Battle Ready Part 31

THE CALLING.

Tony Zinni REFLECTS. REFLECTS.

At the very beginning of the twentieth century-a time when the daring and brave from many nations struck out for the promised land-two men from the rugged, mountainous province of Abruzzo in central Italy set off to achieve that promise. One of the men was a peasant farmer named Francesco Zinni; the other was a tailor named Zupito DiSabatino. They were my grandfathers. They had never met, and would not for many years.

Their trek followed the pattern followed by thousands of others. They came alone, found jobs, established themselves in this strange, raw, bustling land, and a few years later sent for their families. With the same courage and apprehension, my grandmothers, Christina Zinni and Cecilia DiSabatino, packed up the kids, headed to the Italian ports, and sailed across the seas to join their husbands. With Christina in 1910 was her fourteen-year-old son, Antonio, my father; and with Cecilia in 1906 was her three-year-old daughter, Lilla, my mother. I often look at faded old pictures taken around that time and wonder what my parents and grandparents were thinking as these great changes unfolded.

Neither of my parents had an easy life growing up. Like all young immigrants of the time, they managed only a few years of education before they had to go to work. My father worked in mills, and then in landscaping, and eventually became a chauffeur; my mother worked in garment factories.

Our family military tradition in America started with my father, who was drafted to fight in World War One-the War to End All Wars-shortly after he arrived from Italy. He got here and he was drafted. Later, I looked into it and found that twelve percent of America's infantrymen in World War One were Italian immigrants. Their new homeland did not forget their wartime service. My father, who served in the 101st Aero Squadron in France, received his citizens.h.i.+p papers along with his discharge papers. He came out of the war as a full-fledged citizen of the United States. Just imagine what that meant to him!

Meanwhile, his family had settled in a mill town called Conshohocken on the outskirts of Philadelphia; and my mother's family had settled in the Italian neighborhoods of South Philadelphia. These places were the center of my universe for the first two decades of my life.

They met during the 1920s, married, and raised four children: Frank, Christine, Rita, and me. I entered the wonderful, loving world of large Italian families on September 17, 1943, when my parents were well into their forties.

The people with whom I grew up were from working-cla.s.s families. The mothers were full of love and caring, and raised the brood. The men worked hard, and most served their country in time of war-all as enlisted men. Besides my father, I had cousins who served in World War Two; my brother served in the Korean War; and my sisters married men who served. I listened to the stories these men told with fascination and envy. To them, service was an obligation of citizens.h.i.+p and, more important, a rite of pa.s.sage to manhood. That obligation was engraved on my young brain. It was part of what had to be done as you grew into adulthood. If you were fortunate, I thought, you might even see action.

In my neighborhood were ethnic families that included Italian, Irish, Polish, African American, and "Mayflower" Americans. I don't remember much friction between these groups. The mixed neighborhoods, schools, and workplaces tended to bring everyone together. I attended public school for the first five grades, then switched to Catholic school for the upper grades and for high school. The good sisters ran a tight s.h.i.+p. We learned self-discipline and a strong work ethic, mixed with a good dose of right and wrong.

THESE ARE the particular influences that have shaped me. Other, larger events shaped my generation. Those of us who survived those changes, and were able to advance more than we retreated, may have had advantages not shared by many young people starting out today. Of course it always helps to have good genes and DNA, and to come from families that function normally. But we also grew up in school systems that actually taught us something and imprinted us with a code, which helped move us along the path toward being useful citizens. And for most of us, our religious upbringing gave us an acceptance of a Higher Being in one form or another, at the core of our beliefs. the particular influences that have shaped me. Other, larger events shaped my generation. Those of us who survived those changes, and were able to advance more than we retreated, may have had advantages not shared by many young people starting out today. Of course it always helps to have good genes and DNA, and to come from families that function normally. But we also grew up in school systems that actually taught us something and imprinted us with a code, which helped move us along the path toward being useful citizens. And for most of us, our religious upbringing gave us an acceptance of a Higher Being in one form or another, at the core of our beliefs.

Of the events that shaped us, some came to us as a legacy; some we actually lived through. One of the biggest was World War Two, which has proven to be both a blessing and a curse to my generation. The blessing was that the Greatest Generation preserved our freedoms and our way of life, lifted us out of a severe depression on a wave of prosperity, and moved us into a role of world leaders.h.i.+p. The curse is that it was the last Good War-the last with moral clarity, an easily identified and demonized enemy, unprecedented national unity in mobilization and rationing, pride in those who served in uniform (shown by the blue star flags hung by the families of those who fought and the gold star flags by the families of those who died), and welcome home victory parades for those lucky enough to return from overseas. Every war should be fought like that.

