Carrier_ A Guided Tour Of An Aircraft Carrier Part 4

I might add that the new Super Hornet is going to be taking on a lot of the jobs that the Intruder used to do for us. In fact, not too long ago the test crews at NAS Patuxent River [the Navy's test facility in Maryland] launched a Super Hornet loaded up at over 65,000 pounds, which is a thousand pounds more than the Intruder used to fly at. The Super Hornet flies with a full kit of precision guided munitions [PGMs], including the new GBU-29/30/32/32 JDAMS, AGM-154 JSOW, and AGM-88E SLAMER.

Tom Clancy: You just talked about the kinds of weapons that you're going to be carrying and dropping from the Super Hornet and JSF. Is it a safe statement to make that if a target is valuable enough for a carrier-based aircraft to hit it, then that aircraft will use some kind of precision or other tailored munitions to do the job? You just talked about the kinds of weapons that you're going to be carrying and dropping from the Super Hornet and JSF. Is it a safe statement to make that if a target is valuable enough for a carrier-based aircraft to hit it, then that aircraft will use some kind of precision or other tailored munitions to do the job?

Admiral Johnson: I guess my answer to that would be that it would depend on the target set. Generally, I would say yes, that's a fair thing to say. The new things that we're developing in JDAMS and JSOW are really going to help us with our combat punch. I guess my answer to that would be that it would depend on the target set. Generally, I would say yes, that's a fair thing to say. The new things that we're developing in JDAMS and JSOW are really going to help us with our combat punch.

Tom Clancy: You also have strike weapons that aren't launched from aircraft, like Tomahawk and a future series of standoff battlefield support munitions on the horizon. Could you tell us more about them? You also have strike weapons that aren't launched from aircraft, like Tomahawk and a future series of standoff battlefield support munitions on the horizon. Could you tell us more about them?

Admiral Johnson: We're going to embed some quite remarkable combat power in the CVBG of tomorrow. For example, look at our new SC-21 escort design, which we mentioned earlier. The first variant of that is a land-attack destroyer that will have vertically loading guns and vertical missile launchers loaded with all of the new and improved land-attack missiles that you mentioned. We're going to embed some quite remarkable combat power in the CVBG of tomorrow. For example, look at our new SC-21 escort design, which we mentioned earlier. The first variant of that is a land-attack destroyer that will have vertically loading guns and vertical missile launchers loaded with all of the new and improved land-attack missiles that you mentioned.

Tom Clancy: Isn't the Navy about to deploy the first TBMD [Theater Ballistic Missile Defense] system aboard the Aegis s.h.i.+ps, even ahead of the Army and Air Force? Isn't the Navy about to deploy the first TBMD [Theater Ballistic Missile Defense] system aboard the Aegis s.h.i.+ps, even ahead of the Army and Air Force?

Admiral Johnson: Yes, but keep in mind that I am really in compet.i.tion with Yes, but keep in mind that I am really in compet.i.tion with time. time. I'm not in compet.i.tion with the Army and Air Force. I firmly believe that the fleet of Aegis cruisers and destroyers that we have out there is absolutely the optimum place to embed that capability, because of the mobility and flexibility that it gives to the National Command Authorities. So we're full speed ahead on our area-wide, lower-tier system, as well as the theater-wide, upper-tier system. It's going to be an awesome capability. I'm not in compet.i.tion with the Army and Air Force. I firmly believe that the fleet of Aegis cruisers and destroyers that we have out there is absolutely the optimum place to embed that capability, because of the mobility and flexibility that it gives to the National Command Authorities. So we're full speed ahead on our area-wide, lower-tier system, as well as the theater-wide, upper-tier system. It's going to be an awesome capability.

As you know, the top priority of the Department of Defense [DoD] is to get the various area systems on line as quickly as possible. Those are the Army Patriot PAC-3 and the Navy Aegis Area systems. It's looking good right now, and we're planning to have it s.h.i.+pborne in just a few years. That's really a lot of what we're trying to do Navy-wide these days. Doing things "leaner," but more effectively. That's what we need to do to "punch through" into the 21st century.

Tom Clancy: Would it be a fair statement, based upon what you just said, that you're trying to get more out of existing systems and people, rather than start from scratch on new systems? Would it be a fair statement, based upon what you just said, that you're trying to get more out of existing systems and people, rather than start from scratch on new systems?

