Safe Food: Bacteria, Biotechnology, And Bioterrorism Part 5

International decisions about such issues are difficult to track, as they change constantly in response to political pressures. When the European Union approved sales of transgenic corn in 1996, the biotechnology industry was optimistic that Europeans would readily accept genetically modified foods. In 1997, however, the European Parliament required the foods to be labeled, and in 1999 the European Union also required manufacturers to conduct risk a.s.sessments, public consultations, and post-market safety reviews. Some national governments permitted transgenic crops to be grown, but others did not. In mid-2000, Time Time magazine cla.s.sified countries by their att.i.tude toward genetically modified foods-pro-GM (Argentina, China), cautiously pro (Canada, U.S., India), very cautiously pro (Brazil, j.a.pan), or strongly anti (Britain, France)-but the policies of these countries changed constantly in response to new information, ongoing pressures, and decisions of international bodies attempting to deal with issues raised by these foods. magazine cla.s.sified countries by their att.i.tude toward genetically modified foods-pro-GM (Argentina, China), cautiously pro (Canada, U.S., India), very cautiously pro (Brazil, j.a.pan), or strongly anti (Britain, France)-but the policies of these countries changed constantly in response to new information, ongoing pressures, and decisions of international bodies attempting to deal with issues raised by these foods.41 To ill.u.s.trate the complexity of the international picture, To ill.u.s.trate the complexity of the international picture, table 13 table 13 summarizes decisions about transgenic foods made by various countries summarizes decisions about transgenic foods made by various countries just just during the 2001 calendar year. during the 2001 calendar year.

TABLE 13. Actions of selected countries and the European Union regarding planting, labeling, or importing of genetically modified foods, 2001 Country Action Taken Argentina Permits planting.

Australia Permits planting, but also requires posting of locations of planting sites, investigation of violations, and imposition of fines. With New Zealand, issues guidelines for labeling.

Brazil Permits planting, but requires permits and labeling.

China Permits planting, but requires certification of production, sale, and import as safe for humans, animals, and environment.

j.a.pan Establishes labeling threshold of 5% for genetically modified corn or soybeans.

Philippines Rules that failure to label foods containing genetically modified ingredients is punishable by prison (up to 12 years) and fines (up to $2,000).

Saudi Arabia Bans import of transgenic animals; requires health certificates for transgenic plants; requires mandatory labeling of processed foods containing genetically modified ingredients.

Sri Lanka Bans all transgenic foods as of September 1, but later postpones ban indefinitely.

Thailand Bans new field trials; approves Roundup Ready soybeans.

European Union Requires member states to ensure the traceability of genetically modified foods at all stages of marketing; restricts new product approvals to 10 years with renewal for another 10 years; establishes public registers for field-testing sites; phases out use of certain antibiotic-resistance markers; establishes labeling threshold of 1%. France, Italy, Luxembourg, Austria, Denmark and Greece declare moratorium on planting until these rules take effect.

SOURCE: Food Chemical News Food Chemical News, 2001.

The inconsistent decisions of international bodies in dealing with genetically modified foods do little to engender trust that the system will operate in the public interest. In 1999, for example, the Biosafety Protocol, an international committee formed as a result of the 1992 biodiversity treaty forged in Rio de Janeiro, proposed to require s.h.i.+pments of transgenic foods to be approved in advance in advance by importing countries. The United States refused to sign the treaty, which was also opposed by other large food-exporting nations such as Canada, Australia, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay. The reason: the requirement could inst.i.tute "a draconian regime that we have never seen before except for highly toxic and hazardous substances." by importing countries. The United States refused to sign the treaty, which was also opposed by other large food-exporting nations such as Canada, Australia, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay. The reason: the requirement could inst.i.tute "a draconian regime that we have never seen before except for highly toxic and hazardous substances."42 In January 2000, delegates from 130 nations adopted the treaty, but with compromises; they permitted genetically modified foods to be exported without advance notice but allowed countries to decide for themselves whether transgenic foods, seeds, and microbes posed a threat to the environment. If countries decided to prohibit imports on that basis, they could. Industry leaders considered the compromise as a win and hoped that the treaty would help counter the perception that food biotechnology was not adequately regulated. Some European countries viewed such trade agreements as barely masked attempts to achieve political goals. Many Europeans resented U.S. trade restrictions against countries that conduct business with Iran, Libya, or Cuba, and perceived the aggressive marketing of American transgenic crops as arrogant, controlling, and insensitive. They thought the phrase, "what's good for G.M. is good for America," now meant that genetic modification had replaced General Motors as the symbol of United States corporate power. In January 2000, delegates from 130 nations adopted the treaty, but with compromises; they permitted genetically modified foods to be exported without advance notice but allowed countries to decide for themselves whether transgenic foods, seeds, and microbes posed a threat to the environment. If countries decided to prohibit imports on that basis, they could. Industry leaders considered the compromise as a win and hoped that the treaty would help counter the perception that food biotechnology was not adequately regulated. Some European countries viewed such trade agreements as barely masked attempts to achieve political goals. Many Europeans resented U.S. trade restrictions against countries that conduct business with Iran, Libya, or Cuba, and perceived the aggressive marketing of American transgenic crops as arrogant, controlling, and insensitive. They thought the phrase, "what's good for G.M. is good for America," now meant that genetic modification had replaced General Motors as the symbol of United States corporate power.43 Europeans particularly resented the lack of labeling, as it left them little choice at the marketplace. If labels were required, however, U.S. companies would have to take several complicated and expensive actions: segregate conventional crops from transgenic crops in fields as well as during storage, transport, and processing; doc.u.ment the traceability of the crops; and establish thresholds for levels of transgenic contamination. U.S. food producers oppose these measures as impractical and expensive, and international authorities have yet to agree on the lowest level of contaminating transgenes that will permit crops to be labeled "GM-free."