After World War Two, I learned about war at the knees of my cousins, who'd fought at the Battle of the Bulge in Europe and all over the Pacific-on the ground and in the air. A few years later, my older brother was drafted and fought in Korea. Their war stories were remarkable: sometimes gory and horrible, but always positive in the end. It was like winning the Big Game against your archrival-always clean and always good. So this was my generation's legacy: World War Two was the way you fight a war. And all throughout our four decades of service, this notion kept getting reinforced. Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's famous 1984 statement of doctrine about the six criteria for the use of military force88 is a recipe for refighting World War Two-not for fighting the Operations Other Than War (OOTW) that we face today. In fact, if you read the Weinberger Doctrine and adhere to every one of its tenets, you will be able to fight no war other than World War Two. is a recipe for refighting World War Two-not for fighting the Operations Other Than War (OOTW) that we face today. In fact, if you read the Weinberger Doctrine and adhere to every one of its tenets, you will be able to fight no war other than World War Two.

I JOINED the Marines in 1961 and officially retired on September 1, 2000. the Marines in 1961 and officially retired on September 1, 2000.

I'd like to s.h.i.+ne a spotlight on who we were-the military generations who went through the past four decades, from the 1960s up to the new millennium. If you looked at a snapshot taken when I first came into the service, all the generals looked the same-distinguished older white males with Anglo-Saxon names and Southern drawls-while the troops they led came from lots of different places. Let's just say that the generals didn't speak Philadelphia the way I speak Philadelphia.

But things were changing in the 1960s. Marine Corps officers were still coming in from the service academies and military inst.i.tutes, yet more and more were coming in from Catholic colleges in the Northeast (as I did), from state colleges and universities around the nation, and from other schools with strong NROTC units or other strong military traditions. At the same time, we were seeing people coming up through the enlisted ranks to become officers-not just the tough old mustangs or limited-duty officers with midgrade terminal ranks, but young people whom we would send to school as an investment in the future. Back then, whatever our various backgrounds, we all came into the service with a code imprinted on each of us by family, school, or church. Those who had come from military schools received the imprint from their officers. One way or another, all of us were programmed to believe that we were not just doing a job, or even a profession, but were pursuing a calling.

It was never a drag for me to go to work. The troops, the leaders and mentors, the day-to-day experiences, always gave me a charge. I just loved it from day one. Don't get me wrong. It wasn't always fun. There were bad times. And some of the times were truly harrowing. But I never tired of engaging with the challenges. I could wrap my entire self around them-body, mind, and spirit. I never once regretted that I took that course through life.

AROUND THE TURN of the millennium, I had occasion to talk with old World War Two vets. It was often unnerving to face the old guys who'd look at me and seem to say, "How in h.e.l.l did you screw it up? We had it right and we did it right and we fought and we understood and we left this country an incredible legacy, and now look at where we are . . ." of the millennium, I had occasion to talk with old World War Two vets. It was often unnerving to face the old guys who'd look at me and seem to say, "How in h.e.l.l did you screw it up? We had it right and we did it right and we fought and we understood and we left this country an incredible legacy, and now look at where we are . . ."

It's hard to escape the feeling "G.o.d, I've let them down," because the second major challenge that affected us was the Vietnam War-our nation's longest and least satisfactory. It was my second-lieutenant experience, and I was pretty green (that changed fast). I didn't see then all the problems we see now-the war was fought in the wrong way; it was badly led. I went through serious pain and suffering. I was sick; I was badly wounded. Yet despite all these problems, I would do it again. We had to do it.

Not because it was a "good" war, but because even in our failure we delivered a message that had to be delivered. We have to understand Vietnam within its context. We were in the Cold War. We were fighting communism. We had to stop it from spreading. We made a stand and didn't hold that line. But communism didn't spread. You can't tell me that the Soviets didn't get the message that we would stand if we had to.

The veterans of that war, in their losing fight, were no less heroes than the veterans of World War Two; and in some ways their heroism goes deeper, because it was never truly recognized and appreciated by the American people.

As my time in Vietnam lengthened, I began asking questions . . . wondering just what in h.e.l.l our generals-my heroes who fought in World War Two-thought they were doing. Those of us who were platoon commanders and company commanders fought hard, but could never understand what war our most senior leaders thought we were fighting. The tactics didn't make sense and the personnel policies-such as one-year individual rotations instead of unit rotations in and out of country-were hard to comprehend.

Today, of course, we are seeing a stream of apologetic books by the policymakers and military leaders of that era-as though saying mea culpa mea culpa enough will absolve them of the terrible responsibility they still bear. enough will absolve them of the terrible responsibility they still bear.

