The Crisis of the Naval War Part 17

The preparations for the landing involved much collaboration with the military authorities, and Sir Reginald Bacon was frequently at G.H.Q. for the purpose. As soon as it was decided that the 1st Division was to provide the landing party, conferences took place between Admiral Bacon and General Sir Henry Rawlinson (now Lord Rawlinson), and I took the opportunity of a visit paid by Sir H. Rawlinson to London to confer with him myself. Subsequently a conference took place at the War Office at which Sir Douglas Haig was present.

There was entire unanimity between the Navy and Army over the proposed operation, and we greatly admired the manner in which the Sister Service took up the work of preparing for the landing. Secrecy was absolutely vital to success, as the whole scheme was dependent on the operation being a surprise, more particularly in the selection of the landing place. Admiral Bacon describes in his book the methods by which secrecy was preserved. As time pa.s.sed, and the atrocious weather in Flanders during the summer of 1917 prevented the advance of our Army, it became more and more difficult to preserve secrecy; but although the fact that some operation of the kind was in preparation gradually became known to an increasing number of people, it is safe to say that the enemy never realized until long after the operation had been abandoned its real nature or the locality selected for it.

Some officers with experience of the difficulties encountered during the landings at Gallipoli expressed doubts of the practicability of the operation in the face of the heavy fire from large guns and from machine guns which might be expected, but the circ.u.mstances were so different from those at Gallipoli that neither Sir Reginald Bacon nor I shared these doubts. The heavy bombardment of the coast batteries by our own sh.o.r.e guns, which had been greatly strengthened for the purpose, the rapidity of the landing, the use of a dense smoke screen, the fact of the landing being a complete surprise, the use of tanks for dealing with hostile machine guns, the interruption to the enemy's sh.o.r.e communications by heavy artillery fire, and the bombardment by monitors of the coast well to the eastward of the landing place as a feint, were all new factors, and all promised to a.s.sist towards success.

Of the supreme importance of the operation there could be no question. Ever since 1914 the Navy had been pressing for the recapture of the ports on the Belgian coast, and they could only be taken by means of a combined operation. Sir John French (now Field-Marshal Viscount French) himself had in the early days of the war pointed, out the great importance of securing the coast, but circ.u.mstances beyond his control were too powerful for him.

It was in these circ.u.mstances that the decision to undertake the operation was made, and when it became necessary to abandon it owing to the inability of the Army to co-operate the intense disappointment felt by all those who had worked so hard to ensure its success can be realized.

The Harwich force, consisting of the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron and the flotilla of destroyers, was the only other British force stationed in south-eastern waters if we except the local craft at the Nore. The 5th Light Cruiser Squadron and the flotilla were under the command of Commodore (now Rear-Admiral) Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt, an officer whose vessels were, if we except the Dover patrol, more frequently in contact with the enemy than any other British force in Home waters. Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt had several functions to perform:

(1) It was always hoped that he would be able to join forces with the Grand Fleet should events foreshadow a meeting with the High Sea Fleet.

(2) We depended very largely on him for reconnaissance work in the southern part of the North Sea and into the German Bight.

(3) It fell to his lot as a rule to provide the covering force for aerial operations carried out from seaplane carriers in southern waters.

(4) His force was best placed to cut off any enemy light craft that might be located in southern waters and to attack Zeppelins at sea on their return from raids over England.

(5) He was called upon almost weekly to cover the pa.s.sage of the convoy of merchant s.h.i.+ps between the Thames and Holland known as the "Dutch Convoy."

(6) He was constantly called upon the provide reinforcements for the Dover Patrol or to a.s.sist in operations carried out by the latter force.

These miscellaneous duties involved a great deal of work for the Harwich force and particularly for the destroyers.

The necessity for continually providing reinforcements from the Harwich force for the Dover Patrol was a standing handicap to Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt's operations; he took the matter philosophically, although I always realized how difficult it made his work at times, and whenever, as was frequent, combined operations were carried out by the two forces, the greatest harmony prevailed between the Commands.

