Cotton is King, and Pro-Slavery Arguments Part 39

It was urged by counsel that such summary method of reclaiming fugitive slaves was unconst.i.tutional; but the court decided otherwise. It was insisted by Mr. Hambly, just as it is now insisted by Mr. Sumner and others, that such arrest was unconst.i.tutional, because it was made by the mere will of the party, and not, as the Const.i.tution requires, "by due process of law." Thus the point was presented by the record, argued by the counsel, and overruled by the court.

In overruling this argument the court says: "The owner must, therefore, have the right to seize and repossess the slave which the local laws of his own State confer upon him as property; and we all know that this right of seizure and recaption is universally acknowledged in all the slaveholding States. Indeed, this is no more than a mere affirmance of the principles of the common law applicable to this very subject." Then, after a quotation from Blackstone, the court adds: "Upon this ground, we have not the slightest hesitation in holding that, under and in virtue of the Const.i.tution, the owner of a slave is clothed with entire authority in every State in the Union to seize and recapture his slave whenever he can do it without any breach of the peace or any illegal violence."

In accordance with this opinion of the court--delivered by Mr. Justice Story--Mr. Chief Justice Taney says: the master "has a right, peaceably, to take possession of him, and carry him away, without any certificate or warrant from a judge of the District or Circuit Court of the United States, or from any magistrate of the State; and whosoever resists or obstructs him is a wrong-doer; and every State law which proposes, directly or indirectly, to authorize such resistance or obstruction, is null and void, and affords no justification to the individual or the officer of the State who acts under it. This right of the master being given by the Const.i.tution of the United States, neither Congress nor a State Legislature can by any law or regulation impair it or restrict it.[224]

Hence it would have been well if Mr. Sumner and the son of Judge Story had looked into this decision again before they proclaimed the opinion that the right of trial by jury is, in such cases, still an open question. Mr. Justice Story himself must, on reflection, have seen that the off-hand expression attributed to him was erroneous. His more deliberate opinion is recorded, not only in the case of Prigg, but also in his "Commentaries on the Const.i.tution of the United States." "It is obvious," says he, "that these provisions for the arrest and removal of fugitives of both cla.s.ses contemplate summary ministerial proceedings, and not the ordinary courts of judicial investigations to ascertain whether the complaint be well-founded or the claim of owners.h.i.+p be established beyond all legal controversy. In cases of suspected crimes the guilt or innocence of the party is to be made out at his trial, and not upon the preliminary inquiry whether he shall be delivered up. All that would seem in such cases to be necessary is that there should be _prima facie_ evidence before the executive authority to satisfy its judgment that there is probable cause to believe the party guilty, such as, upon an ordinary warrant, would justify his commitment for trial.

And in the cases of fugitive slaves there would seem to be the same necessity of requiring only _prima facie_ proofs of owners.h.i.+p, without putting the party to a formal a.s.sertion of his rights by a suit at the common law."[225]

But, since the abolitionists will discuss this point, then let it be considered an open question, and let them produce their arguments. The first we shall notice is from Mr. Sumner, who again reasons from the sentiments of the fathers. "At the close of the National Convention,"

says he, "Elbridge Gerry refused to sign the Const.i.tution, because, among other things, it established 'a tribunal _without juries_, a Star Chamber as to civil cases.' Many united in his opposition, and, on the recommendation of the First Congress, this additional safeguard was adopted as an amendment." Thus, according to Mr. Sumner, Elbridge Gerry was the father of the clause in the Const.i.tution which guarantees the right of trial by jury. Yet Elbridge Gerry never dreamed of applying this clause to the case of fugitive slaves; for, as we have already seen, he voted for the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, in which such application of it is denied. Nor did any other member of that Congress propose the right of trial by jury in such cases.