The views of different countries on such issues are "harmonized" by the WTO, but also to a lesser extent by the Codex Alimentarius (food code) Commission of the United Nations. In 1994, an international consumers' group pet.i.tioned the Codex to develop standards for mandatory labeling of transgenic foods because "the burden of labeling should fall on those who wish to use and profit from biotechnology and not on those who choose not to use it"; the group renewed such requests through the 1990s. By 1999, public opinion in Europe, especially in Great Britain, overwhelmingly favored labeling and segregation of conventional crops from transgenic crops. When the European Union asked the Codex Commission to require labels for all foods containing identifiable transgenic ingredients, only the United States and Argentina (which also exports transgenic crops) opposed this proposal.44 U.S. Codex representatives argue that the true purpose of calls for labeling is to protect European trade restrictions: "a mandatory process-based label on genetically engineered food has the potential to be perceived by many consumers as a warning label that the product is unsafe, and therefore could be misleading and, consequently, inappropriate as a mandatory international guideline. Foods derived from biotechnology are not inherently less safe than other foods." U.S. Codex representatives argue that the true purpose of calls for labeling is to protect European trade restrictions: "a mandatory process-based label on genetically engineered food has the potential to be perceived by many consumers as a warning label that the product is unsafe, and therefore could be misleading and, consequently, inappropriate as a mandatory international guideline. Foods derived from biotechnology are not inherently less safe than other foods."45 Such arguments, along with the other concerns discussed here, convince critics that the goal of the food biotechnology industry is to control the world's food supply for private profit, and that neither the industry nor governing bodies can be trusted to make decisions in the public interest-whether or not the products are safe. Such arguments, along with the other concerns discussed here, convince critics that the goal of the food biotechnology industry is to control the world's food supply for private profit, and that neither the industry nor governing bodies can be trusted to make decisions in the public interest-whether or not the products are safe.

THE POLITICS OF ANTIBIOTECHNOLOGY ADVOCACY.

We have seen that objections to genetically engineered foods focus as much on issues of distrust as they do on matters of safety, and are likely to continue to do so unless the industry ceases acting in ways that engender suspicion. Public protests against transgenic foods occurred more swiftly and dramatically in Europe, especially in Great Britain, than in the United States, not least because the British were better informed about the issues. At the peak of the "GM crisis" early in 1999, the seven largest daily newspapers in Great Britain ran hundreds of articles on the subject, nearly all of them negative. Many of the articles focused on the extent to which the Clinton administration pressured the British government to accept American transgenic crops and collaborated in efforts to get those crops approved by the European Union.46 Antibiotechnology advocacy-international and domestic-is a constant source of worry to the industry. Such advocacy forms part of a larger trend in organized opposition to other aspects of globalization. During the 1990s, the number of international nongovernmental organizations increased from 6,000 to 26,000, and thousands of such groups exist in the United States alone. These groups are increasingly effective at the corporate, national, and international levels, and business a.n.a.lysts consider them especially difficult to manage because of their skill at using the Internet-an uncontrollable venue-to mobilize support. Yet another irony is the complaint of industry leaders that groups opposed to food biotechnology are so well funded. They point to Greenpeace, for example, which attracts a worldwide income of more than $100 million annually. This amount may seem large, but it is minuscule in comparison to the annual income of the large biotechnology corporations whose officials make that complaint.47 Advocacy has been slower to develop in the United States than in Europe, perhaps because Americans generally are less politically active, but also because they tend to have more positive att.i.tudes toward technology, greater trust in regulatory agencies, and less immediate contact with agriculture. Nevertheless, opposition to food biotechnology exists in this country and appears to be growing. Advocacy groups include environmental organizations (such as Environmental Defense, the Union of Concerned Scientists, and the Sierra Club) but also an extraordinary variety of less familiar organizations such as the International Center for Technology a.s.sessment, the Foundation for Deep Ecology, the International Forum on Globalization, and the Rainforest Action Network. Countless local groups like NW Rage (Northwest Resistance against Genetic Engineering) educate members "to resist the intrusion of genetic engineering . . . into our lives."48 Coalition groups like Genetically Engineered Food Alert demand that food companies refuse to use genetically modified ingredients. Most organizing occurs through dozens of antibiotechnology Internet Web sites and electronic mail services that keep subscribers well informed about the daily actions of companies, government regulators, and critics. Coalition groups like Genetically Engineered Food Alert demand that food companies refuse to use genetically modified ingredients. Most organizing occurs through dozens of antibiotechnology Internet Web sites and electronic mail services that keep subscribers well informed about the daily actions of companies, government regulators, and critics.49 Biotechnology companies appear helpless in the face of such tactics and make little attempt to counter them beyond statements on their own Web sites and in the public relations campaigns of the Council for Biotechnology Information ( Biotechnology companies appear helpless in the face of such tactics and make little attempt to counter them beyond statements on their own Web sites and in the public relations campaigns of the Council for Biotechnology Information (figures 12, 14 14, and 17 17).

Away from the Internet, action against food biotechnology takes many forms, nearly all of which mix safety with other issues to evoke distrust, dismay, contempt, or outrage. To begin with, advocates write books-lots of them. My personal collection includes two or three dozen, of which at least ten were written for a popular audience just from 1998 to 2002.50 Books on the ethics of food biotechnology form an additional publis.h.i.+ng genre. I am not the only person who collects such volumes. The geneticist Richard Lewontin reviewed his own collection of books and found that most opposed genetically modified foods for reasons that he judged muddled. He said, "whatever fears [one] might have of possible allergic reactions to food produced from genetically modified organisms, they are not more unsettling than the allergies induced . . . by the quality of the arguments about them. . . . Even the most judicious and seemingly dispa.s.sionate examinations of the scientific questions turn out, in the end, to be manifestoes." Books on the ethics of food biotechnology form an additional publis.h.i.+ng genre. I am not the only person who collects such volumes. The geneticist Richard Lewontin reviewed his own collection of books and found that most opposed genetically modified foods for reasons that he judged muddled. He said, "whatever fears [one] might have of possible allergic reactions to food produced from genetically modified organisms, they are not more unsettling than the allergies induced . . . by the quality of the arguments about them. . . . Even the most judicious and seemingly dispa.s.sionate examinations of the scientific questions turn out, in the end, to be manifestoes."51 By this, he seemed to mean that critics do not clearly distinguish scientific concerns about safety from concerns about social issues. By this, he seemed to mean that critics do not clearly distinguish scientific concerns about safety from concerns about social issues.

