William Pitt and the Great War Part 9

What Pitt and Grenville thought of Chauvelin's last effort on behalf of peace will best appear in Grenville's despatch of 28th December to Auckland at The Hague:

The tone and language of Chauvelin's note of the 27th appear calculated to accelerate a rupture, and the same conclusion seems to follow from the circ.u.mstance of M. Maret's having informed Mr. Pitt that it was not intended by the _Conseil Executif_ to charge any private agent with any commission of the nature which he had himself suggested in his first conference. I have some reason to believe that it is now intended to bring forward immediately in Holland the same question of receiving formal and official communication from the _Conseil Executif_. I trust that the answer will be conformable to opinions entertained here; and, with the view of avoiding as far as possible, any difference, however slight, in the expression of our sentiments, I shall lose no time in sending to Your Excellency the copy of the answer to M. Chauvelin when it is settled.

I cannot conclude this dispatch without again urging Your Excellency to press in the strongest manner possible upon the Dutch Ministers the necessity of immediately bringing forward their whole force. It is evident that the present intentions of France are those of aggression. Whichever of the Allies is first attacked, there can be no doubt under the present circ.u.mstances, but that they must make common cause in order to render the calamity of war short, if it is unavoidable. And if the state of the preparations of the Republic is found inadequate to the emergency, the attack will certainly be first made there where least resistance is expected. Every circ.u.mstance therefore, of interest and dignity require [_sic_] that no exertion of which the Republic can be made capable, should be spared at such a moment as the present.[159]

Evidently Grenville looked on Chauvelin's note as an ultimatum; and it is noteworthy that Pitt on 28th December refused to see Chauvelin. Our Dutch Allies, however, were by no means ready. The separate Admiralties of the Dutch Provinces had not enough men to equip, still less to man, their s.h.i.+ps; and almost their only defence lay in a British squadron which set sail for Flus.h.i.+ng on or about 29th December.[160]

For the present, then, Pitt and Grenville contented themselves with sending a stiff rejoinder to Chauvelin's note. Grenville reminded him that he had no official character in this country since the fall of the French monarchy, and that the sinister meaning of the decree of 19th November, as shown in the public reception given at Paris to the promoters of sedition in this country, was in no wise cleared away by his recent declaration, which still claimed the right to encourage disloyalty. With regard to the Scheldt question, Grenville declared again that it was of the highest importance both in point of fact and of principle; of fact, because the action of France pre-supposed her sovereignty of the Low Countries; of principle, because, if pa.s.sed over, it would give her the right to abrogate treaties at her will. The desire of England to preserve strict neutrality in French affairs was universally acknowledged, and he (Chauvelin) had not urged a single circ.u.mstance in disproof of it. But, England (continued Grenville) "will never see with indifference that France shall make herself, either directly or indirectly, sovereign of the Low Countries, or general arbitress of the rights and liberties of Europe. If France is really desirous of maintaining friends.h.i.+p and peace with England, she must show herself disposed to renounce her views of aggression and aggrandis.e.m.e.nt, and to confine herself within her own territory, without insulting other Governments, without disturbing their tranquillity, without violating their rights."[161]

This stern rebuke to the flippant claim of the French Ministers to settle the affairs of neighbouring States in accord with their own principles has often been ascribed to Pitt himself. This is doubtful. I can find no proof that he intervened directly in the affairs of the Foreign Office after the accession of Grenville, as he had done in the days of the Duke of Leeds. Perhaps the austere personality of Grenville forbade any intervention; or it may be that the two cousins were in so complete an agreement on principles that Pitt left all details to the Foreign Minister. Certain it is that he himself remained almost pa.s.sive at this time; and all the acts were the acts of Grenville. It was well known that the two men were in close touch. "I consider his lords.h.i.+p the same as Mr. Pitt," wrote Miles to Aust.[162]

More important is the question--What were the aims of the British Government for the settlement of Europe? Fortunately, we are able to answer this without a shadow of doubt. For on 29th December Grenville sent off a despatch to Whitworth at St. Petersburg referring to an effusive offer of alliance from Catharine II. Through Vorontzoff, her envoy at London, she expressed her admiration of the generous conduct of George III, and her earnest desire to help him in restoring order to Europe by means of a concert of the Powers, which might be formed at London. At the same time she found means to instruct her partisans in the British Parliament to relax their efforts against the Ministry.[163]