No doubt there would have been opposition to the act of 1793 if any member of Congress had supposed, for a moment, that it denied the right of trial by jury to the fugitive slave. It does no such thing. It leaves that right unimpaired; and if any slave in the Union, whether fugitive or otherwise, desire such trial, it is secured to him by the Const.i.tution and laws of the country. But he cannot have such trial where or in what State he chooses. If he lives in Richmond, he may have a trial by jury there; but he cannot escape to Boston, and there demand this as a right. The fugitive from labor, like the fugitive from justice, has a right to a trial by jury, but neither can claim to have this trial in any part of the world he pleases. The latter must be tried in "the vicinage" where the offense is alleged to have been committed, because there the witnesses are to be found. He has no right to flee from these and require them to follow him with their testimony. As he has a const.i.tutional right to be tried in the vicinage of the alleged offense, so has the commonwealth a right to insist on his trial there.

In like manner, and for a similar reason, if the colored man wishes to a.s.sert his freedom under the law, he may appeal to a jury of the country; but this must be done in the State under whose laws he is claimed as a slave and where the witnesses reside. He cannot fly to a distant State, and there demand a kind of trial which neither the Const.i.tution, nor the laws, nor public expediency, secures to him. If he a.s.sert this right at all, he must a.s.sert it in conformity with the _undoubted right of the other party_, which is to be sued in this, as in all other personal actions, in the place where he resides.

In the face of these considerations, it is no wonder that the Congress of 1793 were so unanimous in regard to the Fugitive Slave Law. Though this law did not provide for a jury trial, yet its authors all knew that such trial was not denied to the fugitive slave, if he had a mind to claim it. Hence the law was pa.s.sed by that Congress, without even an allusion to this modern abolition objection to its const.i.tutionality.

Among all the members of that body who had taken part in framing the Const.i.tution of the United States,[226] not one was found to hint at such an objection. This objection is of more recent origin, if not of less respectable parentage.

An amendment to the law in question, allowing a trial by jury to the fugitive slave in a distant State, would indeed be a virtual denial of the const.i.tutional right of the master. Either because the jury could not agree, or because distant testimony might be demanded, the trial would probably be continued, and put off, until the expense, the loss of time, and the worriment of vexatious proceedings, would be more than the slave is worth. The language of Mr. Chief Justice Taney, in relation to an action for damages by the master, is peculiarly applicable to such a trial by jury. The master "_would be compelled_," says he, "_to encounter the costs and expenses of a suit, prosecuted at a distance from his own home, and to sacrifice perhaps the value of his property in endeavoring_ to obtain compensation." This is not the kind of remedy, says he, the Const.i.tution "intended to give. The delivery of the property itself--its PROMPT AND IMMEDIATE DELIVERY--_is plainly required, and was intended to be secured_." Such prompt and immediate delivery was a part of "the customary or common law" at the time the Const.i.tution was adopted, and its framers, no doubt, intended that this practice should be enforced by the clause in question, as appears from the fact that so many of them concurred in the Act of 1793.

But if such right to a prompt and immediate delivery be guaranteed by the Const.i.tution itself, then, with all due submission, we would ask, what power has Congress to limit or abridge this right? If under and by virtue of the Const.i.tution this right to a prompt and immediate delivery be secured, then what power has Congress to say there shall _not_ be a prompt or immediate delivery? "This right of the master," says Mr. Chief Justice Taney, "being given by the Const.i.tution of the United States, NEITHER CONGRESS NOR A STATE LEGISLATURE CAN BY ANY LAW OR REGULATION IMPAIR IT OR RESTRICT IT." If this be sound doctrine,--and such we hold it to be,--then Congress has no const.i.tutional power to impair or restrict the right in question, by giving the fugitive slave a trial by jury in the State to which he may have fled. This would not be to give a "prompt and immediate delivery," such as the Supreme Court declares the master is ent.i.tled to by the Const.i.tution itself; it would be either to give no delivery at all, or else one attended with such delays, vexations, and costs, as would materially impair, if not wholly annihilate, the right in question.

