Japan Part 10

Ieyasu thanked him warmly and said: "That were indeed great luck."

Hideyos.h.i.+ added: "Wilt thou reside here at Odawara as the Hojo have done up to this time?"

Ieyasu answered: "Aye, my lord, that I will."

"That will not do," said Hideyos.h.i.+. "I see on the map that there is a place called Yedo about twenty _ri_ eastward from us. It is a position far better than this, and that will be the place for thee to live."

Ieyasu bowed low and replied: "I will with reverence obey your lords.h.i.+p's directions."

In accordance with this conversation after the fall of Odawara, Ieyasu was endowed with the provinces of the Kwanto and took up his residence at Yedo. This is the first important appearance of Yedo in the general history of j.a.pan. It had however an earlier history, when in the fifteenth century it appears as a fis.h.i.+ng village called _Ye-do_, that is _door of the bay_. Near this fis.h.i.+ng village Ota Dokwan, a feudal baron, built himself in A.D. 1456 a castle. With the advent of Ieyasu, Yedo became a place of first importance, a rank which it still holds. The object of Hideyos.h.i.+ in thus entrusting this great heritage to Ieyasu seems to have been to secure him by the chains of grat.i.tude to himself and his family.

Already Ieyasu was connected by marriage with Hideyos.h.i.+, his wife being Hideyos.h.i.+'s sister. By making him lord of an immense and powerful country he hoped to secure him in perpetual loyalty to himself and his heirs.

In order that he might be free from the cares and responsibilities of the government at home, Hideyos.h.i.+ retired from the position of _kwambaku_ A.D.

1591 and took the t.i.tle of _Taiko_. By this t.i.tle he came to be generally known in j.a.panese history, Taiko Sama, or my lord Taiko, being the form by which he was commonly spoken of. His nephew and heir Hidetsugu was at this time promoted to the t.i.tle of _kwambaku_, and was ostensibly at the head of the government. The Jesuit fathers speak of him as mild and amiable, and as at one time a hopeful student of the Christian religion. They note however a strange characteristic in him, that he was fond of cruelty and that when criminals were to be put to death he sought the privilege of cutting them into pieces and trying cruel experiments upon their suffering bodies.

In A.D. 1592 Taiko Sama had by one of his wives a son, whom he named Hideyori. Over this new-born heir, whom, however, many suspect of not being Taiko Sama's son, he made great rejoicing throughout the empire. He required his nephew to adopt this new-born son as his heir, although he had several sons of his own. The result of this action was a feeling of hostility between the uncle and nephew. Hidetsugu applied to Mori, the chief of Chosu, to aid him in the conflict with his uncle. But Mori was too wary to enter upon such a contest with the veteran general. Instead of helping Hidetsugu, he revealed to Taiko Sama the traitorous proposition of his nephew. Hidetsugu was thereupon stripped of his office and sent as an exile to the monastery of Koya-san in the province of Kii. A year later he was commanded with his attendants to commit _hara-kiri_; and with an unusual exhibition of cruelty, his counsellors, wives, and children were likewise put to death.

Hideyos.h.i.+ had for a long time contemplated the invasion of Korea and ultimately of China. In a conversation with n.o.bunaga when he was about to set out on his conquest of the western provinces he is represented as saying(177): "I hope to bring the whole of Chugoku into subjection to us.

When that is accomplished I will go on to Kyushu and take the whole of it.

When Kyushu is ours, if you will grant me the revenue of that island for one year, I will prepare s.h.i.+ps of war, and purchase provisions, and go over and take Korea. Korea I shall ask you to bestow on me as a reward for my services, and to enable me to make still further conquests; for with Korean troops, aided by your ill.u.s.trious influence, I intend to bring the whole of China under my sway. When that is effected, the three countries [China, Korea, and j.a.pan] will be one. I shall do it all as easily as a man rolls up a piece of matting and carries it under his arm." He had already carried out part of this plan; he had brought the whole of Chugoku and of the island of Kyushu under his rule. It remained for him to effect the conquest of Korea and China in order to complete his ambitious project.

