Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt Part 11

"After offering to you our best salutations and compliments, we tender you our thanks for your endeavours, and for the interest you take in the welfare of our country, and for your constant inquiries, either by telegrams or by letters, after the events which have been taking place, and we have already replied, as the rest of us did, explaining the true state of things. We now add these few further explanations.

"All the people in the country are grieved at the despatch of the French and English s.h.i.+ps, and they look on this as a sign of evil intentions on the part of the two Powers towards the Egyptians, and as an intrusion into our affairs, without necessity and without reason; and truly the Egyptians have made up their minds not to give in to any Power which wishes to interfere with our internal administration. They are also determined to keep their privileges confirmed to them by the treaties of the Powers. And they will never allow a t.i.ttle of these to be taken from them as long as they have life. And they will also try their best to watch over European interests and the lives of European subjects, their property and honour, as long as these keep within the limits prescribed to them by law.

"We all endeavour to do our duty, and we trust in G.o.d in defending our rights, and through His help we hope to obtain our purpose.

This is the welfare of our country and the peace of those who live in it. We also trust in the justice of Europe that the Powers shall not begin the attack upon us, but on the contrary that they may behave wisely with us. Because this will really be better for the success of their own wishes, and their interests in our country.

"It will be better for Great Britain if she does not rely on her representatives in this country, because they are persons who have private motives, which they wish to serve. And we think that even if they succeed it will be for the disadvantage of their Government.

"This is enough now of the present state of things, and the future will tell the rest.

"Herewith I send you a letter addressed to Sir William Gregory, and beg you to be kind enough to hand it to him.

"Please present my compliments to Mr. Sabunji and Lady Anne Blunt, and may G.o.d preserve you all.

"AHMED ARABI."

Ninet's letter is of especial value from its date, 19th May, the last day of Egypt's peaceful enjoyment of self-government. It says:

"My heart of an old Swiss patriot bleeds now at the most unjust of all international interventions. The country is entirely united in favour of its honest leader, sprung, like the fellahin, from the _limon du Nil_ (the black mud of the Nile). The Egyptian people has loyally accepted its debt contracted for it by an unscrupulous despot, one who in sixteen years squandered more than three hundred millions sterling to fill his own pockets, the pockets of the diplomacy, high and low, and of the Semitic and Nazarene usurers.... A peaceful revolution has been accompanied by and with the will of the nation. Not a single act unbecoming a scrupulous government has taken place during the great change effected. But Europe, interested more in the dealers in stocks and shares than in the aspirations of a people, sends her fleets. Why? Because the Chamber of Representatives found it proper to claim the right of discussing the Budget! Where is the crime?... Suppose a Minister of your Queen, having a disagreement with her, were to receive news that a powerful combined fleet of the Catholic Powers would go to Ireland and pacify it? Even so the a.n.a.logy is not complete. Egypt is quiet. Not a European or Christian can complain. Would not the position be intolerable?... Arabi is wise and tranquil, awaiting the future like a sage of ancient times. The army, the country, the towns are with him. The French Consul-General has been a silent member. Sir E. Malet has been _ca.s.sant, parti pris inconciliant_, sowing fear in Cairo, instead of rea.s.suring the people. You have no idea, my dear sir, of the abominable lies every day telegraphed to the 'Times,' 'Standard,' 'Daily News,' by the telegraphic agencies.... Well, never a word, not an insult from the population--we have been and are as quiet here as an English congregation on a Sunday in Regent's Park. The fleets are expected to-morrow."

Other letters of a later date will show it in its later stages. The supreme injustice of the attack being made on them by England, the country above all others which had been a.s.sociated in their minds with a traditional love of liberty and of those humanitarian doctrines of which she had been the apostle, revolted men's minds and roused in them feelings of anger foreign to their natural att.i.tude. Under constant threat of violence, now from England, now at English instigation from the Sultan, and knowing not whom to trust and fearing everywhere betrayal, it is not surprising that wild ideas prevailed even among those who had been soberest hitherto in their expression. At the same time it is not a little remarkable what few mistakes were made in action by the leaders under circ.u.mstances of such extreme and constantly changing difficulty, and the closer one examines these the more they redound to their credit. Nothing but the desperate s.h.i.+fts of our agents, when one after another their treacherous expedients had failed them and they found themselves faced with a disgraceful diplomatic defeat, to bring about a violent solution through the guns of the fleet, forced the Egyptians at last from their calm att.i.tude and enabled our Foreign Office to claim a victory.

