Ghost Wars Part 26

1. Interviews with senior Pakistani government officials.

2. Ziauddin's meetings with Sharif 's father in Lah.o.r.e and his reputation as a political general are from interviews with both senior Pakistani and U.S. officials.

3. The CIA's plan to use ISI to set up bin Laden for ambush or capture is from interviews with U.S. officials. There are varying accounts of how American newspaper reporting caused bin Laden to stop using his satellite telephone in the autumn of 1998. The White House counterterrorism aides Benjamin and Simon cite a Was.h.i.+ngton Times Was.h.i.+ngton Times story that reported bin Laden "keeps in touch with the world via computers and satellite phones" as the triggering event. But there were other stories from the same period, including one in story that reported bin Laden "keeps in touch with the world via computers and satellite phones" as the triggering event. But there were other stories from the same period, including one in The Was.h.i.+ngton Post The Was.h.i.+ngton Post that quoted former CIA officials and other a.n.a.lysts talking about bin Laden's use of telecommunications. that quoted former CIA officials and other a.n.a.lysts talking about bin Laden's use of telecommunications.

4. Interviews with U.S. officials.

5. Ibid.

6. "That those ISI individuals . . . didn't know what they were doing" is from an interview with a Clinton administration official. "The policy of the government . . . the overall policy of the government" is from an interview with a second U.S. official. "An incredibly unholy alliance . . . nuclear war in Kashmir" is from an interview with a third senior Clinton administration official.

7. Interviews with U.S. and Pakistani officials.

8. The specific proposal to Ziauddin and his response are from an interview with a U.S. official.

9. Pakistan had paid for but never received American-made F-16 fighter jets at the time economic sanctions were imposed by the congressionally mandated Pressler Amendment in 1991. The original amount frozen was $658 million, but various forms of relief had reduced the amount to $501 million by December 1998, according to the United States. See a.s.sociated Press, December 2, 1998.

10. The time and duration of the Oval Office meeting, the Riedel quotation, and the order of Clinton's talking points are from the Federal Doc.u.ment Clearing House transcript of a briefing provided that afternoon by Riedel and Karl F. Inderfurth.

11. Ibid., and interviews with U.S. and Pakistani officials.

12. Details about the Pakistani proposal are from interviews with U.S. officials. One U.S. official and one Pakistani official present vividly recall a discussion about a commando team at this White House meeting. However, evidence a.s.sembled by the National Commission suggests the plan was hatched only later, when Sharif met Clinton in July 1999. Either way, it seems clear that training did not begin in earnest until the summer of 1999.

13. Interviews with U.S. and Pakistani officials present. "We tried to get the Pakistanis . . . political risk in getting him" is from USA Today, USA Today, November 12, 2001. November 12, 2001.

14. What Sharif said at the lunch, including the joke about cruise missiles and the intelligence report on bin Laden's health, is from an interview with Mushahid Hussain, Sharif 's information minister during the visit, who was present at the luncheon, May 21, 2002, Islamabad, Pakistan (SC). U.S. officials also recall the report about bin Laden's health.

15. What Sharif, Albright, and Berger said over lunch is from the Riedel-Inderfurth briefing hours later. The words quoted are Inderfurth's.

16. Interviews with multiple U.S. officials.

17. "Since just telling us" is from an interview with a Clinton administration official.

18. "Had neither the ability nor the inclination" is from interviews with U.S. officials.

19. Interviews with Haji Habib Ahmad-zai and Sayed Khaled Ishelwaty, aides to Abdul Haq, May 14, 2002, Kabul, Afghanistan (GW).

20. Ibid. Interview with Peter Tomsen, January 21, 2002, Omaha, Nebraska (SC).

21. The account of the desert camp episode is based on interviews with seven U.S. officials familiar with the event. Several of the officials were interviewed multiple times about the episode. The National Commission's staff statement no. 6, p. 8, adds important public confirmation and precise dates. Barton Gellman, writing in The Was.h.i.+ngton The Was.h.i.+ngton Post Post of December 19, 2001, was the first to make public reference to the episode. of December 19, 2001, was the first to make public reference to the episode.

