is probably the reason why he has described "the t.i.the, and every other land-tax of this kind, under the appearance of perfect equality, as very unequal taxes; a certain portion of the produce being in different situations, equivalent to a very different portion of the rent." I have endeavoured to shew that such taxes do not fall with unequal weight on the different cla.s.ses of farmers or landlords, as they are both compensated by the rise of raw produce, and only contribute to the tax in proportion as they are consumers of raw produce. Inasmuch indeed as wages, and through wages, the rate of profits are affected, landlords, instead of contributing their full share to such a tax, are the cla.s.s peculiarly exempted. It is the profits of stock, from which that portion of the tax is derived which falls on those labourers, who from the insufficiency of their funds, are incapable of paying taxes; this portion is exclusively borne by all those whose income is derived from the employment of stock, and therefore it in no degree affects landlords.
It is not to be inferred from this view of t.i.thes, and taxes on the land and its produce, that they do not discourage cultivation. Every thing which raises the exchangeable value of commodities of any kind, which are in very general demand, tends to discourage both cultivation and production; but this is an evil inseparable from all taxation, and is not confined to the particular taxes of which we are now speaking.
This may be considered indeed as the unavoidable disadvantage attending all taxes received and expended by the state. Every new tax becomes a new charge on production, and raises natural price. A portion of the labour of the country which was before at the disposal of the contributor to the tax, is placed at the disposal of the state. This portion may become so large, that sufficient surplus produce may not be left to stimulate the exertions of those who usually augment by their savings the capital of the state. Taxation has happily never yet in any free country been carried so far as constantly from year to year to diminish its capital. Such a state of taxation could not be long endured; or if endured, it would be constantly absorbing so much of the annual produce of the country as to occasion the most extensive scene of misery, famine, and depopulation.
"A land-tax," says Adam Smith, "which like that of Great Britain, is a.s.sessed upon each district according to a certain invariable canon, though it should be equal at the time of its first establishment, necessarily becomes unequal in process of time, according to the unequal degrees of improvement or neglect in the cultivation of the different parts of the country. In England the valuation according to which the different counties and parishes were a.s.sessed to the land-tax by the 4th. William and Mary, was very unequal, even at its first establishment. This tax, therefore, so far offends against the first of the four maxims above mentioned. It is perfectly agreeable to the other three. It is perfectly certain. The time of payment for the tax being the same as that for the rent, is as convenient as it can be to the contributor. Though the landlord is in all cases the real contributor, the tax is commonly advanced by the tenant, to whom the landlord is obliged to allow it in the payment of the rent."
If the tax be s.h.i.+fted by the tenant not on the landlord but on the consumer, then if it be not unequal at first, it can never become so; for the price of produce has been at once raised in proportion to the tax, and will afterwards vary no more on that account. It may offend if unequal, as I have attempted to shew that it will, against the fourth maxim above mentioned, but it will not offend against the first. It may take more out of the pockets of the people than it brings into the public treasury of the state, but it will not fall unequally on any particular cla.s.s of contributors. M. Say appears to me to have mistaken the nature and effects of the English land-tax, when he says, "Many persons attribute to this fixed valuation, the great prosperity of English agriculture. That it has very much contributed to it there can be no doubt. But what should we say to a Government, which, addressing itself to a small trader, should hold this language: 'With a small capital you are carrying on a limited trade, and your direct contribution is in consequence very small. Borrow, and acc.u.mulate capital; extend your trade, so that it may procure you immense profits; yet you shall never pay a greater contribution. Moreover, when your successors shall inherit your profits, and shall have further increased them, they shall not be valued higher to them than they are to you; and your successors shall not bear a greater portion of the public burdens.'
"Without doubt this would be a great encouragement given to manufactures and trade; but would it be just? Could not their advancement be obtained at any other price? In England itself, has not manufacturing and commercial industry made even greater progress, since the same period, without being distinguished with so much partiality? A landlord by his a.s.siduity, economy, and skill, increases his annual revenue by 5000 francs. If the state claim of him the fifth part of his augmented income, will there not remain 4000 francs of increase to stimulate his further exertions?"