This may be affirmed without attributing either to Arabi or to any other of the leaders qualities of a first-cla.s.s kind. They were neither diplomatists nor administrators nor soldiers at all to be compared with their opponents, and they were most of them quite inexperienced in the arts of government and the subtleties of international usage. Arabi's best quality, I think, was a certain dogged determination not to be driven from the position he had originally announced, namely, that, while ready to be friends with all the world, it was his duty to defend his country against all hostile comers. In this he rendered in those weeks an incalculable service to his fellow countrymen, which it is right they should be reminded of. Nothing is more certain than that, if Arabi had been less obstinate than he was in refusing either for threat or bribe to leave Egypt, and if thereby the Egyptians had not fought, the fellahin would still be the double slaves they were in 1880, slaves to their Turkish masters as well as slaves to Europe. What does any patriot suppose would have resulted from Arabi's compliance? Liberty in any form? A continuance of self-government? Foreign rule less strenuous than now? Certainly, none of these things. What would have come to pa.s.s is very clearly shown by the _regime_ established at Cairo immediately after the war. It would have been one of police despotism, espionage, and secret punishments, unmitigated by any further interest taken in Egyptian nationality by the moral sense of Europe. It is possible that as a matter of form a Chamber of Notables might have been allowed to remain in existence for a few sessions as what is called a consultative body, but it would have been one wholly powerless and wholly discredited of patriotism. The Turco-Circa.s.sian rule would have been ruthlessly re-established, and the Financial Control, reinforced with new political powers and exercised entirely in financial and European interests, would have had neither the will nor the power to enfranchise the fellahin from their Turkish masters, themselves the slaves of Europe. The whole legend of fellah nationality would have vanished in a disgraceful smoke, for a nation which has never dared fight for its existence is justly despised.

The native press would have been reduced to the condition we find it in in Tunis. There would have been neither civil nor personal liberty, nor any regard paid to native rights. It would be still, in fact, what Egypt was in 1883, a land where no man could speak above his breath or count on his next door neighbour not to betray him. Arabi at least saved his countrymen from this, and, if when it came to the point of actual warfare he was found incapable as a soldier, they still owe him as a patriot much. He prevented them from incurring the supreme disgrace of not having fought at all on the only occasion in all their history when the chance was theirs to stand up for their freedom.

Having said this much, I will return to my story. The true history of the telegrams, as I afterwards learned it, at Cairo was this. They had arrived at a most critical moment when the att.i.tude of the Deputies and of some among the weaker-kneed of the other civilian leaders was exceedingly doubtful. Malet had persuaded the Khedive to take heart and quarrel with his Ministers, and the Khedive had persuaded Sultan Pasha to join him partly by working on his jealousy of Arabi, for he was disappointed at not having been included by Mahmud Sami in the Ministry of February, partly by informing him that the English and French fleets were on their way to Alexandria. And Sultan, in his turn, had persuaded thirty, as against forty-five, of the Deputies. So that Malet had been able to telegraph to the Foreign Office that the Chamber was supporting the Khedive. My telegrams, however, had given new heart to waverers and had put such pressure upon Sultan that he had gone at once to the Khedive (who was engaged in drawing up a new list of Ministers under the Presidency of Mustafa Pasha Fehmi, the colourless Minister of Foreign Affairs) and effected a reconciliation between him and Mahmud Sami. The ministerial crisis was considered by everybody at an end. Hardly, however, was the arrangement made than it was undone. Malet, having got wind of the telegrams, sent for Sultan Pasha, and partly by threats about the fleet, partly by promises, once more persuaded him to take sides with the European Control.

