New York Times Current History The European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915 Part 10

Fixing the Blame.

n.o.body familiar with the careful work of Sir Edward Grey can for one moment believe that Sir Edward inadvertently dropped the word, just as little as J. Ramsay Macdonald and other British leaders believe that he inadvertently dropped one of the two remaining words, integrity and independence, when he told Parliament of Germany's guarantee, and why Great Britain should not accept it, but go to war.

When the blame for the horrors committed in Belgium are a.s.sessed these facts must be remembered:

1. Belgium was by treaty bound to maintain fortresses.

2. France tempted her to commit "acts friendly" to herself, by which Belgium forfeited her rights to the protection of The Hague articles governing the rights and duties of neutrals.

3. England urged her to take up arms, when she had only asked to have her integrity guaranteed by diplomatic intervention. (Nos. 153, 155.)

4. Germany promised her independence and integrity and peace, while England, quietly dropping her guarantee of neutrality "in future years,"

promised her independence and integrity and war.

5. And Sir Edward Grey was able to sway Parliament, according to one of the leaders of Parliament himself, only because he misrepresented Germany's guarantee, and, having dropped, in his note to Belgium, the word "neutrality," dropped yet another of the two remaining words, integrity and independence.

This is the case as it appears on the evidence contained in the various "White Papers." Austria was attending properly to her own affairs; Servia was willing to yield; Russia, however, was determined to humiliate Austria or to go to war. Germany proved a loyal friend to her ally, Austria; she trusted in the British professions of friends.h.i.+p to the last, and sacrificed seven valuable days in the interest of peace.

France was willing to do "what might be required by her interests,"

while Great Britain yielded to Russia and France, promising them their support without which France, and therefore Russia, would not have decided on war.

As to Belgium, Germany told Sir Edward Grey that she had unimpeachable evidence that France was planning to go through Belgium, and she published her evidence concerning the French officers who remained in Belgium. Although Belgium had thus lost any rights attaching to her state of neutrality, Germany promised to respect her integrity and independence, and to pay for any damage done. She preferred, however, to listen to Great Britain, who promised exactly the same except pay for any damage done.

Unlike Mr. Beck, who in the same article pleads his case as the counsel for the Allies and casts his verdict as the Supreme Court of Civilization, the present writer prefers to leave the judgment to his readers as a whole, and further still, to the whole American people--yea, to all the peoples of the world. Nor is he in a hurry, for he is willing to wait and have the Judges weigh the evidence and call for more, if they consider insufficient what has already been submitted.

Snap judgments are ever unsatisfactory. They have often to be reversed.

The present case, however, is too important to warrant a hasty decision.

The final judgment, if it is based on truth, will very strongly influence the nature of the peace, which will either establish good-will and stable conditions in the world, or lead to another and even more complete breakdown of civilization.

What Gladstone Said About Belgium

By George Louis Beer.

Historian; winner of the first Loubat Prize, 1913, for his book on the origins of the British Colonial system.

In the course of his solemn speech of Aug. 8, 1914, in the House of Commons Sir Edward Grey quoted some remarks made by Gladstone in 1870 on the extent of the obligation incurred by the signatory powers to the Quintuple Treaty of 1839 guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. Shorn from their context as they were, these sentences are by no means illuminating, and it cannot be said that their citation in this form by Sir Edward Grey was a very felicitous one. During the paper polemics of the past months these detached words of Gladstone have been freely used by Germany's defenders and apologists to maintain that Great Britain of 1870 would not have deemed the events of 1914 a casus belli, and that its entrance into the present war on account of the violation of Belgium's neutrality was merely a pretext. During the course of this controversy Gladstone's att.i.tude has in various ways been grossly misrepresented, Dr. von Mach of Harvard even stating in the columns of THE NEW YORK TIMES that Gladstone had declared the Treaty of 1839 "to be without force." But, apart from such patent distortions, Gladstone's real position is apparently not clearly defined in the mind of the general public, which is merely seeking for the unadulterated truth, regardless of its effect upon the case of any one of the belligerents.

Shortly after the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870 the Prussian Amba.s.sador in London informed Gladstone, then Prime Minister, that some time prior to the existing war France had asked Prussia to consent to the former country's absorption of Belgium, and that there was in the possession of the Prussian Government the draft of a treaty to this effect in the handwriting of M. Benedetti, then French Amba.s.sador at Berlin. This communication was obviously made, as Lord Morley tells us, with the object of prompting Gladstone to be the agent in making the evil news public and thus of prejudicing France in the judgment of Europe. Gladstone thought this "no part of his duty," and very shortly thereafter, at the direct instance of Bismarck, this draft treaty of 1866-7 was communicated by Baron Krause of the Prussian Emba.s.sy in London to Delane, the editor of The Times. On July 25, 1870, it was published in the columns of that paper and aroused considerable anxiety in England.