If Mr. Say's suggestion were followed, and the state were to claim the fifth part of the augmented income of the farmer, it would be a partial tax, acting on the farmer's profits, and not affecting the profits of other employments. The tax would be paid by all lands, by those which yielded scantily as well as by those which yielded abundantly; and on some lands there could be no compensation for it by deduction from rent, for no rent is paid. A partial tax on profits never falls on the trade on which it is laid, for the trader will either quit his employment, or remunerate himself for the tax. Now those who pay no rent could be recompensed only by a rise in the price of produce, and thus would M.
Say's proposed tax fall on the consumer, and not either on the landlord or farmer.
If the proposed tax were increased in proportion to the increased quant.i.ty, or value, of the gross produce obtained from the land, it would differ in nothing from t.i.thes, and would equally be transferred to the consumer. Whether then it fell on the gross or on the net produce of land, it would be equally a tax on consumption, and would only affect the landlord and farmer in the same way as other taxes on raw produce.
If no tax whatever had been laid on the land, and the same sum had been raised by any other means, agriculture would have flourished at least as well as it has done; for it is impossible that any tax on land can be an encouragement to agriculture; a moderate tax may not, and probably does not, greatly prevent, but it cannot encourage production. The English Government has held no such language as M. Say has supposed. It did not promise to exempt the agricultural cla.s.s and their successors from all future taxation, and to raise the further supplies which the state might require, from the other cla.s.ses of society; it said only, "in this mode we will no further burthen the land; but we retain to ourselves the most perfect liberty of making you pay, under some other form, your full quota to the future exigencies of the state."
Speaking of taxes in kind, or a tax of a certain proportion of the produce, which is precisely the same as t.i.thes, M. Say says, "This mode of taxation appears to be the most equitable; there is however none which is less so: it totally leaves out of consideration the advances made by the producer; it is proportioned to the gross, and not to the net revenue. Two agriculturists cultivate different kinds of raw produce: one cultivates corn on middling land, his expenses amounting annually on an average to 8000 francs; the raw produce from his lands sells for 12,000 francs; he has then a net revenue of 4000 francs.
"His neighbour has pasture or wood land, which brings in every year a like sum of 12,000 francs, but his expenses amount only to 2000 francs.
He has therefore on an average a net revenue of 10,000 francs.
"A law ordains that a twelfth of the produce of all the fruits of the earth be levied in kind, whatever they may be. From the first is taken in consequence of this law, corn of the value of 1000 francs; and from the second, hay, cattle, or wood, of the same value of 1000 francs. What has happened? From the one, a quarter of his net income, 4000 francs, has been taken; from the other, whose income was 10,000 francs, a tenth only has been taken. Income is the net profit which remains after replacing the capital exactly in its former state. Has a merchant an income equal to all the sales which he makes in the course of a year?
certainly not; his income only amounts to the excess of his sales above his advances, and it is on this excess only that taxes on income should fall."
M. Say's error in the above pa.s.sage lies in supposing that because the value of the produce of one of these two farms, after re-instating the capital, is greater than the value of the produce of the other, on that account the net income of the cultivators will differ by the same amount. M. Say has wholly omitted the consideration of the different amount of rent, which these cultivators would have to pay. There cannot be two rates of profit in the same employment, and therefore when produce is in different proportions to capital, it is the rent which will differ, and not the profit. Upon what pretence would one man with a capital of 2000 francs, be allowed to obtain a net profit of 10,000 francs from its employment, whilst another with a capital of 8000 francs would only obtain 4000 francs? Let M. Say make a due allowance for rent; let him further allow for the effect which such a tax would have on the prices of these different kinds of raw produce, and he will then perceive that it is not an unequal tax, and further that the producers themselves will not otherwise contribute to it, than any other cla.s.s of consumers.
CHAPTER XI.
TAXES ON GOLD.
The rise in the price of commodities, in consequence of taxation or of difficulty of production, will in all cases ultimately ensue; but the duration of the interval, before the market price of commodities conforms to their natural price, must depend on the nature of the commodity, and on the facility with which it can be reduced in quant.i.ty.