22. Mary Anne Weaver, "Of Birds and Bombs," APF Reporter, APF Reporter, online at online at www.aliciapatterson.org.

23. That the U.A.E. effectively maintained a secret air base in northern Pakistan for hunting is from the author's interview with a U.S. official. After the events of September 11, Pakistan made the base available to the United States for clandestine use in its 2001 military campaign against al Qaeda and the Taliban, this official said. It was only then that the U.S. learned of the arrangement between Pakistan and the U.A.E., the official said.

24. Ahmed Ras.h.i.+d, Taliban: Militant Islam, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, p. 201, describes the early contacts between Taliban leaders and Arab hunters in the winter of 1994-95. Unocal employees and consultants who watched bin Laden settle in Kandahar in the winter of 1996-97 said he had a local reputation as an avid falcon hunter. p. 201, describes the early contacts between Taliban leaders and Arab hunters in the winter of 1994-95. Unocal employees and consultants who watched bin Laden settle in Kandahar in the winter of 1996-97 said he had a local reputation as an avid falcon hunter.

25. Interviews with U.S. officials.

26. Ibid. The quotation is from an interview with Gary Schroen, November 7, 2002, Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C. (SC).

27. Ibid.

28. AAP Newsfeed, May 13, 1998. Vice President Al Gore announced the agreement with Sheikh Zayed at the White House. Also, interviews with Clinton administration officials.

29. Interviews with U.S. officials.

30. Interview with Schroen, November 7, 2002.

31. "Wanted to cooperate . . . were properly understood" is from an interview by the author.

32. Interview with Schroen, November 7, 2002.

33. Interviews with U.S. officials. The quotation from Mike, although he is not identified even by his first name, appears on p. 237 of the Joint Inquiry Committee's final report.

34. Prepared testimony of George Tenet before the Joint Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002. Mike's cable quotation from National Commission final report, p. 140. Clinton quotations from Newsweek, Newsweek, April 18, 2002. April 18, 2002.

CHAPTER 25: "THE MANSON FAMILY".

1. Statement of the Director of Central Intelligence, Senate Armed Services Committee, "Current and Projected National Security Threats," February 2, 1999.

2. "Like two-year-olds" is from an interview with a U.S. official.

3. Ninety-seven-paragraph statement: "Current and Projected National Security Threats," February 2, 1999.

4. "Daunting impediments . . . pressure on bin Laden" is from the prepared testimony of George Tenet before the Joint Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002. Cofer Black made the same retrospective argument at these hearings: "Frankly, from an intelligence perspective, in order to have a fighting chance to protect this country from al Qaeda, we needed to attack the Afghan terrorist sanctuary protected by the Taliban. CIA appreciated this all too well. That is also why on 11 September we were ready and prepared to be the first boots on the ground."

5. "A new comprehensive plan . . . princ.i.p.al lieutenants" is from the prepared testimony of George Tenet before the Joint Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002; details about intelligence collection goals are from interviews with U.S. officials.

6. Interviews with U.S. officials.

7. Ibid. During the Joint Inquiry Committee hearings, a dispute erupted between the committee's staff director, Eleanor Hill, and the CIA press office over the number of agency a.n.a.lysts who had been a.s.signed to follow bin Laden and other terrorists prior to September 11. Hill said the CIA had only 3 a.n.a.lysts a.s.signed to al Qaeda full-time at the Counterterrorist Center, a number that rose to 5 during 2000. The CIA argued that this selection of statistics vastly understated the number of a.n.a.lysts working on the bin Laden and terrorism target in other departments. In a press statement the agency said that 115 a.n.a.lysts throughout the agency worked on terrorism during this period and that the bin Laden unit directed 200 officers worldwide. It is hard to know how to evaluate this argument since all of the underlying statistics and personnel records remain cla.s.sified. The estimate of 25 professionals working in the bin Laden unit in 1999, from interviews with U.S. officials, would include personnel a.s.signed to the CIA from other agencies such as the FBI and the National Security Agency. The Joint Inquiry Committee's final report estimated there were "about 40 officers from throughout the Intelligence Community" a.s.signed to the unit prior to September 11, 2001. The statistics about average experience and "take direction from the ladies" is from the final report, p. 64.