It is right and proper, we think, that questions arising exclusively under our own laws should be tried in our own States and by our own tribunals. Hence we shall never consent, unless constrained by the judicial decision of the Supreme Court of the Union, to have such questions tried in States whose people and whose juries may, perhaps, be hostile to our interests and to our domestic inst.i.tutions. For we are SOVEREIGN as well as they.

Only conceive such a trial by jury in a Northern State, with such an advocate for the fugitive slave as Mr. Chase, or Mr. Sumner, or some other flaming abolitionist! There sits the fugitive slave,--"one of the heroes of the age," as Mr. Sumner calls him, and the very embodiment of persecuted innocence. On the other hand is the master,--the vile "slave-hunter," as Mr. Sumner delights to represent him, and whom, if possible, he is determined "to blast with contempt, indignation, and abhorrence." The trial begins. The advocate appeals to the prejudices and the pa.s.sions of the jury. He denounces slavery--about which neither he nor the jury know any thing--as the epitome of all earthly wrongs, as the sum and substance of all human woes. Now, suppose that on the jury there is _only one man_, who, like the Vermont judge, requires "a bill of sale from the Almighty" before he will deliver up a fugitive slave; or who, like Mr. Seward, sets his own private opinion above the Const.i.tution of his country; or who, like Mr. Sumner, has merely sworn to support the supreme law as he understands it; and who, at the same time, possesses his capacity to understand it just exactly as he pleases: then what chance would the master have for a verdict? Just none at all. For that one man, however clear the master's evidence, would hang the jury, and the cause would have to be tried over again.

But suppose the whole twelve jurors should decide according to the law and the evidence, and give a verdict in favor of the claimant; would his rights then be secured? Very far from it. For there is the eager crowd, which never fails to flock to such trials, and which the inflammatory eloquence of the advocate has now wrought into a frenzy. Cannot such crowd, think you, furnish a mob to effect by force what every member of the jury had refused to accomplish by falsehood? If the master--if the abhorred "slave-hunter"--should escape from such a crowd with a sound body only, and without his property, he ought, we think, to deem himself exceedingly fortunate.

Mr. Winthrop, of Ma.s.sachusetts, has advocated a trial by jury in such cases. He was, no doubt, perfectly sincere in the belief expressed by him, that under such a provision more fugitive slaves would be reclaimed than under the law as it now stands. But it is equally certain that neither Mr. Seward nor Mr. Chase was of this opinion when the one proposed, and the other voted for, a trial by jury in such cases.

Neither of these Senators, we think we may confidently affirm, intended to aid the master in reclaiming his fugitive slaves.

"At any rate, sir," says Mr. Winthrop, "I shall vote for the amendment offered by the Senator from New Jersey, as right and just in itself, whatever may be its effects." That is to say, whatever may be the effect of a jury trial in such cases, he means to vote for it _as right and just in itself_! Whether this were a burst of pa.s.sion merely, or the deliberate conviction of the author of it, we are not able to determine, but we shall trust it was the former. For surely such an opinion, if deliberately entertained, is creditable neither to a Senator nor to a jurist. Neither this, nor any other mode of trial, is "right in itself;"

and when right at all, it is only so as a means to an end. It is only right when it subserves the great end of justice; and if it fail to answer this end it is then worse than worthless. Hence the statesman who declares that, "_whatever may be the effects_" of a particular mode of trial, he will nevertheless support it "as right and just in itself,"

thereby announces that he is prepared to sacrifice the end to the means,--a sentiment which, we venture to affirm, is more worthy of a fanatical declaimer than of the high-minded and accomplished Senator by whom it was uttered.

The great objection urged against the Fugitive Slave Law is that under it a freeman may be seized and reduced to slavery. This law, as well as every other, may, no doubt, be grossly abused, and made a cover for evil deeds. But is there no remedy for such evil deeds. Is there no protection for the free blacks of the North, except by a denial of the clear and unquestionable const.i.tutional rights of the South? If not, then we should be willing to submit; but there is a remedy against such foul abuse of the law of Congress in question, and, as we conceive, a most ample remedy.