Sultan Pasha, who afterwards deeply regretted his defection from the National cause at this critical moment, always affirmed that Malet, to win his support, gave him his word of honour that day that the rights of the Egyptian Parliament would be respected; and I have been told by his friends that Sultan died reproaching himself that he had been fool enough to believe him. Nevertheless, with the exception of Sultan, n.o.body of any importance among the Deputies allowed himself again to be detached from the National cause. All who had received my telegrams believed me rather than Malet, and Arabi's hands had been immeasurably strengthened when ten days later the next great crisis came. Malet's coup with the fleet had been discounted, and it ended in a complete fiasco. The sending of the fleet had been intended by Lord Granville as a _brutum fulmen_, which was to effect its purpose without real violence, a method in which he greatly believed and of which his success the year before at Dulcigno in the matter of the Greek frontier had specially enamoured him--indeed, it was one of his maxims that "a threat is as good as a blow." Malet also, who knew Lord Granville's mind, counted at that time on a bloodless victory. He throughout miscalculated the power of the National sentiment; and it was only when he saw that he had failed diplomatically that, following Colvin's lead, he prepared for force. The dates are: May 17th, Malet finally secures Alexandria. May 25th, Malet and Sinkiewicz issue their ultimatum, stating that it has been suggested to them by Sultan Pasha. It demands the resignation of the ministry and Arabi's retirement from Egypt. May 27th, the Mahmud Sami Ministry resigns. May 28th, Cairo rises and insists upon Arabi's reinstatement as Minister, and Arabi is reappointed Minister of War with something like dictatorial powers.

In England during all this crisis the outlook for me was a black one, made darker by the unfortunate defection, just at the moment when his support was most needed, of my fellow champion of the Egyptian cause in London, Sir William Gregory. Gregory had committed himself quite as deeply to the National Party in its earlier stages as I had, and had written a number of powerful letters in support of Arabi in the "Times,"

and his influence stood far higher than mine in official quarters and with Chenery, the "Times" editor. The prospect, however, of possible hostilities in connection with the arrival of the fleets alarmed him, and he had latterly begun in his letters to doubt and qualify his published opinions. Since leaving Egypt in April he had been travelling on the Continent and I had been hoping daily for his arrival in London to reinforce my pleadings with the Government. Instead of this, I found to my dismay that, if not exactly against us, he was doing us little service. We were to have gone together to an anti-aggression meeting but now he refused to go. I find in my journal:

"_May 19._--Gregory has failed us. He dined last night with Chenery who has frightened him, and he refuses now to go to the meeting. I went to the meeting and made my speech and answered a number of questions put to me, giving the true history of the telegrams, and I got Dilwyn, the chairman, to vote my conduct patriotic.

"_May 20._--I hear Lord Granville is furious with me about the telegrams."

On Sunday, 21st May, the very next day, after this entry, I had an embarra.s.sing meeting with Granville. I had been asked with my wife some time before by her cousin, the present Lord Portsmouth, to spend that Sat.u.r.day to Monday at Hurstbourne, and the Granvilles had also been asked and several other persons more or less political. I fancy Granville had wished to meet me, as it is called "accidentally" in diplomatic parlance. But in the interval grave events had taken place, and I was not a little disturbed when I found him staying there, for I had not myself been told of it. The moment was an unfortunate one, for that morning we had brought down with us the "Observer" newspaper which contained an account of the first rebuff given to the fleet at Alexandria. "We arrived with Lowell, the American Minister, and found the house empty, every one gone to morning church. On their return I perceived to my horror, for I was not expecting it, Lord Granville and Lady Granville walking back with the rest of the party. Things however went off well, for I had the sympathy of most of the party with me, especially as we had brought news down with us that the arrival of the fleets at Alexandria had been resolutely answered by Arabi by a call to arms, and that 4,000 of the Redifs (reserve men) had responded to it.

His Lords.h.i.+p looks worried, so I argue well for the Nationalists. I had a deal of conversation with him on every subject in the world except Egypt. Lord Granville is very pleasant company, a _raconteur_ of the old-fas.h.i.+oned type, each story being neatly and concisely got up, not always apposite to the moment but almost always good. With the rest of the party Egypt was gaily and sympathetically discussed. Henry Cowper was charming--Lowell and Stuart Rendall most sympathetic--the last, that is, when Lord Granville was out of hearing.... It was a lovely day and we sauntered about the park and gardens, Henry Cowper telling good stories, amongst others one, _a propos_ of the Eastern Question, of Disraeli. He had heard him say 'Tancred is a book to which I often refer, not for amus.e.m.e.nt but for instruction.'" Lowell, as already said, was the whole of that summer a strong believer in the National Party, and always gave me support in conversation about it when we met.

It is worth noticing in connection with this visit to Hurstbourne that Lord Granville two days later, 23rd May, sent the fatal telegram authorizing Malet to "act as he thought fit," with the result that the Ultimatum was issued on the 25th. The view of the case in Egypt as printed at that date by John Morley in the "Pall Mall Gazette," runs thus: "Affairs still remain in a very critical condition at Cairo.