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FIGURE 27. Greenpeace uses cards like this one to generate support for campaigns to stop sales of genetically modified foods. Text on the back of the card explains why companies should stop selling genetically engineered food and what consumers can do to encourage that action. (Courtesy of Greenpeace, 2000.) The books have a political effect, but not always the one intended. Among the most recent, only one favors food biotechnology: Pandora's Picnic Basket Pandora's Picnic Basket.52 Although written by a scientist who claims to be objective, this book also can be viewed as a manifesto. An instructor in my New York University department a.s.signed it to a graduate cla.s.s on contemporary food issues. He said the cla.s.s found the science parts useful but also found the book infuriatingly patronizing, biased in coverage, and lacking in coherent social a.n.a.lysis. Informing the public about science is valuable, but that alone is not nearly enough to help people understand how scientific and social issues interact in matters of public policy. Although written by a scientist who claims to be objective, this book also can be viewed as a manifesto. An instructor in my New York University department a.s.signed it to a graduate cla.s.s on contemporary food issues. He said the cla.s.s found the science parts useful but also found the book infuriatingly patronizing, biased in coverage, and lacking in coherent social a.n.a.lysis. Informing the public about science is valuable, but that alone is not nearly enough to help people understand how scientific and social issues interact in matters of public policy.

Greenpeace is especially adept at producing materials that use scientific concerns about safety to score points about distrust. Figure 27 Figure 27 gives my favorite example: using the "horror" of transgenic foods to emphasize the lack of transparency in marketing. Another example: at the time of the 1999 WTO meeting in Seattle, a coalition of more than 60 nonprofit groups (The Turning Point Project) placed a series of full-page advertis.e.m.e.nts on food biotechnology and globalization in the gives my favorite example: using the "horror" of transgenic foods to emphasize the lack of transparency in marketing. Another example: at the time of the 1999 WTO meeting in Seattle, a coalition of more than 60 nonprofit groups (The Turning Point Project) placed a series of full-page advertis.e.m.e.nts on food biotechnology and globalization in the New York Times New York Times. One, headlined "Unlabeled, Untested . . . and You're Eating It" (October 18, 1999), listed common food products containing genetically modified ingredients and discussed the hazards of toxicity, allergic reactions, and antibiotic resistance. Subsequent advertis.e.m.e.nts provided lengthy and thought-provoking discussions of various health, environmental, or economic consequences of biotechnology or economic globalization, along with information about how to learn more about such issues. Figure 28 Figure 28 gives yet another example-this one, a painting-of the commingling of safety and social issues as they apply to transgenic foods. gives yet another example-this one, a painting-of the commingling of safety and social issues as they apply to transgenic foods.

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FIGURE 28. In conjunction with an exhibition of artworks on the theme "artists picturing our genetic future," Alexis Rockman's The Farm The Farm appeared on a lower Manhattan billboard (Lafayette and Houston Streets) in fall 2000. (Courtesy of Alexis Rockman and Creative Time; photograph by Charlie Samuels.) appeared on a lower Manhattan billboard (Lafayette and Houston Streets) in fall 2000. (Courtesy of Alexis Rockman and Creative Time; photograph by Charlie Samuels.) This commingling of safety with other issues is most visible in street demonstrations. The 1999 FDA labeling hearings, for example, attracted protests in all three cities where they were held (figure 18, page 190 page 190). The Oakland, California, hearing attracted 500 antibiotechnology demonstrators and received much attention from the press, largely because it also drew a smaller group of counter-demonstrators. These were researchers and graduate students from the nearby University of California, Berkeley, Department of Plant and Microbial Biology, infamous for having been "bought" by Novartis the year before (the department had auctioned itself to Novartis in an exclusive partners.h.i.+p arrangement giving that company the right to select faculty, review research results prior to publication, negotiate licensing agreements, and veto faculty decisions in some areas).53 They said they were demonstrating "out of concern that the public was not being informed about the benefits of biotechnology." They said they were demonstrating "out of concern that the public was not being informed about the benefits of biotechnology."54 Advocates also use the legal system to pursue antibiotechnology goals. In 2001 alone, 36 states considered bills aimed at transgenic foods: restricting plantings or sales; requiring labeling, notification, tracking, or evaluation of environmental impact; banning terminator technology; or prohibiting the use of such foods in school lunch programs. Few such bills pa.s.s, however. By 2001, Maryland was the only state to ban a genetically modified food, in this case fish in waterways that connect to other bodies of water.55 Consumer groups, chefs, and some scientists have filed lawsuits and organized pet.i.tion campaigns to compel the FDA to inst.i.tute labeling and safety testing. The Alliance for Bio-Integrity (Iowa City, IA), led by Steven Druker, has filed such suits. Other suits argue that transgenic manipulations make it impossible to observe religious dietary laws; one was cosigned by 113 Christians, 37 Jews, 12 Buddhists, and 122 people who checked, "my faith is not easily categorized." Still others have filed ant.i.trust lawsuits based on the idea that the industry's control over seeds inhibits compet.i.tion. A pet.i.tion organized by Mothers for Natural Law collected an astounding number of signatures-nearly 500,000-from people favoring transparency in labeling. Jeremy Rifkin organized a cla.s.s-action suit against Monsanto arguing that the company is part of an international conspiracy to control the world's corn and soybean supply through intimidation and deceptive business practices. Regardless of the outcome of the bills and lawsuits, they force attention to be paid to societal as well as safety issues. Consumer groups, chefs, and some scientists have filed lawsuits and organized pet.i.tion campaigns to compel the FDA to inst.i.tute labeling and safety testing. The Alliance for Bio-Integrity (Iowa City, IA), led by Steven Druker, has filed such suits. Other suits argue that transgenic manipulations make it impossible to observe religious dietary laws; one was cosigned by 113 Christians, 37 Jews, 12 Buddhists, and 122 people who checked, "my faith is not easily categorized." Still others have filed ant.i.trust lawsuits based on the idea that the industry's control over seeds inhibits compet.i.tion. A pet.i.tion organized by Mothers for Natural Law collected an astounding number of signatures-nearly 500,000-from people favoring transparency in labeling. Jeremy Rifkin organized a cla.s.s-action suit against Monsanto arguing that the company is part of an international conspiracy to control the world's corn and soybean supply through intimidation and deceptive business practices. Regardless of the outcome of the bills and lawsuits, they force attention to be paid to societal as well as safety issues.56 Such methods may annoy (and sometimes infuriate) biotechnology companies, government regulators, and scientists, but they are traditional ways of taking political action in a pluralistic democracy; they are legal, fair, and-given the many reasons for distrust-thoroughly justifiable. Transgenic sabotage, however, is another matter. When Ingo Potrykus complains about "those who would damage humanitarian projects" (discussed in chapter 5 chapter 5), he worries most that vandals will destroy test plantings of Golden Rice. In Great Britain, Greenpeace and other groups conducted "destruction actions" against test plots of transgenic crops, sometimes dressed in full-body anticontamination suits and goggles. In the United States, numerous incidents of uprooting transgenic crops, tras.h.i.+ng laboratories, burning genetic engineering materials, and making personal threats against scientists cross a legal line and enter into the realm of food terrorism.57 Such actions undermine the legitimacy of the political goals they are designed to accomplish, as do the controlling actions of corporations (see concluding chapter). Such actions undermine the legitimacy of the political goals they are designed to accomplish, as do the controlling actions of corporations (see concluding chapter).