For this purpose he needed s.h.i.+ps on a large scale, for the transportation of troops and for keeping them supplied with necessary provisions. From the foreign merchants, who traded at his ports, he hoped to obtain s.h.i.+ps larger and stronger than were built in his own dominions. It was a great disappointment to him when he found this impossible, and that the merchants, whom he had favored, were unwilling to put their s.h.i.+ps at his disposal. It is claimed by the Jesuit fathers that this disappointment was the chief reason for the want of favor with which Hideyos.h.i.+ regarded them during the last years of his life. It is also advanced as one reason for his entering on the invasion of Korea, that he might thus employ in distant and dangerous expeditions some of the Christian princes whose fidelity to himself and loyalty to the emperor he thought he had reason to doubt. He was ambitious, so they said, to rival in his own person the reputation of the Emperor Ojin, who rose in popular estimation to the rank of Hachiman, the G.o.d of war, and who is wors.h.i.+pped in many temples, because, while he was still unborn, his mother led a hostile and successful expedition into this same Korea.

The immediate pretext(178) for a war was the fact that for many years the emba.s.sies which it had been the custom to send from Korea to j.a.pan with gifts and acknowledgments had been discontinued. In A.D. 1582 he sent an envoy to remonstrate, who was unsuccessful. Subsequently he sent the prince of Tsus.h.i.+ma, who had maintained at Fusan, a port of Korea, a station for trade, to continue negotiations. After some delay and the concession of important conditions the prince had the satisfaction, in A.D. 1590, of accompanying an emba.s.sy which the government of Korea sent to Hideyos.h.i.+. They arrived at Kyoto at the time when Hideyos.h.i.+ was absent on his campaign against Hojo Ujimasa at Odawara. He allowed them to await his return, and even when he had resumed his residence at the capital he showed no eagerness to give them an audience. On the pretence that the hall of audience needed repairs, he kept them waiting many months before he gave orders for their reception. It seemed that he was trying to humiliate them in revenge for their dilatoriness in coming to him. It is not impossible that he had already made up his mind to conduct an expedition in any event into Korea and China, and the disrespect with which he treated the emba.s.sy was with the deliberate intention of widening the breach already existing.

Mr. Aston has given us an account of the reception which was finally accorded to the amba.s.sadors, drawn from Korean sources, and which shows that they were entertained in a very unceremonious fas.h.i.+on. They were surprised to find that in j.a.pan this man whom they had been led to look upon as a sovereign was only a subject. They presented a letter from the king of Korea conveying his congratulations and enumerating the gifts(179) he had sent. These enumerated gifts consisted of horses, falcons, saddles, harness, cloth of various kinds, skins, ginseng, etc. These were articles which the j.a.panese of an earlier age had prized very highly and for the more artistic production of some of which the Koreans had rendered material a.s.sistance. Hideyos.h.i.+ suggested that the emba.s.sy should return to their own country at once without waiting for an answer to their letter.

This they were unwilling to do. So they waited at Sakai whence they were to sail, till the _kwambaku_ was pleased to send them a message for their king. It was so arrogant in tone that they had to beg for its modification several times before they dared to carry it home. The letter plainly announced his intention to invade China and called upon the Koreans to aid him in this purpose.

The amba.s.sadors went home with the conviction that it was Hideyos.h.i.+'s intention to invade their country. At their instigation the government made what preparations it could, by repairing fortresses, and collecting troops, arms, and provisions. The country was a poor country, and had had the good fortune or the misfortune to remain at peace for two hundred years. The arts of war had been forgotten. They had no generals who could cope with the practised soldiers of j.a.pan. Firearms which had been introduced into the military equipments of j.a.panese armies were almost unknown in Korea. It is true that they had been taken under the protection of China and could call upon her for aid. But China was distant and slow, and Korea might be destroyed before her slumbering energies could be aroused.

The preparations which Hideyos.h.i.+ made, as was his custom, were thorough and extensive. Each prince in Kyushu, as being nearest to the seat of war, was required to furnish a quota of troops in proportion to his revenues.

Each prince in s.h.i.+koku and in the Main island, in like manner, was to provide troops proportionate to his revenue and his proximity to the seat of war. Princes whose territories bordered on the sea were to furnish junks and boats, and men to handle them. The force which was thus a.s.sembled at Nagoya, now called Karatsu, in Hizen was estimated at 300,000 men, of whom 130,000 were to be immediately despatched. Hideyos.h.i.+ did not personally lead this force. It was under the command of two generals who were independent of each other, but were ordered to co-operate. One of these generals was Konis.h.i.+ Yukinaga Settsu-no-kami, whom the Jesuit fathers refer to under the name of Don Austin. From an humble position in life he had risen to high and responsible rank in the army. Under the influence of Takeyama, a Christian prince, whom the Jesuit fathers call Justo Ucondono, he had been converted to Christianity. Hideyos.h.i.+, as has been pointed out, was desirous of securing the help of the Christian princes in Kyushu, and therefore appointed a Christian as one of the generals-in-chief. Under him were sent the contingents from Bungo, Omura, Arima, and other provinces where the Christian element was predominant.