The master may recapture his fugitive slave. This is his const.i.tutional right. But, in the language of the Supreme Court of New York, already quoted, if a villain, under cover of a pretended right, proceeds to carry off a freeman, he does so "_at his peril, and would be answerable like any other trespa.s.ser or kidnapper_." He must be caught, however, before he can be punished. Let him be caught, let the crime be proved upon him, and we would most heartily concur in the law by which he should himself be doomed to slavery for life in the penitentiary.

The Fugitive Slave Law is not the only one liable to abuse. The innocent may be, and often have been, arrested for crime; but this is no reason why the law of arrest should be abolished, or even impaired in its operation. Nay, innocent persons have often been maliciously prosecuted; yet no one, on this account, ever dreamed of throwing obstacles in the way of prosecution for crime. The innocent have been made the victims of perjury; but who imagines that all swearing in courts of justice should therefore be abolished? Such evils and such crimes are sought to be remedied by separate legislation, and not by undermining the laws of which they are the abuses. In like manner, though we wish to see the free blacks of the North protected, and would most cheerfully lend a helping hand for that purpose, yet, at the same time, we would maintain our own const.i.tutional rights inviolate. The villain who, under cover of the law made for the protection of our rights, should seek to invade the rights of Northern freemen, is as much abhorred by us as by any abolitionists on earth. Nor, on the other hand, have we any sympathy with those who, under cover of a law _to be made_ for the protection of the free blacks of the North, seek to invade the rights of the South. We have no sympathy with either cla.s.s of kidnappers.

Is it not wonderful that, while the abolitionists of the North create and keep up so great a clamor about the danger their free blacks are in, they do so little, and ask so little, either by legislation or otherwise, in order to protect them, except in such manner, or by such legislation, as shall aim a deadly blow at the rights and interests of the South? If they really wish to protect their free blacks, and if the laws are not already sufficient for that purpose, we are more than willing to a.s.sist in the pa.s.sage of more efficient ones. But we are not willing to abandon the great right which the Const.i.tution spreads, like an impenetrable s.h.i.+eld, over Southern property to the amount of sixteen hundred millions of dollars.

The complaint in regard to the want of protection for the free blacks of the North is without just foundation. In the case of Jack _v._ Martin, decided in the Court of Errors of New York, we find the following language, which is here exactly in point:--"It was contended on the argument of this cause, with great zeal and earnestness, that, under the law of the United States, a freeman might be dragged from his family and home into captivity. This is supposing an extreme case, as I believe it is not pretended any such ever has occurred, or that any complaint of that character has ever been made; at all events, I cannot regard it as a very potent argument. The same position might as well be taken in the case of a fugitive from justice. It might be a.s.sumed that he was an innocent man, and ent.i.tled to be tried by a jury of the State where he was arrested, to ascertain whether he had violated the laws of the State from which he fled; whereas the fact is, the executive of this State would feel bound to deliver up the most exalted individual in this State, (however well satisfied he might be of his innocence,) if a requisition was made upon him by the executive of another State."

In the same case, when before the Supreme Court of New York, the court said: "In the case under review, the proceedings are before a magistrate of our own State, presumed to possess a sympathy with his fellow-citizens, and _where, upon the supposition that a freeman is arrested, he may readily procure the evidence of his freedom_. If the magistrate should finally err in granting the certificate, _the party can still resort to the protection of the national judiciary. The proceedings by which his rights have been invaded being under a law of Congress, the remedy for error or injustice belongs peculiarly to that high tribunal._ UNDER THEIR AMPLE s.h.i.+ELD, THE APPREHENSION OF CAPTIVITY AND OPPRESSION CAN NOT BE ALARMING."