TOWARD DIALOGUE, IF NOT CONSENSUS.

Protests against genetically modified foods-or the threat of such protests-affect the behavior of retailers who understand that consumers can choose to buy organic products, now labeled as such. Many companies label their products "GM-free" (see figure 25 figure 25, page 226 page 226). In the late 1990s, Gerber's and Heinz announced that they would stop using genetically modified ingredients in their baby foods, and McDonald's "quietly" told farmers to stop growing Monsanto's transgenic potatoes. Frito-Lay told its suppliers not to grow transgenic corn, and Archer Daniels Midland warned its grain suppliers to begin segregating bioengineered crops. Corn growers viewed such developments as a clear sign that "GM organisms have become the albatross around the neck of farmers."58 The loss of both domestic and foreign sales outlets coupled with more general problems of overproduction caused corn prices to drop to their lowest point in ten years. As a partial remedy, the American Corn Growers a.s.sociation advised its members to consider planting only conventional seeds. Wall Street a.n.a.lysts were well aware of this problem, seeing current events as very bad news for farmers, seed companies, and seed stocks. They predicted that premium prices would go to conventional rather than transgenic crops because "GMOs are good science but bad politics." The loss of both domestic and foreign sales outlets coupled with more general problems of overproduction caused corn prices to drop to their lowest point in ten years. As a partial remedy, the American Corn Growers a.s.sociation advised its members to consider planting only conventional seeds. Wall Street a.n.a.lysts were well aware of this problem, seeing current events as very bad news for farmers, seed companies, and seed stocks. They predicted that premium prices would go to conventional rather than transgenic crops because "GMOs are good science but bad politics."59 Their predictions were correct; corn acres planted in genetically modified seeds fell from 25 million in 1999 to just over 16 million in 2001. By then, more than half of the Midwest grain elevators required segregation of transgenic seeds, and 20% were offering premium prices for conventional corn or soybeans. Their predictions were correct; corn acres planted in genetically modified seeds fell from 25 million in 1999 to just over 16 million in 2001. By then, more than half of the Midwest grain elevators required segregation of transgenic seeds, and 20% were offering premium prices for conventional corn or soybeans.60 In part because of objections to transgenic varieties, revenues from U.S. corn exports fell drastically from 1996 to 2000. Exports to j.a.pan fell from $2.4 billion to $1.5 billion (a decline of 38%), to Taiwan from $960 million to $460 million (52%), and to European Union countries from $413 million to $69 million (83%). In part because of objections to transgenic varieties, revenues from U.S. corn exports fell drastically from 1996 to 2000. Exports to j.a.pan fell from $2.4 billion to $1.5 billion (a decline of 38%), to Taiwan from $960 million to $460 million (52%), and to European Union countries from $413 million to $69 million (83%).61 Despite these reactions, genetically engineered traits are widely dispersed in the environment, and transgenic ingredients pervade the food supply. Despite these reactions, genetically engineered traits are widely dispersed in the environment, and transgenic ingredients pervade the food supply.

Figuring out what to do about this confusing picture preoccupies federal agencies responsible for the regulation of transgenic foods. They worry that food biotechnology will suffer the fate of nuclear power and that its potential benefits will be lost to humanity. Like public protests over early recombinant-DNA experiments, those over food biotechnology may become muted if companies produce genetically modified foods that really do make farming more efficient or benefit consumers. What cannot be predicted is the strength and persistence of public distrust or the willingness of the industry to respond to it and submit the products and marketing methods to greater scrutiny. To help the industry gain public approval, federal agencies recruit advisory organizations to bring together groups of disparate stakeholders to seek points of agreement. As a partic.i.p.ant in several such meetings, I can attest that they require people with differing perspectives to listen to one another (itself a step forward) and to attempt to identify issues of consensus. These meetings invariably identify labeling, segregation, traceability, and government oversight as necessary first steps toward achieving public confidence. Although reaching consensus on such steps may never be possible, such meetings permit partic.i.p.ants to discuss matters that extend beyond safety and place societal issues of trust firmly on the agenda.

The messy political debates about food biotechnology are not likely to be resolved soon without major changes in the ways the industry conducts business. Genetically engineered foods may be relatively safe by the standards of science-based approaches to risk a.s.sessment, but industry decisions have caused them to rank high on the dread-and-outrage scale. To inspire public confidence, the industry must share control of the food supply with consumers. Until people actually have some choice about whether to consume transgenic foods, there is little reason to accept them. Companies need to label the foods and keep them separate from conventional foods. They also need to make more serious efforts to ensure that transgenes do not escape into the wild. They must work with organic farmers to prevent transgenic contamination of organic crops, and they must stop using public relations to "sell" people on the idea that the products are necessary and safe. If biotechnology companies want to convince people that their foods are beneficial, they must make products that are are beneficial-to consumers and to society. Finally, they must stop acting so aggressively against people who raise questions about the products, stop prosecuting small-scale "violators" of patent rights, and stop insisting that science education-important as it is-will solve the industry's public relations problems. Even some industry supporters understand that biotechnology companies need to become less disingenuous, and set some restraints on "their insatiable appet.i.te for control." beneficial-to consumers and to society. Finally, they must stop acting so aggressively against people who raise questions about the products, stop prosecuting small-scale "violators" of patent rights, and stop insisting that science education-important as it is-will solve the industry's public relations problems. Even some industry supporters understand that biotechnology companies need to become less disingenuous, and set some restraints on "their insatiable appet.i.te for control."62 If food biotechnology does have benefits for individuals and society-and it is still too early to say whether it does-such benefits can only be achieved when the products are viewed as low in science-based safety risk as well as in value-based dread and outrage. If food biotechnology does have benefits for individuals and society-and it is still too early to say whether it does-such benefits can only be achieved when the products are viewed as low in science-based safety risk as well as in value-based dread and outrage.

If companies are going to claim that their work will solve world food problems, they need to put substantial resources into working with scientists in developing countries to help farmers produce more food under local conditions. Such efforts could prove worthwhile if supported by policies designed to support sustainable and organic agriculture, protect against environmental risks, and prevent exploitation of small farmers or of consumers. For some years now, I have suggested that the industry inst.i.tute a "t.i.thing" program and apply 10% of income to research on projects that address the food needs of developing countries, regardless of their eventual profitability. This approach might indicate that the industry recognizes the difference between its commercial and humanitarian goals. Although I am not aware of any company that has taken on this challenge, I continue to believe that to be perceived as credible, the industry must be be credible. credible.

If government agencies want to promote food biotechnology, they are going to have to regulate it more effectively. They must insist that companies label, segregate, and ensure the traceability of genetically engineered crops, provide adequate areas of refuge, and keep their transgenes from pollinating out of control. Government regulators should be working with industry to figure out how to label the products and establish workable thresholds for transgenic contaminants. On the international level, they should stop obstructing multinational agreements and cooperate with government policies of other countries. They should grant consumer protection at least the same level of priority as promotion of industry objectives. Federal regulators must recognize as well that science-based decisions also have political dimensions and must find ways to consider societal and environmental implications when approving genetically modified foods.

And what should the public think or do about food biotechnology? As with other aspects of food politics, much depends on point of view. Eating foods containing transgenic ingredients appears unlikely to cause direct harm to human health, but at the moment there also is little evidence for benefit. If a goal is to reduce pesticides in the environment, genetically modifying foods may be an appropriate method for achieving that goal, but so may other methods that also deserve consideration. If the ultimate goal is to ensure food security for the world's population, other means to do so deserve equal time and resources. Overall, the role of genetically modified foods in these larger aspects of the food system is as yet uncertain and unlikely to be known for some time to come.

With that said, we now turn to the concluding chapter in which we will examine some emerging food safety issues. Like food biotechnology, these issues are relatively low in science-based risk but relatively high in dread: mad cow disease, foot-and-mouth disease, anthrax, and other potential weapons of food bioterrorism.

CONCLUSION.

THE FUTURE OF FOOD SAFETY.

PUBLIC HEALTH VERSUS BIOTERRORISM.

SAFE FOOD IS ONE OF THE GREAT ACHIEVEMENTS OF TWENTIETH-century public health, a result of scientific advances in refrigeration, pasteurization, insecticides, and disease surveillance. This book proposes that food safety also depends on politics. Any doubts about that idea should be thoroughly dispelled by the events of September 2001, when terrorists used airplanes as weapons of destruction and an anonymous correspondent sent letters filled with anthrax spores to civic and media leaders. One consequence of these events was to reveal the vulnerability of food and water supplies to malevolent tampering. Another was to expose the glaring gaps in federal oversight of food safety.1 This concluding chapter examines emerging food safety threats in these contexts. Some of the threats are diseases that affect farm animals and only rarely cause disease in humans. Even so, their effects on human welfare can be profound: ma.s.sive destruction of food animals, loss of livelihoods and community, and restrictions on personal liberty. The outbreaks of mad cow disease and foot-and-mouth disease that occurred in Europe in the 1990s and early 2000s, for example, were destructive, but they occurred as accidental results of production practices. In contrast, bioterrorism is deliberate-the purposeful use of biological or chemical materials to achieve political goals. Bioterrorism introduces a new and especially frightening political dimension to food safety risk: the intention intention to cause harm, regardless of who gets hurt. to cause harm, regardless of who gets hurt.

In this chapter, we will see how bioterrorism brings up questions of food security and expands the common meaning of that term. In the United States, food security usually refers to the reliability of a family's food supply; people who lack food security qualify for federal or private food a.s.sistance. Since the anthrax mailings, food security has also come to mean "food safe from bioterrorism." We begin our discussion of this definitional transition with diseases of farm animals: mad cow disease, foot-and-mouth disease, and anthrax. In recent years, these diseases did not exist or were rare veterinary problems posing relatively little risk to human health. Today, we are concerned about their potential to make us ill, create havoc in the food system, or become tools of bioterrorism. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how we-as a society and as individuals-can take action to address the problems and politics of food safety, now and in the future.

THE POLITICS OF ANIMAL DISEASES.

Because one consequence of globalization is the rapid transport of food across national borders and over long distances, a disease that affects the food supply can travel rapidly from one country to another. Animal diseases have trade implications; if a country harbors sick animals, no other country will accept its meat. Trade implications have political consequences.

As we will see, the British epidemics of mad cow disease and foot-and-mouth disease occurred as inadvertent results of meat production practices. In contrast, the U.S. anthrax mailings were a deliberate act. All three risks, however, rank high in dread; they are involuntary, uncontrollable, and cause exotic disease. Just as important, they undermine trust in the food supply and in government and divert resources from more pressing matters of public health.

Mad Cow Disease: Prions and Species Jumps Mad cow disease emerged as a highly publicized food safety crisis of the mid-1990s, largely confined to Great Britain. The story of this disease is relevant to our discussion for its interweaving of politics and science and its effect on public confidence. The manner in which British officials handled the mad cow crisis, for example, later contributed to public distrust of genetically modified foods. Prior to the early 1980s, hardly anyone had heard of the disease, but by 1999 it had affected at least 175,000 British cows. Its results were catastrophic: destruction of more than 4 million cattle, estimated costs of $7 billion, transmission to at least 18 countries, and worldwide rejection of British beef. By 2001, although "only" about 120 people had died of the human variant of mad cow disease, more deaths-perhaps as many as 100,000-were expected.2 Because this story reveals many aspects of the modern politics of food safety, it is well worth recounting. Because this story reveals many aspects of the modern politics of food safety, it is well worth recounting.

The mad cow epidemic originated in the late 1970s when the political climate in Great Britain favored cost cutting and deregulation-in this case, of the meat-rendering industry. This industry converts the otherwise unusable (offal) parts of dead animals into "meat-and-bone meal" used to supplement the diets of farm animals. In Britain, rendering then involved the use of organic solvents and steam applied under high pressure; this process sterilized the resulting mess and killed anything that might be infectious. The solvents were dangerously flammable, however, and the energy costs high. In the late 1970s, the British industry-but not renderers in other countries-adopted a cheaper method, one that omitted solvents and cooked the offal at lower temperatures. Most rendering plants in Great Britain switched to that system by the early 1980s.3 The new method killed most bacteria and viruses. It did not, however, inactivate prions prions, a generic term for the highly unusual infectious agents believed to cause a disease called sc.r.a.pie in sheep and related diseases in other animals. These invariably fatal diseases affect the brain and nervous system; they are called spongiform encephalopathies because they cause sponge-like holes in the brains of animals and people. Prion diseases present fascinating biological problems. They appear to involve transmission via proteins proteins (rather than bacteria, viruses, or DNA), as well as "species jumps" from one kind of animal to another. In the era before mad cow disease, prion diseases seemed to be confined to their particular host animal. Sc.r.a.pie, for example, affected sheep in Britain for at least three centuries but did not bother people. Instead, people exhibited their own specific and rare form of the disease, as did cows; both appeared spontaneously and were considered "sporadic." At this point, we need to know the names of these diseases: sc.r.a.pie in sheep, bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in cows, and Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) in people. (rather than bacteria, viruses, or DNA), as well as "species jumps" from one kind of animal to another. In the era before mad cow disease, prion diseases seemed to be confined to their particular host animal. Sc.r.a.pie, for example, affected sheep in Britain for at least three centuries but did not bother people. Instead, people exhibited their own specific and rare form of the disease, as did cows; both appeared spontaneously and were considered "sporadic." At this point, we need to know the names of these diseases: sc.r.a.pie in sheep, bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in cows, and Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) in people.4 Because of the way sick cows behave, BSE soon became known as mad cow disease. In turn, mad cow disease soon emerged as the link between prion diseases in sheep and in people. Because of the way sick cows behave, BSE soon became known as mad cow disease. In turn, mad cow disease soon emerged as the link between prion diseases in sheep and in people.5 BSE first appeared soon after cows ate the inadequately rendered meat-and-bone meal supplements. These supplements almost certainly contained offal from sheep infected with sc.r.a.pie; Great Britain raises far more sheep than cattle, and sc.r.a.pie is common in British sheep. Later, they surely also contained offal from cows with as yet unrecognized BSE. Veterinarians observed the first case of BSE in a cow in 1984 and confirmed the disease in 1985. During the next few years, the number of BSE cases in cows increased, signaling a growing epidemic. In 1988, an investigating committee deduced that the sheep disease must have jumped to cows. At this point, the British government banned the use of offal in cow feed and required farmers to report BSE cases and to destroy suspect cattle, all the while repeatedly rea.s.suring the public that British beef posed no health risk.

Despite the new regulations, government officials promised support to the beef industry. The prime minister, John Major, said he was "absolutely determined to reduce the burden of regulation on business."6 Although the government vehemently denied it, beef producers often ignored the 1988 feed ban and nearly half of all the BSE cases occurred in cows born Although the government vehemently denied it, beef producers often ignored the 1988 feed ban and nearly half of all the BSE cases occurred in cows born after after that year. In 1990, the government appointed yet another BSE review committee, but, according to a later investigation, pressured its members to declare beef safe to eat. Meanwhile, cases of BSE in cows continued to rise, reaching a peak in 1993 and then declining gradually as the use of rendered meat-and-bone meal ceased. During the next few years, scientists became increasingly convinced that mad cow disease might be transmitted to people. Britain banned the use in human food of mechanically recovered meat from cow vertebrae (lest it be contaminated with brain or nervous tissue), but health officials continued to deny any risk from this practice. The European Union, however, banned the sale of British beef for three years, noting that the disease seemed to be a particularly British problem. that year. In 1990, the government appointed yet another BSE review committee, but, according to a later investigation, pressured its members to declare beef safe to eat. Meanwhile, cases of BSE in cows continued to rise, reaching a peak in 1993 and then declining gradually as the use of rendered meat-and-bone meal ceased. During the next few years, scientists became increasingly convinced that mad cow disease might be transmitted to people. Britain banned the use in human food of mechanically recovered meat from cow vertebrae (lest it be contaminated with brain or nervous tissue), but health officials continued to deny any risk from this practice. The European Union, however, banned the sale of British beef for three years, noting that the disease seemed to be a particularly British problem.7 These actions came much too late. In 1996, British doctors identified ten young people with a previously unknown variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD). The new disease differed from the slowly progressing CJD that typically occurs in older people. It affected young young adults, it looked different, and it progressed much more rapidly. Dismayed scientists immediately suspected that the new variant disease represented yet another species jump, this time from cows to people. People who "caught" the new disease must have eaten BSE-contaminated beef before the offal-feeding bans went into effect or during the period of government delays, denials, finger pointings, and failures to enforce rules. adults, it looked different, and it progressed much more rapidly. Dismayed scientists immediately suspected that the new variant disease represented yet another species jump, this time from cows to people. People who "caught" the new disease must have eaten BSE-contaminated beef before the offal-feeding bans went into effect or during the period of government delays, denials, finger pointings, and failures to enforce rules.8 By all accounts, British officials did not handle this new crisis any better and only grudgingly admitted the link between mad cow disease and the human variant. In what appeared to be an act of explicit manipulation, the agriculture minister, John Gummer, appeared on television to show his faith in British meat: he fed a hamburger to his four-year-old daughter. Overall, the government seemed to be acting on behalf of the cattle industry rather than protecting public health. Reinforcing a familiar theme in this book, the Lancet Lancet blamed the secret ways in which government and expert committees operate-and the lack of public accountability-for the failure of government to do something to stop mad cow disease and prevent its transmission to people. It pointed to "the weaknesses of separating agricultural and medical science, and of allowing one Government department to protect the interests of both the food consumers and the farming industry." blamed the secret ways in which government and expert committees operate-and the lack of public accountability-for the failure of government to do something to stop mad cow disease and prevent its transmission to people. It pointed to "the weaknesses of separating agricultural and medical science, and of allowing one Government department to protect the interests of both the food consumers and the farming industry."9 The appearance of the new variant disease in people caused a further crisis, this time in international trade. The European Union banned member countries from buying British beef, and McDonald's and other such companies quickly removed it from sale. To protect the industry, the British government stopped permitting older cows (which are more likely to have developed BSE) to be used as food and began destroying them at a rate of 15,000 per week. By the end of 1998, the crisis subsided, and the European Union ended its ban. When that order took effect the next year, France continued to refuse to accept British beef. British officials threatened legal action: "We have science and the law on our side and it is regrettable that the French had ignored science and defied the law."10 Soon after, BSE turned up in cows in Germany, Italy, Spain, and j.a.pan, most likely because the animals had been fed meat-and-bone meal exported from Great Britain. Human cases of vCJD also appeared outside of Britain, perhaps because people ate British beef before the offal ban took effect. Soon after, BSE turned up in cows in Germany, Italy, Spain, and j.a.pan, most likely because the animals had been fed meat-and-bone meal exported from Great Britain. Human cases of vCJD also appeared outside of Britain, perhaps because people ate British beef before the offal ban took effect.