8. Ibid. All quotations are from the author's interviews.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid. "We are at war . . . his operations" from the Joint Inquiry Committee's final report, Appendix, pp. 26-27.

11. The 30 percent cut in operating budget and the statistics about Directorate of Operations personnel during the 1990s are from the testimony of Cofer Black before the Joint Inquiry Committee, September 26, 2002. Black said he had to allocate only "as many people as three infantry companies" across all the targets tracked by the Counterterrorist Center. Some of these groups, such as Hezbollah, which in 1999 had killed more Americans than al Qaeda, required substantial resources, Black said. Overall, Black testified, "We did not have enough people, money, or sufficiently flexible rules of engagement." Congressional investigators later criticized Black's plan to confront bin Laden for "an absence of rigor in the planning process."

12. The account of the Tashkent bombing and its aftermath is from The Was.h.i.+ngton Post, The Was.h.i.+ngton Post, February 17, 1999, and Ahmed Ras.h.i.+d, February 17, 1999, and Ahmed Ras.h.i.+d, The The New Yorker, New Yorker, January 14, 2002. Ras.h.i.+d reported in this excerpt from his book January 14, 2002. Ras.h.i.+d reported in this excerpt from his book Jihad Jihad that the Tashkent bombings allegedly were organized in the United Arab Emirates. that the Tashkent bombings allegedly were organized in the United Arab Emirates.

13. Interviews with U.S. officials.

14. Details of Karimov's cooperation and the att.i.tude of the CIA, ibid. Clinton administration officials from the Pentagon and State were equally enthusiastic about the liaison. General Anthony Zinni, the Marine general who then ran Central Command, led the Pentagon's charge into Central Asia, flying there repeatedly for meetings with his counterparts and developing military-to-military cooperation. Albright and FBI Director Louis Freeh also traveled to Tashkent within a year of the February 1999 car bombings.

15. Interviews with Clinton administration officials. Quotations are from interviews with two different officials.

16. Interview with Qayum Karzai, May 21, 2002, Kabul, Afghanistan (GW).

17. Interview with Hamid Karzai, October 21, 2002, Kabul, Afghanistan (SC).

18. Ibid., and interviews with U.S. officials.

19. Ibid.

20. Inderfurth testimony before Senate Appropriations subcommittee on foreign operations, "Afghanistan Today: The U.S. Response," March 9, 1999.

21. Interviews with State Department officials involved in the discussions.

22. Pickering's argument, ibid.

23. Ma.s.soud's outlook during this period, phone calls with Mullah Omar, and back-channel meetings with Taliban representatives are from multiple interviews with Ma.s.soud aides and relatives. Interviews with his foreign policy adviser, Abdullah, May 8, 2002, Kabul, Afghanistan, and February 26, 2003, Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C. (GW), and Ahmed Wali Ma.s.soud, May 7, 2002, Kabul, Afghanistan (GW). Also multiple interviews with senior intelligence aides to Ma.s.soud during this period.

24. Interviews with State Department officials. Interview with Karl "Rick" Inderfurth, May 7, 2002, Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C. (SC). Defending this policy, Inderfurth said, "It was very clear in the discussions that we had with other countries that we would never support a Taliban regime taking control of the country, never recognize it until all of these various concerns were addressed-including terrorism, including human rights, including narcotics. . . . We also made it clear-whether it would be with the Russians or indeed with the Iranians-that it was important Ma.s.soud remain a viable opposition force. And that's all we needed to say."

25. "Statement by Karl Inderfurth," Tashkent, July 19, 1999. Also, "Tashkent Declaration on Fundamental Principles for a Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict in Afhanistan."

