Ghost Wars Part 18

13. Ibid., p. 61.

14. "Devout Muslim, yes," is from Mohammed Yousaf, Silent Soldier, Silent Soldier, pp. 99-100. pp. 99-100.

15. "Afghan youth will fight," is from "Memorandum of Conversation," President Reagan and President Zia-ul-Haq, December 7, 1982, released by the Cold War International History Project.

16. Mitrokhin, "KGB in Afghanistan," pp. 151-52. Mohammed Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap, The Bear Trap, p. 49. p. 49.

17. Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000, 1947-2000, pp. 256-57. pp. 256-57.

18. "Your Meeting with Pakistan President . . ." Memo from Shultz to Reagan, November 29, 1982, and "Visit of Zia-ul-Haq," from Shultz, also dated November 29, 1982, both released by the Cold War International History Project.

19. The CIA's a.n.a.lysts understood Zia's ambivalence about the United States. In a special estimate prepared on November 12, 1982, the CIA reported, "Islamabad is aware that only the United States can offset Soviet pressures and provide Pakistan with the sophisticated weapons it believes it needs." Yet "the Pakistanis continue to doubt the reliability of U.S. commitments and U.S. steadfastness in time of crisis." See "Special National Intelligence Estimate on Pakistan," November 12, 1982, released by the Cold War International History Project.

20. Interviews with Hart, November 12, 26, and 27, 2001, and with Yousaf, June 1992, Dusseldorf, Germany (SC). A retired Pakistani brigadier general at the time of the interviews, Mohammed Yousaf is the coauthor of The Bear Trap, The Bear Trap, a detailed account of the ISI's Afghan operations between 1983 and 1987. a detailed account of the ISI's Afghan operations between 1983 and 1987.

21. ISI telephone codes are from the author's 1992 interviews with Yousaf, June 1992. ISI rules about CIA contact with Afghans are from Hart, November 12, 26, and 27, 2001, and other U.S. officials familiar with the liaison. Yousaf said that he and Akhtar were blindfolded while visiting the United States. A U.S. official interviewed in 1992 said he "wouldn't steer you away from that. We do have sensitive facilities."

22. Yousaf, Silent Soldier, Silent Soldier, pp. 25-27. Akhtar's professional information is on pp. 27-32. pp. 25-27. Akhtar's professional information is on pp. 27-32.

23. The size of the ISI Afghan bureau is from Yousaf and Adkin, Bear Trap, Bear Trap, pp. 1-3. How ISI was perceived is from interviews with Yousaf and other ISI and Pakistan army generals. pp. 1-3. How ISI was perceived is from interviews with Yousaf and other ISI and Pakistan army generals.

24. Published estimates of U.S. covert aid between fiscal 1981 and 1984 include Barnett R. Rubin, Refugee Survey Quarterly, Refugee Survey Quarterly, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1996. These estimates were confirmed in interviews with several U.S. officials. Fiscal year 1984 was an unusual, complicated year because surplus Pentagon funds were added to the pipeline at the last hour. The Soviet figures cited here are from Larry P. Good-son, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1996. These estimates were confirmed in interviews with several U.S. officials. Fiscal year 1984 was an unusual, complicated year because surplus Pentagon funds were added to the pipeline at the last hour. The Soviet figures cited here are from Larry P. Good-son, Afghanistan's Endless War, Afghanistan's Endless War, p. 63. p. 63.

