A History of Sea Power Part 20

England's chief retaliatory measure was the Orders in Council of November, 1807. Her object in these orders and later modifications was not to cut off trade with the Continent, but to control it to her own profit and the injury of the enemy--in short, "no trade except through England." The orders aimed to compel the aid of neutrals by excluding neutral s.h.i.+ps from the Continent unless they should first enter British ports, pay British dues, and (as would be an inevitable consequence) give covert a.s.sistance in carrying on British trade.

The Continental System reached its greatest efficiency during the apogee of Napoleon's power in 1809 and 1810. To check forbidden traffic, which continued on an enormous scale, he annexed Holland to his empire, and threw a triple cordon of French troops along Germany's sea frontier. As a result, in the critical year of 1811 goods piled up in British warehouses, factories closed, bankruptcies doubled, and her financial system tottered.[1] But to bar the tide of commerce at every port from Trieste to Riga was like trying to stem the sea. At each leak in the barrier, sugar, coffee, and British manufactures poured in, and were paid for at triple or tenfold prices, not in exports, but in coin. Malta, the Channel Islands, and Heligoland (seized by England from Denmark in 1807) became centers of smuggling. The beginning of the end came when the Czar, tired of French dictation and a policy ruinous to his country, opened his ports, first to colonial products (December, 1810), and a year later to all British wares. Six hundred vessels, brought under British convoy into the Baltic, docked at Libau, and caravans of wagons filled the roads leading east and south.

[Footnote 1: In spite of this crisis, British trade showed progressive increase in each half decade from 1800 to 1815, and did not fall off again until the five years after the war. The figures (in millions of pounds sterling) follow: 1801-05, 61 million; 1806-10, 67 million; 1811-15, 74 million; 1816-20, 60 million.--Day, HISTORY OF COMMERCE, p. 355.]

In June of 1812 Napoleon gathered his "army of twenty nations" for the fatal Russian campaign. Now that they had served their purpose, England on June 23 revoked her Orders in Council. The Continental System had failed.

_The War of 1812_

In the same month, on June 18, the United States declared war on Great Britain. Up to 1807 her commerce and s.h.i.+pping, in the words of President Monroe, had "flourished beyond example," as shown by the single fact that her re-export trade (in West Indies products) was greater in that year than ever again until 1915.[1] Later they had suffered from the coercion of both belligerents, and from her own futile countermeasures of embargo and non-intercourse. Her final declaration came tardily, if not indeed unwisely as a matter of practical policy, however abundantly justified by England's commercial restrictions and her seizure of American as well as British seamen on American s.h.i.+ps. An additional motive, which had decisive weight with the dominant western faction in Congress, was the hope of gaining Canada or at least extending the northern frontier.

[Footnote 1: United States exports rose from a value of 56 million dollars in 1803 to 108 million in 1807; then fell to 22 million in 1808, and after rising to about 50 million before the war, went down to 6 million in 1814.--_Ibid._, p 480.]

A subordinate episode in the world conflict, the War of 1812 cannot be neglected in naval annals. The tiny American navy retrieved the failures of American land forces, and shook the British navy out of a notorious slackness in gunnery and discipline engendered by its easy victories against France and Spain.

In size the British Navy in 1812 was more formidable than at any earlier period of the general war. Transport work with expeditionary forces, blockade and patrol in European waters, and commerce protection from the China Sea to the Baltic had in September, 1812, increased the fleet to 686 vessels in active service, including 120 of the line and 145 frigates. There were 75 in all on American stations, against the total American Navy of 16, of which the best were the fine 44-gun frigates _Const.i.tution, President_ and _United States_.

In the face of such odds, and especially as England's European preoccupations relaxed, the result was inevitable. After the first year of war, while a swarm of privateers and smaller war vessels still took heavy toll of British commerce, the frigates were blockaded in American ports and American commerce was destroyed.

But before the blockade closed down, four frigate actions had been fought, three of them American victories. In each instance, as will be seen from the accompanying table, the advantage in weight of broadside was with the victor. The American frigates were in fact triumphs of American s.h.i.+pbuilding, finer in lines, more strongly timbered, and more heavily gunned than British s.h.i.+ps of their cla.s.s.

But that good gunnery and seamans.h.i.+p figured in the results is borne out by the fact that of the eight sloop actions fought during the war, with a closer approach to equality of strength, seven were American victories. The British carronades that had pounded French s.h.i.+ps at close range proved useless against opponents that knew how to choose and hold their distance and could shoot straight with long 24'S.

------------------+----------+----+------+----+------+------------------- | | |Wt. of| |Casu- | s.h.i.+p[1] |Commander |Guns|broad-|Crew|alties| Place and date | | |side | | | ------------------|----------|----|------|----|------|------------------- Const.i.tution[2] |Hull | 54 | 684 |456 | 14 |750 miles east of | | | | | | Boston, Aug. 19, Guerriere (Brit.) |Dacres | 49 | 556 |272 | 79 | 1812.

