The Crisis of the Naval War Part 5

The orders (b), (c) and (d) were those in practice in the Grand Fleet when circ.u.mstances permitted during my term in that command.

A typical route order from New York to Liverpool might be as follows:

"After pa.s.sing Sandy Hook, hug the coast until dark, then make a good offing before daylight and steer to pa.s.s through the following positions, viz:

Lat. 38 N. Long. 68 W.

Lat. 41 N. Long. 48 W.

Lat. 46 N. Long. 28 W.

Lat. 51 30' N. Long. 14 W.

"Thence make the coast near the Skelligs approximately at daylight, hug the Irish coast to the Tuskar, up the Irish coast (inside the banks if possible), and across the Irish Channel during dark hours. Thence hug the coast to your port; zigzag by day and night after pa.s.sing, Long. 20 W."

Sometimes s.h.i.+ps were directed to cross to the English coast from the south of Ireland, and to hug the English coast on their way north.

The traffic to the United Kingdom was so arranged in the early part of 1917 as to approach the coast in four different areas, which were known as Approach A, B, C, and D.

Approach A was used for traffic bound towards the western approach to the English Channel.

Approach B for traffic making for the south of Ireland.

Approach C for traffic making for the north of Ireland.

Approach D for traffic making for the east coast of England via the north of Scotland.

The approach areas in force during one particular period are shown on Chart A (in pocket at the end of the book). They were changed occasionally when suspicion was aroused that their limits were known to the enemy, or as submarine attack in an area became intense.

[Transcriber's note: Chart A is a navigational map of the waters southwest of England, with approach routes marked.]

The approach areas were patrolled at the time, so far as numbers admitted, by patrol craft (trawlers, torpedo-boat destroyers, and sloops), and s.h.i.+ps with specially valuable cargoes were given directions to proceed to a certain rendezvous on the outskirts of the area, there to be met by a destroyer or sloop, if one was available for the purpose. The areas were necessarily of considerable length, by reason of the distance from the coast at which submarines operated, and of considerable width, owing to the necessity for a fairly wide dispersion of traffic throughout the area. Consequently, with the comparatively small number of patrol craft available, the protection afforded was but slight, and losses were correspondingly heavy. In the early spring of 1917, Captain H.W. Grant, of the Operations Division at the Admiralty, whose work in the Division was of great value, proposed a change in method by which the traffic should be brought along certain definite "lines" in each approach area. Typical lines are shown in Chart B.

[Transcriber's note: Chart B is a navigational map of the waters southwest of Ireland, with approach routes marked.]

The idea was that the traffic in, say, Approach Route B, should, commencing on a certain date, be ordered by the Routeing Officer to pa.s.s along the line Alpha. Traffic would continue along the line for a certain period, which was fixed at five days, when it would be automatically diverted to another line, say Gamma, but the traffic along Gamma would not commence until a period of 24 hours had elapsed since discontinuance of the use of the line Alpha. This was necessary in order to give time for the patrol craft to change from one line to the other. During this period of 24 hours the arrangement for routeing at the ports of departure ensured that no traffic would reach the outer end of any of the approach lines, and consequently that traffic would cease on line Alpha 24 hours before it commenced on line Gamma. After a further period of five days the line would again change automatically.

It was necessary that s.h.i.+pping Intelligence Officers should have in their possession the orders for directing traffic on to the various lines for some considerable time ahead, and the masters of s.h.i.+ps which were likely to be for some time at sea were informed of the dates between which the various lines were to be used, up to a date sufficient to cover the end of their voyage. There was, therefore, some danger of this information reaching the enemy if a vessel were captured by a submarine and the master failed to destroy his instructions in time. There was also some danger in giving the information to neutrals.

However, the system, which was adopted, did result in a reduction of losses during the comparatively short time that it was in use, and the knowledge that patrol craft on the line would be much closer together than they would be in an approach area certainly gave confidence to the personnel of the merchant s.h.i.+ps, and those who had been forced to abandon their s.h.i.+p by taking to the boats were afforded a better chance of being picked up.

Various arrangements were in existence for effecting rapidly a diversion of s.h.i.+pping from one route to another in the event of submarines being located in any particular position, and a continual change of the signals for this purpose was necessary to guard against the possibility of the code being compromised by having fallen into enemy hands, an event which, unfortunately, was not infrequent.