This division of the invading army may therefore be looked upon as representing the Christian population of the empire. The other general-in-chief was Kato Kiyomasa,(180) who had been a.s.sociated with Hideyos.h.i.+ ever since the times of n.o.bunaga. He was the son of a blacksmith and in A.D. 1563 he became one of Hideyos.h.i.+'s retainers. He was a man of unusual size and of great personal bravery. He commanded an army collected mainly from the northern and eastern provinces, which comprised the experienced veterans of Hideyos.h.i.+'s earlier campaigns. He is usually spoken of as inimical to the Christians, but this enmity probably grew up along with the ill-feeling between the two armies in Korea.

Konis.h.i.+'s division arrived in Korea April 13, A.D. 1592, and captured the small town of Fusan, which had been the port at which the j.a.panese had for generations maintained a trading post. After the arrival of Kato the two divisions marched towards the capital, reducing without difficulty the castles that lay in their way. The greatest terror prevailed among the inhabitants, and the court, with King Riyen at its head, resolved to flee into the province bordering on China. The armies reached the capital and then set out northward. The dissensions between the commanders had by this time reached such a point that they determined to separate. Kato traversed the northeastern provinces and in his course captured many Koreans of rank.

Konis.h.i.+ marched to the north and found the king at Pingshang on the borders of the river Taitong-Kiang. Here he was joined by Kuroda Noritaka, whom the Jesuit fathers named Condera(181) Combiendono, and by Yos.h.i.+tos.h.i.+ the prince of Tsus.h.i.+ma, who had marched with their forces by a different route. An effort at negotiations at this point met with no success. The king continued his flight northward to Ichiu, a fortified town on the borders of China. After he left a sharp contest took place between the besiegers and defenders, which resulted in the abandonment of the town and its capture by the j.a.panese. The stores of grain which had been collected by the Koreans were captured with the town.

Konis.h.i.+ was anxious to conduct further military operations in connection with the j.a.panese vessels which had been lying all this time at Fusan.

Directions were accordingly sent to have the junks sent round to the western coast. The Koreans picked up courage to show fight with their vessels, which seemed to have been of a superior construction to those of their enemies. They allured the j.a.panese boats out to sea and then turned upon them suddenly and treated them so roughly that they were glad to get back to the protection of the harbor and to give up the purpose of cruising along the western coast. The result of this little success encouraged the Koreans so much that it may be said to have been a turning point in the invasion.

In the meantime the piteous appeals of the Koreans to China had produced some effect. A small army of five thousand men, which was raised in the adjoining province of Laotung, was sent to their aid. This insufficient force rashly undertook to attack the j.a.panese in Pingshang. But they led the invaders into the town, and then so thoroughly routed them that the escaped remnants made their way back to Laotung. This experience led the Chinese officials to see that if they wished to help the Koreans at all they must despatch a stronger force. This they set to work at once to do.

They endeavored to gain some time by pretending to enter upon negotiations for an armistice. During the autumn months of A.D. 1592 the j.a.panese troops were almost idle. And they were very much taken by surprise when near the end of the year the Chinese army, forty thousand strong, besides Koreans, made its appearance on the scene. The j.a.panese commander had no time to call for help, and before he realized the imminency of the danger Pingshang was attacked. Being far outnumbered Konis.h.i.+ deemed it prudent to make his escape from the beleaguered town, and to save his army by a retreat, which was a painful and inglorious one.

The other division of the j.a.panese army under Kato, who had occupied the west coast, found its position untenable with a superior Chinese army threatening it. It also was compelled to retreat towards the south. But the veteran army of Kato was not content to yield all that it had gained without a struggle. A b.l.o.o.d.y engagement followed near Pachiung, in which the Chinese and Korean army suffered a significant defeat. The Chinese army then retired to Pingshang, and Kato was not in a condition to follow it over the impa.s.sable winter roads and with deficient supplies. The j.a.panese troops had suffered an experience such as never befell them under the redoubtable leaders.h.i.+p of Hideyos.h.i.+. And the Chinese had had enough of the terrible two-handed swords which the j.a.panese soldier could wield so effectively.(182)

The chief obstacle to peace was the mutual distrust with which each of the three parties regarded the others. Korea hated the j.a.panese with a perfect and justifiable hatred; she also feared and despised the pompous and pretentious pride of China. But in the negotiations which ensued the country which had suffered most had least to say. It remained for the two greater powers to come to some agreement which should be satisfactory to them; and whether Korea were satisfied or not was of secondary moment.