The third major test we went through was the challenge of the '70s. It was the toughest time for me in my four decades of Marine Corps service-racial problems, drug problems, generational problems, authority problems . . . flower children, peace marches, demonstrations (some of them violent), the loss of trust in the military by a large portion of the American people. But in pa.s.sing through that tumultuous cauldron, our military has, in my view, put together its greatest achievement during that forty-year period. To name just one example, it is the one segment of society where integration of the races has fully taken hold. Sure, we still run into problems, but nowhere else in American society can a person of color find the kind of opportunity he or she can find in our military. And we in the military are far better off for their presence. I am proud of them. We want the best and the brightest, and we get them.

The fourth challenge that affected my generation was the Cold War-which was actually a forty-year commitment to refight World War Two, if ever the need arose. Once again, we were energized to engage in global conflict, but this time against the evil "Red Menace." Problem was, we could never figure just how this particular war would actually start. After playing a bazillion war games at the Naval War College and other places, I still could not come up with a logical or convincing way such a war would kick off. It was just too hard to show why the Soviets would want to conquer a burning, devastated Europe, or how that could possibly benefit the communists in any way. So we would just gloss over the way the miserable war got started, jump into the middle of things, and play on. The Cold War was ever-present, and it was great for justifying programs, systems, and force structure-but, deep down inside, no one seriously believed that it would actually happen.

Still, it necessarily drove things. It drove the way we thought; it drove the way we organized and equipped; and it drove the way we developed our concepts of fighting. It totally shaped shaped us. It totally defined who we were. And when it was all over, we achieved our aim. The war didn't happen. This was us. It totally defined who we were. And when it was all over, we achieved our aim. The war didn't happen. This was not not a dog that didn't bark. The readiness we worked so hard to achieve for so many years was apparent to the Soviets and their surrogates. They could see the level of our commitment. They didn't want to take us on. Our readiness and commitment acted as a deterrent-exactly what we wanted them to do. a dog that didn't bark. The readiness we worked so hard to achieve for so many years was apparent to the Soviets and their surrogates. They could see the level of our commitment. They didn't want to take us on. Our readiness and commitment acted as a deterrent-exactly what we wanted them to do.

That taught us one other vital lesson: How to contain and how to deter-the use of the military to prevent prevent wars. This was the first time in history, to my knowledge, that a great power has taken that course. It's a course we will have to take again and again in the twenty-first century. wars. This was the first time in history, to my knowledge, that a great power has taken that course. It's a course we will have to take again and again in the twenty-first century.

Then suddenly, at the end of the 1980s, the Berlin Wall came down, the Evil Empire collapsed, and we found ourselves in the New World Order. It would require a major adjustment. We didn't do that right.

The next influential event was Desert Storm, which, as far as I am concerned, was an aberration. Though it seemed to work out okay for us-indeed proved beyond doubt how enormously powerful our Cold War military really was-it was the final salute of the Cold War military. It left the impression that the terrible mess that awaits us abroad can somehow be overcome by good, clean soldiering, just like in World War Two. In reality, the only reason Desert Storm worked was because we managed to go up against the only jerk on the planet who was stupid enough to challenge us to refight World War Two-with less of everything that counted, including the moral right to do what he did to Kuwait. In the top-level war colleges, we still fight this type of adversary, so we always can win. I rebelled at this notion, thinking there would be n.o.body out there so stupid to fight us that way. But then along came Saddam Hussein, and "good soldiering" was vindicated once again.

Worse yet, the end of any conflict often brings into professional circles the heartfelt belief that "Now that the war is over, we can get back to real soldiering." So we merrily backtrack in that direction. Scary, isn't it? Still trying to fight our kind of war-be it World War Two, Desert Storm, or Operation Iraqi Freedom-we ignore the real war-fighting requirements of today. We want to fight the services' conventional doctrines. We want to find a real adversarial demon-a composite of Hitler, Tojo, and Mussolini-so we can drive on to his capital city and crush him there. Unconditional surrender. Then we'll put in place a Marshall Plan, embrace the long-suffering vanquished, and help them regain entry into the community of nations. Everybody wants to do that. But it ain't gonna happen.

Today, we are stuck with the likes of a wiser Kim Jong Il and a still-elusive Osama bin Laden-just a couple of those charmers out there who will no longer take us on in a symmetric force matchup. And we're going to be doing things like humanitarian operations, consequence management, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. Somewhere along the line, we'll have to respond to some kind of environmental disaster. And somewhere else along the line we may get stuck with putting a U.S. battalion in place on some demarcation line between two adversaries, embedded in a weird, screwed-up chain of command. And do you know what? We're going to b.i.t.c.h and moan about it. We're going to dust off the Weinberger Doctrine and the Powell Doctrine and throw them in the face of our civilian leaders.h.i.+p.