26. Interview with Inderfurth, May 7, 2002.

27. Interviews with Ma.s.soud's advisers and aides; see note 23.

28. Interviews with multiple State Department and Clinton administration officials. Sheehan wrote a thirty-page cla.s.sified memo during this period urging more pressure on U.S. allies such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan over the terrorism problem. The memo called Pakistan central to the problem and suggested that terrorism should be elevated as the primary issue in U.S.-Pakistan relations. The memo was ignored by senior State Department officials who believed nuclear proliferation and economic development had to remain near the top of the agenda with Pakistan. See The The New York Times, New York Times, October 29, 2001, and October 29, 2001, and The The Was.h.i.+ngton Post, Was.h.i.+ngton Post, December 20, 2001. Clinton's outlook on Pakistan is from a senior administration official who reviewed the subject with Clinton in 2003. December 20, 2001. Clinton's outlook on Pakistan is from a senior administration official who reviewed the subject with Clinton in 2003.

29. The account of the CIA's opening to Ma.s.soud and the Counterterrorist Center's initial trip to the Panjs.h.i.+r are from interviews with multiple U.S. officials as well as multiple interviews with intelligence and foreign policy advisers to Ma.s.soud.

30. Previous CIA payments to Ma.s.soud, after 1996, had been authorized from the Stinger recovery program. The October 1999 visit inaugurated a counterterrorism pro- gram that also produced cash stipends to Ma.s.soud from the CIA. Agency officers carried cash on multiple official visits after 1999. One official estimated the typical payment at $250,000; another recalled it was $500,000.

31. All quotations are from author's interviews. These sorts of exchanges reinforced a pattern of mutual suspicion between the Clinton White House and the CIA.

32. The language quoted is from interviews with U.S. officials. Without prompting, several officials in different areas of government used the same phrase in interviews when they described the policy guidance. A decla.s.sified sentence in a redacted section of the Joint Inquiry Committee's final report a.s.serts: "The CIA was not authorized to upset the political balance in Afghanistan." What Clinton said about Ma.s.soud and what he recalled about the a.n.a.lysis he received at the time is from a senior administration official who reviewed the subject with Clinton in 2003. For the February memo, see National Commission final report, p. 139.

33. Interviews with U.S. officials and Ma.s.soud aides. As part of this network the CIA installed a secure phone in the suburban bas.e.m.e.nt of Daoud Mir, Ma.s.soud's envoy in Was.h.i.+ngton. The network effectively put the CIA in real-time contact with Ma.s.soud agents who placed radio sets as far forward into Taliban territory as Kabul and Jalalabad, according to Ma.s.soud intelligence aides.

34. The quotation is from author's interview.

35. "American solution" is from an interview with a U.S. official.

36. Interview with Abdullah, February 26, 2003.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Interview with a senior intelligence aide to Ma.s.soud.

CHAPTER 26: "THAT UNIT DISAPPEARED".

1. The Taliban's role is inferred from court testimony provided by a Hamburg cell member who traveled to Kandahar immediately after the four described here. Mounir el- Mota.s.sadeq testified that Atta told him in February 2000 how to travel to Afghanistan for training and that his only instructions were to go to the Taliban office at an address in Quetta that Atta provided. When he got there, Mota.s.sadeq said, the Taliban did not ask why he had come; they arranged for him to travel to Kandahar.

2. The Atta biography is from McDermott, Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles Times, January 27, 2002. Jarrah's biography is from Laabs and McDermott, January 27, 2002. Jarrah's biography is from Laabs and McDermott, Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles Times, January 27, 2003. Binals.h.i.+bh's background is from January 27, 2003. Binals.h.i.+bh's background is from The New York The New York Times, Times, February 10, 2003; February 10, 2003; Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles Times, October 24, 2002; and a.s.sociated Press, September 14, 2002. October 24, 2002; and a.s.sociated Press, September 14, 2002.

