Essay on the Trial By Jury Part 5

[27] Blackstone says, "Our ancient Saxon laws nominally punished theft with death, if above the value of twelve pence; but the criminal was permitted to redeem his life by a pecuniary ransom, as among their ancestors, the Germans, by a stated number of cattle. Bit in the ninth year of Henry the First (1109,) this power of redemption was taken away, and all persons guilty of larceny above the value off twelve pence were directed to be hanged, which law continues in force to this day." 4 Blackstone, 238

I give this statement of Blackstone, because the latter clause may seem to militate with the idea, which the former clause corroborates, viz., that at the time of Magna Carta, fines were the usual punishment of offenses. But I think there is no probability that a law so unreasonable in itself, (unreasonable even after making all allowance for the difference in the value of money,) and so contrary to immemorial custom, could and did obtain any general or speedy acquiescence among a people who cared little for the authority of kings.

Maddox, writing of the period from William the Conqueror to John, says: "The amercement in criminal and common pleas, which were wont to be imposed during this first period and afterwards, were of so many several sorts, that it is not easy to place them under distinct heads. Let them, for methods' sake, be reduced to the heads following: Amercements for or by reason of murders and manslaughters, for misdemeanors, for disseisins, for recreancy, for breach of a.s.size, for defaults, for non-appearance, for false judgment, and for not making suit, or hue and cry. To them may be added miscellaneous amercements, for trespa.s.ses of divers kinds." 1 Maddox' History of the Exchequer, 542.

[28] c.o.ke, in his exposition of the words legem terrae, gives quite in detail the principles of the common law governing arrests, and takes it for granted that the words "nisi per legem terre" are applicable to arrests, as well as to the indictment, &c. 2 inst., 51, 52.

[29] I cite the above extract from Mr. Hallam solely for the sake of his authority for rendering the word vel by and; and not by any means for the purpose of indorsing the opinion he suggests, that legem terrae authorized "judgments by default or demurrer,*'

without the intervention of a jury. He seems to imagine that lex terrae, the common law, at the time of Magna Carta, included everything, even to the practice of courts, that is, at this day, called by the name of Common Law; whereas much of what is now called Common Law has grown up, by usurpation, since the time of Magna Carta, in palpable violation of the authority of that charter. He says, "Certainly there are many legal procedures, besides trial by jury, through which a party's goods or person may be taken." Of course there are now many such ways, in which a party's goods or person are taken, besides by the judgment of a jury; but the question is, whether such takings are not in violation of Magna Carta.

He seems to think that, in cases of "judgment by default or demurrer," there is no need of a jury, and thence to infer that legem terrae may not have required a jury in those cases. But this opinion is founded on the erroneous idea that juries are required only for determining contested facts, and not for judging of the law. In case of default, the plaintif must present a prima facie case before he is ent.i.tled to a judgment; and Magna Carta, (supposing it to require a jury trial in civil cases, as Mr. Hallam a.s.sumes that it does,) as much requires that this prima facie case, both law and fact, be made out to the satisfaction of a jury, as it does that a contested case shall be.

As for a demurrer, the jury must try a demurrer (having the advice and a.s.sistance of the court, of course) as much as any other matter of law arising in a case.

Mr. Hallam evidently thinks there is no use for a jury, except where there is a "trial" meaning thereby a contest on matters of fact. His language is, that "there are many legal procedures, besides trial by jury, through which a party's goods or person may be taken." Now Magna Carta says nothing of trial by jury; but only of the judgment, or sentence, of a jury. It is only by inference that we come to the conclusion that there must be a trial by jury. Since the jury alone can give the judgment, or sentence, we infer that they must try the case; because otherwise they would be incompetent, and would have no moral right, to give judgment.

They must, therefore, examine the grounds, (both of law and fact,) or rather try the grounds, of every action whatsoever, whether it be decided on "default, demurrer," or otherwise, and render their judgment, or sentence, thereon, before any judgment can be a legal one, on which "to take a party's goods or person." In short, the principle of Magna Carta is, that no judgment can be valid against a party's goods or person, (not even a judgment for costs,) except a judgment rendered by a jury. Of course a jury must try every question, both of law and fact, that is involved in the rendering of that judgment. They are to have the a.s.sistance and advice of the judges, so far as they desire them; but the judgment itself must be theirs, and not the judgment of the court.

As to "process of attachment for contempt," it is of course lawful for a judge, in his character of a peace officer, to issue a warrant for the arrest of a man guilty of a contempt, as he would for the arrest of any other offender, and hold him to bail, (or, in default of bail, commit him to prison,) to answer for his offence before a jury. Or he may order him into custody without a warrant when the offence is committed in the judge's presence.

But there is no reason why a judge should have the power of punis.h.i.+ng, for contempt, any more than for any other offence. And it is one of the most dangerous powers a judge can have, because it gives him absolute authority in a court of justice, and enables him to tyrannize as he pleases over parties, counsel, witnesses, and jurors. If a judge have power to punish for contempt, and to determine for himself what is a contempt, the whole administration of justice (or injustice, if he choose to make it so) is in his hands.

And all the rights of jurors, witnesses, counsel, and parties, are held subject to his pleasure, and can be exercised only agreeably to his will. He can of course control the entire proceedings in, and consequently the decision of, every cause, by restraining and punis.h.i.+ng every one, whether party, counsel, witness, or juror, who presumes to offer anything contrary to his pleasure.

This arbitrary power, which has been usurped and exercised by judges to punish for contempt, has undoubtedly had much to do in subduing counsel into those servile, obsequious, and cowardly habits, which so universally prevail among them, and which have not only cost so many clients their rights, but have also cost the people so many of their liberties.

If any summary, punishment for contempt be ever necessary, (as it probably is not,) beyond exclusion for the time being from the court-room, (which should be done, not as a punishment, but for self-protection, and the preservation of order,) the judgment for it should be given by the jury, (where the trial is before a jury,) and not by the court, for the jury, and not the court, are really the judges. For the same reason, exclusion from the court-room should be ordered only by the jury, in cases when the trial is before a jury, because they, being the real judges and triers of the cause, are ent.i.tled, if anybody, to the control of the court-room. In appeal courts, where no juries sit, it may be necessary not as a punishment, but for self-protection, and the maintenance of order that the court should exercise the power of excluding a person, for the time being, from the court-room; but there is no reason why they should proceed to sentence him as a criminal, without his being tried by a jury.

If the people wish to have their rights respected and protected in courts of justice, it is manifestly of the last importance that they jealously guard the liberty of parties, counsel, witnesses, and jurors, against all arbitrary power on the part of the court.

Certainly Mr. Hallam may very well say that "one may doubt whether these (the several eases he has mentioned) were in contemplation of the framers of Magna Carta " that is, as exceptions to the rule requiring that all judgmcnts, that are to be enforced "against a party's goods or person,", be rendered by a jury.

Again, Mr. Hallam says, if the word vel, be rendered by and,, "the meaning will be, that no person shall be disseized, &c., except upon a lawful cause of action.", This is true; but it does not follow that any cause of action, founded on statute only,, is therefore a "lawful, cause of action," within the meaning of legem terrae, , or the Common Law., Within the meaning of the legem terrae, of Magna Carta, nothing but a common law, cause of action is a "lawful", one.

CHAPTER III. ADDITIONAL PROOFS OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF JURORS

If any evidence, extraneous to the history and language of Magna Carta, were needed. to prove that, by that chapter which guaranties the trial by jury, all was meant that has now been ascribed to it, and that the legislation of the king was to be of no authority with the jury beyond what they chose to allow to it, and that the juries were to limit the punishments to be inflicted, we should find that evidence in various sources, such as the laws, customs, and characters of their ancestors on the continent, and of the northern Europeans generally; in the legislation and customs that immediately succeeded Magna Carta; in the oaths that have at different times been administered to jurors, &c;., &c;. This evidence can be exhibited here but partially. To give it all would require too much s.p.a.ce and labor

SECTION I

Weakness of the Regal Authority.

Hughes, in his preface to his translation of Horne's "Mirror of Justices," (a book written in the time of Edward I, 1272 to 1307,) giving a concise view of the laws of England generally, says:

"Although in the Saxon's time I find the usual words of the acts then to have been edictum, (edict,) const.i.tutio, (statute,) little mention being made of the commons, yet I further find that, tum demum Leges vim et vigorem habuerunt, c.u.m fuerunt non modo inst.i.tutae sed firmatae approbatione communitatis." (The laws had force and vigor only when they were not only enacted, but confirmed by the approval of the community.)

The Mirror of Justices itself also says, (ch. 1, sec. 3,) in speaking "Of the first Const.i.tutions of the Ancient King."

"Many ordinances were made by many kings, until the time of the king that now is (Edward I.); the which ordinances were abused, or not used by many, nor very current, because they were not put in writing, and certainly published." Mirror of Justices, p. 6.

Hallam says:

"The Franks, Lombards, and Saxons seem alike to have been jealous of judicial authority; and averse to surrendering what concerned every man's private right, out of the hands of his neighbors and equals." 1 Middle Ages, 271.

The "judicial authority," here spoken of, was the authority of the kings, (who at that time united the office of both legislators and judges,), and not of a separate department of government, called the judiciary, like what has existed in more modern times. [1]

Hume says:

"The government of the Germans, and that of all the northern nations, who established themselves on the ruins of Rome, was always extremely free; and those fierce people, accustomed to independence and inured to arms, were more guided by persuasion, than authority, in the submission which they paid to their princes. The military despotism, which had taken place n the Roman empire, and which, previously to the irruption of those conquerors, had sunk the genius of men, and destroyed every n.o.ble principle of science and virtue, was unable to resist the vigorous efforts of a free people, and Europe, as from a new epoch, rekindled her ancient spirit, and shook off the base servitude to arbitrary will and authority under which she had so long labored. The free const.i.tutions then established, however impaired by the encroachments of succeeding princes, still preserve an air of independence and legal administration, which distinguished the European nations; and if that part of the globe maintain sentiments of liberty, honor, equity, and valor, superior to the rest of mankind, it owes these advantages chiefly to the seeds implanted by those generous barbarians.

"The Saxons, who subdued Britain, as they enjoyed great liberty in their own country, obstinately retained that invaluable possession in their new settlement; and they imported into this island the same principles of independence, which they had inherited from their ancestors. The chieftains, ( for such they were, more than kings or princes,) who commanded them in those military expeditions, still possessed a very limited authority; and as the Saxons exterminated, rather than subdued the ancient inhabitants, they were, indeed, transplanted into a new territory, but preserved unaltered all their civil and military insfitutions. The language was pure Saxon; even the names of places, which often remain while the tongue entirely changes, were almost all affixed by the conquerors; the manners and customs were wholly German; and the same picture of a fierce and bold liberty, which is drawn by the masterly pen of Tacitus, will suit those founders of the English government. The king, so far from being invested with arbitrary power, was only considered as the first among the citizens; his authority depended more on his personal qualities than on his station; he was even so far on a level with the people, that a stated price was fixed for his head, and a legal fine was levied upon his murderer, which though proportionate to his station, and superior to that paid for the life of a subject, was a sensible mark of his subordination to the community." 1 Hume, Appendix, l.

Stuart says:

"The Saxons brought along with them into Britain their own customs, language, and civil inst.i.tutions. Free in Germany, they renounced not their independence, when they had conquered.

Proud from victory, and with their swords in their hands, would they surrender their liberties to a private man? Would temporary laders, limited in their powers, and unprovided in resources, ever think to usurp an authority over warriors, who considered themselves as their equals, were impatient of control, and attached with devoted zeal to their privileges? Or, would they find leisure to form resolutions, or opportunities to put them in practice, amidst the tumult and confusion of those fierce and b.l.o.o.d.y wars, which their nations first waged with the Britons, and then engaged in among themselves? Sufficiently flattered in leading the armies of their countrymen, the ambition of commanders could as little suggest such designs, as the liberty of the people could submit to them. The conquerors of Britain retained their independence; and this island saw itself again in that free state in which the Roman arms had discovered it.

"The same firmness of character, and generosity of manners, which, in general, distinguished the Germans, were possessed in an eminent degree by the Saxons; and while we endeavor to unfold their political inst.i.tutions, we must perpetually turn our observation to that masterly picture in which the Roman historian has described these nations. In the woods of Germany shall we find the principles which directed the state of land, in the different kingdoms of Europe; and there shall we find the foundation of those ranks of men, and of those civil arrangements, which the barbarians everywhere established; and which the English alone have had the good fortune, or the spirit, to preserve." Stuart on the Const.i.tution of england, p. 59 - 61.

"Kings they (the Germans) respected as the first magistrates of the state; but the authority possessed by them was narrow and limited." Ditto, p. 134.