25. Details of the weapons systems and financial details are from Yousaf, June 1992; Hart, November 12, 26, and 27, 2001; and other U.S. officials familiar with the pipeline during these years. Yousaf and Adkin describe many of these purchases in The Bear The Bear Trap. Trap. The Turkish incident comes from interviews with Yousaf. Hart recalled that the CIA paid the Chinese about $80 for a Kalashnikov copy that probably cost them about $12 or $15 to make. Because the Chinese enforced the greatest quality control in their manufacturing, over time most of the CIA's covert purchases s.h.i.+fted toward Beijing. State-owned Chinese s.h.i.+ps always seemed to steam into Karachi on just the date they were due, and the a.s.sistant Chinese defense attache from the Islamabad emba.s.sy would invariably be standing at dockside, clipboard in hand. The Turkish incident comes from interviews with Yousaf. Hart recalled that the CIA paid the Chinese about $80 for a Kalashnikov copy that probably cost them about $12 or $15 to make. Because the Chinese enforced the greatest quality control in their manufacturing, over time most of the CIA's covert purchases s.h.i.+fted toward Beijing. State-owned Chinese s.h.i.+ps always seemed to steam into Karachi on just the date they were due, and the a.s.sistant Chinese defense attache from the Islamabad emba.s.sy would invariably be standing at dockside, clipboard in hand.

26. Interviews with Hart, November 12, 26, and 27, 2001, and Yousaf, June 1992.

27. See Chapter 7 for a more detailed account of this issue.

28. "The Secretary's Visit to Pakistan: Afghanistan," cable from U.S. emba.s.sy, Islamabad, to Secretary of State, June 1, 1983, released by the Cold War International History Project.

29. A copy of the letter was obtained by the author. Hart's trip into Afghanistan is from interviews with Hart, November 12, 26, and 27, 2001. He is the only source for the account of the trip. At least two other D.O. officers, including a later Islamabad station chief, also made unauthorized trips into Afghanistan during the Soviet phase of the war, according to U.S. officials familiar with the trips.

CHAPTER 4: "I LOVE DOSAMA".

1. This account of Badeeb's trip to Pakistan and his meeting with Zia is from the author's interview with Ahmed Badeeb and Saeed Badeeb on February 1, 2002, in Jedda, Saudi Arabia (SC). The interview lasted approximately two hours and was conducted in English. Subsequently, Ahmed Badeeb supplied to the author videotapes of two days of interviews he gave early in 2002 to an Arabic language satellite news service based in Lebanon, Orbit Television. The author employed a Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C.-based firm to translate these Orbit interviews from Arabic into English. Some of the quotations of Badeeb in this chapter, such as the account of his visit with boxes of cash to Pakistan, are from the author's interview. Other quotations are from the Orbit interviews, as rendered into English by the translation service. The distinctions are indicated in the footnotes. That Badeeb attended college in North Dakota is from an interview with a U.S. official.

2. Interview with Nat Kern, January 23, 2002, Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C. (SC). Kern maintains close contacts with the Saudi government as the editor of a newsletter about oil markets and Middle East politics. The quote from Turki is attributed by Kern to his business partner, Frank Anderson, a retired clandestine officer in the CIA's Near East Division and at one time director of the D.O.'s Afghanistan task force.

3. Nawaf Obaid, "Improving U.S. Intelligence a.n.a.lysis on the Saudi Arabian Decision Making Process," master's degree thesis, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1998. "Both believed fervently" is from Mohammed Yousaf, Silent Silent Soldier, Soldier, p. 87. p. 87.

4. The Saudi air cover over Karachi is from the Badeeb interviews with Orbit.

5. The history of GID is from interviews with Saudi officials; with Nat Kern, January 23, 2002; a telephone interview with Ray Close, a former CIA station chief in Jedda who subsequently worked as a consultant to Prince Turki, January 10, 2002 (SC); and David Long, a former U.S. diplomat who also later worked for Prince Turki, January 22, 2002, Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C. (SC). By one account GID provided Sadat with a regular income during 1970 when Sadat was Egypt's vice president. See Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987, CIA, 1981-1987, p. 352. p. 352.

