Cheap Postage Part 4

"Congress shall have power to-

"Establish post-offices and post-roads."

This clause declares plainly the will of the people of the United States, that the federal government should be charged with the responsibility of furnis.h.i.+ng the whole Union with convenient and proper mail privileges-according to their reasonable wants, and the reasonable ability of the government. This is one point of the "general welfare," for which we are to look to congress, just as we look to congress to provide for the general defence by means of the army and navy. It imposes no other restrictions in the one case than the other, as to the extent to which provision shall be made-the reasonable wants of the people, and the reasonable ability of the government. It limits the resources for this object to no particular branch of the revenue. It gives no sort of sanction to the so oft-repeated rule, which many suppose to be a part of the const.i.tution, that the post-office must support itself. Still less, does it authorize congress to throw all manner of burdens upon the mail, and then refuse to increase its usefulness as a public convenience, because it cannot carry all those loads. The people must have mails, and congress must furnish them. To reason for or against any proposed change, on the ground that the alternative may be the discontinuance of public mails, the privation of this privilege to the people, and the winding up of the post-office system, is clearly inadmissible. When the government ceases to give the people the privileges of the mail, the government itself will soon wind up, or rather, will be taken in hand and wound up by the people, and set a-going again on better principles. The sole inquiry for congress is, what is the best way to meet the reasonable wants of the people, by means within the reasonable ability of the government?

The objects of the post-office system, which regulate its administration, are well set forth in the Report of the House Committee in 1844: "To content the man, dwelling more remote from town, with his homely lot, by giving him regular and frequent means of intercommunication; to a.s.sure the emigrant, who plants his new home on the skirts of the distant wilderness or prairie, that he is not forever severed from the kindred and society that still share his interest and love; to prevent those whom the swelling tide of population is constantly, pressing to the outer verge of civilization from being surrendered to surrounding influences, and sinking into the hunter or savage state; to render the citizen, how far soever from the seat of his government, worthy, by proper knowledge and intelligence, of his important privileges as a sovereign const.i.tuent of the government; to diffuse, throughout all parts of the land, enlightenment, social improvement, and national affinities, elevating our people in the scale of civilization, and binding them together in patriotic affection."

These are the objects for which congress is bound to maintain the post-office, and it is impossible that congress should ever seriously consider whether they will not abandon them. The maintenance of convenient mails for these objects is therefore to be regarded as a necessary function of the government of the United States. In the infancy of that government, while the government itself was an experiment, when the country was deeply in debt for the cost of our independence, and when its resources for public expenditure were untried and unknown, there was doubtless a propriety in the adoption of the principle, that the post-office department should support itself. But that state of things has long gone by, and our government now has ample ability to execute any plans of improvement whatever, for the advancement of knowledge, and for binding the Union together, provided such plans come within the acknowledged powers conferred by the const.i.tution.

The post-office being, then, like the army and navy, a necessary branch of the government, it follows that the charge of postage for the conveyance of letters and papers is of the nature of a tax, as has been well expressed by the present Postmaster-General, in his last annual report, quoted above. "_Postage is a tax_, not only on the business of the country, but upon intelligence and knowledge, and the exercise of the friendly and social affections." The question before us is, How heavy a "tax" ought the government of a federal republic to impose on these interests? Every friend of freedom and of human improvement answers spontaneously, that nothing but a clear necessity can justify any tax at all upon such subjects, and that the tax should be reduced, in all cases, to the very lowest practicable rate. The experience of the British government, the prodigious increase of correspondence produced by cheap postage, and the immense revenue accruing therefrom, demonstrate that TWO CENTS is not below the rate which the government can afford to receive.

Let the people understand that all beyond this is a mere "tax," not required by any necessity, and they will soon demand that the government look for its resources to some more suitable subjects of taxation than these.