If the quant.i.ty of the commodity taxed could not be diminished, if the capital of the farmer or of the hatter for instance, could not be withdrawn to other employments, it would be of no consequence that their profits were reduced below the general level by means of a tax; unless the demand for their commodities should increase, they would never be able to elevate the market price of corn and hats up to the increased natural price. Their threats to leave their employments, and remove their capitals to more favoured trades, would be treated as an idle menace which could not be carried into effect; and consequently the price would not be raised by diminished production. Commodities however of all descriptions can be reduced in quant.i.ty, and capital can be removed from trades which are less profitable to those which are more so, but with different degrees of rapidity. In proportion as the supply of a particular commodity can be more easily reduced, the price of it will more quickly rise after the difficulty of its production has been increased by taxation, or by any other means. Corn being a commodity indispensably necessary to every one, little effect will be produced on the demand for it in consequence of a tax, and therefore the supply could not be long excessive, even if the producers had great difficulty in removing their capitals from the land; the price of corn therefore, will speedily be raised by taxation, and the farmer will be enabled to transfer the tax from himself to the consumer.
If the mines which supply us with gold were in this country, and if gold were taxed, it could not rise in relative value to other things till its quant.i.ty were reduced. This would be more particularly the case, if gold were exclusively used for money. It is true that the least productive mines, those which paid no rent, could no longer be worked, as they could not afford the general rate of profits till the relative value of gold rose, by a sum equal to the tax. The quant.i.ty of gold, and therefore the quant.i.ty of money would be slowly reduced; it would be a little diminished in one year, a little more in another, and finally its value would be raised in proportion to the tax; but in the interval, the proprietors or holders, as they would pay the tax, would be the sufferers, and not those who used money. If out of every 1000 quarters of wheat in the country, and every 1000 produced in future, government should exact 100 quarters as a tax, the remaining 900 quarters would exchange for the same quant.i.ty of other commodities that 1000 did before; but if the same thing took place with respect to gold, if of every 1000_l._ money now in the country, or in future to be brought into it, government could exact 100_l._ as a tax, the remaining 900_l._ would purchase very little more than 900_l._ purchased before. The tax would fall upon him, whose property consisted of money, and would continue to do so till its quant.i.ty were reduced in proportion to the increased cost of its production caused by the tax.
This perhaps would be more particularly the case with respect to a metal used for money, than any other commodity, because the demand for money is not for a definite quant.i.ty, as is the demand for clothes, or for food. The demand for money is regulated entirely by its value, and its value by its quant.i.ty. If gold were of double the value, half the quant.i.ty would perform the same functions in circulation, and if it were of half the value, double the quant.i.ty would be required. If the market value of corn be increased one tenth by taxation, or by difficulty of production, it is doubtful, whether any effect whatever would be produced on the quant.i.ty consumed, because every man's want is for a definite quant.i.ty, and, therefore, if he has the means of purchasing, he will continue to consume as before; but for money, the demand is exactly proportioned to its value. No man could consume twice the quant.i.ty of corn, which is usually necessary for his support, but every man purchasing and selling only the same quant.i.ty of goods, may be obliged to employ twice, thrice, or any number of times the same quant.i.ty of money.
The argument which I have just been using, applies only to those states of society in which the precious metals are used for money, and where paper credit is not established. The metal gold like all other commodities has its value in the market ultimately regulated by the comparative facility or difficulty of producing it; and although from its durable nature, and from the difficulty of reducing its quant.i.ty, it does not readily bend to variations in its market value, yet that difficulty is much increased from the circ.u.mstance of its being used as money. If the quant.i.ty of gold in the market for the purpose of commerce only, were 10,000 ounces, and the consumption in our manufactures were 2000 ounces annually, it might be raised one fourth, or 25 per cent. in its value, in one year, by withholding the annual supply; but if in consequence of its being used as money, the quant.i.ty employed were 100,000 ounces, it would not be raised one fourth in value in less than ten years. As money made of paper may be readily reduced in quant.i.ty, its value, though its standard were gold, would be increased as rapidly as that of the metal itself would be increased if it had no connexion whatever with money.
On The Principles of Political Economy, and Taxation Part 9
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