------------------|----------|----|------|----|------|------------------- United States[2] |Decatur | 54 | 786 |478 | 12 |Off Canary Islands, Macedonian (Brit.)|Carden | 49 | 547 |301 | 104 | Oct. 25. 1812.

------------------|----------|----|------|----|------|------------------- Const.i.tution[2] |Bainbridge| 52 | 654 |475 | 34 |Near Bahia, Dec.

Java (Brit.) |Lambert | 49 | 576 |426 | 150 | 29, 1812.

------------------|----------|----|------|----|------|------------------- Chesapeake |Lawrence | 50 | 542 |379 | 148 |Off Boston, June 1, Shannon (Brit.)[2]|Broke | 52 | 550 |330 | 83 | 1813.

[Footnote 1: The figures are from Roosevelt's NAVAL WAR OF 1812, in which 7% is deducted for the short weight of American shot.]

[Footnote 2: Victorious.]

"It seems," said a writer in the London _Times_, "that the Americans have some superior mode of firing." But when Broke with his crack crew in the _Shannon_ beat the _Chesapeake_ fresh out of port, he demonstrated, as had the Americans in other actions, that the superiority was primarily a matter of training and skill.

On the Great Lakes America's naval efforts should have centered, for here was her main objective and here she was on equal terms.

Both sides were tremendously hampered in communications with their main sources of supply. But with an approach from the sea to Montreal, the British faced no more serious obstacle in the rapids of the St.

Lawrence above than did the Americans on the long route up the Mohawk, over portages into Oneida Lake, and thence down the Oswego to Ontario, or else from eastern Pennsylvania over the mountains to Lake Erie. The wilderness waterways on both sides soon saw the strange spectacle of immense anchors, cables, cannon, and s.h.i.+p tackle of all kinds, as well as armies of sailors, s.h.i.+pwrights, and riggers, making their way to the new rival bases at Sackett's Harbor and Kingston, both near the foot of Lake Ontario.

Of the whole lake and river frontier, Ontario was of the most vital importance. A decisive American victory here, including the capture of Kingston, would cut enemy communications and settle the control of all western Canada. Kingston as an objective had the advantage over Montreal that it was beyond the direct reach of the British navy. The British, fully realizing the situation, made every effort to build up their naval forces on this lake, and gave Commodore Yeo, who was in command, strict orders to avoid action unless certain of success. On the other hand, the American commander, Chauncey, though an energetic organizer, made the mistake of a.s.suming that his mission was also defensive. Hence when one fleet was strengthened by a new s.h.i.+p it went out and chased the other off the lake, but there was little fighting, both sides engaging in a grand s.h.i.+pbuilding rivalry and playing for a sure thing. Naval control remained unsettled and s.h.i.+fting throughout the war. It was fortunate, indeed, says the British historian, James, that the war ended when it did, or there would not have been room on the lake to maneuver the two fleets. The _St. Lawrence_, a 112-gun three-decker completed at Kingston in 1814, was at the time the largest man-of-war in the world.

Possibly a growing lukewarmness about the war, manifested on both sides, prevented more aggressive action. But it did not prevent two brilliant American victories in the lesser theaters of Lake Erie and Lake Champlain. Perry's achievement on Lake Erie in building a superior flotilla in the face of all manner of obstacles was even greater than that of the victory itself. The result of the latter, won on September 10, 1813, is summed up in his despatch: "We have met the enemy and they are ours--2 s.h.i.+ps, 2 brigs, 1 schooner, and 1 sloop." It a.s.sured the safety of the northwestern frontier.

On Lake Champlain Macdonough's successful defense just a year later held up an invasion which, though it would not have been pushed very strenuously in any case, might have made our position less favorable for the peace negotiations then already under way. In this action, as in the one on Lake Erie, the total strength of each of the opposing flotillas, measured in weight of broadsides (1192 pounds for the British against 1194 far the Americans), was about that of a single s.h.i.+p-of-the-line. But the number of units employed raised all the problems of a squadron engagement. Macdonough's shrewd choice of position in Plattsburg Bay, imposing upon the enemy a difficult approach under a raking fire, and his excellent handling of his s.h.i.+ps in action, justify his selection as the ablest American naval leader developed by the war.

At the outbreak of the American War, France and England had been engaged in a death grapple in which the rights of neutrals were trampled under foot. Napoleon, by his paper blockade and confiscations on any pretext, had been a more glaring offender. But America's quarrel was after all not with France, who needed American trade, but with England, a commercial rival, who could back her restrictions by naval power. Once France was out of the war, the United States found it easy to come to terms with England, whose commerce was suffering severely from American privateers.[1] At the close of the war the questions at issue when it began had dropped into abeyance, and were not mentioned in the treaty terms.