The truth is that military conflict has changed and we have been reluctant to recognize it. Defeating nation-state forces in conventional battle is not the task for the twenty-first century. Odd missions to defeat transnational threats or rebuild nations are the order of the day, but we haven't as yet adapted. We all know it, but we won't acknowledge it.

THE OBLIGATION TO SPEAK THE TRUTH.

In April of 2003, I was invited by the U.S. Naval Academy to address the mids.h.i.+pmen in a lecture hosted by their Center for the Study of Military Ethics. I chose as my topic "The Obligation to Speak the Truth." I told these future leaders that speaking the truth could be painful and costly, but it was a duty. Often those who need to hear it won't like it and may even punish you for it; but you owed the truth to your country, your leaders, and your troops.

I have been amazed that men who bravely faced death on the battlefield are later, as senior officers, cowed and unwilling to stand up for what is right or to point out what is wrong. There are many reasons for this, from careerism and the hope of personal gain, to political expediency, to a false sense of obedience, to a kind of "Charge of the Light Brigade" mentality: As long as guys are dying out there, it is morally reprehensible to criticize the flawed policies and tactics that put them in that predicament. Bulls.h.i.+t.

I vowed long ago to a wounded young lance corporal in Vietnam that I would never shrink from speaking out. If it required an end to my career, so be it. Later, I was blessed to serve under great leaders who allowed me to speak and welcomed and encouraged my input, even when it was contrary to their views. These men taught me more about courage than I learned on any battlefield-people like Hugh Shelton, who, as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, required all of us four-star commanders (CINCs and service chiefs) to read a book by H. R. McMaster, then a bright young Army major and a celebrated armor officer in Desert Storm (as a captain he commanded Eagle Troop of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment during the Battle of 73 Easting, the biggest tank clash since 1973 in the Sinai). The book, Dereliction of Duty, Dereliction of Duty, details the failures of the Joint Chiefs to speak out during the Vietnam War; they knew they were building a military campaign on lies, but they pressed forward anyway into the Valley of Death. At a breakfast meeting on January 29, 1998, which was led by Major McMaster, the chairman's message was clear: He expected us to speak out. I experienced the same sort of encouragement under exceptional commanders like Generals Al Gray, Bob Barrow, Jack Galvin, Mick Trainor, Fred Haynes, Jim McCarthy, Joe h.o.a.r, Binnie Peay, Bob Johnston, and Admiral Snuffy Smith. We need more leaders such as these. details the failures of the Joint Chiefs to speak out during the Vietnam War; they knew they were building a military campaign on lies, but they pressed forward anyway into the Valley of Death. At a breakfast meeting on January 29, 1998, which was led by Major McMaster, the chairman's message was clear: He expected us to speak out. I experienced the same sort of encouragement under exceptional commanders like Generals Al Gray, Bob Barrow, Jack Galvin, Mick Trainor, Fred Haynes, Jim McCarthy, Joe h.o.a.r, Binnie Peay, Bob Johnston, and Admiral Snuffy Smith. We need more leaders such as these.

Moral courage is often more difficult than physical courage. There are times when you disagree and you have to suck it in and say, "Yes, sir," and go do what you're told. There are also times when you disagree and you have to speak out, even at the cost of your career. If you're a general, you might have to throw your stars on the table, as they say, and resign for the sake of some principle or truth from which you can't back away.

Careerism is corrosive to the principle of truth telling. So is political expediency. In both cases, the hope of personal gain outweighs personal integrity and honor. "Don't rock the boat" leads to moral blindness about threats to the mission or the lives and welfare of the troops and of their families. The troops are interested in more from their leaders back home than statements such as, "We back them one hundred percent." That's the mentality of the chateau generals in World War One who sent hundreds of thousands of fine young men to useless deaths. If you make a political mistake, the troops have to pay for it with their blood. Our political and military leaders must be held accountable for their mistakes. Somebody has to tell them that the measures of success they're selling are not what is really happening on the ground.

The troops want leaders who understand them, fight for them, and appreciate what they're going through. Credibility is lost in their eyes if their leaders are silent when things are not right. To them that silence is either incompetence or careerism. It is not a demonstration of support.

I have often been called "outspoken." I am. Too many of our senior commanders have been "Stepford Generals and Stepford Admirals." They fail in their obligation to speak the truth. And when they do, they're vilified. Recently, the Army chief of staff testified that we would need 300,000 troops to pacify Iraq. Everybody in the military knew he was right. But the party line down from the Pentagon decreed that the number was half that, and he was pilloried.

