The Development of the European Nations, 1870-1914 Part 47

"To tell the truth, the Slav seems to us a born slave."--TREITSCHKE, June 1876.

On October 7, 1908, Austria-Hungary exploded a political bomb-sh.e.l.l by declaring her resolve to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, she had provisionally occupied and administered those provinces as mandatory of Europe (see p. 238). But now, without consulting Europe, she appropriated her charge. On the other hand, she consented to withdraw from the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar which she had occupied by virtue of a secret agreement with Russia of July 1878. Even so, her annexation of a great province caused a sharp crisis for the following reasons: (1) It violated the international law of Europe without any excuse whatever. (2) It exasperated Servia, which hoped ultimately to possess Bosnia, a land peopled by her kindred and necessary to her expansion seawards. (3) It no less deeply offended the Young Turks, who were resolved to revivify the Turkish people and a.s.sert their authority over all parts of the Ottoman dominions. (4) It came at the same time as the a.s.sumption by Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria of the t.i.tle of Tsar of the Bulgarians. This change of t.i.tle, which implied a prospect of sovereignty over the Bulgars of Macedonia, had been arranged during a recent visit to Buda-Pest, and foreshadowed the supremacy of Austrian influence not only in the new kingdom of Bulgaria but eventually in the Bulgar districts of Macedonia[523].

[Footnote 523: H.W. Steed, _The Hapsburg Monarchy_, pp. 52, 214.]

Thus, Austria's action const.i.tuted a serious challenge to the Powers in general, especially to Russia, Servia, and to regenerated Turkey[524].

So daring a _coup_ had not been dealt by Austria since 1848, when Francis Joseph ascended the throne; it is believed that he desired to have the provinces as a jubilee gift, a set off to the loss of Lombardy and Venetia in 1859 and 1866. Certainly Austria had carried out great improvements in Bosnia; but an occupier who improves a farm does not gain the right to possess it except by agreement with others who have joint claims. Moreover, the Young Turks, in power since July 1908, boasted their ability to civilise Bosnia and all parts of their Empire.

Servia also longed to include it in the large Servo-Croat kingdom of the future.

[Footnote 524: The const.i.tutional regime which the Young Turks imposed on the reactionary Abdul Hamid II., in July 1908, was hailed as a victory for British influence. The change in April 1909 favoured German influence. I have no s.p.a.ce for an account of these complex events.]

The Bosnian Question sprang out of a conflict of racial claims, which two masterful men, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and the Austrian Foreign Minister, Aehrenthal, were resolved to decide in favour of Austria. The Archduke disliked, and was disliked by, the Germans and Magyars on account of his pro-Slav tendencies. In 1900 he contracted with a Slav lady, the Countess Chotek, a morganatic marriage, which brought him into strained relations with the Emperor and Court. A silent, resolute man, he determined to lessen German and Magyar influence in the Empire by favouring the law for universal suffrage (1906), and by the appointment as Foreign Minister of Aehrenthal, who harboured ambitiously expansive schemes. The Archduke also furthered a policy known as Trialism, that of federalising the Dual Monarchy by const.i.tuting the Slav provinces as the third of its component groups.

The annexation of Bosnia would serve to advance this programme by depressing the hitherto dominant races, the Germans and Magyars, besides rescuing the monarchy from the position of "brilliant second" to Germany. Kaiser William was taken aback by this bold stroke, especially as it wounded Turkey; but he soon saw the advantage of having a vigorous rather than a pa.s.sive Ally; and, in a visit which he paid to the Archduke in November 1908, their intercourse, which had hitherto been coldly courteous, ripened into friends.h.i.+p, which became enthusiastic admiration when the Archduke advocated the building of Austrian _Dreadnoughts_.