Ourabi[14] persists in maintaining an att.i.tude of defiance. He is playing his last card. The reserves are being brought up from the villages--in chains--troops are being hurried to the coast to resist a landing and artillerymen are being sent to the ports at Alexandria, the guns of which, such as they are, surround our ironclads. All this, probably, is only a game of brag, intended to extort better terms for himself." "The experiment," says Morley, "of vigorous representations emphasized by ironclads at Alexandria has been fairly tried, and there seems to be no doubt that it has completely failed."

"_May 22._--To London. Harry Brand, whom I met at the Club, tells me Dilke tells him 'it must end in intervention.'

"Old Houghton sent to say he wished to consult me about Egypt, and I had a long talk with him in the Lobby of the House of Lords.... I advised him, if he was pus.h.i.+ng the Government to land troops in Egypt, to send at once for his daughter home.

"_May 23._--Lord Granville in the Lords has made a jocular answer to demands for information about Egypt.

"_May 26._--Gladstone has spoken about Egypt, a long rigmarole of which the only thing remarkable is that he expresses his confidence in a peaceful solution.... The Consuls have delivered an Ultimatum stating that their object is to restore the Khedive's personal authority and demanding the exile of Arabi.

"_May 27._--Sultan Pasha denies having suggested the terms of the Ultimatum.... The Ultimatum is refused.... Saw Gregory. We think the Egyptians will have to fight now, and I feel I ought to go out and join them.... Telegram in the evening papers that Arabi's Ministry has resigned.

"_May 28._--Sunday at Crabbet. Things all seem gone to ruin in Egypt. I suppose the Khedive's personal authority under the Control will now be revived. If Arabi leaves the country and the army is disbanded, or reorganized under Circa.s.sian officers, Egypt may bid good-bye to liberty. She will share the fate of Tunis. Vicisti O Colvine!

"_May 29._--I could not sleep but began roaming about soon after 3. It tormented me to think I did not go to Egypt immediately on hearing Lord Granville's speech. I might have saved matters.... Now all is bright again. By an extraordinary transition the papers announce that Cairo has risen and has demanded Arabi's recall as Minister of War, the Khedive acquiescing. The news seems too good to be true, but it cannot be doubted from the anger of the newspapers. This s.h.i.+fts things back into more than their old place, and now there is nothing to fear except from the Porte. I have made up my mind to go at once to Egypt. Went up to London, saw Gregory, lunched with the Howards, and wrote a letter to Eddy Hamilton announcing my intention. Mrs. Howard advises me to trust all to Gladstone, and in my letter to Hamilton I have done so implicitly. Only it is a wrench to leave England in June and face the turmoil and the heat of Cairo. I am happier though, feeling that at least I am doing all I can do and doing my duty. Anne will go with me."

My letter to Hamilton, written under the influence of the Gladstonian atmosphere of Palace Green, runs thus:

"_May 29th, 1882._

"DEAR EDDY,

"Though Mr. G. is, I fear, displeased with me for the telegrams I sent to Egypt a fortnight ago, I do not wish to take any important step without his knowledge. I am convinced that some day he will forgive me for what I have done, and approve what I intend to do; and I have perfect confidence in him that he will act towards Egypt on the Liberal grounds you spoke of, as soon as he is certain of the truth. I believe, also, that I may still be of use to England as well as to Egypt in circ.u.mstances which may occur; and with that idea, I am going, unless anything unforeseen occurs, next Friday to Cairo.

"I will tell you exactly what I shall advise the National leaders.

I shall urge them, first of all, to sink all petty differences in the presence of a great danger. I shall urge them, as I have always done, not to quarrel with the Khedive; and if I have an opportunity I shall urge the Khedive not to allow himself to be persuaded by the Consuls to quarrel with the people. I shall fortify Arabi in his determination to retain the full direction of the army in his hands by remaining Minister of War, but shall advise him to leave all other offices of State to civilians, and especially to members of the Chamber. I shall urge the Egyptians to keep on the best terms they can with the Sultan, short of admitting his soldiers into their country, and on the best terms with the European Powers short of yielding their const.i.tutional rights. At the same time, I shall advise them strongly, as I advised them last January, to yield something to the Controllers of their present claim regarding the Budget--that is to say, to postpone their rights at least for this next year. I shall explain to them the position, as far as I understand it, of the English Government, anxious not to destroy their independence, yet bound by ties contracted by their predecessors; of the French Government, traditionally inclined to push its powers in the Mediterranean, and forced on by the financiers; of the German Government, willing to divert the French from home affairs and dissolve the English alliance; and, lastly, of the Sultan, with his Caliphal dreams, a matter which they probably understand at least as well as I do.