Admiral Johnson: Yes. We want to harness and focus the technologies that are out there, and embed them in these new systems in ways that give us maximum combat power and flexibility in new and exciting ways. We also want to have the s.h.i.+ps and systems manned by fewer people. I believe that, with the right equipment, we can do that and still maintain our effectiveness. Yes. We want to harness and focus the technologies that are out there, and embed them in these new systems in ways that give us maximum combat power and flexibility in new and exciting ways. We also want to have the s.h.i.+ps and systems manned by fewer people. I believe that, with the right equipment, we can do that and still maintain our effectiveness.

We have to be careful how we flow into all that. But you know about our "Smart s.h.i.+p" program, which is teaching us a lot about how to do these things. We're learning a lot, really focusing on what makes sense for us on a combat platform in terms of downsizing the number of people we need aboard. For instance, the "mark on the wall" that we have for the SC-21 land-attack destroyer is that we want that s.h.i.+p to be manned by ninety-five people or less. That's a s.h.i.+p the size of an Arleigh Burke-cla.s.s [DDG-51] guided-missile destroyer, but with a crew about one-third the size. That's where we are going.

Tom Clancy: We talked a lot about the s.h.i.+ps, aircraft, and things that you have to buy to give the Navy power. But people make those things work. Obviously, just like the rest of the services, you've had to draw down the size of your personnel pool. You're saying that in the future you want to be able to man your s.h.i.+ps with fewer people, each of whom will have to do more. Tell us about the young people you want in the Navy of the future, and what you expect from them? We talked a lot about the s.h.i.+ps, aircraft, and things that you have to buy to give the Navy power. But people make those things work. Obviously, just like the rest of the services, you've had to draw down the size of your personnel pool. You're saying that in the future you want to be able to man your s.h.i.+ps with fewer people, each of whom will have to do more. Tell us about the young people you want in the Navy of the future, and what you expect from them?

Admiral Johnson: People People are are our Navy. But the Navy is going to have to become leaner and more capable. The Navy has very high recruiting standards. As we mentioned earlier, we have a "crossbar" of ninety-five percent high school graduates and sixty-five percent in the upper mental group as recruiting standards. We believe that gives us the quality of sailor that we need to operate our new systems and take us into the next century. I don't see that changing. our Navy. But the Navy is going to have to become leaner and more capable. The Navy has very high recruiting standards. As we mentioned earlier, we have a "crossbar" of ninety-five percent high school graduates and sixty-five percent in the upper mental group as recruiting standards. We believe that gives us the quality of sailor that we need to operate our new systems and take us into the next century. I don't see that changing.

Admiral Jay Johnson speaking to officers in the Middle East.

OFFICIAL. U.S. NAVY PHOTO.

[image]

But the compet.i.tion for those young men and women is very intense. It's the same corner of the personnel market that private industry, my Joint Chiefs brethren, and everyone else is going for these days. So far, we've been holding our own in the recruiting process. We will build from that pool of great young men and women a Navy that is reshaped into the proper size and structure for the future. We will give them the best tools for their jobs and the quality of life that they deserve.We accept the reality that says the Navy must get smaller. The caution in all of that is that if the Navy gets smaller and our requirements don't change, we run the risk of having to ask our people to do more with less. I've told my Navy that right now, right now, we're out of the "do more with less" business. We don't do that anymore. What we're going to do is reshape ourselves in such a way that we'll be sized for tomorrow, and then do the missions that we are called to do while maintaining a proper optempo, so we don't operate on the backs of our sailors. we're out of the "do more with less" business. We don't do that anymore. What we're going to do is reshape ourselves in such a way that we'll be sized for tomorrow, and then do the missions that we are called to do while maintaining a proper optempo, so we don't operate on the backs of our sailors.Let me tell you, that's a very tough thing to do. That's what I tell my sailors. It's a much easier thing to say than to do. Our policy of six months deployment portal to portal, two-to-one turnaround ratio, and fifty-percent minimum in-port time over a five-year period, gives us a set of standards and policies that I think the Navy can live with. The CNO is the only one who can waive that policy, and we've only done it a total of five times in the last year. I might add that four of those five waivers were written for s.h.i.+ps in out-of-home-port maintenance. So we're holding well to that policy.