The annexation of Bosnia was a defiance to Europe, because, at the Conference of the Powers held at London in 1871, they all (Austria included) solemnly agreed not to depart from their treaty engagements without a previous understanding with the co-signatories. Austria's conduct in 1908, therefore, dealt a severe blow to the regime of international law. But it was especially resented by the Russians, because for ages they had lavished blood and treasure in effecting the liberation of the Balkan peoples. Besides, in 1897, the Tsar had framed an agreement with the Court of Vienna for the purpose of exercising conjointly some measure of control over Balkan affairs; and he then vetoed Austria's suggestion for the acquisition of Bosnia. In 1903, when the two Empires drew up the "February" and "Murzsteg" Programmes for more effectually dealing with the racial disputes in Macedonia, the Hapsburg Court did not renew the suggestion about Bosnia, yet in 1908 Austria annexed that province. Obviously, she would not have thus defied the public law of Europe and Russian, Servian, and Turkish interests, but for the recent humiliation of Russia in the Far East, which explains both the dramatic intervention of the Kaiser at Tangier against Russia's ally, France, and the sudden apparition of Austria as an aggressive Power. In his speech to the Austro-Hungarian Delegations Aehrenthal declared that he intended to continue "an active foreign policy," which would enable Austria-Hungary to "occupy to the full her place in the world." She had to act because otherwise "affairs might have developed against her."

Thus the Eastern Question once more became a matter of acute controversy. The Austro-Russian agreements of 1897 and 1903 had huddled up and cloaked over those racial and religious disputes, so that there was little chance of a general war arising out of them. But since 1908 the Eastern Question has threatened to produce a general conflict unless Austria moderated her pretensions. She did not do so; for, as we have seen, Germany favoured them in order to a.s.sure uninterrupted communications between Central Europe and her Bagdad Railway. Already Hapsburg influence was supreme at Bukharest, Sofia, and in Macedonian affairs. If it could dominate Servia (anti-Austrian since the accession of King Peter in 1903) the whole of the Peninsula would be subject to Austro-German control. True, the influence of Germany at Constantinople at first suffered a shock from the Young Turk Revolution of July 1908; and those eager nationalists deeply resented the annexation of Bosnia, which they ascribed to the Austro-German alliance. The men of Berlin, however, so far from furthering that act, disapproved of it as endangering their control of Turkey and exploitation of its resources.

In fact, Germany's task in inducing her prospective va.s.sals, the Turks, to submit to spoliation at the hands of her ally, Austria, was exceedingly difficult; and in the tension thus created, the third partner of the Triple Alliance, Italy, very nearly parted company, from disgust at Austrian encroachments in a quarter where she cherished aspirations. As we have seen, Victor Emmanuel III., early in his reign, favoured friendly relations with Russia; and these ripened quickly during the "Annexation Crisis" of 1908-9, as both Powers desired to maintain the _status quo_ against Austria[525]. On December 24, 1908, the Russian Foreign Minister, Izvolsky, declared that, with that aim in view, he was acting in close concert with France, Great Britain, and Italy. He urged Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro to hold closely together for the defence of their common interests: "Our aim must be to bring them together and to combine them with Turkey in a common ideal of defence of their national and economic development." A cordial union between the Slav States and Turkey now seems a fantastic notion; but it was possible then, under pressure of the Austro-German menace, which the Young Turks were actively resisting.

[Footnote 525: t.i.ttoni, _Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy_ (English translation, p. 128). t.i.ttoni denied that the Triple Alliance empowered Italy to demand "compensation" if Austria expanded in the Balkans. But the Triple Alliance Treaty, as renewed in 1912, included such a clause, No. VII.]

During the early part of 1909 a general war seemed imminent; for Slavonic feeling was violently excited in Russia and Servia. But, hostilities being impossible in winter, pa.s.sions had time to cool. It soon became evident that those States could not make head against Austria and Germany. Moreover, the Franco-Russian alliance did not bind France to act with Russia unless the latter were definitely attacked; and France was weakened by the widespread strikes of 1907-8 and the vehement anti-militarist agitation already described. Further, Italy was distracted by the earthquake at Messina, and armed intervention was not to be expected from the Campbell-Bannerman Ministry. Bulgaria and Roumania were pro-Austrian. Turkey alone could not hope to reconquer Bosnia, and a Turco-Serb-Russian league was beyond the range of practical politics. These material considerations decided the issue of events. Towards the close of March, Kaiser William, the hitherto silent backer of Austria, ended the crisis by sending to his amba.s.sador at Petrograd an autograph letter, the effect of which upon the Tsar was decisive. Russia gave way, and dissociated herself from France, England, and Italy. In consideration of an indemnity of 2,200,000 from Austria, Turkey recognised the annexation. Consequently no Conference of the Powers met even to register the _fait accompli_ in Bosnia. The Germanic Empires had coerced Russia and Servia, despoiled Turkey, and imposed their will on Europe. Kaiser William characteristically a.s.serted that it was his apparition "in s.h.i.+ning armour" by the side of Austria which decided the issue of events. Equally decisive, perhaps, was Germany's formidable s.h.i.+pbuilding in 1908-9, namely, four _Dreadnoughts_ to England's two, a fact which explains this statement of Bulow: "When at last, during the Bosnian crisis, the sky of international politics cleared, when German power on the Continent burst its encompa.s.sing bonds, we had already got beyond the stage of preparation in the construction of our fleet[526]."