6. Alexei Va.s.siliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, The History of Saudi Arabia, p. 213, quoting the British Arabist Gertrude Bell. Va.s.siliev's history, translated from the original Russian, draws heavily on original Arabic and Ottoman sources as well as the accounts of travelers; it is the princ.i.p.al source of the pre-twentieth-century Arabian peninsula history in this chapter. p. 213, quoting the British Arabist Gertrude Bell. Va.s.siliev's history, translated from the original Russian, draws heavily on original Arabic and Ottoman sources as well as the accounts of travelers; it is the princ.i.p.al source of the pre-twentieth-century Arabian peninsula history in this chapter.

7. The author owes the observation that Saudi Arabia was the first modern nation-state created by jihad to the anonymous author of a survey of the kingdom published in The Economist, The Economist, March 23, 2002. March 23, 2002.

8. The demographic statistics are from Va.s.siliev, History of Saudi Arabia, History of Saudi Arabia, p. 421. p. 421.

9. The quotations are from a speech Prince Turki gave on February 3, 2002, in Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C.; it was transcribed and published on the World Wide Web by the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies. Prince Turki also spoke briefly about his time at Lawrenceville during an interview with the author, August 2, 2002, in Cancun, Mexico (SC).

10. That Clinton did not know Turki at Georgetown and only met him after taking office is from interviews with senior Saudi officials and with Kern, January 23, 2002.

11. Quotations are from Turki's speech on February 3, 2002.

12. Ibid. The a.s.sa.s.sination of Turki's father is from Va.s.siliev, History of Saudi Arabia, History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 394-95. pp. 394-95.

13. Interviews with Saudi and U.S. officials.

Government budget statistics are from The The Economist, Economist, March 23, 2002. GID's computer expansion is from interviews with U.S. officials and March 23, 2002. GID's computer expansion is from interviews with U.S. officials and Business Week, Business Week, October 6, 1980. October 6, 1980.

14. Interviews with U.S. officials.

15. Author's interview with Ahmed Badeeb and Saeed Badeeb, February 1, 2002.

16. Interviews with Saudi officials. The George quote is from the author's interview with Clair George, December 21, 2001, Chevy Chase, Maryland (SC).

17. Interview with Saeed Badeeb, February 1, 2002. That their father was a modestly successful merchant in Jedda is from an interview with a Saudi newspaper editor.

18. That the Saudis arranged contacts for the CIA at the hajj hajj is from interviews with former U.S. intelligence officials. The "Safari club" is from Turki's speech, February 3, 2002. is from interviews with former U.S. intelligence officials. The "Safari club" is from Turki's speech, February 3, 2002.

19. "Memorandum of Conversation between HRH Prince Turki and Senator Bill Bradley," April 13, 1980, author's files.

20. That the agreement with the Saudis to match funding dollar for dollar was reached in July is from the unpublished original ma.n.u.script of Robert Gates's memoir, p. 13/31. That Bandar used to hold on to the funds and that CIA officers speculated he was doing so to earn the interest is from interviews with three U.S. officials with direct knowledge. Hart, the Islamabad station chief from 1981 to 1984, said in interviews that the Saudis were frequently late in paying their bills, although he did not comment on Bandar's role.

21. Badeeb quotes are from the Orbit interview. Yousaf 's quote is from Yousaf, Silent Silent Soldier, Soldier, p. 88. p. 88.

22. The account of the Taif conference and Badeeb's encounters with the mujahedin leaders and with Sayyaf is from the author's interview with Badeeb, February 1, 2002, and so is the following account of the relations.h.i.+p between GID and Saudi charities.

23. That Turki sometimes controlled where the charity funds could be directed is from an interview with Turki and with other Saudi officials. The Badeeb quote is from the author's interview, February 1, 2002.

24. Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Holy War, pp. 41-48, provides a carefully sourced account of the bin Laden family's origins and business success. pp. 41-48, provides a carefully sourced account of the bin Laden family's origins and business success.

25. Interview with Turki, August 2, 2002. That Faisal set up a trust to ensure the safe pa.s.sage of the bin Laden firm to the older sons is also from that interview.