Elaborate orders were necessary to regulate coastal traffic, and fresh directions were continually being issued as danger, especially danger from mines, was located. Generally speaking, the traffic in home waters was directed to hug the coast as closely as safe navigation permitted. Two reasons existed for this, (a) in water of a depth of less than about eight fathoms German submarines did not care to operate, and (b) under the procedure indicated danger from submarine attack was only likely on the side remote from the coast.

Here is an example of the instructions for pa.s.sing up Channel:

From Falmouth to Portland Bill.-Hug the coast, following round the bays, except when pa.s.sing Torbay. (Directions followed as to the procedure here.)

From Portland Bill to St. Catherines.-Pa.s.s close south of the Shambles and steer for Anvil Point, thence hug the coast, following round the bays.

And so on.

As it was not safe navigationally to follow round the bays during darkness, the instructions directed that s.h.i.+ps were to leave the daylight route at dusk and to join the dark period route, showing dimmed bow lights whilst doing so.

Two "dark period routes" were laid down, one for vessels bound up Channel, and another for vessels bound down Channel, and these routes were some five miles apart in order to minimize the danger of collision, s.h.i.+ps being directed not to use their navigation lights except for certain portions of the route, during which they crossed the route of transports and store s.h.i.+ps bound between certain southern British ports (Portsmouth, Southampton and Devonport) and French ports.

Routes were similarly laid down for s.h.i.+ps to follow when navigating to or from the Bristol Channel, and for s.h.i.+ps navigating the Irish Sea.

Any system of convoy was at this time out of the question, as neither the cruisers to marshal the convoy to the submarine area, nor the destroyers to screen it when there, were available.

There was one very important factor in the situation, viz., the comparative rate at which the Germans could produce submarines and at which we could build vessels suitable for anti-submarine warfare and for defence of commerce. The varying estimates gave cause for grave anxiety. Our average output of destroyers was four to five per month. Indeed, this is putting the figure high; and, of course, we suffered losses. The French and Italians were not producing any vessels of this type, whilst the j.a.panese were, in the early part of 1917, not able to spare any for work in European waters, although later in the year they lent twelve destroyers, which gave valuable a.s.sistance in the Mediterranean. The United States of America were not then in the war. Consequently measures for the defence of the Allied trade against the new menace depended on our own production.

Our submarines were being produced at an average rate of about two per month only, and-apart from motor launches, which were only of use in the finest weather and near the coast-the only other vessels suitable for anti-submarine work that were building at the time, besides some sloops and P-boats, were trawlers, which, whilst useful for protection patrol, were too slow for most of the escort work or for offensive duties. The Germans' estimate of their own submarine production was about twelve per month, although this figure was never realized, the average being nearer eight. But each submarine was capable of sinking many merchant s.h.i.+ps, thus necessitating the employment of a very large number of our destroyers; and therein lay the gravity of the situation, as we realized at the Admiralty early in 1917 that no effort of ours could increase the output of destroyers for at least fifteen months, the shortest time then taken to build a destroyer in this country.

And here it is interesting to compare the time occupied in the production of small craft in Great Britain and in Germany during the war.

In pre-war days we rarely built a destroyer in less than twenty-four months, although shortly before the war efforts were made to reduce the time to something like eighteen to twenty months. Submarines occupied two years in construction.

In starting the great building programme of destroyers and submarines at the end of 1914, Lord Fisher increased very largely the number of firms engaged in constructing vessels of both types. Hopes were held out of the construction both of destroyers and of submarines in about twelve months; but labour and other difficulties intervened, and although some firms did complete craft of both cla.s.ses during 1915 in less than twelve months, by 1916 and 1917 destroyers averaged about eighteen months and submarines even longer for completion.

The Germans had always built their small craft rapidly, although their heavy s.h.i.+ps were longer in construction than our own. Their destroyers were completed in a little over twelve months from the official date of order in pre-war days. During the early years of the war it would seem that they maintained this figure, and they succeeded in building their smaller submarines of the U.B. and U.C. types in some six to eight months, as U.B. and U.C. boats began to be delivered as early as April, 1915, and it is certain that they were not ordered before August, 1914.