"Did he, (the king,) at any time, relax his activity and martial ardor, did he employ his abilities to the prejudice of his nation, or fancy he was superior to the laws; the same power which raised him to honor, humbled and degraded him. The customs and councils of his country pointed out to him his duty; and if he infringed on the former, or disobeyed the latter, a fierce people set aside his authority.

"His long hair was the only ornament he affected, and to be foremost to attack an enemy was his chief distinction.

Engaged in every hazardous expedition, he was a stranger to repose; and, rivalled by half the heroes of his tribe, he could obtain little power. Anxious and watchful for the public interest, he felt every moment his dependence, and gave proofs of his suhmission.

"He attended the general a.s.sembly of his nation, and was allowed the privilege to harangue it first; but the arts of persuasion, though known and respected by a rude people, were unequally opposed to the prejudices and pa.s.sions of men." Ditto, p. 135 - 6.

"The authority of a Saxon mnarch was not more considerable. The Saxons submitted not to the arbitrary rule of princes. They administered an oath to their sovereigns, which bound them to aeknowledge the laws, and to defend the rights of the church and people; and if they forgot this obligation, they forfeited their office. In both countries, a price was affixed on kings, a fine expiated their murder, as well as that of the meanest citizen; and the smallest violation of ancient usage,or the least step towards tyranny, was always dangerous, and often fatal to them."

Ditto, p. 189-40.

"They were not allowed to impose taxes on the kingdom." Ditto, p. 146.

"Like the German monarchs, they deliberated in the general a.s.sembly of the nation; but their legislative authority was not much respected; and their a.s.sent was considered in no better light than as a form. This, however, was their chief prerogative; and they employed it to acquire an ascendant in the state. To art and insinuation they turned, as their only resource, and flattered a people whom they could not awe; but address, and the abilities to persuade, were a weak compensation for the absence of real power.

"They declared war, it is said, and made peace. In both cases, however, they acted as the instruments of the state, and put in execution the resolutions which its councils had decreed. If, indeed, an enemy had invaded the kingdoms, and its glory and its safety were concerned, the great lords took the field at the call of their sovereign. But had a sovereign declared war against a neighboring state, without requiring their advice, or if he meant to revenge by arms an insult offered to him by a subject, a haughty and independent n.o.bility refused their a.s.sistance. These they considered as the quarrels of the king, and not of the nation; and in all such emergencies he could only be a.s.sisted by his retainers and dependents." Ditto, p. 147 8.

"Nor must we imagine that the Saxon, any more than the German monarchs, succeeded each other in a lineal descent, [2] or that they disposed of the crown at their pleasure. In both countries, the free election of the people filled the throne; and their choice was the only rule by which princes reigned. The succession, accordingly, of their kings was often broken and interrupted, and their depositions were frequent and groundless.

The will of a prince whom they had long respected, and the favor they naturally transferred to his descendant, made them often advance him to the royal dignity; but the crown of his ancestor he cnsidered as the gift of the people, and neither expected nor claimed it as a right." Ditto, p. 151 3.

In Germany "It was the business of the great to command in war, and in peace they distributed justice.

"The princes in Germany were earls in England. The great contended in both countries in the number of their retainers, and in that splendor and magnificence which are so alluring to a rude people; and though they joined to set bounds to regal power, they were often animated against each other with the fiercest hatred.

To a proud and impatient n.o.bility it seemed little and unsuiting to give or accept compositions for the injuries they committed or received; and their va.s.sals adopting their resentment and pa.s.sions, war and bloodshed alone could terminate their quarrels.

What necessarily resulted from their situation in society, was continued as a privilege; and the great, in both countries, made war, of their private authority, on their enemies. The Saxon earls even carried their arms against their sovereigns; and, surrounded with retainers, or secure in fortresses and castles, they despised their resentment, and defied their power.

"The judges of the people, they presided in both countries in courts of law. [3] The particular districts over which they exerted their authority were marked out in Germany by the council of the state; and in England their jurisdiction extended over the fiefs and other territories they possessed. All causes, both civil and criminal, were tried before them; and they judged, except in cases of the utmost importance, without appeal. They were even allowed to grant pardon to criminals, and to correct by their clemency the rigors of justice. Nor did the sovereign exercise any authority in their lands. In these his officers formed no courts, and his writ was disregarded.

"They had officers, as well as the king, who collected their revenues, and added to their greatness; and the inhabitants of their lands they distinguished by the name of subjects.