26. Bergen, Holy War, Holy War, pp. 47-48. Bin Laden's allowance is reported in National Commission staff statement no. 15, p. 3-4. pp. 47-48. Bin Laden's allowance is reported in National Commission staff statement no. 15, p. 3-4.

27. Author's interview with Badeeb, February 1, 2002.

28. The Badeeb quote is from the author's interview, February 1, 2002.

29. Interviews with U.S. officials.

30. See, for instance, the testimony of Cofer Black, director of the CIA's Counterterrorist Center between 1999 and 2002, September 26, 2002, to Congress's Joint Inquiry into the September 11 attacks. "We had no relations.h.i.+p with him [bin Laden] but we watched a 22-year-old rich kid from a prominent Saudi family change from frontline mujahedin fighter to a financier for road construction and hospitals." CIA Director George Tenet testified under oath on October 17, 2002, that during the 1980s, "While we knew of him, we have no record of any direct U.S. government contact with bin Laden at that time."

31. "I loved Osama . . ." and "He was not an extremist at all . . ." are Badeeb quotes from the Orbit interviews.

32. Ibid.

33. Quotations are from Turki's speech in Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C., February 3, 2002. He provided this version of his interactions with bin Laden during the 1980s in several other interviews as well.

34. Badeeb, Orbit interviews. (See p. 609, note 1.) It was during the first day's...o...b..t interview that Badeeb talked most openly and expansively about his relations.h.i.+p with bin Laden and about bin Laden's relations.h.i.+p with the Saudi government. At the the start of the second day's session, Badeeb interrupted his interviewer to volunteer a "clarification" that bin Laden was not a Saudi intelligence agent and that Badeeb met with him "only in my capacity as his former teacher." The sequence raises the possibility that Saudi government officials saw or heard about the first part of the interview, were displeased, and asked Badeeb to issue this "clarification."

CHAPTER 5: "DON'T MAKE IT OUR WAR".

1. Contents of briefing to Reagan from Robert Gates's unpublished original ma.n.u.script, p. 23/33.

2. Interviews with former CIA officials. Also Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap, The Bear Trap, pp. 193-95. pp. 193-95.

3. That McMahon wondered about the purpose of the covert war, Bob Woodward, Veil, Veil, p. 104. The Twetten quote is from Kirsten Lundberg, Philip Zelikow, and Ernest May, "Politics of a Covert Action," p. 12. The Directorate of Intelligence a.s.sessment is from "Afghanistan: The Revolution After Four Years," CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, July 1982; decla.s.sified July 1999; released by the National Security Archive. p. 104. The Twetten quote is from Kirsten Lundberg, Philip Zelikow, and Ernest May, "Politics of a Covert Action," p. 12. The Directorate of Intelligence a.s.sessment is from "Afghanistan: The Revolution After Four Years," CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, July 1982; decla.s.sified July 1999; released by the National Security Archive.

4. "The longest midlife crisis in history" is from George Crile, Charlie Wilson's War, Charlie Wilson's War, p. 39. The book provides detailed and colorful accounts, mainly from Wilson and CIA officer Gust Avrakatos, of Wilson's role in the Soviet-Afghan conflict, which Crile regards as decisive. The book also describes in profane and painful detail Wilson's alcoholism, womanizing, self-infatuation, and extravagant, sometimes bullying global travel. The quotes from former Miss Northern Hemisphere are on p. 223. p. 39. The book provides detailed and colorful accounts, mainly from Wilson and CIA officer Gust Avrakatos, of Wilson's role in the Soviet-Afghan conflict, which Crile regards as decisive. The book also describes in profane and painful detail Wilson's alcoholism, womanizing, self-infatuation, and extravagant, sometimes bullying global travel. The quotes from former Miss Northern Hemisphere are on p. 223.

5. The congressional resolution is quoted in Lundberg, Zelikow, and May, "Politics of a Covert Action," p. 20. "The U.S. had nothing . . ." is from Crile, Charlie Wilson's War, Charlie Wilson's War, p. 262. p. 262.