Incidents like that are not lost on our subordinates. Many are disgusted and disillusioned, and leave the service of their country. Others learn that following the party line is the course to high rank.

In the lead-up to the Iraq war and its later conduct, I saw, at a minimum, true dereliction, negligence, and irresponsibility; at worst, lying, incompetence, and corruption. False rationales presented as a justification; a flawed strategy; lack of planning; the unnecessary alienation of our allies; the underestimation of the task; the unnecessary distraction from real threats; and the unbearable strain dumped on our overstretched military, all of these caused me to speak out. I did it before the war as a caution, and as an attempt to voice concern over situations I knew would be dangers, where the outcomes would likely mean real harm to our nation's interests. I was called a traitor and a turncoat by Pentagon officials. The personal attacks are painful, as I told those young mids.h.i.+pmen, but the photos of the casualties I see every day in the papers and on TV convince me not to shrink from the obligation to speak the truth.

OUR OBLIGATION to tell the truth extends even to the media. to tell the truth extends even to the media.

Over the past forty years, we have seen strange things happen with regard to the media. To be sure, there are few Ernie Pyles out there-great journalists who make combat come alive the way that the boots on the ground experience it-but there's nothing inherently wrong with the media. It has the same percentages of good guys and bad guys as other fields.

Yet technology has changed things. The media are on the battlefield; the media are in your headquarters; the media are everywhere. And the media report everything-good and bad, warts and all. And everyone knows that the warts tend to make better stories. As a CINC, I was chewed out by seniors maybe five times; four of the five were about statements I'd made to the media. At that stage of my life, it didn't really bother me-because where in h.e.l.l did I go from there? But if you are a lieutenant or a captain and you see another officer get fried, you have a different reaction. The message is clear: "Avoid the media." And the message hardens into a code: "They are the enemy. Don't be straight with them."

And that is bad. That is bad because we live in the Information Age. Battlefield reports are going to come back in real time, and they are going to be interpreted-with all sorts of subtle shadings and nuances-by the reporters and their news editors. But the relations.h.i.+p between the military and the media, which should be at its strongest right now, has bottomed out. It has begun to heal a little, but a lot more must be done. We need to rebuild a sense of mutual trust. My uncles in World War Two generally experienced a friendly press-with Bill Mauldin's Willie and Joe cartoons and Ernie Pyle's stories. The press then was part of the war effort. G.I. Joe was lionized and bad news was suppressed-if not by the military then by the media. The relations.h.i.+p generally remained positive through the Korean War, despite its ambiguities. But the relations.h.i.+p soured during and after Vietnam, for a number of reasons-not the least of which was mounting distrust of government by the media and the American people.

The military and the media need to regain the mutual trust that once existed. It will be hard, given the recent past and the speed and sophistication of today's media technology, but it's crucial to protecting one of our most cherished freedoms, while keeping vital operational information secure.

LEADERs.h.i.+P AND LIFE.

You can't lead unless you love those you lead. That's principle number one. All other leaders.h.i.+p principles flow out of it. Too much leaders.h.i.+p training focuses on the leader and not enough on the led. Your charges are your family. In professions that are truly callings, you have to have that. In my profession, guys put everything on the line and can die for it. We have to care about these guys. They have to mean something to us. We must know what makes them tick; who they are; what they want and need; what motivates them.

I remember talking to Prime Minister Meles of Ethiopia a few years ago. Before he became leader of his government, he was a fighting general in a twenty-year-long revolution. He knew knew his troops. They'd lived and fought together for two decades. One day during the fighting, his troops had to pa.s.s through a minefield, without any of the mechanical devices we use for our protection. He had no choice. He had to send troops ahead of everybody to find lanes. Many of them died, but his forces successfully made the pa.s.sage. his troops. They'd lived and fought together for two decades. One day during the fighting, his troops had to pa.s.s through a minefield, without any of the mechanical devices we use for our protection. He had no choice. He had to send troops ahead of everybody to find lanes. Many of them died, but his forces successfully made the pa.s.sage.

When he told me the story, tears were in his eyes for the troops he'd lost. If you don't or can't feel that, then you shouldn't lead.

The second principle is to know yourself. Few leaders are as good as they think they are. And commanders develop skills in finding measures of success that make them look good, such as body counts. What's the real measure of success? You get it from truly understanding the conflict and by seeking feedback from the guys with boots on the ground. They're there; they know. An ego can be bruised by feedback, but it's critical truly to know how you stand as a leader. True leaders seek feedback regardless of the news. They learn from it.

All people come in three parts: body, mind, and spirit. No one is complete unless all three are developed and tended to. As a leader, you need to care for these in yourself and in those you lead.