The j.a.panese envoy proceeded to Peking and is said to have negotiated peace on these conditions: That the emperor of China should grant to Hideyos.h.i.+ the honor of invest.i.ture, that the j.a.panese troops should all leave Korea, and that j.a.pan should engage never to invade Korea again.

There was some jangling about the withdrawal of the j.a.panese soldiers but at last this matter was arranged.

An emba.s.sy was sent by the Chinese government to j.a.pan to carry out the ceremony of invest.i.ture. They arrived in the autumn of the year A.D. 1596.

Taiko Sama made elaborate preparations for their reception. Some fears were felt as to how Taiko Sama would regard this proposition of invest.i.ture when he came to understand it. The Buddhist priest, who was to translate the Chinese doc.u.ment into j.a.panese(183) for the benefit of Taiko Sama, was urged to make some modification in the wording to conciliate his ambition. But he was too honest to depart from the true rendering. He read to Taiko Sama and the a.s.sembled court a letter from the Chinese emperor granting him invest.i.ture as king of j.a.pan, and announced having sent by the amba.s.sadors the robe and the golden seal pertaining to the office.

Taiko Sama listened with amazement,(184) as he for the first time realized that the Emperor of China by this doc.u.ment had undertaken to invest him as king of j.a.pan instead of ("Ming emperor"). He was in an uncontrollable rage. He tore off the robe which he had put on. He s.n.a.t.c.hed the doc.u.ment from the reader and tore it into shreds, exclaiming: "Since I have the whole of this country in my grasp, did I wish to become its emperor I could do so without the consent of the barbarians." He was with difficulty restrained from taking the life of the j.a.panese amba.s.sador who had negotiated the treaty. He sent word to the Chinese envoys who had brought the robe and seal to begone back to their country and to tell their emperor that he would send troops to slaughter them like cattle. Both Korea and China knew that a new invasion would surely result from this disappointment. Kato and Konis.h.i.+ the j.a.panese generals in the previous campaign and who had gone home during the interval were ordered back to take command of the old troops and of fresh recruits which were to be sent. They busied themselves with repairing the fortifications which had been left in possession of the j.a.panese garrisons.

The disgraced and frightened Chinese amba.s.sadors made their way back to Peking. They were ashamed to present themselves without showing something in return for the gifts they had carried to Taiko Sama. They purchased some velvets and scarlet cloth, which they represented as the presents which had been sent. They pretended that Taiko Sama was much pleased with the invest.i.ture, and that his invasion of Korea was due to the fact that the Korean government had interfered to prevent the free and kindly intercourse between China and j.a.pan. The cloth and velvet, however, were at once recognized as European productions and not derived from j.a.pan. So the amba.s.sadors were charged with deceit and at last confessed.

The j.a.panese army was reinforced, it is said, with 130,000 fresh troops.

Supplies, however, were difficult to obtain, and the movements were much hindered. A small Chinese army of 5,000 men arrived at the end of the year A.D. 1597 to aid the Koreans. An attack on the j.a.panese s.h.i.+ps at Fusan was made by the Korean navy, but it was without difficulty repelled and most of the attacking s.h.i.+ps destroyed. After some material advantages, which, however, were not decisive, the j.a.panese troops were forced to return to Fusan for the winter. The princ.i.p.al engagement was at Yol-san, a strong position, accessible both by sea and land. It was garrisoned by troops of Kato's division, who were brave and determined. The army composed of Chinese and Koreans, under the Chinese commander-in-chief Hsing-chieh, laid siege to this fortress, and succeeded in cutting off all its communications. But Kuroda and Hachisuka came to Kato's a.s.sistance, and compelled the Chinese general to raise the siege and retreat to Soul, the Korean capital. It was in one of the battles fought during the summer of A.D. 1598, that 38,700 heads of Chinese and Korean soldiers are said to have been taken. The heads were buried in a mound after the ears and noses had been cut off. These grewsome relics of savage warfare were pickled in tubs and sent home to Kyoto, where they were deposited in a mound in the grounds of the temple of Daibutsu, and over them a monument erected which is marked _mimi-zuka_ or ear-mound. There the mound and monument can be seen to this day.(185)

The death of Taiko Sama occurred on the day equivalent to the 18th of September, A.D. 1598, and on his death-bed he seems to have been troubled with the thought of the veteran warriors who were uselessly wearing out their lives in Korea. In his last moments he opened his eyes and exclaimed earnestly: "Let not the spirits of the hundred thousand troops I have sent to Korea become disembodied in a foreign land."(186) Ieyasu, on whom devolved the military responsibility after the Taiko's death, and who had never sympathized with his wishes and aims regarding Korea, did not delay the complete withdrawal of the troops which still remained in Korea.

Thus ended a chapter in the history of j.a.pan, on which her best friends can look back with neither pride nor satisfaction. This war was begun without any sufficient provocation, and its results did nothing to advance the glory of j.a.pan or its soldiers. The great soldier who planned it and pushed it on with relentless energy gained nothing from it except vexation. Much of the time during which the war lasted he sat in his temporary palace at Nagoya in Hizen, waiting eagerly for news from his armies. Instead of tidings of victories and triumphs and rich conquests, he was obliged too often to hear of the dissensions of his generals, the starving and miseries of his soldiers, and the curses and hatred of a ruined and unhappy country. All that he had to show for his expenditure of men and money were several _sake_ tubs of pickled ears and noses with which to form a mound in the temple of Daibutsu, and the recollection of an invest.i.ture by the emperor of China, which could only bring to him pain and humiliation.

The only beneficial results to j.a.pan that can be traced to all this was the introduction into different provinces of some of the skilled artisans of Korea. The prince of Satsuma, s.h.i.+mazu Yos.h.i.+hiro, in A.D. 1598, brought home with him when he returned from the Korean war seventeen families of Korean potters,(187) who were settled in his province. They have lived there ever since, and in many ways still retain the marks of their nationality. It is to them that Satsuma _faence_ owes its exquisite beauty and its world-wide reputation.

[Ill.u.s.tration]

Hideyos.h.i.+.

When the Taiko realized that his recovery was impossible he tried to arrange the affairs of the empire in such a way as to secure a continuation of the power in his son Hideyori, who was at that time only five years old. For this purpose he appointed a council consisting of Tokugawa Ieyasu, Maeda Tos.h.i.+-ie, Mori Terumoto, Ukita Hide-ei and Uesugi Kagekatsu, of which Ieyasu was the president and chief. These were to const.i.tute a regency during his son's minority. He also appointed a board of a.s.sociates, who were called middle councillors, and a board of military officers called _bugyo_. He called all these councillors and military officers into his presence before he died, and made them swear allegiance to his successor Hideyori. There seems to have been among them a suspicion of the fidelity of Ieyasu, for the Taiko is represented as saying to two of his friends: "You need not be anxious about Ieyasu. He will not rebel against my house.(188) Cultivate friends.h.i.+p with him." Thus in his sixty-second year died (September, 1598) the greatest soldier, if not the greatest man, whom j.a.pan has produced. That he rose from obscurity solely by his own talents, is a more conspicuous merit in j.a.pan than in most other countries. Family and heredity have always counted for so much in this land of the G.o.ds, that few instances have occurred in which men of humble birth have risen to eminence. That one such in spite of his low birth, in spite of personal infirmities, in spite of the opposition and envy of contemporaries, had risen to so high a position in the empire, has been a source of pride and encouragement to thousands of his countrymen.

The Taiko was buried close to the Daibutsu temple, which he himself had built to shelter the colossal figure of Buddha, constructed in imitation of the Daibutsu which Yoritomo had built at Kamakura. The figure was to be one hundred and sixty feet in height, and the workmen had it nearly finished when a terrible earthquake in A.D. 1596 shook down the building.

In the following year the temple was rebuilt, and the image was completed up to the neck. The workmen were preparing to cast the head, when a fire broke out in the scaffolding and again destroyed the temple, and also the image. It was one of the schemes of Ieyasu, so it is said, to induce the young Hideyori to exhaust his resources upon such expensive projects, and thus render him incapable of resisting any serious movement against himself. He therefore suggested to the boy and his mother that this temple and image, which Hideyos.h.i.+ had begun, should not fail of erection. They therefore resumed the construction, and carried it on with great lavishness. It took until A.D. 1614 to complete the work, and when it was about to be consecrated with imposing ceremonies, Ieyasu, who by this time was supreme in the empire, suddenly forbade the progress of the ceremony.

He affected to be offended by the inscription which had been put on the bell,(189) but the real reason was probably his desire to find some pretext by which he could put a quarrel upon the adherents of Hideyori.

CHAPTER X. THE FOUNDING OF THE TOKUGAWA SHOGUNATE.