[Footnote 526: Bulow, _Imperial Germany_, p. 99.]

The crisis of 1908-9 revealed in a startling manner the weakness of international law in a case where the stronger States were determined to have their way. It therefore tended to discourage the peace propaganda and the social movement in Great Britain and France. The increased speed of German naval construction alarmed the British people, who demanded precautionary measures[527]. France and Russia also improved their armaments, for it was clear that Austria, as well as Germany, intended to pursue an active foreign policy which would inflict other rebuffs on neighbours who were unprepared. Further, the Triple Entente had proved far too weak for the occasion. True, France and England loyally supported Russia in a matter which chiefly concerned her and Servia, and her sudden retreat before the Kaiser's menace left them in the lurch.

Consequently, the relations between the Western Powers and Russia were decidedly cool during the years 1909-10, especially in and after November 1910, when the Tsar met Kaiser William at Potsdam, and framed an agreement, both as to their general relations and the railways then under construction towards Persia. On the other hand, the rapid advance of Germany and Austria alarmed Italy, who, in order to safeguard her interests in the Balkans (especially Albania), came to an understanding with Russia for the support of their claims. The details are not known, neither are the agreements of Austria with Bulgaria and Roumania, though it seems probable that they were framed with the two kings rather than with the Governments of Sofia and Bukharest. Those sovereigns were German princes, and the events of 1908-9 naturally attracted them towards the Central Powers.

[Footnote 527: Annoyance had been caused by the Kaiser's letter of Feb.

18, 1908, to Lord Tweedmouth, First Lord of the Admiralty, advising (though in friendly terms) the cessation of suspicion towards Germany's naval construction. It was held to be an attempt to put us off our guard.]

In 1909-10 France and England also lost ground in Turkey. There the Young Turks, who seized power in July 1908, were overthrown in April 1909, when Abdul Hamid II. was deposed. He was succeeded by his weakly complaisant brother, Mohammed V. This change, however, did not promote the cause of reform. The Turkish Parliament became a bear-garden, and the reformers the tools of reaction. In the four years 1908-12 there were seven Ministries and countless ministerial crises, and the Young Turks, copying the forms and killing the spirit of English Liberalism, soon became the most intolerant oppressors of their non-Moslem subjects.

In administrative matters they acted on the old Turkish proverb--"The Sultan's treasure is a sea, and he who does not draw from it is a pig."

Germany found means to satisfy these dominating and acquisitive instincts, and thus regained power at the Sublime Porte. The Ottoman Empire therefore remained the despair of patriotic reformers, a hunting-ground for Teutonic _concessionnaires_, a h.e.l.l for its Christian subjects, and the chief storm-centre of Europe[528].

[Footnote 528: Lack of s.p.a.ce precludes an account of the Cretan Question, also of the Agram and Friedjung trials which threw lurid light on Austria's treatment of her South-Slav subjects, for which see Seton-Watson, _Corruption and Reform in Hungary_. Rohrbach, _Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt_ (1912), p. 172, explains the success of German efforts at the Porte by the belief of the Young Turks that Germany was the only Power that wished them well--Germany who helped Austria to secure Bosnia; Germany, whose Bagdad Railway scheme mercilessly exploited Turkish resources! (See D. Fraser, _The Short Cut to India_, chs. iii. iv.)]

The death of King Edward VII. on May 6, 1910, was a misfortune for the cause of peace. His tact and discernment had on several occasions allayed animosity and paved the way for friendly understandings. True, the German Press sought to represent those efforts as directed towards the "encircling" (_Einkreisung_) of Germany. But here we may note that (1) King Edward never transgressed the const.i.tutional usage, which prescribed that no important agreement be arrived at apart from the responsible Ministers of the Crown[529]. (2) The agreements with Spain, Italy, France, Germany, and Portugal (in 1903-4) were for the purposes of arbitration. (3) The alliance with j.a.pan and the Ententes with France and Russia were designed to end the perilous state of isolation which existed at the time of his accession. (4) At that time Germany was allied to Austria, Italy, and (probably) Roumania, not to speak of her secret arrangements with Turkey. She had no right to complain of the ending of our isolation. (5) The marriage of King Alfonso of Spain with Princess Ena of Battenberg (May 1906), was a love-match, and was not the result of King Edward's efforts to detach Spain from Germany. It had no political significance. (6) The Kaiser's sister was Crown Princess (now Queen) of Greece; the King of Roumania was a Hohenzollern; and the King of Bulgaria and the Prince Consort of Holland were German Princes. (7) On several occasions King Edward testified his friends.h.i.+p with Germany, notably during his visit to Berlin in February 1909, which Germans admit to have helped on the friendly Franco-German agreement of that month on Morocco; also in his letter of January 1910, on the occasion of the Kaiser's birthday, when he expressed the hope that the United Kingdom and Germany might always work together for the maintenance of peace[530].

[Footnote 529: I have been a.s.sured of this on high authority.]

[Footnote 530: Viscount Esher, _the Influence of King Edward: and Other Essays_, p. 56. The "encircling" myth is worked up by Rachfahl, _Kaiser und Reich_, p, 228; Reventlow, _op, cit._ pp. 254, 279, 298, etc.; and by Rohrbach, _Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt_ (ch. vi.), where he says that King Edward's chief idea from the outset was to cripple Germany. He therefore won over j.a.pan, France, Spain, and Russia, his aim being to secure all Africa from the Cape to Cairo, and all Asia from the Sinaitic Peninsula to Burmah.]

The chief danger to public tranquillity arises from the vigorous expansion of some peoples and the decay of others. Nearly all the great nations of Europe are expansive; but on their fringe lie other peoples, notably the Turks, Persians, Koreans, and the peoples of North Africa, who are in a state of decline or semi-anarchy. In such a state of things friction is inevitable and war difficult to avoid, unless in the councils of the nations goodwill and generosity prevail over the suspicion and greed which are too often the dominant motives. Scarcely was the Bosnian-Turkish crisis over before Morocco once more became a danger to the peace of the world.

There the anarchy continued, with results that strained the relations between France and Germany. Nevertheless, on February 8, 1909 (probably owing to the friendly offices of Great Britain[531]), the two rivals came to an agreement that France should respect the independence of Morocco and not oppose German trade in that quarter, while Germany declared that her sole interests there were commercial, and that she would not oppose "the special political interests of France in that country[532]." But, as trade depended on the maintenance of order, this vague compact involved difficulties. Clearly, if disorders continued, the task of France would be onerous and relatively unprofitable, for she would be working largely for the benefit of British and German traders.

Indeed, the new Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, admitted to the French amba.s.sador, Jules Cambon, that thenceforth Morocco was a fruit destined to fall into the lap of France; only she must humour public opinion in Germany. Unfortunately, the "Consortium," for joint commercial enterprises of French and Germans in Morocco and the French Congo, broke down on points of detail; and this produced a very sore feeling in Germany in the spring of 1911. Further, as the Moorish rebels pushed their raids up to the very gates of Fez, French troops in those same months proceeded to march to that capital (April 1911). The Kaiser saw in that move, and a corresponding advance of Spanish troops in the North, a design to part.i.tion Morocco. Failing to secure what he considered satisfactory a.s.surances, he decided to send to Agadir a corvette, the _Panther_ (July 1, 1911), replaced by a cruiser, the _Berlin_.

[Footnote 531: Rachfahl, p. 310.]

[Footnote 532: Morel, App. XIV.]

Behind him were ambitious parties which sought to compa.s.s world-predominance for Germany. The Pan-German, Colonial, and Navy Leagues had gained enormous influence since 1905, when they induced the Kaiser to visit Tangiers; and early in 1911 they issued pamphlets urging the annexation of part of Morocco. The chief, termed _West-Marokko deutsch_, was inspired by the Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Kiderlen-Wachter, who thereafter urged officially that the Government must take into account public opinion--which he himself had manipulated.

Again, as at Tangiers in 1905, Germany's procedure was needlessly provocative if, as the agreement of 1909 declared, her interests in Morocco were solely commercial. If this were so, why send a war-s.h.i.+p, when diplomatic insistence on the terms of 1909 would have met the needs of the case, especially as German trade with Morocco was less than half that of French firms and less than one-third that of British firms?

Obviously, Germany was bent on something more than the maintenance of her trade (which, indeed, the French were furthering by suppressing anarchy); otherwise she would not have risked the chance of a collision which might at any time result from the presence of a German cruiser alongside French war-s.h.i.+ps in a small harbour.

It is almost certain that the colonial and war parties at Berlin sought to drive on the Kaiser to hostilities. The occasion was favourable. In the spring of 1911 France was a prey to formidable riots of vine-growers. On June 28 occurred an embarra.s.sing change of Ministry.

Besides, the French army and navy had not yet recovered from the Socialist regime of previous years. The remodelling of the Russian army was also very far from complete. Moreover, the Tsar and Kaiser had come to a friendly understanding at Potsdam in November 1910, respecting Persia and their att.i.tude towards other questions, so that it was doubtful whether Russia would a.s.sist France if French action in Morocco could be made to appear irregular. As for Great Britain, her ability to afford sufficiently large and timely succour to the French was open to question. In the throes of a sharp const.i.tutional crisis, and beset by acute Labour troubles, she was ill-fitted even to defend herself. By the close of 1911 the Navy would include only fourteen first-cla.s.s s.h.i.+ps as against Germany's nine; while Austria was also becoming a Naval Power.

The weakness of France and England had appeared in the spring when they gave way before Germany's claims in Asia Minor. On March 18, 1911, by a convention with Turkey she acquired the right to construct from the Bagdad Railway a branch line to Alexandretta, together with large privileges over that port which made it practically German, and the natural outlet for Mesopotamia and North Syria, heretofore in the sphere of Great Britain and France. True, she waived conditionally her claim to push the Bagdad line to the Persian Gulf; but her recent bargain with the Tsar at Potsdam gave her the lion's share of the trade of Western Persia.

After taking these strides in the Levant, Germany ought not to have shown jealousy of French progress in Morocco, where her commerce was small. As in 1905, she was clearly using the occasion to test the validity of the Anglo-French Entente and the effectiveness of British support to France. Probably, too, she desired either a territorial acquisition in South Morocco, for which the colonial party and most of the Press were clamouring; or she intended, in lieu of it, to acquire the French Congo. At present it is not clear at which of these objects she aimed. Kiderlen-Wachter declared privately that Germany must have the Agadir district, and would never merely accept in exchange Congolese territory[533].

[Footnote 533: The following facts are significant. On November 9, 1911, the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, a.s.sured the Reichstag that Germany had never intended to annex Moroccan territory, an a.s.sertion confirmed by Kiderlen-Wachter on Nov. 17. But during the libel action brought against the Berlin _Post_ it was positively affirmed that the Government and Kiderlen-Wachter had intended to annex South-West Morocco. A high official, Dr. Heilbronn, telephoned so to the _Post_, urging it to demand that step.]

Whatever were the real aims of the Kaiser, they ran counter to French and British interests. Moreover, the warning of Sir Edward Grey, on July 4, that we must be consulted as to any new developments, was completely ignored; and even on July 21 the German amba.s.sador in London could give no a.s.surance as to the policy of his Government. Consequently, on that evening Mr. Lloyd George, during a speech at the Mansion House, apprised Germany that any attempt to treat us as a negligible factor in the Cabinet of Nations "would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure." The tension must have been far more severe than appeared in the published doc.u.ments to induce so peace-loving a Minister to speak in those terms. They aroused a storm of pa.s.sion in the German Press; and, somewhat later, a German admiral, Stiege, declared that they would have justified an immediate declaration of war by Germany[534]. Certainly they were more menacing than is usual in diplomatic parlance; but our cavalier treatment by Germany (possibly due to Bethmann-Hollweg's belief in blunt Bismarckian ways) justified a protest, which, after all, was less questionable than Germany's despatching a cruiser to Agadir, owing to the reserve of the French Foreign Office. Up to July 27 the crisis remained acute; but on that day the German amba.s.sador gave a.s.surances as to a probable agreement with France.

[Footnote 534: Rear-Admiral Stiege in _uberall_ for March 1912.]

What caused the change of front at Berlin? Probably it was due to a sharp financial crisis (an unexpected result of the political crisis), which would have produced a general crash in German finance, then in an insecure position; and prudence may have counselled the adoption of the less ambitious course, namely a friendly negotiation with the French for territorial expansion in their Congo territory in return for the recognition of their protectorate of Morocco. Such a compromise (which, as we shall see, was finally arrived at) involved no loss for Germany.

On the contrary, she gained fertile districts in the tropics and left the French committed to the Morocco venture, which, at great cost to them, would tend finally to benefit commerce in general, and therefore that of Germany.

Also, before the end of these discussions there occurred two events which might well dispose the Kaiser to a compromise with France.

Firstly, as a result of his negotiations with Russia (then beset by severe dearth) he secured larger railway and trading concessions in Persia, the compact of August 19 opening the door for further German enterprises in the Levant. Secondly, on September 29, Italy declared war on Turkey, partly (it is said) because recent German activity in Tripoli menaced the ascendancy which she was resolved to acquire in that land.

This event greatly deranged the Kaiser's schemes. He had hoped to keep the Triple Alliance intact, and yet add to it the immense potential fighting force of Turkey and the Moslem World. Now, however he might "hedge," he could hardly avoid offending either Rome or Constantinople; and even if he succeeded, his friends would exhaust each other and be useless for the near future. Consequently, the Italo-Turkish War (with its sequel, the Balkan War of 1912) dealt him a severe blow. The Triple Alliance was at once strained nearly to breaking-point by Austria forbidding Italy to undertake naval operations in the Adriatic (probably also in the Aegean). Equally serious was the hostility of Moslems to Europeans in general which compromised the Kaiser's schemes for utilising Islam. Accordingly, for the present, his policy a.s.sumed a more peaceful guise.

Here, doubtless, are the decisive reasons for the Franco-German accord of November 4, 1911, whereby the Berlin Government recognised a French protectorate over Morocco and agreed not to interfere in the Franco-Spanish negotiation still pending. France opened certain "closed"

ports (among them Agadir), and guaranteed equality of trading rights to all nations. She also ceded to Germany about 100,000 square miles of fertile land in the north-west of her Congo territory, which afforded access to the rivers Congo and Ubangi. The explosion of Teutonic wrath produced by these far from unfavourable conditions revealed the magnitude of the designs that prompted the _coup_ of Agadir. The Colonial Minister at once resigned; and scornful laughter greeted the Chancellor when he announced to the Reichstag that the _Berlin_ would be withdrawn from that port, the protection of German subjects being no longer necessary. He added that Germany would neither fight for Southern Morocco nor dissipate her strength in distant expeditions. In fact, he would "avoid any war which was not required by German honour." Far different was the tone of the Conservative leader, Herr Heydebrand, who declared Mr. Lloyd George's "challenge" to be one which the German people would not tolerate; England had sought to involve them in a war with France, but they now saw "where the real enemy was to be found."

The Crown Prince, who was present, loudly applauded these Anglophobe outbursts. The German Press showed no less bitterness. Besides criticising the Chancellor's bl.u.s.tering beginning and huckstering conclusion, they manifested a resolve that Germany should always and everywhere succeed. The Berlin journal, the _Post_, went so far as to call the Kaiser _ce poltron miserable_ for giving up South Morocco; and it was clear that a large section of the German people ardently desired war with the Western Powers.