It immediately became imperative upon the British Government to take some action. As Gladstone wrote to Bright, the publication of this treaty

has thrown upon us the necessity of doing something fresh to secure Belgium, or else of saying that under no circ.u.mstances would we take any step to secure her from absorption. This publication has wholly altered the feeling of the House of Commons, and no Government could at this moment venture to give utterance to such an intention about Belgium. But neither do we think it would be right, even if it were safe, to announce that we would in any case stand by with folded arms and see actions done which would amount to a total extinction of the public right in Europe.

The Special Identical Treaties.

A simple declaration of Great Britain's intention to defend the neutrality of Belgium by arms in case it were infringed seemed to Gladstone not to meet the special requirements of the case as revealed by the proposed Treaty of 1866-7 between Prussia and France. His main object was to prevent the actual execution of such an agreement, by means of which the two belligerent powers would settle their quarrels and satisfy their ambitions at the expense of helpless Belgium. Hence, on July 30, the British Government opened negotiations with France and Prussia and within a fortnight had concluded separate but identical treaties with each of these powers. According to these treaties, in case the neutrality of Belgium were violated by either France or Germany, Great Britain agreed to co-operate with the other in its defense. The preamble of these treaties states that the contracting powers

being desirous at the present time of recording in a solemn act their fixed determination to maintain the independence and neutrality of Belgium,

as provided in the Treaty of 1839, have concluded this separate treaty, which,

without impairing or invalidating the conditions of the said Quintuple Treaty, shall be subsidiary and accessory to it.

Article III. further provided that these Treaties of 1870 were to expire twelve months after the conclusion of the existing war, and that thereafter the independence and neutrality of Belgium would "continue to rest, as heretofore," on the Treaty of 1839.

These doc.u.ments tell a plain tale, which is amply confirmed by the proceedings in Parliament in connection with this matter. On Aug. 5, 1870, while the negotiations leading to the above-mentioned treaties were still pending, questions were raised in the House of Commons about the recently published abortive Treaty of 1866-7 between Prussia and France. In reply Gladstone stated that

the Treaty of 1839 is that under which the relations of the contracting powers with Belgium are at present regulated;

and that, while he could not explain the intentions of the Government "in a matter of this very grave character in answer to a question," he hoped to be able to communicate some further information in an authentic manner. Three days later, as these treaties with France and Prussia had been virtually concluded, Gladstone was able to satisfy the anxiety of the House and outlined their terms. He explicitly stated that, after their expiration,

the respective parties, being parties to the Treaty of 1839, shall fall back upon the obligations they took upon themselves under that treaty.

After Gladstone had finished speaking the leader of the opposition, Disraeli, took the floor and pointed out that, as a general proposition,

when there is a treaty guarantee so explicit as that expressed in the Treaty of 1839, I think the wisdom of founding on that another treaty which involves us in engagements may be open to doubt.

But he accepted Gladstone's statement

as the declaration of the Cabinet, that they are resolved to maintain the neutrality and independence of Belgium, I accept it as a wise and spirited policy, and a policy, in my opinion, not the less wise because it is spirited.

Gladstone then replied, saying that the reason the Government had not made a general declaration of its intentions regarding Belgium was that much danger might arise from such a declaration and that inadvertently they might have given utterance to words

that might be held to import obligations almost unlimited and almost irrespectively of circ.u.mstances.

We had made up our minds, he continued, that we had a duty to perform, and we thought a specific declaration of what we thought the obligations of this country better than any general declaration. Referring to the two treaties in process of ratification, he concluded:

We thought that by contracting a joint engagement we might remove the difficulty and prevent Belgium from being sacrificed.

The policy of the Government continued, however, to be criticised, mainly on the ground that the Treaty of 1839 amply covered the case. On Aug. 10 Gladstone defended his policy in the House of Commons in a speech pitched on a high moral plane, in which he dilated upon Belgium's historic past and splendid present and on Great Britain's duty to this little nation irrespective of all questions of its own self-interest.

With genuine fervor, he exclaimed:

If, in order to satisfy a greedy appet.i.te for aggrandis.e.m.e.nt, coming whence it may, Belgium were absorbed, the day that witnessed that absorption would hear the knell of public right and public law in Europe.... We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in answer to the question whether under the circ.u.mstance of the case this country, endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become partic.i.p.ators in the sin.

What Gladstone Had in Mind.

What Gladstone had in mind was the scheme of 1866-7, by which France was to absorb Belgium, with Prussia's consent and aid. He distinctly stated that the Treaties of 1870 were devised to meet the new state of affairs disclosed by the publication of this incomplete treaty. It was in order to prevent the revival of such a conspiracy that Gladstone made separate and identical treaties in 1870 with France and Prussia. They were a practical device to secure an effectual enforcement of the Treaty of 1839 under unforeseen and difficult circ.u.mstances. The agreement of 1870 was, as Gladstone said, a c.u.mulative treaty added to that of 1839, and the latter treaty

loses nothing of its force, even during the existence of this present treaty.

During the course of this speech defending the Government's action against those critics who claimed that the Treaty of 1839 adequately met the situation, Gladstone made some general remarks about the extent of the obligation incurred by the signatories to the Treaty of 1839:

It is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into the complicated question of the nature of the obligations of that treaty, but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an a.s.sertion that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises.