Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965 Part 66

[Footnote 17-43: ORO-T-99, "A Preliminary Report on the Utilization of Negro Manpower," 30 Jun 51, S4-S6, copy in CMH. A draft version of a more comprehensive study on the same subject was prepared in seven volumes (ORO-R-11) in November 1951. These several doc.u.ments are usually referred to as Project CLEAR, the code name for the complete version. The decla.s.sification and eventual publication of this very important social doc.u.ment had a long and interesting history; see, for example, Memo, Howard Sacks, Office of the General Counsel, SA, for James C. Evans, 3 Nov 55, in CMH.

For over a decade a "sanitized" version of Project CLEAR remained For Official Use Only. The study was finally cleared and published under the t.i.tle _Social Research and the Desegregation of the U.S.

Army_, ed. Leo Bogart (Chicago: Markham, 1969).]

General Collins immediately accepted the Project CLEAR conclusions when presented to him verbally on 23 July 1951.[17-44] His endors.e.m.e.nt and the subsequent announcement that the Army would integrate its forces in the Far East implied a connection which did not exist.

Actually, the decision to integrate in Korea was made before Project CLEAR or the G-1 study appeared. This is not to denigrate the importance of these doc.u.ments. Their justification of integration in objective, scientific terms later helped convince Army traditionalists of the need for worldwide change and absolved the Secretary of the Army, his Chief of Staff, and his theater commander of the charge of having made a political and social rather than a military decision.[17-45]

[Footnote 17-44: ORO, "Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army: A 1951 Study" (advance draft), pp.

viii-ix, copy in CMH.]

[Footnote 17-45: Ltr, Dir, ORO, to G-3, 20 Nov 52, G-3 291.2; see also Interv, Nichols with Davis.]

_Integration of the Eighth Army_

On 14 May 1951 General Ridgway forced the issue of integration by formally requesting authority to abolish segregation in his command.

He would begin with the 24th Infantry, which he wanted to replace after rea.s.signing its men to white units in Korea. He would then integrate the other combat units and, finally, the service units. (p. 443) Where special skills were not a factor Ridgway wanted to a.s.sign his black troops throughout the theater to a maximum of 12 percent of any unit. To do this he needed permission to integrate the 40th and 45th Divisions, the federalized National Guard units then stationed in j.a.pan. He based his proposals on the need to maintain the combat effectiveness of his command where segregated units had proved ineffective and integrated units acceptable.[17-46]

[Footnote 17-46: Msg, CINCFE to DA, DA IN 12483, 14 May 51, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower in the FEC; ibid., DA IN 13036, 15 May 51, same sub. See also Ltrs, CG, Eighth Army, to CINCFE, 7 May 51, sub: Redesignation of Negro Combat Units, and Ridgway to author, 3 Dec 73, both in CMH.]

When it finally arrived, the proposal for wide-scale integration of combat units encountered no real opposition from the Army staff.

General Ridgway had rehea.r.s.ed his proposal with the G-3 when the latter visited the Far East in April. Taylor "heartily approved,"

calling the times auspicious for such a move.[17-47] Of course his office quickly approved the plan, and McAuliffe in G-1 and the rest of the staff followed suit. There was some sentiment on the staff, eventually suppressed, for retaining the 24th Infantry as an integrated unit since the statutory requirement for the four black regiments had been repealed in 1950.[17-48] The staff did insist, over the G-1's objections, on postponing the integration of the two National Guard divisions until their arrival in Korea, where the change could be accomplished through normal replacement-rotation procedures.[17-49] There were other minor complications and misunderstandings between the Far East Command and the Army staff over the timing of the order, but they were easily ironed out.[17-50]

Collins discussed the plan with the appropriate congressional chairmen, Ridgway further briefed the Secretary of Defense during General Marshall's 1951 visit to j.a.pan, and Secretary of the Army Pace kept the President informed.[17-51]

[Footnote 17-47: Ridgway, _The Korean War_, p. 192.]

[Footnote 17-48: Section 401, Army Organization Act of 1950 (PL 581, 81st Cong.), published in DA Bull 9, 6 Jul 50. See also Msg, DA to CINCFE, DA 92561, 28 May 51; G-1 Summary Sheet for CofS and SA, 14 May 51, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower; Memo for Rcd, G-1 (ca. 14 May 51). All in G-1 291.2.]

[Footnote 17-49: G-1 Summary Sheets for CofS, 18 and 23 May 51, sub: Utilization of Negro Troops in FECOM, G-1 291.2. See also Elva Stillwaugh's study, "Personnel Problems in the Korean Conflict," pp.

26-29, in CMH.]

[Footnote 17-50: See, for example, Msg, DA to CINCFE, DA 92561, 28 May 51; Msg, CINCFE to DA, C6444, 8 Jun 51.]

[Footnote 17-51: Memo, Actg CofS for SA, 28 May 51, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower, CS 291.2.]

Pace had succeeded Gordon Gray as secretary in April 1950 and partic.i.p.ated in the decisions leading to integration. A Harvard-trained lawyer with impressive managerial skills, Pace did not originate any of the Army's racial programs, but he fully supported the views of his Chief of Staff, General Collins.[17-52] Meeting with his senior civilian a.s.sistants, the G-1 and G-3 of the Army, and a.s.sistant Secretary of Defense Rosenberg on 9 June, Pace admitted that their discussions were being conducted "probably with a view to achieving complete integration in the Army." Nevertheless, he stressed a cautionary approach because "once a step was taken it was very much harder to retract." He was particularly worried about the high percentage of black soldiers, 12.5 percent of the Army's total, compared with the percentage of Negroes in the other services. He summarized the three options still under discussion in the Department of the Army: Ridgway's call for complete integration in Korea, followed by integration of Army elements in j.a.pan, with a 10 percent limit (p. 444) on black replacements; Mark Clark's proposal to s.h.i.+p black combat battalions to Korea to be used at the division commanders' discretion, with integration limited to combat-tested individuals and then only in support units; and, finally, the Army staff's decision to continue sending replacements for use as the Far East Command saw fit.

[Footnote 17-52: Interv, author with Collins.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: GENERAL RIDGWAY.]

Commenting on the Ridgway proposal, one partic.i.p.ant pointed out that a 10 percent limit on black replacements, even if integration spread to the European Command, would mean that the majority of the Army's Negroes would remain in the United States. Rosenberg, however, preferred the Ridgway plan. Stressing that it was an Army decision and that she was "no crusader," she nevertheless reminded Secretary Pace that the Army needed to show some progress. Rosenberg mentioned the threat of a Congress which might force more drastic measures upon the Army and pointedly offered to defer answering her many congressional inquisitors until the Army reached a decision.[17-53]

[Footnote 17-53: Memo for Rcd, Col James F. Collins, a.s.st to ASD (M&P), 9 Jun 51, SD 291.2.]

The decision was finally announced on 1 July 1951. A message went out to General Ridgway approving "deactivation of the 24th Infantry and your general plan for integration of Negroes into all units (with the temporary exception of the 40th and 45th Divisions)."[17-54] The staff wanted the move to be gradual, progressive, and secret to avoid any possible friction in the Eighth Army and to win general acceptance for integration. But it did not remain secret for long. In the face of renewed public criticism for its segregated units and after lengthy staff discussion, the Army announced the integration of the Far East Command on 26 July, the third anniversary of the Truman order.[17-55]

Prominent among the critics of the Army's delay was General MacArthur, who publicly blamed President Truman for the continued segregation of his former command. The charge, following as it did the general's dismissal, was much discussed in the press and the Department of Defense. Easily disputed, it was eventually overtaken by the fact of integration.

[Footnote 17-54: Msg, DA to CINCFE, DA 95359, 1 Jul 51.]

[Footnote 17-55: Memo, Chief, Public Info Div, CINFO, for Dir, Office of Public Info, DOD, 26 Jul 51; DOD Press Release, 26 Jul 51. For last-minute criticism of the continued segregation see, for example, Ltr, Sens. Herbert Lehman and Hubert Humphrey to SecDef, 25 Jul 51; Memo, ASA for ASD (M&P), 19 Jul 51, sub: Racial Segregation in FECOM; Telg, Elmer W.

Henderson, Dir, American Council on Human Rights, to George C. Marshall, SecDef, 31 May 51. All in SecDef 291.2.]

Three problems had to be solved in carrying out the integration (p. 445) order. The first, inactivation of the 24th Infantry and the choice of a replacement, was quickly overcome. From the replacements suggested, Ridgway decided on the 14th Infantry, which had been recently a.s.signed, minus men and equipment, to the Far East Command. It was filled with troops and equipment from the 34th Infantry, then training replacements in j.a.pan. On 1 October it was a.s.signed to the 24th's zone of responsibility in the 25th Division's line. The 24th Infantry, its men and equipment transferred to other infantry units in Korea, was inactivated on 1 October and "transferred to the control of the Department of the Army."[17-56]

[Footnote 17-56: Per Ltr, TAG to CINCFE, 9 Aug 51, AGAO-I 322 (26 Jul 51), implemented by Eighth Army GO 717, 22 Sep 51.]

The second problem, integration of units throughout the command, proved more difficult and time-consuming. Ridgway considered the need most urgent in the infantry units and wanted their integration to take precedence. The 3d Battalion of the 9th Infantry was reorganized first, many of its black members scattered throughout other infantry units in the 2d Division. But then things got out of phase. To speed the process the Army staff dropped its plan for inactivating all segregated units and decided simply to remove the designation "segregated" and a.s.sign white soldiers to formerly all-black units.

Before this form of integration could take place in the 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, the last major black infantry unit, the 64th Tank Battalion and the 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion began the process of s.h.i.+fting their black troops to nearby white units. The 77th Engineer Combat Company was the last combat unit to lose the asterisk, the Army's way of designating a unit black.[17-57] The command was originally committed to an Army contingency plan that would transfer black combat troops found superfluous to the newly integrated units to service units, but this proved unnecessary. All segregated combat troops were eventually a.s.signed to integrated combat units.[17-58]

[Footnote 17-57: Msg, DA 81846, 19 Sep 51; Eighth Army GO 774, 16 Oct 51.]

[Footnote 17-58: FECOM Mil Hist Section, "History of the Korean War," III (pt. 2):153-57.]

To soften the emotional aspects of the change, troop transfers were scheduled as part of the individual soldier's normal rotation. By the end of October 1951 the Eighth Army had integrated some 75 percent of its infantry units. The process was scheduled for completion by December, but integration of the rest of its combat units and the great number of service units dragged on for another half year. It was not until May 1952 that the last divisional and nondivisional organizations were integrated.[17-59]

[Footnote 17-59: Memo, ASA (M&RF) for ASD (M&P), 22 Aug 52, sub: Integration of Negro Manpower, SD 291.2.]

The third and greatest problem in the integration of the Far East Command was how to achieve a proportionate distribution of black troops throughout the command. Ridgway was under orders to maintain black strength at a maximum 12 percent except in combat infantry units, where the maximum was 10 percent. The temporary restriction on integrating the 40th and 45th Divisions and the lack of specially trained Negroes eligible for a.s.signment to the j.a.pan Logistical Command added to the difficulty of achieving this goal, but the basic cause of delay was the continued s.h.i.+pment of black troops to the (p. 446) Far East in excess of the prescribed percentage. During the integration period the percentage of black replacements averaged between 12.6 and 15 percent and occasionally rose above 15 percent.[17-60] Ridgway finally got permission from Was.h.i.+ngton to raise the ratio of black soldiers in his combat infantry units to 12 percent, and further relief could be expected in the coming months when the two National Guard divisions began integrating.[17-61] Still, in October 1951 the proportion of Negroes in the Eighth Army had risen to 17.6 percent, and the flow of black troops to the Far East continued unabated, threatening the success of the integration program. Ridgway repeatedly appealed for relief, having been warned by his G-1 that future black replacements must not exceed 10 percent if the integration program was to continue successfully.[17-62]

[Footnote 17-60: Ibid.; Stillwaugh, "Personnel Problems in the Korean Conflict," pp. 33-35.]

[Footnote 17-61: Msg, CSA to CINCFE, DA 96489, 18 Jul 51.]

[Footnote 17-62: Journal Files, G-1, FEC, Oct 51, Annex 2.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: MACHINE GUNNERS OF COMPANY L, 14TH INFANTRY, _Hill 931, Korea, September 1952_.]

Ridgway was particularly concerned with the strain on his program caused by the excessive number of black combat replacements swelling the percentage of Negroes in his combat units. By September black combat strength reached 14.2 percent, far above the limits set by the Army staff. Ridgway wanted combat replacements limited to 12 (p. 447) percent. He also proposed that his command be allowed to request replacements by race and occupational specialty in order to provide Army headquarters with a sound basis for allotting black enlisted men to the Far East. While the Army staff promised to try to limit the number of black combat troops, it rejected the requisition scheme.

Selection for occupational specialist training was not made by race, the G-1 explained, and the Army could not control the racial proportions of any particular specialty. Since the Army staff had no control over the number of Negroes in the Army, their specialties or the replacement needs of the command, no purpose would be served by granting such a request.[17-63]

[Footnote 17-63: Rad, CINCFE for DA, DA IN 182547, 11 Sep 52, sub: Negro Personnel; Msg, DA to CINCFE, 23 Sep 52, G-1 291.2.]

Yet Ridgway's advice could not be ignored, because by year's end the whole Army had developed a vested interest in the success of integration in the Far East. The service was enjoying the praise of civil rights congressmen, much of the metropolitan press, and even some veterans' groups, such as the Amvets.[17-64] Secretary Pace was moved to call the integration of the Eighth Army a notable advance in the field of human relations.[17-65] But most of all, the Army began to experience the fruits of racial harmony. Much of the conflict and confusion among troops that characterized the first year of the war disappeared as integration spread, and senior officials commented publicly on the superior military efficiency of an integrated Army in Korea.[17-66] As for the men themselves, their att.i.tudes were in sharp contrast to those predicted by the Army traditionalists. The conclusion of some white enlisted men, wounded and returned from Korea, were typical:

Far as I'm concerned it [integration] worked pretty good.... When it comes to life or death, race does not mean any difference....

It's like one big family.... Got a colored guy on our machine gun crew--after a while I wouldn't do without him.... Concerning combat, what I've seen, an American is an American. When we have to do something we're all the same.... Each guy is like your own brother--we treated all the same.... Had a colored platoon leader. They are as good as any people.... We [an integrated squad] had something great in common, sleeping, guarding each other--sometimes body against body as we slept in bunkers....

Takes all kinds to fight a war.[17-67]

[Footnote 17-64: See, for example, Press Release by Senator Herbert H. Lehman, 27 July 1951, which expressed the praise of nine U.S. senators; Editorial in the Baltimore Sun, December 21, 1951; Ltr, National Cmdr, Amvets, to CINCFE, 5 Dec 51, copies in CMH.]

[Footnote 17-65: _Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1-December 31, 1951_ (Was.h.i.+ngton: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 13.]

[Footnote 17-66: See, for example, Interv, Nichols with Bradley; Ltr, Ridgway to author, 3 Dec 73; Mark S. Watson, "Most Combat GI's are Unsegregated," datelined 15 Dec 51 (probably prepared for the Baltimore _Sun_). All in CMH files. See also James C. Evans and David Lane, "Integration in the Armed Services," _Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences_ 304 (March 1956):78.]

[Footnote 17-67: Extracted from a series of interviews conducted by Lee Nichols with a group of wounded soldiers at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, 12 November 1952, in Nichols Collection, CMH.]

Integration was an established fact in Korea, but the question remained: could an att.i.tude forged in the heat of battle be sustained on the more tranquil maneuver grounds of central Europe and the American south?