Each leader needs a code to live by. That code can be formed by many factors. Our family, our schooling, our faith, our friends, and our calling in life can all be counted among those factors. My daughter once asked me what I would die for. I thought about that a lot before I answered her. I knew the answer would truly define me. I told her I would die for my faith, my family, my friends, my freedom, and my flag-the five "Fs," a simplified expression of my code. But a code is worthless unless you live it. Words like integrity, ethics, honor, integrity, ethics, honor, etc., need to be lived and not just uttered. etc., need to be lived and not just uttered.

You never stop learning unless you decide to. I have an unquenchable thirst for knowledge. It is an obsession for me. My sources for learning are all around me. When I make a mistake or fail, I have to know why. I need to know what makes things and people tick. I am amazed at how much people miss by not observing the world around them with an open curiosity.

I have learned more from sergeants than I have from generals. The troops relate to a leader by testing him or her to see if they relate to them, to see if they're open to them and listen to them. They want to know if they're fundamentally honest with them. This is not a "buddy" thing. Leaders can't be buddies with the led. But the troops want to be able to say: "I can talk to this captain. He listens." If you don't listen, they will be polite, but you can forget about their respect . . . or about getting the truth where the rubber meets the road. You want them to tell you: "Sir, this is not working." Or: "It is working." Or: "Yeah, it's working okay, but it could be better." When you know such truths, and can do something about them, that's when you have real success.

I love to teach. It is a princ.i.p.al function of leaders.h.i.+p.

My teaching philosophy is based on two principles. The first has to do with the mission of the teacher. His role is to provide the students with the facts and with a clear articulation of the varying views, opinions, and options on a given subject. His purpose, after he has provided this framework, is to then teach the students how how to think and not to think and not what what to think about the subject. You want to teach the student how to ask the questions that really count and not how to give answers that satisfy conventional wisdom and long-fossilized received opinions. If you know how to ask the right questions, the best answers usually follow . . . though it may take time. to think about the subject. You want to teach the student how to ask the questions that really count and not how to give answers that satisfy conventional wisdom and long-fossilized received opinions. If you know how to ask the right questions, the best answers usually follow . . . though it may take time.

The second principle deals with the foundation of thinking. It must have a set of values at its base. This requires teachers to emphasize the importance of a values-based thinking process without imposing personal interpretations of those values. The values will be more powerful in a student's life and in his way of thinking, his decision making, and in how he defines his ethical code if he has discovered and defined them on his own.

The greatest enjoyment for a teacher is to see that moment of discovery or that moment of doubt that wasn't there before, but now presents the student with a spur to reason.

Learning is guided discovery. The guide is the teacher. His scholars.h.i.+p provides the factual basis for the student's journey of discovery; and his leaders.h.i.+p, personal example, and mentoring skills provide the moral basis. A teacher's competence, therefore, comes in two inseparable parts. He must be expert in his subject and he must be qualified in his leaders.h.i.+p ability. Technical competence alone is not sufficient. Leading and teaching are synonymous. You cannot a.s.sume to do one without the other.

As a teacher, I strive to meet the obligations articulated in this philosophy. It requires me to develop in myself the mental, physical, and spiritual qualities I desire to impart and instill in my students.

As a young captain, I began writing down everything I believed about my profession. I expressed my beliefs, asked others to challenge them, and sought more insight into each of them. I continuously changed or altered them as a result.

Over time these dynamic beliefs settled into three categories: those that I was absolutely sure were right; those that I was pretty sure were right; and those that were up for grabs. It was an even split, with new ideas coming and some old ones going; they were in a constant state of morphing over time. I called these my "Combat Concepts." To me they were a mechanism for continuous learning.

The particular concepts themselves don't matter as much as the process. This process was so important to me that I extended it from war fighting to other areas-leaders.h.i.+p, life, other people, team building. I kept asking myself: "What makes people tick? What do they want in life? What makes teams tick? How can I bring them together more strongly and effectively?"

I'd write down my thoughts on these things, but they were always open to challenge and to change. I wanted always to be able to keep examining my core. I learned long ago that when you stop examining your core, you can really be shaken when you take a hard hit.

AMERICA AND THE WORLD.

Our country is great. It has become great because it strives to be good. That is, our country is values based . . . values we hold dear in good times and bad. Our country is admired, respected, envied, and hated for its greatness. To some it is the beacon that Jefferson said we should strive to be. It offers hope and promise. As a first-generation American, I know what that means. Everything is possible here.

We have to stay with all that. We might not always succeed, but we must always try. It's important not not to stop being America when we take bad hits. It's most important for America to be America when it's hardest to be America. When the going gets tough, the temptation is to start compromising on our values. After 9/11, it's been hard to be America. True leaders.h.i.+p is not to slip into compromises. to stop being America when we take bad hits. It's most important for America to be America when it's hardest to be America. When the going gets tough, the temptation is to start compromising on our values. After 9/11, it's been hard to be America. True leaders.h.i.+p is not to slip into compromises.

WE ARE now an empire. Not an empire of conquest in the traditional sense. We are an empire of influence. Our power, our values, our promise affect the world. We are more than Jefferson's beacon. We are an expectation of better things. The world demands of us the delivery of the promise we project. We are seen to have an obligation to share our light. Other peoples want help, leaders.h.i.+p, and guidance in getting to where we are. They want our help in reaching their potential. But they don't want or expect us to put them on the dole. Go back to what I said about teaching. They want us to show them how to move up to what we are. They don't want handouts. now an empire. Not an empire of conquest in the traditional sense. We are an empire of influence. Our power, our values, our promise affect the world. We are more than Jefferson's beacon. We are an expectation of better things. The world demands of us the delivery of the promise we project. We are seen to have an obligation to share our light. Other peoples want help, leaders.h.i.+p, and guidance in getting to where we are. They want our help in reaching their potential. But they don't want or expect us to put them on the dole. Go back to what I said about teaching. They want us to show them how to move up to what we are. They don't want handouts.

We are, however, reluctant to deliver. We have never comfortably settled on our role in the world or on our obligations to the other citizens of this planet. The Wilsonian dream of using our blessings to better the world has always clashed with the opposing isolationist heritage to "avoid foreign entanglements." In my view, this will be the true issue with which we will have to come to grips in this century. The world at our gates demands it of us.

And it's not a clean, well-ordered world. It's messy. A lot of folks don't like us. Or they envy us. Or they don't like the way we throw our weight around.

In a sense, it's going to be back to the future: Today's international landscape has strong similarities to the Caribbean region of the 1920s and '30s-unstable countries being driven by uncaring dictators to the point of collapse and total failure. We are going to see more crippled states and failed states that look like Somalia and Afghanistan-and are just as dangerous. And more and more U.S. military men and women are going to be involved in vague, confusing military actions-heavily overlaid with political, humanitarian, and economic considerations. And those representing the United States-the Big Guy with the most formidable presence-will have to deal with each messy situation and pull everything together. We're going to see more and more of that.

Certain of these collapsed states will continue to provide sanctuary to extremist groups who will continue to use these bases to plan, train, and organize for strikes against U.S. forces and other targets. Natural and man-made humanitarian catastrophes will continue to be on the rise; along with civil strife that seems out of control in many parts of the world. Regional hegemons and rogue states will learn the lessons of our wars with Iraq and develop what we call "asymmetric" capabilities-threats designed to exploit our evident military vulnerabilities and gaps. These threats range the spectrum from weapons of ma.s.s destruction and long-range missiles to low-tech sea mines and terrorist tactics. All are designed to challenge a perceived weakness in our military, political, or psychological ability to use force.

Victory no longer happens when you capture the enemy capital. And we can't just declare victory in a photo op on an aircraft carrier. These events signal that the home team is ahead in the third inning. The game goes nine innings-or longer if necessary; and victory happens when you put in place a lasting, stable environment.

Globalization and the explosion of information technology have meanwhile made the world ever more interdependent and interconnected. Geographic obstacles such as oceans and mountain ranges no longer provide impenetrable boundaries. Economic, political, or social-related instability in remote parts of the world will likewise continue to affect our security interests and well-being on our ever-shrinking planet. Added to that will be the continued rise of non-state ent.i.ties, such as nongovernmental organizations, transnational criminal groups, extremist organizations, global corporations, and warlord groups, all bringing a confusing new dimension to a world previously dominated by the interactions of nation-states.

In recent years, an arc covering a large part of the earth's surface-from North Africa to the Philippines, and from Central Asia to Central Africa-is chaotic and in turmoil. We are going to be dealing with this turmoil for decades. Remote places such as Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Rwanda, East Timor, Aceh, Colombia, and others have become flash points that required our intervention at some level. At the same time, the need to contain regional threats such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea still remained a major military requirement. These became more threatening as they developed greater military capabilities aimed at denying us access to their regions and to our allies within those regions. More and more, our security interests have drawn us into remote, unstable parts of the world.

As a result of these commitments, our shrinking and adjusting armed forces were hit by an onslaught of strange, nontraditional missions that pressured their dwindling ranks and resources with an operational and personnel tempo that was not sustainable. With some exceptions, the U.S. military resisted these missions and the adjustments it should have made in doctrine, organization, training, and equipment needed to meet this growing new mix of commitments. Traditionalists in the military leaders.h.i.+p insisted on holding the line; they wanted to fight only our nation's wars, and hoped to go back to "real soldiering" as they were mending a transitioning force suffering from all the pressures on it. One of our most senior military leaders was quoted as saying, "Real men don't do OOTW"-a term that became the t.i.tle for all of those messy little low-end commitments (we now call these missions "Stability Operations").

THE TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY MILITARY.

Several serious questions and challenges face our military. The first has to do with the growing number of these nontraditional threats. Will these continue to increase, with new types added to the confusing mix, and will we rely on the military as our princ.i.p.al instrument to deal with them? Second, can we afford the kind of military that can meet all the potential challenges ahead? The third question relates to the much-needed military reform. Can the military change, reform, or transform to meet the challenges of the new century and adapt to the rapid development of new technologies that could radically alter the military as we know it today? The fourth issue deals with the interagency reform necessary for other agencies to move in parallel with military reforms. Can we meet the demand for better decision making and the integration of all the instruments of power (political, economic, informational, etc.) to solve the multidimensional challenges ahead?

No one can predict the future, but we can make judgments on the growing number of threats that now face us. Some of these will not be what we have grown used to preparing for.

Our security interests will require that we have a military capable and prepared to respond to: * A global power with significant military capabilities.* Regional hegemons with asymmetric capabilities, such as weapons of ma.s.s destruction and missiles, designed to deny us access to vital areas and regional allies.* Transnational threats that include terrorist groups, international criminal and drug organizations, warlords, environmental security issues, issues of health and disease, and illegal migrations.* Problems of failed or incapable states that require peacekeeping, humanitarian a.s.sistance and disaster relief, or national reconstruction.* Overseas crises that threaten U.S. citizens and property.* Domestic emergencies that exceed the capacity of other federal and local government agencies to handle.* Threats to our key repositories of information and to our systems of moving information.

This demanding list of requirements does not include many of the clean, clear war-fighting missions our military would prefer. We have sworn to defend against "all enemies foreign and domestic." But today the "enemies" that threaten our well-being may include some strange, nontraditional ones.

At this moment in Iraq, we are dealing with the Jihadis, who are coming in from outside to raise h.e.l.l; crime on the streets is rampant; ex-Ba'athists and Fedayeen are still running around making trouble; American soldiers are getting blown up; suicide bombings have driven out the UN and many NGOs; and there is a potential now for the country to fragment-s.h.i.+a on s.h.i.+a, s.h.i.+a on Sunni, Kurds on Turkomans; you name it. It is a powder keg. If there is a center that can hold this mess together, I don't know what it is. Civil war could break out at any time. Resources are needed; a strategy is needed; and a plan is needed.

This is not the kind of conflict for which we have traditionally planned. War fighting is only one element of it. Some people on the battlefield don't play according to our rules. They do not come in military formations and with standard-issue equipment. They come in many different forms; and all of their agendas are different.

The destabilizing environment in which we may commit forces to confront many of these threats may be further degraded by the effects of urbanization, economic depression, overpopulation, and the depletion of basic resources. The world has become reliant on natural resources and raw materials that come from increasingly unstable regions, with the compounding problems of a poor infrastructure and environment. Access to energy resources, water sources, timber, rare gems and metals, etc., is becoming a growing rationale for intervention and conflict in many parts of the world.

We will also require that our forces continue to meet the peacetime demands of engagement and shaping. The importance of maintaining stable regions by building viable, interoperable coalitions with the forces of regional allies will remain necessary to ensure our security in key areas of the world. Military engagement produces dividends in deterrence, confidence building, and burden sharing, and also demonstrates our commitment and resolve. Yet these tasks will continue to tax our already thinly stretched forces.

Some proposals have been put forward to achieve-and afford-a military transformation by drastically cutting our force structure, removing forward-based and -deployed forces from overseas, and stopping modernization. Advocates of such a "strategic pause" think we can withdraw from the world and opt out of interventions that threaten our interests. They are wrong. They are blind to the world as it is. We cannot gamble on a self-ordering world. The risk to us could be great-even fatal-if we are not capable of dealing with an unforeseen threat that emerges from this disordered global environment.

The need right now is critical to transform our military in a deliberate and thoughtful, yet significant, way. Americans must acknowledge this need and support investment in this transformation for it to succeed. This will require a stronger and closer relations.h.i.+p between Americans and their military. This relations.h.i.+p has drifted apart, and has even been strained at times, since the end of the Vietnam War and the inst.i.tution of the all-volunteer force.

What should be the shape of that transformation?