New York Times Current History The European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915 Part 3

"in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier and to give time for the four powers, acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg, to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate."

[English "White Paper," Nos. 24 and 25.]

To this reasonable request the Imperial German Chancellor replied:

"First and last, we take the ground that this question must be localized _by the abstention of all the powers from intervention in it_,"

but added that Germany would, if an Austro-Russian dispute arose,

"co-operate with the other great powers in mediation between Russia and Austria."

[German "White Paper," Annex 13.]

This distinction is very hard to grasp. It attempts to measure the difference between tweedledum and tweedledee. Russia's difference with Austria was over the attempt of the latter to crush Servia. Germany would not interfere in the latter, but would as an abstract proposition mediate between Russia and Austria. For all practical purposes the two things were indistinguishable.

How she "co-operated" we shall presently see.

All that Germany _did_ on July 25, so far as the record discloses, was to "pa.s.s on" England's and Russia's requests for more time, but subsequent events indicate that it was "pa.s.sed on" without any indors.e.m.e.nt, for is it credible that Austria would have ignored its ally's request for more time if it had ever been made?

The Austrian Foreign Minister, having launched the ultimatum, absented himself from the capital, but the Russian Minister at Vienna, as already stated, succeeded in submitting this most reasonable request verbally to the Acting Foreign Minister, who simply said that he would submit it to Count Berchtold, _but that he could predict with a.s.surance a categorical refusal_. Later on that day (July 25) Russia was definitely advised that no time extension would be granted.

[Russian "Orange Paper," Nos. 11 and 12.]

Was ever the peace of the world shattered upon so slight a pretext? A little time, a few days, even a few hours, might have sufficed to preserve the world from present horrors, but no time could be granted.

A colossal snap judgment was to be taken by these pettifogging diplomats. A timely word from the German Chancellor would have saved the flower of the youth of Germany and Austria from peris.h.i.+ng. It would be difficult to find in recorded history a greater discourtesy to a friendly power, for Austria was not at war with Russia.

Defeated in their effort to get an extension of time, England, France, and Russia made further attempts to preserve peace by temporarily arresting military proceedings until efforts toward conciliation could be made. Sir Edward Grey proposed to Germany, France, Russia, and Italy that they should unite in asking Austria and Servia not to cross the frontier "until we had had time to try and arrange matters between them," but the German Amba.s.sador read Sir Edward Grey a telegram that he had received from the German Foreign Office that "once she [Austria] had launched that note [the ultimatum] Austria could not draw back."

[English "White Paper," No. 25.]

As we have seen, Germany never, so far as the record discloses, sought in any way to influence Austria to make this or any concession. Its att.i.tude was shown by the declaration of its Amba.s.sador at Paris to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, which, while disclaiming that Germany had countenanced the Austrian ultimatum, yet added that Germany approved its point of view,

"and that certainly the arrow, once sent, Germany could not allow herself to be guided except by her duty to her ally."

This seemed to be the fatal fallacy of Germany, that its duties to civilization were so slight that it should support its ally, Austria, whether the latter were right or wrong. Such was its policy, and it carried it out with fatal consistency. To support its ally in actual war may be defensible, but to support it in times of peace in an iniquitous demand and a policy of gross discourtesy offends every sense of international morality.

On the following day Russia proposed to Austria that they should enter into an exchange of private views, with the object of an alteration in common of some clauses of the Austrian note of July 23. _To this Austria never even replied._ The Russian Minister communicated this suggestion to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs and expressed the hope that he would "find it possible to advise Vienna to meet our proposal," but this did not accord with German policy, for on that day the German Amba.s.sador in Paris called upon the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in reply to a similar suggestion that Germany should suggest to Vienna to meet Servia in the same conciliatory spirit which Servia had shown, the Amba.s.sador answered that that "was not possible in view of the resolution taken not to interfere in the Austro-Servian conflict."

On the same day England asked France, Italy, and Germany to meet in London for an immediate conference to preserve the peace of Europe, and to this fruitful suggestion, which might have saved the peace of Europe, the German Chancellor replied with the pitiful quibble that "it is impossible to bring our ally before a European court in its difference with Servia," although it affected to accept "in principle" the policy of mediation.

Germany's acceptance "in principle" of a policy which she in practice thwarted suggests the law-abiding tendencies of that Maine statesman who was "for the Maine prohibition liquor law, but against its enforcement."

[English "White Paper," No. 46.]

Germany's refusal to have Servia's case submitted to the powers even for their consideration is the more striking when it is recalled that the German Amba.s.sador at London quoted to Sir Edward Grey the German Secretary of State as saying

"that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia could hardly be expected to accept,"

thus recognizing that Austria's ultimatum was, at least in part, unjust.

Sir Edward Grey then called the German Amba.s.sador's attention to the fact that if Austria refused the conciliatory reply of Servia and marched into that country

"it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be involved."

He added that the Servian reply

"should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause,"

and asked that the German Government should urge this at Vienna, but the German Secretary of State on July 27 replied that such a conference "was not practicable," and that it "would practically amount to a court of arbitration," and could not, in his opinion, be called together "except at the request of Austria and Russia."

[English "White Paper," Nos. 43 and 46.]

That this was a mere evasion is perfectly plain. Germany already knew that Austria would not ask for such a conference, for Austria had already refused Russia's request for an extension of time and had actually commenced its military operations. Germany's att.i.tude is best indicated by the letter of the Russian Minister in Germany to the Russian Foreign Office in which he states that on July 27 he called at the German Foreign Office and asked it

"to urge upon Vienna in a more pressing fas.h.i.+on to take up this line of conciliation. Jagow replied that he could not advise Austria to yield."

[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 38.]

Why not? Russia had advised Servia to yield, and Servia had conceded nearly every claim. Why could not the German Foreign Office advise Vienna to meet conciliation by conciliation, if its desire for peace were sincere? All that Russia and England desired was that a little time and consideration should be given, without prejudice to the rights or claims of Austria, before the peace of the world was hopelessly shattered.

Before this interview took place the French Amba.s.sador had called at the German Foreign Office on a similar errand and urged the English suggestion that action should at once be taken by England, Germany, Russia, and France at St. Petersburg and Vienna, to the effect that Austria and Servia

"should abstain from any act which might aggravate the situation at the present hour."

By this was meant that there should be, pending further parleys, no invasion of Servia by Austria and none of Austria by Russia. _To this the German Foreign Minister opposed a categorical refusal._

On the same day the Russian Amba.s.sador at Vienna had "a long and earnest conversation" with the Austrian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He expressed the earnest hope that

"something would be done before Servia was actually invaded.

Baron Machio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been aggressors."

The Russian Amba.s.sador then said that his country would do all it could to keep the Servians quiet,

"and even to fall back before an Austrian advance in order to gain time."

He urged that the Austrian Amba.s.sador at St. Petersburg should be furnished with full powers to continue discussions with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,

"who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent power."

The only reply to this reasonable suggestion was that it would be submitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[English "White Paper," No. 56.]

On the same day the German Amba.s.sador at Paris called upon the French Foreign Office and strongly insisted on the "_exclusion of all possibility of mediation or of conference_," and yet contemporaneously the Imperial German Chancellor was advising London that he had

"started the efforts toward mediation in Vienna, immediately in the way desired by Sir Edward Grey, and had further communicated to the Austrian Foreign Minister the wish of the Russian Foreign Minister for a direct talk in Vienna."

What hypocrisy! In the formal German defense, the official apologist for that country, after stating his conviction