The time taken by the Germans to build submarines of the U type was estimated by us at twelve months, and that of submarine cruisers at eighteen months. German submarine officers gave the time as eight to ten months for a U-boat and eighteen months for a submarine cruiser.

(It is to be observed that Captain Persius in a recent article gives a much longer period for the construction of the German submarines. It is not stated whether he had access to official figures, and his statement is not in agreement with the figures given by German submarine officers.)

It is of interest to note here the rate of s.h.i.+p production attained by some firms in the United States of America during the war.

As I mention later (Vide Chapter vi, p. 157), the Bethlehem Steel Company, under Mr. Schwab's guidance, produced ten submarines for us in five months from the date of the order. Mr. Schwab himself informed me that towards the end of the war he was turning out large destroyers in six weeks. The Ford Company, as is well known, produced submarine chasers of the "Eagle" type in even a shorter period, but these vessels were of special design and construction.

I have dealt so far with the question of anti-submarine measures involving only the use of destroyers and other small surface craft. There were, of course, other methods both in use and under consideration early in 1917 when we took stock of the situation.

For some time we had been using Decoy vessels, and with some success; it was possible to increase the number of these s.h.i.+ps at the cost of taking merchant s.h.i.+ps off the trade routes or by building. A very considerable increase was arranged.

The use of our own submarines offensively against enemy submarines had also been tried, and had met with occasional success, but our numbers were very limited (the total in December, 1916, fit for oversea or anti-submarine work was about forty). They were much needed for reconnaissance and offensive work against surface men-of-war in enemy waters, and only a few were at the time available for anti-submarine operations, and then only at the cost of other important services.

The hydrophone had been in the experimental stage and under trial for a considerable period, but it had not so far developed into an effective instrument for locating submarines, and although trials of the different patterns which had been devised were pushed forward with energy, many months elapsed before it became a practicable proposition.

One of the best offensive measures against the enemy submarines, it was realized, was the mine, if laid in sufficiently large numbers. Unfortunately, in January, 1917, we did not possess a mine that was satisfactory against submarines.

Our deficiency in this respect was clearly shown in the course of some trials which I ordered, when one of our own submarines was run against a number of our mines, with the result that only about 33 per cent. of the mines (fitted, of course, only with small charges) exploded. The Germans were well aware that our mines were not very effective against submarines.

We possessed at the time mines of two patterns, and whilst proving unsatisfactory against submarines, they were also found to be somewhat unreliable when laid in minefields designed to catch surface vessels, owing to a defect in the mooring apparatus. This defect was remedied, but valuable time was lost whilst the necessary alterations were being carried out, and although we possessed in April, 1917, a stock of some 20,000 mines, only 1,500 of them were then fit for laying. The position, therefore, was that our mines were not a satisfactory anti-submarine weapon.

A new pattern mine, which had been designed on the model of the German mine during Sir Henry Jackson's term of office as First Sea Lord in 1916, was experimented with at the commencement of 1917, and as soon as drawings could be prepared orders for upwards of 100,000 were placed in antic.i.p.ation of its success. There were some initial difficulties before all the details were satisfactory, and, in spite of the greatest pressure on manufacturers, it was not until November, 1917, that mines of this pattern were being delivered in large numbers. The earliest minefields laid in the Heligoland Bight in September and October, 1917, with mines of the new pattern met with immediate success against enemy submarines, as did the minefields composed of the same type of mine, the laying of which commenced in November, 1917, in the Straits of Dover.

When it became possible to adopt the system of bringing merchant s.h.i.+ps in convoys through the submarine zone under the escort of a screen of destroyers, this system became in itself, to a certain extent, an offensive operation, since it necessarily forced the enemy submarines desirous of obtaining results into positions in which they themselves were open to violent attack by depth charges dropped by destroyers.

During the greater part of the year 1917, however, it was only possible to supply destroyers with a small number of depth charges, which was their princ.i.p.al anti-submarine weapon; as it became feasible to increase largely the supply of these charges to destroyers, so the violence of the attack on the submarines increased, and their losses became heavier.

The position then, as it existed in the early days of the year 1917, is described in the foregoing remarks.