Among all the friends and retainers of Hideyos.h.i.+ the most prominent and able was Tokugawa Ieyasu. He was six years younger than Hideyos.h.i.+, and therefore in A.D. 1598, when the Taiko died, he was fifty-six years old.

He was born at the village of Matsudaira in the province of Mikawa A.D.

1542. His family counted its descent from Minamoto Yos.h.i.+-ie, who in the eleventh century had by his military prowess in the wars against the Ainos earned the heroic name of Hachiman-Taro. Therefore he was, as custom and tradition now for a long time had required for those holding the office of shogun, a descendant from the Minamoto family.(190) The name Tokugawa, which Ieyasu rendered famous, was derived from a village in the province of s.h.i.+motsuke, where his ancestors had lived. His first experiences in war were under n.o.bunaga, side by side with Hideyos.h.i.+. He proved himself not only a capable soldier, prudent and painstaking, but also a good administrator in times of peace. Hideyos.h.i.+ had such confidence in him, and so much doubt about the wisdom of requiring the guardians to wait until his son, a mere child five years old, had grown up to years of responsibility, that he is represented as having said to Ieyasu: "I foresee that there will be great wars after my decease; I know too that there is no one but you who can keep the country quiet. I therefore bequeath the whole country to you, and trust you will expend all your strength in governing it. My son Hideyori is still young. I beg you will look after him. When he is grown up, I leave it to you to decide whether he will be my successor or not."(191)

As soon as the Taiko was dead, and the attempt was made to set in motion the machinery he had designed for governing the country, troubles began to manifest themselves. The princes whom he had appointed as members of his governing boards, began immediately to quarrel among themselves. On Ieyasu devolved the duty of regulating the affairs of the government. For this purpose he resided at Fus.h.i.+mi, which is a suburb of Kyoto. His most active opponent was Is.h.i.+da Mitsunari, who had been appointed one of the five _bugyo_, or governors, under the Taiko's arrangement. They grew jealous of Ieyasu, because, under the existing order of things, the governors were of very minor importance. Mitsunari had acquired his influence with the Taiko, not through military achievements, but by intrigue and flattery. He was cordially detested by such disinterested friends as Kato Kiyomasa and others.

The ground on which the opposition to Ieyasu was based was that he was not faithfully performing his duty, as he had promised to the dying Taiko, towards his child and heir. It is not improbable that even at this early day it was seen that Ieyasu proposed to disregard the pretensions of the youthful son of Hideyos.h.i.+, in the same way that he in his day had disregarded the claims of the heir of n.o.bunaga. The rough and warlike times, and the restless and ambitious manners of the feudal lords of these times, made it impossible to entrust the country to the hands of a child.

Under this strained relation, the members of the regency divided into two parties. Speaking broadly, it was again a contest between the north and the south of j.a.pan. Ieyasu's a.s.sociation had been from the beginning with the Kwanto, and now more than ever his power was centred about Yedo.

Mitsunari on the contrary had leagued himself with the princes of Chosu and Satsuma, and with others of minor importance, all more or less representative of the southern half of the empire. The Christians chiefly sided with Hideyori and his adherents. Mitsunari himself was a Christian convert, and the Jesuit fathers explain that his position and that of the other Christian leaders were due to their conscientious desire to fulfil their oath of fidelity to Hideyori. That Ieyasu should have been derelict in such a solemn duty was a sufficient cause for their opposition to him.

Events now rushed rapidly to a culmination. One of the most powerful of the princes allied against Ieyasu was Uesugi Kagekatsu, the lord of Echigo and Aizu. He had retired to Aizu after having solemnly made a covenant(192) with the others engaged in the plot to take measures against Ieyasu. He was summoned to Kyoto to pay his respects to the emperor, but on some trivial excuse he declined to come. Ieyasu now saw that nothing but war would settle the disputes which had arisen. He repaired to Yedo and to s.h.i.+motsuke, and made preparations for the conflict which he saw impending.

In the meantime the members of the league were busy. Mitsunari sent an urgent circular to all the feudal princes, charging Ieyasu with certain misdeeds and crimes, the chief of which was that instead of guarding the inheritance of the Taiko for his son, he was with the blackest guilt endeavoring to seize it for himself. A formidable army was gathered at Osaka consisting of 128,000 men.(193) Made up as it was from different provinces and officered by its provincial leaders, it lacked that element of unity and accord which is so essential to an army. The first movement was against the castle of Fus.h.i.+mi, which was the centre from which Ieyasu governed the country. After a short siege it fell and then, it is said, was accidentally burned to the ground.