"I do not propose myself to take any part in military operations, should such occur, except in the last necessity, against the Turks, for I know nothing of military matters, and have a horror of war.

But I shall urge the Egyptians to resist invasion, from whatever quarter, and, if vanquished, to pursue a persistent policy of refusing taxation not sanctioned by their laws--whereas, if unmolested, I would have them pay their debt to the last farthing.

I shall have no need to repress fanaticism, for they are not fanatics; but I shall join my voice to Arabi's in favour of the humanest interpretation of the laws of war. I also wish to be at hand in case of need, to protect European residents at the first outbreak of hostilities.

"I do not think I am acting unadvisedly in telling you this. My idea of a policy for the Egyptians is, that they should act by a rule diametrically opposite to the common Oriental ones. I would have them tell the truth, even to their enemies--be more humane than European soldiers, more honest than their European creditors.

So only can they effect that moral reformation their religious leaders have in view for them.

"I am, yours affectionately, W. S. B."

The "Pall Mall" utterances of this date are again worth quoting, as they show the absurdly unreal view of the situation in Egypt put forward at that time by the Foreign Office, Colvin, Dilke, and the rest. Malet's despatches had led the Foreign Office to believe that Arabi had behind him no popular following outside the army, that the Khedive was in reality beloved by his subjects, and it was thought that it only needed now a little additional show of outside help from Constantinople being at hand to bring about a manifestation in Tewfik's favour which, if it did not force the army to submission, would lead to civil war demanding intervention.

The "Pall Mall Gazette," 26th May, says: "The Ultimatum which England and France have addressed to the Egyptian Ministry is to be accepted or rejected in twenty-four hours. This afternoon, therefore, the crisis ought to be over and the order despatched to Constantinople for the Ottoman _gens d'armes_ who are to restore the authority of the Khedive under the control of England and France." Again, on 27th May: "A few hours may decide whether the crisis in Egypt is to be solved peacefully, or whether the country is to be the scene of civil war and foreign occupation. The Ministry has resigned, and so far the terms of the Anglo-French Ultimatum have been complied with.... On the other hand it is at least likely that Ourabi ... may throw off the mask and declare boldly against his head." The kind of civil war expected is explained next day, 28th May: "Last night the Khedive slept at the Ismalia palace surrounded by twelve thousand loyal Bedouins. The presence of these children of the desert in the Capital of Egypt const.i.tutes a material safeguard against a new _p.r.o.nuncia mento_. No doubt it is a fearful prospect, that of a civil war in the streets of Cairo between the Bedouins and the regular army; but its possibility is a security for a pacific solution of the crisis.... Ourabi's position is no longer what it was. Even the power of the sword is no longer exclusively in his hands. If the Khedive with the swords of the Bedouins, the ironclads of England and France, and the support of the Chamber of Notables cannot reduce Ourabi to submission, the position must be more hopelessly complicated than any one has. .h.i.therto ventured to affirm."

What a fantastic account! Twelve thousand loyal Bedouins camped round the palace of Ismalia! The Chamber of Deputies devoted to the Khedive!

Arabi standing alone intimidating them all! Yet it was with these lies, of which honest John Morley was made the popular mouthpiece, that Gladstone was being persuaded to apply the astonis.h.i.+ng remedy for unruly Egyptian Nationalism of bringing in on it the "unspeakable Turk," the "Bas.h.i.+-bazouk," fresh from his "Bulgarian atrocities," and the "man of sin" himself, Sultan Abdul Hamid. The illusion of the Khedive's popularity only lasted forty-eight hours. Then we read in the "Pall Mall Gazette" of 30th May: "The time has at last come for immediate action in Egypt. The Khedive is a prisoner in his palace. The twelve thousand Bedouins who were reported to be encamped around their sovereign have vanished into thin air," etc., etc.