[Footnote 1: According to figures cited in Mahan's WAR OF 1812, (Vol.

II, p. 224), 22 American naval vessels took 165 British prizes, and 526 privateers took 1344 prizes. In the absence of adequate motives on either side for prolonging the war, these losses, though not more severe than those inflicted by French cruisers, were decisive factors for peace.]

The view taken of the aggressions of sea power in the Napoleonic Wars will depend largely on the view taken regarding the justice of the cause in which it fought. It saved the Continent from military conquest. It preserved the European balance of power, a balance which statesmen of that age deemed essential to the safety of Europe and the best interests of America and the rest of the world. On the other hand, but for the sacrifices of England's land allies, the Continental System would have forced her to make peace, though still undefeated at sea. Even if her territorial accessions were slight, England came out of the war undisputed "mistress of the seas" as she had never been before, and for nearly a century to come was without a dangerous rival in naval power and world commerce.

REFERENCES

For general history of the period see: HISTORIES OF THE BRITISH NAVY by Clowes (Vols. V, VI, 1900) and Hannay (1909), Mahan's INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE (1892) and WAR OF 1812 (1905), Chevalier's HISTOIRE DE LA MARINE FRANcAISE SOUS LA PREMIeRE RePUBLIQUE (1886), Graviere's GUERRES MARITIMES (1885), Callender's SEA KINGS OF BRITAIN (Vol. III, 1911), and Maltzahn's NAVAL WARFARE (tr. Miller, 1908).

Among biographies: Mahan's and Laughton's lives of Nelson, Anson's LIFE OF JERVIS (1913), Clark Russell's LIFE OF COLLINGWOOD (1892), and briefer sketches in FROM HOWARD TO NELSON, ed. Laughton (1899).

For the Trafalgar campaign see:

British Admiralty blue-book on THE TACTICS OF TRAFALGAR (with bibliography, 1913), Corbett's CAMPAIGN OF TRAFALGAR (1910), Col.

Desbriere's PROJETS ET TENTATIVES DE DeBARQUEMENT AUX ILES BRITANNIQUES (1902) and CAMPAGNE MARITIME DE TRAFALGAR (1907).

See also Col. C. E. Callwell's MILITARY OPERATIONS AND MARITIME PREPONDERANCE (1913), and Professor Clive Day's HISTORY OF COMMERCE (revised edition, 1911, with bibliography).

CHAPTER XIV

REVOLUTION IN NAVAL WARFARE: HAMPTON ROADS AND LISSA.

During the 19th century, from 1815 to 1898, naval power, though always an important factor in international relations, played in general a pa.s.sive role. The wars which marked the unification of Germany and Italy and the thrusting back of Turkey from the Balkans were fought chiefly on land. The navy of England, though never more constantly busy in protecting her far-flung empire, was not challenged to a genuine contest for mastery of the seas. In the Greek struggle for independence there were two naval engagements of some consequence--Chios (1822), where the Greeks with fires.h.i.+ps destroyed a Turkish squadron and gained temporary control of the aegean, and Navarino (1827), in which a Turkish force consisting princ.i.p.ally of frigates was wiped out by a fleet of the western powers. But both of these actions were one-sided, and showed nothing new in types or tactics. In the American Civil War control of the sea was important and even decisive, but was overwhelmingly in the hands of the North. Hence the chief naval interest of the period lies not so much in the fighting as in the revolutionary changes in s.h.i.+ps, weapons, and tactics--changes which parallel the extraordinary scientific progress of the century; and the engagements may be studied now, as they were studied then, as testing and ill.u.s.trating the new methods and materials of naval war.

_Changes in s.h.i.+ps and Weapons_

Down to the middle of the 19th century there had been only a slow and slight development in s.h.i.+ps and weapons for a period of nearly 300 years. A sailor of the Armada would soon have felt at home in a three-decker of 1815. But he would have been helpless as a child in the fire-driven iron monsters that fought at Hampton Roads. The s.h.i.+ft from sail to steam, from oak to iron, from shot to sh.e.l.l, and from muzzle-loading smoothbore to breech-loading rifle began about 1850; and progress thereafter was so swift that an up-to-date s.h.i.+p of each succeeding decade was capable of defeating a whole squadron of ten years before. Success came to depend on the adaptability and mechanical skill of personnel, as well as their courage and discipline, and also upon the progressive spirit of constructors and naval experts, faced with the most difficult problems, the wrong solution of which would mean the waste of millions of dollars and possible defeat in war. Every change had to overcome the spirit of conservatism inherent in military organizations, where seniority rules, errors are sanctified by age, and every innovation upsets cherished routine. Thus in the contract for Ericsson's _Monitor_ it was stipulated that she should have masts, spars, and sails!

