Concerning Justice Part 4

But another and different proposition is urged upon us. It is not to leave the legislature without check upon the tendency to disregard const.i.tutional limitations upon its power, but to subject the judicial check itself to reversal by a majority of that part of the electorate choosing to act on the matter. It is proposed that whenever a court of last resort shall adjudge that a statute trespa.s.ses upon the reserved const.i.tutional rights of the individual, an appeal may be taken direct to the electorate, and that if a majority of those choosing to vote on the question desire the statute to stand, the const.i.tution shall thereafter be held to be amended to that extent. It is submitted that such a procedure would destroy all const.i.tutional guaranties, no matter what safeguards are attempted. Is there any a.s.surance that such a majority would be more considerate of the individual's right to life, liberty, and property than their representatives whom they have selected or should have selected for their virtue and wisdom, and who are sworn, as well as the judges, to respect const.i.tutional guaranties?

Under the present procedure for amendment to const.i.tutions, propositions for amendment are first considered and debated face to face in a legislature or const.i.tutional convention by representatives of the people, and cannot be submitted to the people until after opportunity for full and free discussion by their representatives, and the people themselves have thereby been more or less prepared for its consideration. Even under this procedure, amendments have been adopted that the people have afterward regretted. There is now much agitation for the "short ballot," for restoring to the chief executive the power of appointment of important officials, a power at first possessed by him, but taken away by later const.i.tutional amendments. The adoption of the "initiative and referendum" has not produced the beneficial results expected. It is found that the initiative sometimes produces defective, unworkable statutes, and that the referendum can be used to delay and even veto expedient legislation.

Under the proposed procedure the questions whether the const.i.tution should be amended and as to the nature of the amendment are sprung upon the people without this preliminary examination, debate and approval by their chosen representatives, and this often, if not always, in times of popular excitement. With such a procedure I can see no more stability of right, no more security for justice, than under any unlimited, absolute government.

How unstable popular sentiment may be at times may be seen in the cla.s.sic example of the citizens of Rome applauding Marius and Sulla in turn with equal fervor, and in the lesser and very recent example of the voters of the city of Seattle, who elected a mayor, then soon recalled him, and but little later re-elected him by a larger majority than before. Const.i.tutions to be of any value as bulwarks of liberty should not be immediately changeable with the popular sentiment of the day, but slowly and only after long reflection and discussion. They should contain only the results of long thought and long experience.

Legislation is ever active, ever moving this way and that way, ever experimenting, enacting new statutes and amending and repealing old ones, now imposing fetters on individual liberty, now striking them off and perhaps imposing others. Even in England and America, where personal liberty of action is most prized, time was when statutes were enacted almost putting people and business in strait-jackets. In English Norfolk as late as Henry VIII's time no one was to "dye, shear or calender" cloth except in the town of Norwich; and no one in the northern counties was to make "worsted coverlets" except in the city of York. In the reign of Elizabeth a statute was pa.s.sed forbidding the eating of meat on Wednesday and Sat.u.r.days and this not on the score of health or religion but avowedly to increase the price of fish.

Statutes fixing the weight and price of loaves of bread and the size and price of a gla.s.s of ale were not formally repealed till 1824. The famous Statute of Laborers forbade laboring men to ask or receive more than a prescribed low sum for their labor and also forbade their moving about seeking employment. The statutes against forestalling, regrating, and engrossing were not formally repealed until 1844. In early times in New England also, statutory attempts were made to fix the price of various commodities and the wages of various kinds of workmen. Men were fined for accepting higher than the prescribed wages. The Sunday laws in some places forbade walking about on Sunday except "reverently to go to and return from meeting." Everywhere was the ever present tendency of the legislative power to invade and direct every function of society,--social, religious, political, and economical. It should be noted that all these and similar statutes were under governments unrestrained by written const.i.tutions and bills of right enforced by an independent judiciary.