Another rule of right in regard to this "tax" is well laid down in the Report of the House Committee, for 1844: "As the post-office is made to sustain itself solely by a tax on correspondence, it should derive aid and support from everything which it conveys. No man's private correspondence should go free, since the expense of so conveying it becomes a charge upon the correspondence of others; and the special favor thus given, and which is much abused by being extended to others not contemplated by law, is unjust and odious. Neither should the public correspondence be carried free of charge where such immunity operates as a burden upon the correspondence of the citizen. There is no reason why the public should not pay its postages as well as citizens-no sufficient reason why this item of public expenses should not be borne, like all others, by the general tax paid into the treasury." These remarks are made, indeed, with reference to the franking privilege, which the committee properly proposed to abolish on the grounds here set forth. But it is plain that the principle is equally pertinent to the question of taxing the correspondence of the thickly settled parts of the country for the purpose of raising means to defray the expense of sending mails to the new and distant parts of the country. There is no justice in it. The extension of these mails is a duty of the government; and let the government, by the same rule, pay the cost out of its own treasury. "Postage," says the same report, "in the large towns and contiguous places, is, in part, a _contribution_." It is a forced contribution, levied not upon the property of the people, but upon their intelligence and affections.

Our letters are taxed to pay the following expenses:

1. For the franking of seven millions of free letters.

2. For the distribution of an immense ma.s.s of congressional doc.u.ments, which few people read at all, and most of which might as well be sent in some other way-would be seen the moment they should be actually subjected to the payment of postage by those who send or receive them.

3. For the extension of mails over numerous and long routes, in the new or thinly settled parts of the country, which do not pay their own expenses.

I do not believe these routes are more extensive or numerous than the government ought to establish; but then the government ought to support them out of the general treasury. Many of them are necessary for the convenience of the government itself. For many of them the treasury is amply remunerated, and more, by the increased sale of the public lands, the increase of population, and the consequent increase of the revenue from the custom-house. And the rest are required by the great duty of self-preservation and self-advancement, which is inherent in our inst.i.tutions.

4. For the cost of about two millions of dead letters, and an equal number of dead newspapers and pamphlets, the postage on which, at existing rates, would amount to at least $175,000 a year, and the greater part of which would be saved under the new postal system.

Why should these burdens be thrown as a "tax upon correspondence," or made an apology for the continuance of such a tax? It is unreasonable. All these expenses should be borne, "like all others, by the general tax paid into the treasury." This would leave letters chargeable only with such a rate of postage as is needed for the prevention of abuses, and to secure the orderly performance of the public duty. And a postage of two cents would amply suffice for this. Some have suggested that _one cent_ is all that ought to be required.

There is another view of the matter, which shows still more strongly the injustice of the present tax upon letters. "It is not matter of inference," says Mr. Rowland Hill, "but matter of fact, that the expense of the post-office is practically the same, whether a letter is going from London to Burnet (11 miles), or from London to Edinburgh (397 miles); the difference is not expressible in the smallest coin we have." The cost of transit from London to Edinburgh he explained to be only one thirty-sixth of a penny. And the average cost, per letter, of transportation in all the mails of the kingdom, did not differ materially from this. Of course, it was impossible to vary the rates of postage according to distance, when the longest distance was but a little over one-tenth of a farthing. The same reasoning is obviously applicable to all the _productive_ routes in the United States. And we have seen the injustice of taxing the letters on routes that are productive or self-supporting, to defray the expense of the unproductive routes which the government is bound to create and pay for.

Another view of the case shows the futility of the attempt to make distance the basis of charge. The actual cost of transit, to each letter, does not vary with the distance, but is inversely as the number of letters, irrespective of distance. The weight of letters hardly enters into the account as a practical consideration. Ten thousand letters, each composed of an ordinary sheet of letter paper, would weigh but one hundred and fifty-six pounds, about the weight of a common sized man, who would be carried from Boston to Albany or New York for five dollars. The average cost of transportation of the mails in this country, is a little over six cents per mile. For convenience of calculation, take a route of ten miles long, which costs ten cents per mile, and another of one hundred miles long at the same rate. There are many routes which do not carry more than one letter on the average. The letter would cost the department one dollar for carrying it ten miles. On the route of one hundred miles we will suppose there are one thousand letters to be carried, which will cost the government for transportation just one mill per letter. How then can we make distance the basis of postage?

The matter may be presented in still another view. The government establishes a mail between two cities, say Boston and New York, which is supported by the avails of postage on letters. Then it proceeds to establish a mail between New York and Philadelphia, which is supported by the postage between those places. Now, how much will it cost the government to carry in addition, all the letters that go from Boston to Philadelphia, and from Philadelphia to Boston? Nothing. The contracts will not vary a dollar. In this manner, you may extend your mails from any point, wherever you find a route which will support itself, until you reach New Orleans or Little Rock, and it is as plain as the multiplication table, that it will cost the government no more to take an individual letter from Boston to Little Rock than it would to take the same letter from Boston to New York. The government is quite indifferent to what place you mail your letter, provided it be to a place which has a mail regularly running to it.