In the United States, federal agencies first took action against BSE in 1997, when the USDA banned imports of European cattle and sheep and the FDA banned the use of animal proteins as feed for ruminant animals. In 2000, the agencies banned imports of rendered animal products from 31 countries that had either reported BSE in their cattle or could not demonstrate that cattle were free of the disease. Food safety officials say the absence of mad cow disease and vCJD in the United States is due to such preventive actions. Others, however, are skeptical that the country can remain free of either disease. More than 30 s.h.i.+pments of animal byproducts from prohibited countries entered the United States after the ban, but regulatory agencies could not track what happened to at least half of them, perfectly ill.u.s.trating the need for a system of food traceability. FDA officials said that most of the by-products ended up in pet food, but this fate cannot be confirmed (and would be unlikely to rea.s.sure pet owners, regardless). Inspections revealed that 20% of about 2,500 feed mills handling meat-and-bone meal took no precautions to prevent the meal from getting into animal feed. No federal agency tests for prohibited material in feed for cattle. Worse, the bans on use of meat-and-bone meal do not apply to other farm animals such as pigs or chickens because officials a.s.sume that feed for these animals never enters the food supply for cows or people. This a.s.sumption, as we learned from the StarLink episode, is overly optimistic.11 Because evidence of BSE in U.S. cows would be catastrophic for the industry, the USDA commissioned a three-year study from the Harvard Center for Risk a.n.a.lysis, a group sponsored in part by industry. This study, based on a "probabilistic simulation model" (translation: a.s.sumptions and best guesses), said mad cow disease posed only minimal risk to American cattle or people: "Our a.n.a.lysis finds that the U.S. is highly resistant to any introduction of BSE or a similar disease. . . . Measures taken by the U.S. government and industry make the U.S. robust against the spread of BSE to animals or humans should it be introduced into this country." The report did not say that BSE could never enter the country, just that "The new cases of BSE would come primarily from lack of compliance with the regulations enacted to protect animal feed. . . . Even if they existed, these hypothetical sources of BSE could give rise to only one to two cases per year." Therefore, "the disease is virtually certain to be eliminated from the country within 20 years after its introduction."12 These conclusions may rea.s.sure or not depending, as usual, on point of view. A spokesman for the National Cattlemen's Beef a.s.sociation said they gave "consumers and cattle producers the a.s.surance of the safety of the American beef supply," and the president of the American Meat Inst.i.tute agreed: "The U.S. is free of many animal diseases that plague other nations, testaments to the success of government-industry efforts." British observers, however, thought such groups must be "in denial." Other countries, they said, also claim not to have mad cow disease but find it as soon as they look for it; any failure to test for it in large numbers of cattle is a serious mistake. But, as a BSE researcher in Oregon explained, "let's face it, no country wants to find the disease."13 Early in 2002, the General Accounting Office (GAO) criticized the Harvard study as based on flawed a.s.sumptions, and identified glaring weaknesses in U.S. inspection, testing, and enforcement policies against animal (and, therefore, human) prion diseases: "While BSE has not been found in the United States, federal actions do not sufficiently ensure that all BSE-infected animals or products are kept out or that if BSE were found, it would be detected promptly and not spread to other cattle through animal feed or enter the human food supply."14 A meat industry spokesman dismissed the GAO report as a "rehash" and complained that it failed to recognize that "the risk of BSE ever occurring in the United States is extremely low and getting lower every day." A meat industry spokesman dismissed the GAO report as a "rehash" and complained that it failed to recognize that "the risk of BSE ever occurring in the United States is extremely low and getting lower every day."15 As if to admit its unease with the current level of protection, however, the USDA announced that it was considering a variety of more stringent bans on use of brain, nervous tissue, and other offal from older and "downer" cows (those that died before slaughter), and that it had commissioned another report from the Harvard Center to evaluate such options. As if to admit its unease with the current level of protection, however, the USDA announced that it was considering a variety of more stringent bans on use of brain, nervous tissue, and other offal from older and "downer" cows (those that died before slaughter), and that it had commissioned another report from the Harvard Center to evaluate such options.16 All in all, the experience with mad cow disease confirms that the British beef industry, like that in the United States, acts in its own self-interest regardless of consequences for public health. It also confirms that no government agency willingly makes decisions in the public interest if those decisions oppose industry interests. Finally, the mad cow experience reveals the international nature of diseases that affect the food supply. Two examples: in j.a.pan, British meat-and-bone meal caused a case of mad cow disease, which, in turn, induced a scare responsible for a 50% drop in j.a.panese imports of U.S. beef, and the first case of vCJD in the United States occurred in a young British woman living in Florida. All borders are porous, food problems are global, and international strategies are required to ensure the safety of any country's food supply.17 Foot-and-Mouth Disease: A Contagious and Virulent Virus Such lessons were firmly reinforced in spring 2001 when an epidemic of foot-and-mouth disease devastated cattle not only in Great Britain but also in other European countries. By the time the epidemic ended, officials had destroyed 4 million animals, quarantined entire communities, and witnessed the destruction of British tourism. Foot-and-mouth disease only occasionally infects humans, but it is a severe political threat-to governments, economies, communities, and international relations.18 The cause of foot-and-mouth disease is a virus with several particularly dread-inspiring attributes. It spreads rapidly in air and water and over long distances, is highly contagious by inhalation or contact, and can be transmitted through shoes, clothing, automobile tires, pets, and wild animals. It affects cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, and deer, but people only rarely. It makes animals very sick; they eventually recover from the symptoms-fever and blistered mouths and hooves-but never catch up in growth, weight, or vitality. Animals infected with this disease become useless as meat. The United States takes precautions against foot-and-mouth disease and has not experienced an outbreak since 1929. The last previous British epidemic occurred in the late 1960s. Since early 2000, however, the disease has been reported in Russia, five countries in Asia, seven in Africa, and five in South America. Once started, it is not easy to contain.19 Thus, countries go to a great deal of trouble to eradicate foot-and-mouth disease and prevent its entry, and this disease is one of the main reasons why U.S. customs officials ask travelers whether they have recently visited farms. Thus, countries go to a great deal of trouble to eradicate foot-and-mouth disease and prevent its entry, and this disease is one of the main reasons why U.S. customs officials ask travelers whether they have recently visited farms.