Though from time to time many restrictive statutes have been modified and many repealed, other restrictive statutes have been enacted. Today the same process is going on. While now and then restrictions and embargoes of longer or shorter standing are removed, there is still the same tendency to enact other restrictions and prohibitions. At every session of Congress and of the state legislatures measures are constantly proposed hampering in some way the freedom of the citizen in his occupation, in his pursuit of happiness. Demands are being made upon the legislative department by one cla.s.s or interest for legislation to restrain other cla.s.ses or interests, but for exemption for itself. In earlier times there were statutes fixing a maximum wage for labor, and though these proved ineffectual it is now proposed to fix a minimum wage, even though it should prove to be much more than the labor is worth. There are also proposed, and in many instances enacted, statutes restricting the freedom of the workman as to his output, of the employer as to his direction of his business. The natural activities of men are sought to be hampered and handicapped in vexatious ways. In ill.u.s.tration, I quote the following from the "Boston Herald" of June 5, 1914:

"Twenty-five states and the United States itself forbid any discrimination by an employer against union men. Utah alone has a law to protect the non-union men from organized discrimination of union labor to drive him from his trade. Several of our states require that all public printing shall bear the union label. One extends that rule to all stationery. Twelve states require employers advertising for help to mention in the advertis.e.m.e.nt the existence of a strike. The Minnesota statute provides that, per contra, no employer shall require any statement from a person seeking employment as to his partic.i.p.ation in a strike. Eight states have enacted statutes exempting labor organizations from their respective anti-trust laws. The unscrupulous employer may yet find the labor union the best means of throttling his compet.i.tors and securing a monopoly." There seems at times to be a frenzy for such legislation. Only a vivid imagination can adequately picture what might result if Congress and the state legislatures, or the inconstant majority of the electorate, were freed from all const.i.tutional limitations or from the check of an independent judiciary.

Though Great Britain, our mother country, has no written const.i.tution and no judiciary empowered to enforce its limitations, it is the happy possessor of a practically h.o.m.ogeneous people of the Anglo-Saxon race, little affected by immigration, and imbued for centuries with a deep regard for personal liberty and private rights. Yet, even there today, statutes are demanded and sometimes enacted in derogation of them. In this country the population as the result of great immigration is more heterogeneous. It comprises races and peoples of diverse temperaments, of diverse experiences, of diverse traditions, many unschooled in self-government and lacking in that traditional reverence for liberty and order so characteristic of the Teutonic races. We even find some cla.s.ses openly declaring that if they can get possession of the government they will exploit the rest of the people for their own benefit. They essay also to bargain their votes for special legislation in their favor at the expense of the people at large and without regard to the principles of equality of right.

With such a population with its universal suffrage, were it not for our written const.i.tutions with their Bills of Rights and with an independent judiciary to guard them, there would be no security here for personal liberty and rights. We should be in the condition of the people of France as depicted by Wm. S. Lilly in his recent book, "The New France." He wrote: "It is now more than a century since the principles of 1789 were formulated there. But in no country, not even in Russia, is individual freedom less. The state is as ubiquitous and as autocratic as under the worst Bourbon or Oriental despots. Nowhere is its hand so heavy upon the subject in every department of human life. Nowhere is the negation of the value and of the rights of personal independence more absolute, more complete, and more effective." Yet France is a republic with manhood suffrage and with an elective legislature. But its courts are not vested with any power to conserve any rights of the people against legislative caprice.

CONCLUSION

The thesis I have endeavored to support in these lectures, so far as I have a thesis, is this: (1) that, after all, human justice consists in securing to each individual as much liberty of action in the exercise of his physical and mental powers and as much liberty to enjoy the fruits of such action as is consistent with like liberty for other individuals, and with such restrictions only as are necessary for the welfare of society as a whole without discrimination for or against any individual; and (2) that that justice is more firmly secured by a government with a division of powers, with a written const.i.tution excluding from governmental interference such personal rights as long experience has shown to be necessary both for the happiness and efficiency of the individual subject and for the welfare and efficiency of all; and (3) finally with an independent judiciary to defend those rights when a.s.sailed, as they often have been, and will be, by impatient and changeable majorities.

It may be admitted that the courts sometimes err in their interpretation of the const.i.tution and the laws, since judges, however carefully selected, are but men; but there must be somewhere in the body politic of a free state some body of men with the power of authoritative interpretation of the fundamental law as well as other laws. Does earlier history or later experience point to any better equipped, more stable, more safe tribunal? Should not the people endeavor to raise rather than lower the position of the courts; to conserve rather than impair that freedom, impartiality, and independence of the judges declared by the people of Ma.s.sachusetts in their Declaration of Rights, after years of galling experience of the contrary, to be "essential to the preservation of every individual, his life, liberty, property and character"? Are not they the reactionaries who, despite the lessons of history, would revert to the days of a dependent, recallable, and hence timid judiciary?

But justice is not fully and certainly secured by the maintenance of particular political inst.i.tutions, however excellent. Political inst.i.tutions are not self-acting. They are only instrumentalities for the action of society. They are not only to be established and maintained; they are to be administered, and the best inst.i.tutions may be maladministered. Even under such a system of government as I have endeavored to show to be the best yet devised to secure justice, injustice is still often suffered by the individual or by society.

Oppressive statutes within the legislative power are too readily enacted. Abuses in administration are too long permitted to exist. The only remedy for these is a more enlightened public opinion, a wider diffusion of the spirit of impartiality, a greater realization of the right and need of every person to life, liberty, and the results of his industry and economy.

Nor are the judgments of our courts always righteous. Some of the instances of unrighteous judgments result from failure to ascertain and apply the truth as to the facts of the case; some from errors in judgment; some from lack of firmness in judges in enforcing the known rights of the individual on the one hand, or those of society on the other; and perhaps a very few from incompetency or corruption. These causes can be removed to a large extent, by a more rigid insistence on skill, ability, industry, learning, and courage on the part of those a.s.suming to administer justice as attorneys and counselors. The same insistence in the selection of judges will lessen the injustice resulting from their errors in judgment and from their lack of firmness.

There is yet another cause of injustice, the delay and expense in obtaining even righteous judgments. It is an axiom, that justice delayed is justice denied. This delay and expense are often charged against the courts and judges, as if they had full control over judicial procedure. It is not the judges but the legislature that shapes the judicial system and prescribes the judicial procedure, so far as they are not fixed by the const.i.tution.

It is not the courts but the legislatures that provide for so many appeals and allow so many stays and consequent delays. Judges and lawyers the country over are urging a more simplified, a more speedy, and less expensive procedure. They are also urging the establishment of more courts with more judges to cope with the constantly increasing litigation, in order that the wrongs against the individual and the wrongs against society may be redressed with a minimum of delay and cost. It is the legislatures that hesitate and often it is the legislatures that tie the hands of the judges. In some states it is sought to deprive the judges of their proper influence in jury trials.

In some states it is even sought to prevent them from saying more than yes or no to proposed instructions to a jury. In many states nearly the whole matter of procedure, its various steps, are fixed by statute and become difficult of improvement. If courts could have more power and the legislatures would interfere less in matters of procedure, I am sure the cause of justice would be better served.

In conclusion, perfect justice may not be attainable by us imperfect men. As said by Addison, "omniscience and omnipotence are requisite for its full attainment." Yet it is our duty and especially the duty of those of the legal profession to attain to such approximation as may be possible. No more n.o.ble work can engage our powers; no greater service can be rendered mankind. I do not except the endowment of schools, colleges, libraries, and the like, nor the endowment of hospitals and other charitable inst.i.tutions. Great as are the virtues of charity, benevolence, philanthropy, piety and the like, justice is a yet greater virtue. To quote Addison again, "There is no virtue so truly great and G.o.dlike as justice"; and in the words of Daniel Webster's eulogy: "Whoever labors on this edifice of justice, clears its foundations, strengthens its pillars, adorns its entablatures, or contributes to raise its august dome still higher in the skies, connects himself in name, fame, and character with that which is, and must be, as durable as the frame of human society."