The first successful steamboat for commerce was, as is well known, Robert Fulton's flat-bottomed side-wheeler _Clermont_, which in August, 1807, made the 150 miles from New York to Albany in 32 hours. During the war of 1812 Fulton designed for coast defense a heavily timbered, double-ender floating battery, with a single paddle-wheel located inside amids.h.i.+ps. On her trial trip in 1815 this first steam man-of-war, the U. S. S. _Fulton_, carried 26 guns and made over 6 knots, but she was then laid up and was destroyed a few years later by fire. Ericsson's successful application of the screw propeller in 1837 made steam propulsion more feasible for battles.h.i.+ps by clearing the decks and eliminating the clumsy and exposed side-wheels. The first American screw wars.h.i.+p was the U. S. S. _Princeton_, of 1843, but every s.h.i.+p in the American Navy at the outbreak of the Civil War had at least auxiliary sail rig.

Though by 1850 England had 30 vessels with auxiliary steam, the _Devastation_ of 1869 was the first in the British service to use steam exclusively. Long after this time old "floating museums"

with sail rig and smoothbores were retained in most navies for motives of economy, and even the first s.h.i.+ps of the American "White Squadron" were enc.u.mbered with sails and spars.

[Ill.u.s.tration: EARLY IRONCLADS]

Progress in ordnance began about 1822, when explosive sh.e.l.ls, hitherto used only in mortars, were first adopted for ordinary cannon with horizontal fire. At the time of the Crimean War sh.e.l.ls were the usual ammunition for lower tier guns, and at Sinope in 1853 their smas.h.i.+ng effect against wooden hulls was demonstrated when a Russian squadron destroyed some Turkish vessels which fired only solid shot. The great professional cry of the time, we are told, became "For G.o.d's sake, keep out the sh.e.l.l."[1]

[Footnote 1: Custance, THE s.h.i.+P OF THE LINE IN BATTLE, p. 9.]

In 1851 Minie rifles supplanted in the British army the old smoothbore musket or "Brown Bess," with which at ranges above 200 yards it was difficult to hit a target 11 feet square. This change led quickly to the rifling of heavy ordnance as well. The first Armstrong rifles of 1858--named after their inventor, Sir William Armstrong, head of the Royal Gun Factory at Woolwich--included guns up to 7-inch diameter of bore. The American navy, however, depended chiefly on smoothbores throughout the Civil War.

Breech-loading, which had been used centuries earlier, came in again with these first rifles, but after 1865 the British navy went back to muzzle-loading and stuck to it persistently for the next 15 years. By that time the breech-loading mechanism had been simplified, and its adoption became necessary to secure greater length of gun barrel, increased rapidity of fire, and better protection for gun-crews. About 1880 quick-fire guns of from 3 to 6 inches, firing 12 or 15 shots a minute, were mounted in secondary batteries.

As already suggested, the necessity for armor arose from the smas.h.i.+ng and splintering effect of sh.e.l.l against wooden targets and the penetrating power of rifled guns. To attack Russian forts in the Crimea, the French navy in 1855 built three steam-driven floating batteries, the _Tonnant, Lave_, and _Devastation_, each protected by 4.3-inch plates and mounting 8 56-lb. guns. In the reduction of the Kinburn batteries, in October of the same year, these boats suffered little, but were helped out by an overwhelming fire from wooden s.h.i.+ps, 630 guns against 81 in the forts.

The French armored s.h.i.+p _Gloire_ of 1859 caused England serious worry about her naval supremacy, and led at once to H. M. S. _Warrior_, like the _Gloire_, full rigged with auxiliary steam. The _Warrior's_ 4.5-inch armor, extending from 6 feet below the waterline to 16 feet above and covering about 42 per cent of the visible target, was proof against the weapons of the time. At this initial stage in armored construction, naval experts turned with intense interest to watch the work of ironclads against s.h.i.+ps and forts in the American Civil War.

_The American Civil War_

The naval activities of this war are too manifold to follow in detail. For four years the Union navy was kept constantly occupied with the tasks of blockading over 3000 miles of coast-line, running down enemy commerce destroyers, cooperating with the army in the capture of coast strongholds, and opening the Mississippi and other waterways leading into the heart of the Confederacy. To make the blockade effective and cut off the South from the rest of the world, the Federal Government unhesitatingly applied the doctrine of "continuous voyage," seizing and condemning neutral s.h.i.+ps even when bound from England to Bermuda or the Bahamas, if their cargo was ultimately destined for Southern ports. The doctrine was declared inapplicable when the last leg of the journey was by land,[1] doubtless because there was little danger of heavy traffic across the Mexican frontier. Blockade runners continued to pour goods into the South until the fall of Fort Fisher in 1865; but as the blockade became more stringent, it crippled the finances of the Confederacy, shut out foodstuffs and munitions, and shortened, if it did not even have a decisive effect in winning the war.