6. There have been multiple accounts of William Casey's covert dealings with the Catholic Church during the 1980s. Some of his efforts in Central America were described in testimony at Clair George's criminal trial arising from the Iran-Contra scandal. About the CIA and the Church in Poland see Carl Bernstein and Marco Politi, His Holiness His Holiness . .

7. Interview with a former CIA official. See also Woodward, Veil, Veil, p. 130. p. 130.

8. The quote from Mrs. Casey is from Joseph E. Persico, Casey: From the OSS to the Casey: From the OSS to the CIA, CIA, p. 26. The pre-CIA biographical material in this chapter draws heavily on Persico's strong work, which itself drew on access to Casey's papers and extensive interviews with his family and CIA colleagues. Also helpful was Casey's own scattered accounts of his war experiences and political outlook in p. 26. The pre-CIA biographical material in this chapter draws heavily on Persico's strong work, which itself drew on access to Casey's papers and extensive interviews with his family and CIA colleagues. Also helpful was Casey's own scattered accounts of his war experiences and political outlook in Scouting the Scouting the Future, Future, an extensive collection of Casey's public speeches compiled by Herbert E. Meyer. an extensive collection of Casey's public speeches compiled by Herbert E. Meyer.

9. "Goosing s.h.i.+p builders" is from Persico, Casey, Casey, p. 51, and "ex-polo players" is on p. 56. p. 51, and "ex-polo players" is on p. 56.

10. "Never had I been in contact," ibid., p. 57.

11. Ibid., pp. 68-69.

12. Fifty-eight teams, Persico, ibid., p. 79. Success rate and "We probably saved" and "for the first time," ibid., p. 83. See also Casey's speech of September 19, 1986, in Casey, Scouting the Future, Scouting the Future, pp. 218-27. pp. 218-27.

13. "Had been permitted to run down" is from Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows, From the Shadows, p. 210. The vodka martini scene and "He would demand something," ibid., p. 198. p. 210. The vodka martini scene and "He would demand something," ibid., p. 198.

14. "The Mumbling Guy" is from the author's interview with Ahmed Badeeb, February 1, 2002, Jedda, Saudi Arabia (SC). The Reagan note to Bush is from Persico, Casey, Casey, p. 228. The Buckley quote, ibid., p. 571. "I can tell you" is from a speech on June 29, 1984, in Casey, p. 228. The Buckley quote, ibid., p. 571. "I can tell you" is from a speech on June 29, 1984, in Casey, Scouting the Future, Scouting the Future, p. 289. p. 289.

15. "As a legacy" is from Casey's speech of May 21, 1982, in Casey, Scouting the Future, Scouting the Future, p. 11. "The primary battlefield" is from his speech of July 30, 1986, ibid., p. 26. "The isthmus" and "the oil fields" is from his speech of October 27, 1986, ibid., p. 35. p. 11. "The primary battlefield" is from his speech of July 30, 1986, ibid., p. 26. "The isthmus" and "the oil fields" is from his speech of October 27, 1986, ibid., p. 35.

16. The Mein Kampf Mein Kampf comparison is from Casey's speech of May 1, 1985, in Casey, comparison is from Casey's speech of May 1, 1985, in Casey, Scouting the Future, Scouting the Future, p. 183. "That two can play the same game" is from his speech of October 27, 1986, ibid., p. 36. "Far fewer people" is from his speech of September 19, 1986, ibid., p. 299. "Afghan freedom fighters" is from his speech of October 23, 1981, ibid., pp. 119-20. p. 183. "That two can play the same game" is from his speech of October 27, 1986, ibid., p. 36. "Far fewer people" is from his speech of September 19, 1986, ibid., p. 299. "Afghan freedom fighters" is from his speech of October 23, 1981, ibid., pp. 119-20.