It is evident that when this opinion was p.r.o.nounced by the Supreme Court of New York, it had not fathomed the depths of some men's capacity of being alarmed by apprehensions of captivity and oppression. The abolitionists will, whether or no, be most dreadfully alarmed. But the danger consists, not in the want of laws and courts to punish the kidnapper, but in the want of somebody to catch him. If he does all the mischief ascribed to him by the abolitionists, is it not wonderful that he is not caught by them? Rumor, with her thousand tongues, is clamorous about his evil deeds; and fanatical credulity, with her ten thousand ears, gives heed to the reports of rumor. But yet, somehow or other, the abolitionists, with all their fiery, restless zeal, never succeed in laying their hands on the offender himself. He must, indeed, be a most adroit, a most cunning, a most wonderful rogue. He boldly goes into a community in which so many are all eye, all ear, and all tongue, in regard to the black man's rights; he there steals a free negro, who himself has the power to tell when, where, and how, he became free; and yet, in open day, and amid ten thousand flaming guardians of freedom,[227] he escapes with perfect impunity! Is he not a most marvelous proper rogue? But perhaps the reason the abolitionists do not lay hands on him is that he is an imaginary being, who, though intangible and invisible, will yet serve just as well to create an alarm and keep up a great excitement as if he were a real personage.

-- IV. _The duty of the Citizen in regard to the Const.i.tution of the United States._

The Const.i.tution, it is agreed on all sides, is "the supreme law of the land,"--of every State in the Union. The first duty of the citizen in regard to the Const.i.tution is, then, to respect and obey each and every one of its provisions. If he repudiates or sets at naught this or that provision thereof, because it does not happen to agree with his own views or feelings, he does not respect the Const.i.tution at all; he makes his own will and pleasure the supreme law. The true principle of loyalty resides not in his bosom. We may apply to him, and to the supreme law of the land, the language of an inspired apostle, that "whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all."

He is guilty of all, because, by his willful disobedience in the one instance, he sets at naught the authority by which the whole was ordained and established.

In opposing the Fugitive Slave Law, it is forgotten by the abolitionists that, if no such law existed, the master would have, under the Const.i.tution itself, the same right to reclaim his fugitive from labor, and to reclaim him in the same summary manner; for, as we have seen, the Supreme Court of the United States has decided that by virtue of the Const.i.tution alone the master has a right to pursue and reclaim his fugitive slave, without even a writ or legal process. Hence, in opposing the Fugitive Slave Law because it allows a summary proceeding in such cases, the abolitionists really make war on the Const.i.tution. The battery which they open against the Const.i.tution is merely masked behind the Fugitive Slave Law; and thus the nature of their attack is concealed from the eyes of their non-legal followers.

But, says Mr. Chase, of Ohio, I do not agree with the Supreme Court of the United States. I oppose not the Const.i.tution, but the decision of the Supreme Court. "A decision of the Supreme Court," says he, "cannot alter the Const.i.tution." This is very true; but then, on the other hand, it is equally true that neither can his opinion alter the Const.i.tution. But here the question arises, which is the rule of conduct for the true and loyal citizen,--the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, or the opinion of Governor Chase? We decidedly prefer the former. "Sir," says Mr. Chase, "when gentlemen from the slave States ask us to support the Const.i.tution, I fear they mean only their _construction_ of the Const.i.tution." We mean not so. We mean neither _our_ nor _his_ construction of the Const.i.tution, but that construction only which has been given to it by the highest judicial tribunal in the land, by the supreme and final arbiter in all such conflicts of opinion.

But Mr. Chase opposes argument as well as opinion to the decision of the Supreme Court in regard to slavery. "What more natural," says he, "than that gentlemen from the slave States, in view of the questions likely to come before the Supreme Court, should desire that a majority of its members might have interests like those which they would desire to maintain! _Certain it is that some care has been taken to secure such a const.i.tution of the court, and not without success._" If Mr. Chase, or any other abolitionist, should insinuate that the decision in question is owing to such an unfair const.i.tution of the Supreme Court, the answer is as easy and triumphant as the accusation would be infamous and vile; for, as is well known, the very decision which is so obnoxious to his sentiments was delivered by the great jurist of Ma.s.sachusetts, Mr.