Many Frenchmen and Belgians credited the German colonial party with the design of acquiring the whole of the French Congo, as a first step towards annexing the Belgian Congo[535]. Belgium became alarmed, and in 1913 greatly extended the principle of compulsory military service. On the other hand, the German Chauvinists certainly desired the acquisition of a naval base in Morocco which would help to link up their naval stations and facilitate the conquest of a World Empire. This was the policy set forth by Bernhardi in the closing parts of his work, _Germany and the next War,_ where he protested against the Chancellor's surrender of Morocco as degrading to the nation and damaging to its future.

Following the lead of Treitschke, he depreciated colonies rich merely in products; for Germany needed homes for her children in future generations, and she must fight for them with all her might at the first favourable opportunity. This is the burden of Bernhardi's message, which bristles with rage at the loss of Morocco. He regarded that land as more important than the Congo; for, in addition to the strategic value of its coasts, it offered a fulcrum in the west whereby to raise the Moslems against the Triple Entente. In the Epilogue he writes: "Our relations with Islam have changed for the worse by the abandonment of Morocco. . . . We have lost prestige in the whole Mohammedan world, which is a matter of the first importance for us."

[Footnote 535: Hanotaux, _La Politique de l'equilibre_, p. 417.]

The logical conclusion of Bernhardi's thesis was that Germany and Austria should boldly side with the Moors and Turks against France and Italy, summoning Islam to arms, if need be, against Christendom. Perhaps if Turkey had possessed the 1,500,000 troops whom her War Minister, Chevket Pacha, was hopefully striving to raise, this might have been the outcome of events. As it was, _Realpolitik_ counselled prudence, and the observance of the forms of Christianity.

Certainly there was no sufficient pretext for war. France and Russia had humoured Germany. As to "the real enemy," light was thrown on her att.i.tude during the debate of November 27, 1911, at Westminster. Sir Edward Grey then stated that we had consistently helped on, and not impeded, the Franco-German negotiations. Never had we played the dog-in-the-manger to Germany. In fact, the Berlin Government would greatly have eased the tension if she had declared earlier that she did not intend to take part of Morocco. Further, the Entente with France (made public on November 24) contained no secret articles; nor were there any in any compact made by the British Government. On December 6, Mr. Asquith declared that we had no secret engagement with any Power obliging us to take up arms. "We do not desire to stand in the light of any Power which wants to find its place in the sun. The first of British interests is, as it always has been, the peace of the world; and to its attainment British diplomacy and policy will be directed." The German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, also said in the Reichstag, "We also, sirs, sincerely desire to live in peace and friends.h.i.+p with England"--an announcement received with complete silence. Some applause greeted his statement that he would welcome any definite proof that England desired friendlier relations with Germany.

Thus ended the year 1911. Frenchmen were sore at discovering that the Entente entailed no obligation on our part to help them by force of arms[536]; and Germans, far from rejoicing at their easy acquisition of a new colony, harboured resentment against both the Western Powers.

Britons had been aroused from party strifes and Labour quarrels by finding new proofs of the savage enmity with which Junkers, Colonials, and Pan-Germans regarded them; and the problem was--Should England seek to regain Germany's friends.h.i.+p, meanwhile remaining aloof from close connections with France and Russia; or should she recognise that her uncertain att.i.tude possessed all the disadvantages and few of the advantages of a definite alliance?

[Footnote 536: Hanotaux, _La Politique de l'equilibre,_ p. 419.]

Early in 1912 light was thrown on the situation, and the Berlin Government thenceforth could not plead ignorance as to our intentions; for efforts, both public and private, were made to improve Anglo-German relations. Mr. Churchill advocated a friendly understanding in naval affairs. Lord Haldane also visited Berlin on an official invitation. He declared to that Government that "we would in no circ.u.mstances be a party to any sort of aggression upon Germany." But we must oppose a violation of the neutrality of Belgium, and, if the naval compet.i.tion continued, we should lay down two keels to Germany's one. As a sequel to these discussions the two Governments discussed the basis of an Entente.

It soon appeared that Germany sought to bind us almost unconditionally to neutrality in all cases. To this the British Cabinet demurred, but suggested the following formula:

The two Powers being mutually desirous of securing peace and friends.h.i.+p between them, England declares that she will neither make, nor join in, any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object.