At the commencement of 1917 the Harwich force comprised 8 light cruisers, 2 flotilla leaders and 45 destroyers. During the year new vessels were either added to it or replaced older craft which were withdrawn for other services, and at the end of the year the force included 9 light cruisers, 4 flotilla leaders and 24 destroyers.

The force was constantly operating in the outer waters of the Heligoland Bight to seaward of our minefields. The objects of the presence of our s.h.i.+ps in these waters, in addition to reconnaissance work and aerial operations, were:

(a) To intercept any enemy light forces which might be intending to operate off our coasts or which might be on pa.s.sage between German ports.

(b) To surprise and attack enemy minesweeping vessels.

(c) To destroy Zeppelins either on reconnaissance or raiding work.

(d) To capture enemy merchant s.h.i.+ps trading between Dutch and German ports, or neutrals with contraband trading to Germany.

The opportunities that were given to the force under heading (a) were exceedingly rare during the year 1917, when even the light forces of the High Sea Fleet were content to remain almost constantly in port except when engaged in the operations in the Baltic, and excepting also on the two occasions on which attacks were made on the Scandinavian convoy; but a portion of the Harwich force succeeded on one occasion in intercepting a flotilla of German destroyers en route to Zeebrugge from German ports with the result that one destroyer was seriously damaged and forced into the Dutch port of Ymuiden and another either sunk or badly damaged.

Forces from Harwich also succeeded in capturing or sinking twenty-four merchant s.h.i.+ps trading between Antwerp and Dutch ports and Germany during the year, but the main result of the operations of this force was shown in the refusal of the enemy to risk his vessels except under cover of darkness in the area in which the Harwich force worked.

The duty of protecting the Dutch convoy imposed a heavy strain upon the Harwich force. During the year 1917, 520 eastbound and 511 westbound vessels were convoyed between Dutch and British ports with the loss of only four s.h.i.+ps by submarine attack, one by destroyer attack, and one by mine. The price paid by the force for this success was the loss of four destroyers by mines, and one by collision, and the damage of three destroyers by mine or torpedo, and of five destroyers and one light cruiser by collision. The frequent collisions were due to the conditions under which the traffic was carried out at night without lights, and to the prevalence of fogs. The procedure adopted by the force was frequently changed as it necessarily became known to the Germans.

The extraordinarily small losses in the convoys were a very great tribute to the handling of the protecting force and to the organization in Holland for arranging sailings, when it is borne in mind that it was almost impossible to prevent leakage of information to German agents once the time of sailing was given out, and that the convoys were open to attack from destroyers and submarines operating either from Zeebrugge or from the Ems or other German ports. The orders of course emanated from the Admiralty, and of all the great work achieved by Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver, the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, during his service at the Admiralty in the year 1917 and indeed in the two preceding years, the success attending the work of this convoy was certainly not the least.

It is difficult to put into words the great admiration which I felt for Sir Henry Oliver's work throughout the war. Our a.s.sociation commenced during my command of the Grand Fleet, but became of course much closer at the Admiralty, and during my service there his a.s.sistance was of immense help to me and of incalculable value to the nation.

It was fortunate indeed for the Allied cause that he held such important Staff appointments during the most critical periods of the war.

CHAPTER IX

THE SEQUEL The foregoing chapters have been devoted to describing the measures that were devised or put into force or that were in course of preparation during the year 1917 to deal with the unrestricted submarine warfare against merchant s.h.i.+pping adopted by Germany and Austria in February of that year. It now remains to state, so far as my information admits, the effect of those measures.

British anti-submarine measures were almost non-existent at the commencement of the war. Sir Arthur Wilson, when in command of the Channel Fleet in the early days of the submarine, had experimented with nets as an anti-submarine measure, and shortly before the war submarines were exercised at stalking one another in a submerged condition; also the question of employing a light gun for use against the same type of enemy craft when on the surface had been considered, and some of our submarines had actually been provided with such a gun of small calibre. Two patterns of towed explosive sweeps had also been tried and adopted, but it cannot be said that we had succeeded in finding any satisfactory anti-submarine device, although many brains were at work on the subject, and therefore the earliest successes against enemy submarines were princ.i.p.ally achieved by ramming tactics. Gradually other devices were thought out and adopted; these comprised drift and stationary nets fitted with mines, the depth charge, decoy s.h.i.+ps of various natures, gunfire from patrol craft and gunfire from armed merchant s.h.i.+ps, as well as the numerous devices mentioned in Chapter III.