3. Interviews with U.S. officials. Testimony of George Tenet, Senate Intelligence Committee, February 2, 2000.

4. Interviews with U.S. officials.

5. The trial of Mounir el-Mota.s.sadeq and his conviction as an accessory in the September 11 attacks, held in Germany during the winter of 2003, produced the first courtroom evidence and witness statements doc.u.menting the birth and growth of the Hamburg cell. McDermott (see note 2) and Peter Finn in The Was.h.i.+ngton Post The Was.h.i.+ngton Post have published rich interview-based biographies of Atta, Jarrah, Zammar, and others. CIA and FBI reporting about Zammar is from the Joint Inquiry Committee's final report, pp. 29-30. have published rich interview-based biographies of Atta, Jarrah, Zammar, and others. CIA and FBI reporting about Zammar is from the Joint Inquiry Committee's final report, pp. 29-30.

6. Swanson and Crewdson, Chicago Tribune, Chicago Tribune, February 20, 2003, reported that "police records" they obtained showed that "among the numbers called were three belonging to radical Saudi clerics. . . . The calls occurred soon after the three clerics-Na.s.ser al-Omar, Safar al-Hawali, and Saman al-Auda-were freed in 1999." The calls were reportedly placed from a phone belonging to Mota.s.sadeq. February 20, 2003, reported that "police records" they obtained showed that "among the numbers called were three belonging to radical Saudi clerics. . . . The calls occurred soon after the three clerics-Na.s.ser al-Omar, Safar al-Hawali, and Saman al-Auda-were freed in 1999." The calls were reportedly placed from a phone belonging to Mota.s.sadeq.

7. "A house of study . . . attached to his mother" is from McDermott, Los Angeles Los Angeles Times, Times, January 27, 2002. "Raising him as a girl" is from January 27, 2002. "Raising him as a girl" is from The New York Times, The New York Times, October 10, 2001. "Almost tricked him" and "embodied the idea of drawing" are from McDermott. October 10, 2001. "Almost tricked him" and "embodied the idea of drawing" are from McDermott.

8. "Danger" is from The Was.h.i.+ngton Post, The Was.h.i.+ngton Post, July 15, 2002. "The victors will come . . . paradise is rising" is from Laabs and McDermott, July 15, 2002. "The victors will come . . . paradise is rising" is from Laabs and McDermott, Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles Times, January 27, 2003. January 27, 2003.

9. National Commission staff statement no. 16, pp. 2-4, 13-14, 18-19.

10. Ibid.

11. Chicago Tribune, Chicago Tribune, February 26, 2003. February 26, 2003.

12. The information on Musharraf 's family is from The New Yorker, The New Yorker, August 12, 2002. August 12, 2002.

Musharraf 's att.i.tude toward the Taliban is from an interview with Pervez Musharraf, May 25, 2002, Islamabad, Pakistan (SC), and interviews with Pakistani and U.S. officials who talked regularly with Musharraf.

13. "He took off his commando jacket" and "Down to earth" are from The New The New Yorker, Yorker, August 12, 2002. August 12, 2002.

14. What the emba.s.sy pieced together is from interviews with U.S. officials. Also, Bruce Riedel, "American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House," Center for Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, Policy Paper Series 2002.

15. That Musharraf briefed Sharif and that Sharif approved is from multiple sources including U.S. officials. This remains a subject of controversy among some Pakistani commentators and political figures.

16. That the information was obtained from cables from Islamabad and a dozen secret letters from interviews with U.S. officials. Reports of Pakistan preparing its nuclear a.r.s.enal for possible use is from Riedel, "American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit." Riedel, then at the National Security Council, cites one "well-informed a.s.sessment" which concluded that a Pakistani strike on Bombay alone with a small weapon "would kill between 150,000 and 850,000." Clinton's June 19 letter is from Madeleine Albright's written testimony to the National Commission, March 23, 2004.

17. Riedel, ibid. "Sharif seemed to be hedging his bet on whether this would be a round trip."

18. Ibid.