Meanwhile I was awaiting an answer from Downing Street, and making my preparations for an immediate start for Egypt. Mr. Gladstone was out of town, staying with Lord Rosebery at the Durdans, in my eyes an ominous circ.u.mstance. I knew Rosebery's view of the Egyptian question, for a few weeks before I had found him at Downing Street with Hamilton, and had walked with them both by the little garden exit through St. James's Park. On the way I had asked him his views about Egypt, and he had answered very briefly, "I have no views at all but those of a bondholder." He was, in fact, through his wife, a Rothschild, largely interested in the financial aspect of the case; and I looked upon Gladstone's visit to him just then as an evil symptom. Rosebery was not as yet in office, but had influence with Gladstone, and I knew through b.u.t.ton that he was being pushed forward by the Rothschilds to do their political work for them. This continued for some years, and his mission to Berlin in 1885 was suggested and made successful by the Rothschilds, and later at the Foreign Office he worked consistently in their interests on Egyptian questions, though I have heard that before taking office he got rid of his Egyptian stock.

"_May 30._--No answer from Eddy. I see Mr. G. is out of town at the Durdans. All however is going on well in Egypt, Arabi the acknowledged master of the situation.... I found a note yesterday from Houghton asking again to see me, and I went to him at his house in Mayfair, and told him of my plan of going to Egypt. By his manner I am convinced that he has been commissioned by Lord Granville to sound me.... I have told Glyns (my bankers, Messrs. Glyn, Mills, and Currie) to get me 1,000 in French gold, the sinews of war. I feel very loath to go, but happy, being sure that I am doing what is right.... Sabunji will go too....

"_May 31._--To London early and found another note from Houghton saying 'surely I won't go.' I am certain this is an unofficial hint."

Houghton's note was characteristic: "My dear Blunt, a.s.suredly you had better not go to Egypt just now. Whatever you say or do there will be exaggerated and probably misinterpreted. The alliance between the Military Party and the Porte seems complete, and that won't suit your views. You could let me know if you hear anything precise. My daughter is still at Alexandria, but I am anxious for Fitzgerald, who must be obnoxious to the army from his military economies. I am yours very truly, Houghton. Bring your friend (Arabi) back with you if you do go, and come and dine here with him."

"Also a telegram from Eddy. 'Your letter received. I implore you to do nothing till after seeing me. Shall be back this evening.' He is at Salisbury.... At half past five found Eddy in Downing Street. He implored me not to go, as my position in Egypt, and my known connection with Gladstone would be misunderstood, and make a terrible row. He promised me there would be no landing of troops or intervention at all.

On this a.s.surance I consented not to go. I told him, however, that I hoped they would not consider me responsible for accidents which might occur, and which it was my main object in going to prevent. He said they would not.

"A large card has come from Lady Granville inviting us to the Foreign Office on the 3rd to celebrate the Queen's birthday. I shall keep this as an answer to Harry Brand's charge of treason.... Now I am quite contented. Sabunji is to go instead of me, and will do just as well. He has telegraphed by my orders to Arabi in answer to a letter I have received from him: 'Letter received. Do not fear the s.h.i.+ps. No intervention. Issue public notices in every town for the safety of Europeans.' This in accordance with a suggestion of Eddy's.

"_June 1._--Everything seems going on beautifully. Arabi acknowledged master of the situation in Egypt. The Sultan supposed to be so at Constantinople. b.u.t.ton thinks the 'Times' will pay for my telegrams Sabunji may send them. If so, so much the better. I have agreed to give Sabunji 30 a month and his expenses.... Went to the House of Commons with Nigel Kingscote (the Prince of Wales's equerry), who got me into the Speaker's Gallery. Gladstone was giving his announcement of a conference at Constantinople as the upshot of it all. No troops are to be mobilized in India, and no troops to be landed in Egypt. He considers such a course would endanger European lives. McCoan, an M. P., formerly editor of the 'Levant Herald,' asked whether it was true I was 'about to proceed to Egypt to put myself at the head of the insurrection.' Dilke answered that he believed I had 'relinquished my intention.' Gladstone then made the astounding statement that Arabi had 'thrown off the mask,'

and had threatened to depose the Khedive and put Halim on the throne of Egypt. This is too absurd, but it is playing into my hands, because the statement must be at once disproved, and the fact of its having been made will show how ignorant the Foreign Office are. Gladstone will now probably be angry with Malet for having led him into such a blunder.

Frank Lascelles, however, who walked home with me from the House, tells me he has seen Malet's telegram respecting this, and all it says is that the Khedive told him this, and he does not vouch for its truth. So are things done!"