Pitt and Grenville were not dazzled by these proposals. The latter generously declared to Auckland that he did not believe the Opposition to be influenced by unpatriotic motives; and he doubted the sincerity of Catharine's offer.[164] Nevertheless, in view of the imminence of a French attack on Holland, Grenville decided to encourage the Czarina to form a league of the Powers; but the instructions which he sent on 29th December to Whitworth set forth aims very different from hers. He suggested that the Powers not yet at war should invite the French people to accept the following terms:

The withdrawing of their arms within the limits of the French territory: the abandoning their conquests; the rescinding any acts injurious to the sovereignty or rights of any other nations; and the giving, in some public and unequivocal manner, a pledge of their intention no longer to foment troubles and to excite disturbances against their own Governments. In return for these stipulations the different Powers of Europe who should be parties to this measure might engage to abandon all measures or views of hostility against France or interference in their internal affairs, and to maintain a correspondence or intercourse of amity with the existing powers in that country with whom such a treaty may be concluded. [If, however, France refuses to give these pledges, then the Powers will take] active measures to obtain the ends in view, and it may be considered whether, in such a case, they might not reasonably look to some indemnity for the expenses and hazards to which they would necessarily be exposed.[165]

From this remarkable p.r.o.nouncement it appears that Pitt and Grenville harboured no hostility to the French Republic as such, provided that it acted on the principles which it professed up to the end of October 1792. The ensuing acts of aggression and propagandism they unflinchingly opposed, but in the hope that the combined remonstrances of all the Powers would induce the French leaders to withdraw their untenable claims. Above all, the British Cabinet did not refuse eventually to recognize the new state of things at Paris, a point of view very far removed from the flaming royalism of Catharine II and Burke. Whether a concert of the Powers could have been formed on these moderate terms is very doubtful. What is certain is that Pitt and Grenville saw in it the chief hope of peace, and that they did not desire to force royalty on reluctant France. For them the war, if it came, was not a war of opinion--Monarchy _versus_ Republic. It was a struggle to preserve the Balance of Power, which in all ages our statesmen had seen to be incompatible with the sovereignty of France in the Low Countries. That danger averted, they were content to let France settle her own affairs, if she behaved with the like tolerance towards her neighbours.

Unhappily, these pacific and enlightened views were not accompanied by conciliatory manners. It was the bane of Pitt, and still more of Grenville, that their innate reserve often cooled their friends and heated their opponents.[166] In the case of so vain and touchy a man as Chauvelin a little affability would have gone a long way; and this was especially desirable, as he had enough support at Paris to thwart the attempt to replace him by some envoy less disliked at St. James's.

Nevertheless, they persisted in their resolve not to recognize him officially; and the Executive Council made it a point of honour to force him on the British Court. Personal questions therefore told against a peaceful settlement. Even at the end of the year 1792 it was not wholly impossible, provided that the questions in dispute were treated with open-mindedness and a desire to understand the point of view of the opponent.

Undoubtedly it was for the French Government to take the first steps towards reconciliation by retracting or toning down the decrees of 16th and 19th November and 15th December, which had brought about the crisis.

Further, the Convention ought to have seen through and thwarted the attempt of Lebrun to regain popularity by insulting Pitt in the report of 18th December. Had that body been less intent on the party manoeuvres centring in the trial of Louis XVI, it would a.s.suredly not have furthered the insidious designs of that Minister. It might have offered to recall Chauvelin, and to subst.i.tute Maret, a man known to be a _persona grata_ to Pitt. Finally, in view of the large concourse of Frenchmen now in London, reckoned at 15,000, the Executive Council would have done well to say nothing about the pa.s.sing of the Aliens Bill, obviously a precautionary measure called for by the emergency.[167]

The French Ministers took exactly the contrary course. On 30th December they decided that Chauvelin should demand the withdrawal of that measure, as contrary to the treaty of 1786; failing this, France would declare that compact at an end. They also began to prepare for an invasion of England, on a plan which came before them on 28th December; and on the last day of the year, Monge, Minister for the Navy, issued a circular letter to Friends of Liberty and Equality in the seaports. It contained pa.s.sages to the following effect:

The English Government is arming, and the King of Spain, encouraged by this, is preparing to attack us. These two tyrannical Powers, after persecuting the patriots on their own territories, think no doubt that they will be able to influence the judgment to be p.r.o.nounced on the traitor, Louis. They hope to frighten us; but no! a people which has made itself free, a people which has driven out of the bosom of France, and as far as the distant borders of the Rhine, the terrible army of the Prussians and Austrians--the people of France will not suffer laws to be dictated to them by any tyrant. The King and his Parliament mean to make war upon us. Will the English republicans suffer it? Already these free men show their discontent and the repugnance which they have to bear arms against their brothers, the French. Well! We will fly to their succour. We will make a descent in the island. We will lodge there 50,000 caps of Liberty. We will plant there the sacred tree, and we will stretch out our arms to our republican brethren. The tyranny of their Government will soon be destroyed.

What did the famous mathematician think of this effusion in the heyday of the Empire, when he became Count of Pelusium with a Westphalian estate bringing in 200,000 francs a year? A collection of the frank confessions of the _ci-devant_ Jacobins would form an entertaining volume.

Not the least piquant of them would be the criticisms of a Breton captain, Kersaint, on the bellicose speech which he launched at the Convention on 1st January 1793. Admitting that Pitt really wanted peace, while Fox only desired to abase his rival, he averred that the Prime Minister would try to arrest France in her rapid career of land conquest either by a naval war or by an armed mediation. War, said Kersaint, must result, were it only from the perplexities of Pitt and the hatred of George III for the French Republic. France, then, must threaten to free the Scottish and Irish nations which England had so long oppressed. The Republic could appeal with telling effect to the English sailors not to fight against the champions of the Rights of Man. Further, France need not fear the British Empire; for it is vulnerable in every sea, on all the continental markets, while France stands four-square, rooted in her fertile soil. Let them, then, attack the sources of British wealth which are easily a.s.sailable. "The credit of England rests upon fict.i.tious wealth, the real riches of that people are scattered everywhere....

Asia, Portugal and Spain are the best markets for English products....

We must attack Lisbon and the Brazils, and carry an auxiliary army to Tippoo Sultan." As for Spain (continued Kersaint) she could be paralysed by the revolutionizing of Spanish America--the suggestion of Miranda to Dumouriez. In fact, Frenchmen need not fear war with all Governments.

Open enmity was better than neutrality. This war would "regulate the destiny of nations and found the liberty of the world." Accordingly he proposed to offer to England either war or an alliance; to equip thirty sail of the line and twenty-four frigates; and to form a Committee of General Defence. The Convention a.s.sented to this last and referred the other questions to it.

Thus opened the terrible year, 1793. The circular letter of Monge and the speech of Kersaint furnished the weather-gauge for the future. In them we detect the mental exaltation, the boundless daring, the overwrought conviction of their neighbours' weakness, which were to carry Frenchmen up to bewildering heights of glory and overwhelm them in final disaster. We behold in awful perspective the conquest of Holland, Italy, and Central Europe, the Irish Rebellion, the Egyptian Expedition, the war on British commerce, culminating in the Continental System, with its ensuing campaigns in Spain and Russia, and the downfall of Napoleon.

All this and more can be seen dimly, as in a crystal globe, in that fateful phrase of Kersaint--"The credit of England rests upon fict.i.tious wealth."

Turning to the last details that preceded the declaration of war, we notice that on 7th January Chauvelin, acting on the order of Lebrun, sent in a sharp protest against the Aliens Bill as an infraction of Pitt's Treaty of Commerce of 1786. On one count Chauvelin certainly had a right to complain; for, strange to say, the Act was put in operation against Talleyrand, nominally his adviser, and the champion of the Anglo-French _entente_. The ex-Bishop of Autun penned an eloquent protest, which apparently had some effect, for he was not expelled until March 1794.[168] Far more incisive was Chauvelin's complaint. We can imagine his feelings when Grenville curtly declined to receive it.[169]

At the same time Grenville refused to discuss or explain the stoppage of certain cargoes of grain destined for French ports. His private correspondence with Auckland shows that this measure was due to the fear that the French would store the corn for the use of the army that was threatening Holland. That motive of course could not be disclosed to Chauvelin; and Grenville declined to explain it at all until the resolutions arrived at in Paris were clearly set forth.

On Sunday, 13th January, Chauvelin received from Lebrun a long despatch, drawn up in less provoking terms than the last. He sought an informal interview with Grenville, which was immediately granted. Grenville's. .h.i.therto unpublished account of the interview may be quoted in full, as it enables us to see the _nuances_ of the situation:

_Jan. 13, 1793._[170]

M. Chauvelin as soon as he came into my room began by stating that he was desirous of explaining that all his steps subsequent to the date of my letter of Dec. 31 had been taken in consequence of positive instructions from the _Conseil Executif_, given before they had received that letter. That they had seen in that letter one thing which had been satisfactory to them, notwithstanding the other things of which they might complain--this was the a.s.surance which enabled them to reject the idea entertained by some persons in France of its being the intention of the Government here to declare war at all events.

Under this a.s.surance they had authorized him to give to their answer a form which was not liable to the exceptions which had before been taken. He then gave me the despatch from M. Le Brun.

When I had read it I told him only that the circ.u.mstances were too critical for me to say anything as to its contents except to refer him to the answer which I should be [_sic_] to give to it.

He then said that there was one other point which he was desirous of mentioning. That one of the difficulties of the present situation of the two Countries was the want of a proper channel of communication. That he himself, from having no access to the King's Ministers, was frequently unable to give accounts of their real views and intentions. That he was therefore to desire the permission to see me often _sous la meme forme_ that he had now come [_sic_].

I told him that this was a point on which I was unwilling to take upon myself personally to give him an answer; but that he should have one; and in order to avoid mistakes I repeated to him the phrase, that his request was to see me _sous la meme forme_. He said "yes," and that this was conceived to be a means of arriving sooner at the object of his being allowed to present to the King the _lettres de creance_ with which he was charged. As he did not express this quite distinctly, I asked him again whether I understood him right; that his present request was only to communicate under the form in which he now came. He again a.s.sented to this, but in doing it threw out that he had _almost_ had direct orders from the _Conseil Executif_ to apply for permission to present his letters. He however expressly a.s.sented to my statement that the other was at present his only request.

Nothing else material pa.s.sed, except justifications of himself from the imputation of treating on public business with some persons in this country with whom he had connections of private friends.h.i.+p and intercourse, and complaints of the manner in which he was treated in the newspapers. To neither of these points I said anything.[171]

It is not surprising that Grenville asked for time to consult his colleagues (probably also the King) before returning an answer to Lebrun's missive; for, though un.o.bjectionable in form, it re-affirmed the French claims and justified all the proceedings of that Government.

Lebrun accused the Pitt Cabinet of raising difficulties of form and of discovering hostile intentions where none existed. While repudiating the notion of annexing Belgium, he firmly adhered to the Scheldt decree.

France, he declared, would respond to all appeals which emanated from the general will of a nation, and he even a.s.serted that she could treat only with a Government which "is deemed the organ of the general will of the nation governed." If her efforts for peace failed, she would fight England with regret but without fear.[172]

In effect, then, this despatch held out no hope of a reconciliation.

There came with it, however, a long and rambling letter from Maret to Miles, which was intended partly to threaten, partly to cajole the Ministry. In its more dulcet pa.s.sages the hope was set forth that the Scheldt affair could be settled, and even that Chauvelin might be replaced by the estimable Barthelemy. Miles, highly elated, hurried to the Foreign Office on that momentous Sunday, 13th January, and found that a Cabinet meeting was proceeding. Pitt came out and cordially received Maret's note. He returned to the Cabinet meeting (at which, strange to say, Burke was present) but came out again "furious, freighted with the bile of the whole Cabinet," and forbade Miles to have any dealings with the French Executive Council.[173]

How are we to explain this change from affability to anger? The impressionable Miles believed that in that hour Pitt capitulated to Burke and became a man of war. The reader who takes the trouble to compare Lebrun's note with that of Maret will probably come to another conclusion, namely, that the latter seems very like a device to throw the British Ministry off its guard. The terms of the two notes are widely divergent; and, in such a case, Pitt naturally accepted that of Lebrun and scouted that of Maret, as of a busybody or an intriguer.

Grenville objected to this double-dealing;[174] and probably the presence of Burke at the Cabinet meeting sharpened the demand for its cessation.

Another explanation of Pitt's fury is possible. Grenville and he may have received news of the warlike preparations going on in the French seaports and on the Dutch borders. I have found no proof of this; but it is certain that by this time they must have had before them the inflammatory appeal of Monge to French and English Jacobins as well as the boastful tirade of Kersaint to the Convention. Having these proofs of the warlike ardour of the French and of their reliance on British reformers, how could Pitt and Grenville look on the philanthropic professions of Maret as anything but a snare, and Miles as his dupe?

Miles had ever been officious. Clearly the time had come to stop his fussy advances to an unofficial agent, which Lebrun might once more ascribe to Pitt's secret fear of France.

It would be interesting to discover how far Pitt and Grenville were at this time aware of the secret designs of the French Executive Council.

On this topic I have found no definite evidence. It is very unlikely that on 13th January they knew of the aggressive plans which the Executive Council had formed three days before. But it is certain that such plans were set on foot on 10th January. On that day the Executive Council drew up secret orders for Generals Dumouriez and Miranda. The former was then at Paris concerting plans for the next campaign, not for the purpose of saving Louis XVI, as he afterwards stated. Whether he fanned the warlike ardour of the Executive Council will perhaps never be known. But undoubtedly on 10th January the Executive Council bade him order his lieutenant, Miranda, to prepare for the invasion of Dutch Flanders and Walcheren within twelve days. Furnaces were to be supplied to the French gun-vessels in the Scheldt so as to beat off the frigates, whether English or Dutch is not stated.[175]

Why did not Miranda carry out this plan? Merely because he had neither stores nor food[176]--a fact which justifies the British Government in placing an embargo on the corn intended for France. Undoubtedly if he had had supplies, Miranda would have seized the lands at the mouth of the Scheldt, and cut off the retreat of the Stadholder to his place of refuge, Walcheren. It will further be observed that these orders were given at Paris three days after the despatch of Lebrun's and Maret's notes to London. The design apparently was to amuse England until a deadly blow could be struck at the Dutch. Auckland, writing on the 11th at The Hague, expressed to Grenville the hope that war might be avoided, or, if that were impossible, that the rupture should be postponed until the Austrians and Prussians had re-crossed the Rhine. The preparations of the Dutch were going on with the usual slowness.[177] Evidently the French Government counted on their traditional inertia and on the malcontents in Great Britain and Ireland. The private letters of Maret, that _soi-disant_ friend of peace, breathe full a.s.surance of victory.[178]

Grenville of course sent no answer to the last missive of Maret; but to Lebrun he replied, on 18th January, that his explanations were wholly unsatisfactory, as they maintained the right of the Executive Council to annul treaties at will. Until satisfaction were granted for the aggressions on His Majesty's ally, he would continue to take all measures needful for their common safety. The terms of this reply were doubtless due to the last news received from Paris. On 12th January the arch-intriguer, Brissot, had fired off at the Convention a warlike harangue in which he depicted the British Ministry as helpless in the midst of a discontented populace and without a friend in the world.

France could therefore easily arouse Ireland and Scotland to revolt, besides carrying liberty to India.[179] On the following day the Convention ordered the equipment of 30 sail-of-the-line and 20 frigates, and the construction of 25 sail-of-the-line and 20 frigates.

On his side Chauvelin saw the rupture to be imminent. In forwarding Grenville's despatch to Lebrun on the 19th he described his situation in London as intolerable, and added that no alternative but war was left.

His a.s.sistant, Reinhard, ended a letter of that day to Miles with the words "_M. Chauvelin leaves_." That resolve must have been strengthened by Grenville's haughty note of the 20th, stating that no special means could be taken to protect his couriers and that he must rank "among the general ma.s.s of foreigners resident in England." On the same day Grenville informed Sir James Murray, who had gone on a special mission to the Prussian headquarters, that war was likely to break out, as France "insists on terms entirely inconsistent with the Government of this country and His Majesty's dignity and honour." His Majesty is strenuously making preparations and hopes to concert plans with Prussia and Austria.[180]

Such was the state of affairs on 21st January, when Louis XVI laid his head on the block in the Place de la Revolution. The news of this tragedy reached London late in the afternoon of the 23rd; and the horror which it aroused led to a demand at the Haymarket that the farce should be put off. On the advice of the Cabinet George III now intervened. At a Court held on the morrow at the Queen's House (on the site of Buckingham Palace) an order was issued that Chauvelin, as the envoy deputed by Louis XVI, should leave the country on or before 1st February. But on or before 25th January, that is, before the news of this mandate can have reached Paris, Lebrun had decided to recall the French mission from London. On 25th January he wrote to Monsieur Greenville [_sic_] stating that, as his plenipotentiary, Chauvelin, had orders to return to Paris, Maret would proceed to London to look after the papers at the French Emba.s.sy. This statement merits attention; for it shows that Chauvelin's departure was hastened only a day or two by the King's command;[181]

and further it refutes the oft-repeated a.s.sertion that Maret came charged with offers of peace to which Pitt and Grenville paid no heed.

It will be well to examine this latter question somewhat closely. In order to understand the situation at Paris, we must remember that Dumouriez was at that time hesitating between an attack on Holland and a pacific mission to England. On 23rd January, while at Paris, he wrote two very significant letters, one to Miranda, the other to Auckland. In the former he states: "The Executive Council ... has thought of sending me as special amba.s.sador to England to make that country decide definitely for peace or war. Consequently _an order has been given for our amba.s.sador, Chauvelin, to return_. To-morrow they will send a secret agent [Maret], very well known to Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox, to ask the two parties (that is to say the whole nation) for a safe-conduct for me and an a.s.surance that I shall be welcome. As I have to ask for _yes_ or _no_, like Cato at Carthage, this mission will not last more than eight days." Pending the reply to the first question (says Dumouriez) he will set out for Dunkirk, Bruges, and Antwerp. His second letter, of the same date, is to Auckland at The Hague, stating that he knows him to be desirous of peace, as he himself is. Can they not have an interview on the Dutch frontier, near Antwerp, where he will be on 30th January?[182]

Now it is clear from Grenville's and Auckland's correspondence that Ministers paid some heed to the offer of Dumouriez. Nothing came of it owing to the arrival of news of the French declaration of war; but the proposal was at least considered.[183] There is not a line to show that Pitt and Grenville took Maret's so-called "mission" at all seriously.

For, in the first place, he had no powers, no authority to do anything more than collect the papers of the emba.s.sy. He himself gave out to Miles that he came on a "pacific mission," but he carefully refrained from telling even him what it was.[184] His biographer, Ernouf, has invested his journey to London with some importance by declaring that on 22nd January he (Maret) drew up and sent off a "despatch" to Chauvelin, stating that the French Executive Council desired peace, and that he was coming as _charge d'affaires_ to the French Emba.s.sy in London. This missive (whether signed by Lebrun is not stated) met Chauvelin on his way from London to Dover; but it produced no change whatever in his plans. He proceeded on his way to Paris, pa.s.sing Maret in the night near Abbeville. To a.s.sign much importance to his "despatch" is to overrate both his errand and his position at Paris. Maret was only one of the head clerks at the French Foreign Office and had no right to sign official despatches. If he really was charged by Lebrun to tender the olive-branch, why was not that despatch sent to London in a form and manner which would procure credence and have some effect? Again, if Maret came to restore peace, why did he not at once produce his powers?

The question was infinitely important and undeniably urgent. Instead of taking decisive action, as any well-wisher of mankind must have done at so awful a crisis, he declined to enter into particulars, and, on the plea that Chauvelin was ordered to Paris (which he himself knew before he left that city) waited for further instructions--which never came.

Finally he confessed to Miles that he came to prepare the way for Dumouriez and to discover whether that general would be a.s.sured of personal safety if he came to England.

Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus.

Such must have been the thought of Miles, when he heard this singular admission. For what trust could be placed in Dumouriez, whose conquest of Belgium--the source of the present difficulties--had by no means sated his desire for its natural sequel, the conquest of Holland? That Maret had credentials of some kind may be admitted; for he showed them to Miles and claimed to be _charge d'affaires_; but, as Miles found his powers to be "extremely limited,"[185] we may doubt whether they extended beyond the collection and transport of the archives of Portman Square. If he had any authority to treat with our Government, it is curious that he refrained from doing so merely on the ground of Chauvelin's departure. "Apprehensive that this event might derange what had been agreed upon, he despatched a messenger with a letter to Lebrun stating that _under the present circ.u.mstances, he should not think himself authorized to communicate with the British Ministers without fresh instructions_."[186]

Notwithstanding the urgency of the case, he received not a line, not even a newspaper, from Paris during his stay in London. In fact, the _soi-disant "charge d'affaires"_ of France knew so little of the real state of affairs that he a.s.sured Miles of the desire of his countrymen to give up Nice, Mainz, Worms, the Rhineland, the Scheldt, and the Low Countries[187]--at the very time (31st January) when Danton carried unanimously a decree annexing the Low Countries to the French Republic.

The explanation of the silence of Maret and the ambiguous conduct of Dumouriez may be found in the Memoirs of the latter. He states that a proposal came up in the French Executive Council at Paris on 22nd January to send him to London; but it was negatived by three votes to two. Nevertheless, he arranged with the minority (Lebrun and Garat) that he should go to Antwerp and have _pourparlers_ with Auckland preparatory to a mission to England, while Maret returned to London to pave the way for him.[188] The scheme was a private venture, proposed by Dumouriez, and favoured only by the minority of the Council. In such a case neither Dumouriez nor Maret could be invested with official functions; and it was only a last despairing effort for peace that led Maret to pose as a _charge d'affaires_ and write to Paris for "fresh instructions." This praiseworthy device did not altogether impose even on Miles, who clearly was puzzled by the air of mystery that his friend a.s.sumed.