A vaccine exists but poses its own international problems of trade and politics. Vaccinated animals could be carrying the virus but display no symptoms, and no country wants to import an infected animal or its products. Most countries refuse entry to meat or milk from vaccinated animals, and the rules of the European Union (EU) do not allow vaccination. Six weeks into the outbreak, however, the EU granted a waiver and allowed Britain to vaccinate animals against the disease. The British government chose not to do so, however. The Nestle corporation, which controls much of the milk processing in the affected region, strongly opposed vaccination because it might have "potential ma.s.sive negative impact on export of products to other countries."20 Under pressure from this company and a food trade a.s.sociation, the government instead decided to follow standard procedures for dealing with foot-and-mouth disease outbreaks. Under pressure from this company and a food trade a.s.sociation, the government instead decided to follow standard procedures for dealing with foot-and-mouth disease outbreaks.

These procedures require officials to take three prompt actions: (1) destroy sick animals, (2) destroy healthy animals that might have come in contact with sick animals, and (3) quarantine people living in the vicinity of affected animals. Some countries confine farm families with animals that have the disease-or might have it-to what is effectively a war zone. In Holland, for example, officials did not permit members of such families to leave their property even to go to school, church, or the doctor. They permitted the besieged families to pick up supplies only at checkpoint barriers.21 Given the extent of this virus's contagion and its ability to disrupt the food supply and the lives of citizens, it is not difficult to imagine foot-and-mouth disease as an instrument of terror. Scientists may argue about whether it is better to vaccinate animals or destroy them promptly, but this disease can destroy food supplies, communities, and international trade as well as the confidence of a population in its government. The foot-and-mouth epidemic also pointed out gaps in food safety oversight. While it was in progress, the United States banned import of meat from the European Union. Nevertheless, at least 750,000 pounds of prohibited meat entered U.S. warehouses after the ban, in part because of the inadequate inspection capability of federal agencies.22 Anthrax: A Bacterial Instrument of Terror?

Before a possible bioterrorist mailed letters laced with anthrax spores, biologists knew this microbe best as a prototype for Koch's Postulates, the rules developed in 1884 by Robert Koch, a German scientist, to prove that bacteria cause disease.23 Anthrax bacteria ( Anthrax bacteria (Bacillus anthracis) are common in soil and are eaten by grazing animals. They exist in two stages: rod-shaped bacteria bacteria that reproduce into long chains and form that reproduce into long chains and form spores spores when food sources are depleted. The spores are exceptionally hardy; when eaten, they reconst.i.tute into bacteria, invade the bloodstream, reproduce rapidly, and produce deadly toxins. When an infected animal dies, the bacteria turn into spores that eventually drop into the soil and continue the cycle. when food sources are depleted. The spores are exceptionally hardy; when eaten, they reconst.i.tute into bacteria, invade the bloodstream, reproduce rapidly, and produce deadly toxins. When an infected animal dies, the bacteria turn into spores that eventually drop into the soil and continue the cycle.24 Anthrax is normally a veterinary problem. Infected animals are so visibly sick that farmers cull them before they get into the meat supply. Infected cows are too sick to produce milk, or they produce milk of unusable quality, which is why milk and cheese are not known sources of anthrax. Digestive acids and enzymes-and cooking-ordinarily kill the bacteria, and people seem to have some natural immunity. Because heavy bacterial infestations overcome these defenses and spores resist them, people occasionally acquire anthrax from eating undercooked meat from sick or downer water buffalo, goats, sheep, and cattle. Even so, food-borne anthrax is so rare that medical journals like to report the occasional cases. In August 2000, for example, Minnesota health officials described an outbreak of anthrax in a farm family whose members ate meat from a downer steer. When family members became ill, investigators discovered that the carca.s.s was heavily infested with anthrax bacteria.25 Anthrax would be almost nonexistent in people if eating it were the only route of infection, but it also causes disease through the skin and lungs. The skin disease comes from handling infected carca.s.ses. The lung disease comes from breathing in spores from infected animal skins or soil. These forms also are relatively rare. In the United States, health officials reported about 225 cases of the skin disease over the 50-year period from 1944 to 1994. In 2001, they added to this total a man in North Dakota who had disposed of five cows dead of anthrax. Officials logged only 18 cases of inhalation anthrax from 1900 to 1978, and just two from 1992 to 2000.26 Nevertheless, the hardiness and lethality of anthrax spores has long suggested their potential as agents of germ warfare, and numerous countries worked on secret anthrax bioweapons projects during the Cold War. Much of what is known about weapons-grade anthrax comes from studies of a single epidemic in the former Soviet Union in 1979. When the Soviet state collapsed, scientists were able to trace the epidemic to an accidental release of an aerosol of anthrax spores from a nearby germ weapons factory. Nearly all of the unlucky people and animals who developed the disease were downwind of the factory when the plume of invisible spores blew over.27 Even before the U.S. anthrax mailings in 2001, experts on bioterrorism understood that anthrax is simple to grow, is durable, and is suitable for many forms of delivery, and that many countries had stockpiled spores: "The long-dreaded concern that chemical and biological weapons might reach terrorist hands is now a reality." Even before the U.S. anthrax mailings in 2001, experts on bioterrorism understood that anthrax is simple to grow, is durable, and is suitable for many forms of delivery, and that many countries had stockpiled spores: "The long-dreaded concern that chemical and biological weapons might reach terrorist hands is now a reality."28 The United States worked on inhalation anthrax during the Cold War, and although it and numerous other countries signed a treaty in 1993 against this use, at least 10 countries are thought to be working on such projects. Ironically, because the spores mailed in 2001 were weapons-grade, some experts suspected they must have come from a U.S. military insider eager to demonstrate the need for more research on biological weapons. They were proven correct after a long, poorly handled investigation. The United States worked on inhalation anthrax during the Cold War, and although it and numerous other countries signed a treaty in 1993 against this use, at least 10 countries are thought to be working on such projects. Ironically, because the spores mailed in 2001 were weapons-grade, some experts suspected they must have come from a U.S. military insider eager to demonstrate the need for more research on biological weapons. They were proven correct after a long, poorly