Except at the very commencement of the war, when production of craft in Germany was slow, presumably as a result of the comparatively small number under construction when war broke out, the British measures failed until towards the end of 1917 in sinking submarines at a rate approaching in any degree that at which the Germans were producing them.

Thus Germany started the war with 28 submarines; five were added and five were lost during 1914, leaving the number still 28 at the commencement of 1915.

During 1915, so far as our knowledge went, 54 were added and only 19 were lost, the total at the commencement of 1916 being therefore 63.

During 1916 it is believed that 87 submarines were added and 25 lost, leaving the total at the commencement of 1917 at 125.

During 1917 our information was that 78 submarines were added and 66 lost, leaving the total at the end of the year at 137.

The losses during 1917, given quarterly, indicate the increasing effectiveness of our anti-submarine measures. These losses, so far as we know them, were:

First quarter ... 10 Third quarter ... 20 Second quarter ... 12 Fourth quarter ... 24 During 1918, according to Admiral Scheer ("Germany's High Sea Fleet In the World War," page 335), 74 submarines were added to the fleet in the period January to October. The losses during this year up to the date of the Armistice totalled 70, excluding those destroyed by the Germans on the evacuation of Bruges and those blown up by them at Pola and Cattaro. Taken quarterly the losses were:

First quarter ... 18 Third quarter ... 21 Second quarter ... 26 Fourth quarter (to date of Armistice) ... 6 It will be seen from the foregoing figures for 1917 and 1918 that the full result of the anti-submarine measures inaugurated in 1917 and previous years was being felt in the last quarter of 1917, the results for 1918 being very little in advance of those for the previous half-year.

According to our information, as shown by the figures given above, the Germans had completed by October, 1918, a total of 326 submarines of all cla.s.ses, exclusive of those destroyed by them in November at Bruges, Pola and Cattaro.

Admiral von Capelle informed the Reichstag Committee that a total of 810 was ordered before and during the war. It follows from that statement that over 400 must have been under construction or contemplated at the time of the Armistice.

It is understood that the number of submarines actually building at the end of 1918 was, however, only about 200, which perhaps was the total capacity of the German s.h.i.+pyards at one time.

At the risk of repet.i.tion it is as well to repeat here the figures giving the quarterly losses of merchant s.h.i.+ps during 1917 and 1918, as they indicate in another and effective way the influence of the anti-submarine measures.

These figures are:

1917

British. Foreign. Total.

1st quarter 911,840 707,533 1,519,373 2nd quarter 1,361,870 875,064 2,236,934 3rd quarter 952,938 541,535 1,494,473 4th quarter 782,887 489,954 1,272,843 1918

British. Foreign. Total.

1st quarter 697,668 445,668 1,143,336 2nd quarter 630,862 331,145 962,007 3rd quarter 512,030 403,483 915,513 4th quarter 83,952 93,582 177,534 Figures for 4th quarter are for Month of October only.

The decline of the losses of British s.h.i.+pping was progressive from the second quarter of 1917; in the third quarter of 1918 the reduction in the tonnage sunk became very marked, and suggested definitely the approaching end of the submarine menace.

The fact that during the second quarter of 1918 the world's output of tonnage overtook the world's losses was another satisfactory feature. The output for 1917 and 1918 is shown in the following table:

United Dominions, Kingdom Allied and Total for Output. Neutral World.

Countries.

1917 1st quarter 246,239 340,807 587,046 2nd quarter 249,331 435,717 685,048 3rd quarter 248,283 426,778 675,061 4th quarter 419,621 571,010 990,631 1918 1st quarter 320,280 550,037 870,317 2nd quarter 442,966 800,308 1,243,274 3rd quarter 411,395 972,735 1,384,130 4th quarter, Oct. only 136,100 375,000 511,100 It will be noticed that by the last quarter of 1918 the output of s.h.i.+pping in the United Kingdom alone had overtaken the losses of British s.h.i.+pping.