17. "Realistic counter-strategy" is from Casey's speech of October 29, 1983, ibid., pp. 119-20. p. 144. His discussions with Ames about communism and traditional religion are from his speech of May 1, 1985, ibid., pp. 186-87.

18. Casey and King Khalid, Persico, Casey, Casey, pp. 310-11. Casey and oil, interviews with former CIA officers and U.S. officials. pp. 310-11. Casey and oil, interviews with former CIA officers and U.S. officials.

19. "Is completely involved" is from Yousaf, Silent Soldier, Silent Soldier, pp. 80-81. The $7,000 carpet is from Persico, pp. 80-81. The $7,000 carpet is from Persico, Casey, Casey, p. 507. He reported the gift and pa.s.sed the carpet to the U.S. government. p. 507. He reported the gift and pa.s.sed the carpet to the U.S. government.

20. Persico, Casey, Casey, p. 226. p. 226.

21. Casey and Zia, and Zia's red template, are from Charles G. Cogan, "Partners in Time,"World Policy Journal, p. 79. "Moral duty" is from Gates, p. 79. "Moral duty" is from Gates, From the Shadows, From the Shadows, p. 252. The CIA map produced for Casey is from Gates's unpublished ma.n.u.script, pp. 18/63-65. p. 252. The CIA map produced for Casey is from Gates's unpublished ma.n.u.script, pp. 18/63-65.

22. Persico, Casey, Casey, p. 313. p. 313.

23. Interviews with Howard Hart, November 12, 26, and 27, 2001 (SC). His account is corroborated by several other sources, including Yousaf.

24. Memo quotation is from Gates's ma.n.u.script, pp. 23/37-38.

25. Interviews with former CIA officials.

26. Gates, From the Shadows, From the Shadows, p. 320. p. 320.

27. Funding numbers and December 6 memo quotations from Gates's ma.n.u.script, pp. 23/37-38.

28. That Casey insisted on seeing the border camps is from the author's 1992 interviews with Yousaf. "Kabul must burn!" is from the same interviews. What Casey and Akhtar wore is from a photograph taken during the visit and published in Yousaf, Silent Soldier. Silent Soldier.

29. Gates's ma.n.u.script, pp. 13/6-11.

30. The May 1984 lecture report is quoted in CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, "The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Five Years After," May 1985, released by the National Security Archive. That U.S. diplomats traveled to Central Asia is from an interview with Edmund McWilliams, January 15, 2002, Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C. (SC). McWilliams was a political officer in the Moscow emba.s.sy during this period and traveled to Central Asia several times.

31. Interviews with Yousaf, 1992. Also Yousaf and Adkin, Bear Trap, Bear Trap, pp. 189-95. pp. 189-95.

32. Yousaf 's recollections from the author's 1992 interviews. The Gates quotations are from Gates's ma.n.u.script, pp. 26/13-14.

33. Interviews with officials at all three agencies during 1992.

34. Gates, From the Shadows, From the Shadows, p. 199. p. 199.

35. Interviews with U.S. officials. "Not authorize . . . which we did" is from a written communication to the author from Piekney, July 6, 2003.

CHAPTER 6: "WHO IS THIS Ma.s.sOUD?".

1. The account of Ma.s.soud's childhood and family life is based primarily on a lengthy series of interviews in Kabul in May 2002 with Yahya Ma.s.soud, Ahmed Shah's older brother by two years (GW). Yahya also provided a daylong tour of the Panjs.h.i.+r Valley during which he narrated his family's history in the region and discussed his brother's tactics for defending the valley from the Soviets. Throughout the 1980s, Yahya served in Ahmed Shah Ma.s.soud's army as an adviser and as a liaison between Ma.s.soud and the British intelligence service, MI6. There is a brief account of the young Ma.s.soud's war games in Sebastian Junger's 2001 book, Fire, Fire, which contains an essay on Ma.s.soud t.i.tled "The Lion in Winter," p. 213. which contains an essay on Ma.s.soud t.i.tled "The Lion in Winter," p. 213.