This brings us to the unproductive routes. An act was pa.s.sed by the last Congress to establish mail routes in Oregon territory. An agent is appointed to superintend the business, at a salary of $1000 a year and his travelling expenses; contracts are made or to be made, mails carried, postmasters appointed and paid. This is doubtless a very proper and necessary thing, one which the government could not have omitted without a plain dereliction of duty. The honor and interest of the nation required that as soon as the t.i.tle to the country was settled, our citizens who were resident there, and those who shall go to settle there, should enjoy the benefits of the mail. And as it was the nation's business to establish the mail, it was equally the nation's business to pay the expense. No man can show how it is just or reasonable, that the letters pa.s.sing between Boston and New York should be taxed 150 per cent. to pay the expense of a mail to Oregon, on the pretext that the post-office must support itself.

A mail is run at regular periods to Eagle River, Wisconsin, for the accommodation of the persons employed about the copper mines on Lake Superior. Without questioning the certainty of the great things that are to be done there hereafter, it is no presumption to express the belief that the expenses of that mail are hardly paid by the postage on the letters now carried to and from Lake Superior. Nor, after making all due allowances for the liberal distribution of copper stock at the East, is it rational to believe that all the people who write letters here, are so directly interested as to make a tax upon letters the most equitable mode of a.s.sessing the expense.

During the debates in Congress on the act of 1844, an incident was related by Senator Crittenden, of Kentucky, to this effect. He said he was travelling in the mail stage somewhere in the State of Tennessee. At a time of day when he was tired and hungry, the stage turned off from the road a number of miles, to carry the mail to a certain post-office; it was night when they reached the office, the postmaster was roused with difficulty, who went through the formality of taking the mail pouch into his hand, and returned it to the driver, saying there was not a letter in it, and had not been for a month. I will not inquire whose letters ought to be taxed to sustain that mail route, but only remark, that whatever consideration caused its establishment, ought to carry the cost to the public treasury, and not throw it as a burden upon our letters.

The Postmaster-General, in his late report, says that "the weight and bulk of the mails, which add so greatly to the cost of transportation, and impede the progress of the mail, are attributable to the ma.s.s of printed matter daily forwarded from the princ.i.p.al cities in the Union to every part of the country;" and "justice requires that the expense of their transportation should be paid by the postage." I would add to this the qualifying phrase, "or by the government, out of the public treasury," and then ask why the same principle of justice is not as applicable to long mail routes as to heavy mail bags. There is and can be no ground of apprehension, that mails will ever be overloaded or r.e.t.a.r.ded by the weight of paid letters they contain. It was found by the parliamentary committee, that the number of letters, which was then nearly fifty per cent. greater than in all our mails, might be increased twenty-four fold, without overloading the mails, and without any material addition to the contracts for carrying the mails. They also found that the whole cost of receiving, transporting and delivering a letter was 76-100ths of a penny, of which the transit cost but 19-100ths, and the receipt and delivery 57-100ths.

The cost of transit, per letter, is of course reduced by the increase of correspondence.

I have dwelt so long on this part of the subject, because I find that here is the great difficulty in the application of the principles and results of the British system to our own country-ours is such a "great country,"

and we have so many "magnificent distances." But disposing as I have of the unproductive mail routes, and showing as I have, the injustice of taxing letters with the expense of any public burthens, this whole difficulty is removed, and it is made to appear that two cents is the highest proper rate of postage which the government can justly exact for letters, on the score either of a just equivalent for the service rendered, or of a tax imposed for the purposes of the government itself.

This is the conclusion to which the parliamentary committee were most intelligently and satisfactorily drawn-that "the principle of a uniform postage is founded on the facts, that the cost of distributing letters in the United Kingdom consists chiefly in the expenses incurred with reference to their receipt at and delivery from the office, and that the cost of transit along the mail roads is comparatively unimportant, and determined rather by the number of letters carried than the distance;"

that "as the cost of conveyance per letter depends more on the number of letters carried than on the distance which they are conveyed, (the cost being frequently greater for distances of a few miles, than for distances of hundreds of miles,) the charge, if varied in proportion to the cost, ought to increase in the inverse ratio of the number of letters conveyed,"

but it would be impossible to carry such a rule into practice, and therefore the committee were of opinion, that "the easiest practicable approach to a fair system, would be to charge a medium rate of postage between one post-office and another, whatever may be their distance." And the committee were further of opinion, "that such an arrangement is highly desirable, not only on account of its abstract fairness, but because it would tend in a great degree to simplify and economize the business of the post-office."

Waterston's Cyclopedia of Commerce says, "the fixing of _a low rate_ flowed almost necessarily from the adoption of a _uniform_ rate. It was besides essential to the stoppage of the private conveyance of letters.

The post-office was thus to be restored to its ancient footing of an inst.i.tution, whose primary object was public accommodation, not revenue."

The adoption of this simple principle, of Uniform Cheap Postage, was a revolution in postal affairs. It may almost be called a revolution in the government, for it identified the policy of the government with the happiness of the people, more perfectly than any one measure that was ever adopted. It prepared the way for all other postal reforms, which are chiefly impracticable until this one is carried. We also can have franking abolished, as soon as cheap postage shall have given the franking privilege alike to all. We can have label stamps, and free delivery, and registry of letters, and reduced postage on newspapers, and whatever other improvement our national ingenuity may contrive, to the fullest extent of the people's wants, and the government's ability, just as soon as we can prevail upon the people to ask, and congress to grant, this one boon of Uniform Cheap Postage.

V. _Franking._

The unanimity and readiness with which the franking privilege was surrendered by the members of parliament-men of privilege in a land of privilege-is proof of the strong pressure of necessity under which the measure was carried. It is true, a few members seemed disposed to struggle for the preservation of this much-cherished prerogative. One member complained that the bill would be taxing him as much as 15 per annum.

Another defended the franking privilege on account of its benefits to the poor. But the opposition melted away, like an unseasonable frost, as soon as its arguments were placed in the light of cheap postage. And the whole system of franking was swept away, and each department of the government was required to pay its own postage, and report the same among its expenditures. The debates in parliament show something of the reasons which prevailed.

_July 22, 1848._ The postage bill came up on the second reading:

Sir Robert H. Inglis, among other things, objected to the abolition of the franking privilege. He could not see why, because a tax was to be taken off others, a tax was to be imposed on members. It would be, to those who had much correspondence, at least 15 a year, at the reduced rate of a penny a letter. To the revenue the saving would be small, and he hoped the house would not consent to rescind that privilege.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said the sacrifice of the franking privilege would be small in amount. But at the same time, be it small or great, he thought there would be not one feature of the new system which would be more palatable to the public, than this practical evidence of the willingness of members of this house, to sacrifice everything personal to themselves, for the advantage of the public revenue.

Sir Robert Peel did not think it desirable that members of this house should retain the franking privilege. He thought if this were continued after this bill came into operation, there _would be a degree of odium_ attached to it which would greatly diminish its value. He agreed that it would be well to restrict in some way the _right of sending by mail the heavy volumes of reports_. He said there were many members who would shrink from the exercise of such a privilege, to load the mail with books. He would also require that each department should specially pay the postage incurred for the public service in that department. If every office be called upon to pay its own postage, we shall introduce a useful principle into the public service. There is no habit connected with a public service so inveterate, as the privilege of official franking.

On a former day, July 5, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had said concerning the abolition of the franking privilege:

Undoubtedly, we may lose the opportunity now and then, of obliging a friend; but on other grounds, I believe there is no member of the house who will not be ready to abandon the privilege. As to any notion that honorable gentlemen should retain their privilege under a penny postage, they must have a more intense appreciation of the value of money, and a greater disregard for the value of time, than I can conceive, if they insist on it.

All the peculiarities which distinguish British inst.i.tutions from our own, might naturally be expected to make public men in that country more tenacious of privilege than our own statesmen. In a land of privilege, we should expect mere privilege to be coveted, because it is privilege. This practical and harmonious decision of British statesmen, of all parties, in favor of abolis.h.i.+ng the franking privilege, in order to give strength and consistency to the system of cheap postage, shows in a striking light the sense which they entertained of the greatness of the object of cheap postage. The arguments which convinced them, we should naturally suppose would have tenfold greater force here than there; while the arguments in favor of the privilege would have tenfold greater influence there than here. Can there be a doubt that, when the subject is fairly understood, there will be found as much magnanimity among American as among British legislators?