Justice Story, and was concurred in by the other Northern members of the Court. This is not all. How did it happen that substantially the same decision has been rendered by the Supreme Courts of New York, Ma.s.sachusetts, and Pennsylvania? Were these high tribunals also const.i.tuted with reference to the peculiar interests of the South?

The question is not whether the decision of the Supreme Court, or the opinion of Mr. Chase, the more perfectly reflects the Const.i.tution. Even if he were infallible, as the Supreme Court certainly is not, we, the people of the United States, have not agreed that he shall decide such questions for us. And besides, it would be difficult, perhaps, to persuade the people that he is, for the determination of such questions, any more happily const.i.tuted than the Supreme Court itself, with all the manifold imperfections of its Southern members. But, however this may be, it is certain that until the people shall be so persuaded, and shall agree to abide by his opinions, it is the duty of the good citizen to follow the decisions of the great judicial tribunal provided by the Const.i.tution of his country.

If you, good citizen of the North, have a right to set up your opinion in opposition to such decisions, then I have the same right, and so has every other member of the commonwealth. Thus, as many constructions of the Const.i.tution would necessarily result as there are individual opinions in the land. Law and order would be at an end; a chaos of conflicting elements would prevail, and every man would do that which seemed right in his own eyes. The only escape from such anarchy is a just and loyal confidence in the judicial tribunals of the land--is a subjection of the intense egotism of the individual to the will of the nation, as expressed in the Const.i.tution and expounded by the const.i.tutional authorities. Hence, we mean to support the Const.i.tution, not as _we_ understand it nor as _you_ understand it, but as it is understood by the Supreme Court of the United States. Such, it seems to us, is the only wise course--nay, is the imperative duty--of every citizen who does not intend to disorganize the fundamental law and revolutionize the government of his country.

It may be supposed, perhaps, by those who have reflected little on the subject, that the controversy respecting the Fugitive Slave Law is merely about the value of a few slaves. It is, in our opinion, far otherwise; it is a great const.i.tutional question; and hence the deep interest which it has excited throughout the nation, as well as in the Senate of the United States. It is a question, as it appears to us, whether the Const.i.tution or the abolitionists shall rule the country.

The Fugitive Slave Law is, as we have seen, surrounded by the strongest possible evidences of its const.i.tutionality; and hence, if this may be swept away as unconst.i.tutional by the pa.s.sions of a mad faction, then may every other legal defence be leveled before like storms, and all security annihilated. Hence, as the friends of law and order, we intend to take our stand right here, and defend this Act, which, although despised and abhorred by a faction, has received the sanction of the fathers, as well as of the great judicial tribunals, of the land.

We are asked to repeal this law--ay, by the most violent agitator of the North we are asked to repeal this law--for "_the sake of tranquillity and peace_!" But how can this bring peace? Suppose this law were repealed; would tranquillity be restored? We have not forgotten--nor can we be so easily made to forget--that this very agitator himself has declared, that slavery is "a wrong so transcendent" that no truce is to be allowed to it so long as it occupies a single foot of ground in the United States. Is it not, then, a delusive prospect of peace which is offered to us in exchange for the law in question?

Nor can we forget what other agitators have uttered respecting the abolition of slavery in the Southern States. "Slavery," said Mr. Seward, at a ma.s.s-meeting in Ohio, "can be limited to its present bounds; it can be ameliorated. It can be--and it _must_ be--ABOLISHED, and you and I can and _must_ do it." Does this look like peace, if the Fugitive Slave Law were only out of the way? Mr. Seward, from his place in the Senate of the United States, tells us how we must act among the people of the North, if, in reclaiming our fugitive slaves, we would not disturb their peace. But he had already exhorted the people of the North to "extend a cordial welcome" to our fugitive slaves, and to "defend them as they would their household G.o.ds." What, then, does he mean by peace?

This outcry, indeed, that the peace of the country is disturbed by the Fugitive Slave Law, is as great a delusion as ever was attempted to be palmed off on any people. If this law were repealed to-morrow, would agitation cease? Would the abolitionists of the North cease to proclaim that their doors are open, and their hospitality is ready, to receive the poor benighted blacks? (the blacks of the South, we mean; for we have never heard of their open doors, or cordial hospitality, for the poor free blacks of their own neighborhood.) But we have heard--from Dr.

Channing himself--of "a convention at the North, of highly respected men, preparing and publis.h.i.+ng an address to the slaves, in which they are exhorted to fly from bondage, and to _feel no scruple in seizing and using horse or boat which may facilitate their escape_." Now, if the Fugitive Slave Law were repealed, would all such proceedings cease? Or if, under the Const.i.tution as expounded by the Supreme Courts of the Union and of New York, and without any such law to back him, the master should seek to reclaim his property, would he be welcomed, or hooted and resisted, by the defenders of the fugitive from service? Let these things be considered, and it will be evident, we think, that the repeal of the law in question would only invite further aggressions, and from this prostrate outpost the real enemies of the peace of the country would march, if possible, over every other defense of the Const.i.tution.

Hence, although we most ardently desire harmony and concord for the States of the Union, we shall never seek it by a surrender of the Const.i.tution or the decisions of the Supreme Court. If it cannot be found under these, it cannot be found at all. Mr. Chase a.s.sures us, indeed, that just so long as the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Prigg prevails, we must "encounter difficulties, and serious difficulties."[228] If it must be so, then so be it. If the question be whether the decisions of the Supreme Court, or the dictation of demagogues, shall rule our destinies, then is our stand taken and our purpose immovably fixed.

We have a right to peace under the decisions of that august tribunal. It is neither right nor proper--it is contrary to every principle of natural justice--that either party to this great controversy should decide for itself. Hence, if the abolitionists will not submit to the decisions of the Supreme Court, we shall most a.s.suredly refuse submission to their arrogant dictation. We can, from our inmost hearts, respect the feelings of those of our Northern brethren who may choose to remain pa.s.sive in this matter, and leave us--by such aid as the law may afford--to reclaim our own fugitives from labor. For such we have only words of kindness and feelings of fraternal love. But as for those--and especially for those in high places--who counsel resistance to the laws and to the Const.i.tution of the Republic, we hold them guilty of a high misdemeanor, and we shall ever treat them as disturbers of the public peace, nay, as enemies of the independence, the perpetuity, the greatness, and the glory of the Union under which, by the blessing of Almighty G.o.d, we have hitherto so wonderfully prospered.

FOOTNOTES:

[209] On this point, see page 176.

[210] XIV. Wendell, Jack v. Martin, p. 528

[211] XIV. Wendell's Reports, Jack _v._ Martin.

[212] In a.s.serting that freedom is national, Mr. Sumner may perhaps mean that it is the duty of the National Government to exclude slavery from all its territories, and to admit no new State in which there are slaves. If this be his meaning, we should reply, that it is as foreign from the merits of the Fugitive Slave Law, which he proposed to discuss, as it is from the truth. The National Government has, indeed, no more power to exclude, than it has to ordain, slavery; for slavery or no slavery is a question which belongs wholly and exclusively to the sovereign people of each and every State or territory. With our whole hearts we respond to the inspiring words of the President's Message: "If the friends of the Const.i.tution are to have another struggle, its enemies could not present a more acceptable issue than that of a State, whose Const.i.tution clearly embraces a republican form of government, being excluded from the Union because its domestic inst.i.tutions may not, in all respects, comport with the ideas of what is wise and expedient entertained in some other State."

[213] Chap. ii -- x.

[214] Madison Papers, p. 1448.

[215] One member seems to have been absent from the House.

[216] Annals of Congress; 2d Congress, 1791-1793, p. 861.

[217] This error was by no means a capital one.