The moral evils of the franking system are far more serious than the pecuniary expense, although that is by no means undeserving of regard. It is not only an ensnaring prerogative to those who enjoy it, and an anomaly and incongruity in our republican inst.i.tutions, but it is an oppressive burden upon the post-office, which ought to be removed.

The parliamentary committee ascertained, by three distinct calculations, (of which all the results so nearly agreed as to strengthen each other,) that, reckoning by numbers, one-ninth of the letters pa.s.sing through the post-office in a year, were franked. And, reckoning by weight, the proportion was 30 per cent. of the whole. Of seven millions of franked letters and doc.u.ments, nearly five millions were by members of parliament.

If all the franks had been subject to postage, they would have yielded upwards of a million sterling yearly. This was after the parliamentary franks had been restricted to a certain number (ten) daily for each member, and limited in weight to two ounces. The amount of postage on parliamentary franks would be yearly 350,000, averaging about 310 to each member. But there were a number of official persons, whose franks were not limited, either in number or weight. These franks were obtained and used, by those who could get them, without stint or scruple.

The celebrated Dr. Dionysius Lardner, who then occupied a prominent place among men of letters in Great Britain, testified before the parliamentary committee in 1838, that he was in the practice of sending and receiving about five thousand letters a year, of which he got four-fifths without postage-chiefly by franks. While he lived in Ireland, his correspondence was so heavy, not only as to the number of letters, but their bulk and weight, that he was obliged to apply to the Postmaster-General of Ireland, Lord Rosse, who allowed them to go under his franks. From the year 1823, or soon after he quitted the university, until the year 1828, his letters went and came under the frank of Lord Rosse, who had the power of franking to any weight. Since he came to England, his facilities of getting franks were very great.

Without such means, he would have found it very difficult indeed to send his letters by post. His heavy correspondence was chiefly sent through official persons, who had the power of franking to any weight; and his correspondents knew that they could send their letters under care to these friends; so that he received communications from them in the same way. He endeavored to save as much trouble as he could, by dividing the annoyance among them, and by enclosing a bundle of letters for the same neighborhood under one cover. He said that, to obtain these privileges a man must be connected or known to the aristocratic cla.s.ses, and that it was certainly unfair, as it gave unfair advantages to those who happened to have friends or connections having that power. His foreign correspondence was carried on through the emba.s.sies; and in this way the letters came free. He got his letters from the United States free in that way. Any man who was a Fellow of the Royal Society, or who lived among that cla.s.s, could avail himself of these means of obtaining scientific communications.

The number of franked letters posted, throughout the kingdom, in two weeks in January, 1838, is stated in the following table.

Week ending Country to London to Country to Total London. country. country.

15 January, 41,196 43,345 36,361 122,902 29 January, 46,371 51,046 37,894 135,311 --- --- --- --- Total, 87,567 96,391 74,255 258,213 Proportion, .339 .373 .287 1.

It was stated in the debates, that before the franking privilege was limited, it had been worth, to some great commercial houses, who had a seat in parliament, from 300 to 800 a year; and that after the limitation it was worth to some houses as much as 300 a year. The committee spoke of the use of franks for scientific and business correspondence, as "an exemplification of the irregular means by which a scale of postage, too high for the interests and proper management of the affairs of the country, is forced to give way in particular instances. And like all irregular means, it is of most unfair and partial application; the relief depends, not on any general regulation, known to the public, and according to which relief can be obtained, but upon favor and opportunity; and the consequence is, that while the more pressing suitor obtains the benefit he asks, those of a more forbearing disposition pay the penalty of high postage." It also keeps out of view of the public, "how much the cost of distribution is exceeded by the charge, and to what extent therefore the postage of letters is taxed" to sustain this official privilege. The committee therefore concluded in their report, that "taking into the account the serious loss to the public revenue, which is caused by the privilege of franking, and the inevitable abuse of that privilege in numerous cases where no public business is concerned, it would be politic in a financial point of view, and agreeable to the public sense of justice, if, on effecting the proposed reduction of the postage rates, the privilege of franking were to be abolished." Only the post-office department now franks its own official correspondence; pet.i.tions to parliament are sent free; and parliamentary doc.u.ments are charged at one-eighth the rate of letters. Letters _to_ the Queen also go free.