Tom Clancy: You've been saying all along that you're going to be trying to man your new generation of s.h.i.+ps with fewer sailors doing more jobs than on older vessels. This means that you're probably going to have to raise the crossbar when it comes to getting new sailors trained. Chuck Krulak has much the same plans for his Marines, and has inst.i.tuted the You've been saying all along that you're going to be trying to man your new generation of s.h.i.+ps with fewer sailors doing more jobs than on older vessels. This means that you're probably going to have to raise the crossbar when it comes to getting new sailors trained. Chuck Krulak has much the same plans for his Marines, and has inst.i.tuted the Crucible Crucible program to help form and toughen his recruits. Are you going to do something similar for Navy recruits? program to help form and toughen his recruits. Are you going to do something similar for Navy recruits?

Admiral Johnson: It's a work in progress. We have upped our own crossbar. Let me give you a couple of quick examples. I talked earlier about the young men and women who come into the Navy from the upper parts of the demographic profile. These are really smart, well-schooled young folks. What we do with them then is send them into a recruit training experience that is a very different, very positive, and very challenging experience. It's a work in progress. We have upped our own crossbar. Let me give you a couple of quick examples. I talked earlier about the young men and women who come into the Navy from the upper parts of the demographic profile. These are really smart, well-schooled young folks. What we do with them then is send them into a recruit training experience that is a very different, very positive, and very challenging experience.

Now, I'm not too proud to admit that we have liked what we have seen of the programs that you have mentioned from General Krulak, including the Crucible. Crucible. We now have a "final battle problem" exercise evaluation inst.i.tuted at Great Lakes Training Center. This is a Navy version of a Crucible-like evolution. We call it We now have a "final battle problem" exercise evaluation inst.i.tuted at Great Lakes Training Center. This is a Navy version of a Crucible-like evolution. We call it "Battle Stations," "Battle Stations," and it's a very arduous, physically demanding fourteen-hour damage-control problem/scenario requiring stamina, ingenuity, and teamwork from the recruits to pa.s.s. and it's a very arduous, physically demanding fourteen-hour damage-control problem/scenario requiring stamina, ingenuity, and teamwork from the recruits to pa.s.s.We just came back from Great Lakes, where we observed pieces of the pilot version. We think that this is an extremely good and powerful program. The way that we treat our recruits and the things that we indoctrinate them with-heritage, core values, tradition, and pride-lets us groom them into very strong sailors when they leave Great Lakes.Then we have what we call the Basic Military Training Continuum, which takes them into the fleet and builds on what they have learned in boot camp. We also have embedded throughout the Navy something we call the Leaders.h.i.+p Training Continuum. Now, I'm only the implementer of this program, not the inventor. The program was Admiral Frank Kelso's idea. Kelso was CNO before Admiral Boorda, who also worked on it.It's powerful! It consists of four two-week training blocks for officers and enlisted personnel, and provides formalized leaders.h.i.+p training throughout their careers. That's the basic framework, and we'll build on that later.Right now I'm interested in getting these four basic blocks inst.i.tuted throughout the Navy. And mark my words: If you plan on being in the Navy as a career and want to advance, you will will take these training blocks! The Navy has made an inst.i.tutional investment in formalized leaders.h.i.+p training. I'm convinced, based on just the early feedback training and what I've seen thus far, that when you and 1 are gone from this world, this Navy will be a stronger at all levels because of it. take these training blocks! The Navy has made an inst.i.tutional investment in formalized leaders.h.i.+p training. I'm convinced, based on just the early feedback training and what I've seen thus far, that when you and 1 are gone from this world, this Navy will be a stronger at all levels because of it.

Tom Clancy: Obviously, the Navy has had a rough and rocky time integrating women into the force. Yet, one gets the feeling that the Navy is farther through the process than perhaps the other services and that you've paid a high price to reach that goal. Is it your opinion that the first-stage initiatives for fully integrating women into the combat force have been successfully completed? Obviously, the Navy has had a rough and rocky time integrating women into the force. Yet, one gets the feeling that the Navy is farther through the process than perhaps the other services and that you've paid a high price to reach that goal. Is it your opinion that the first-stage initiatives for fully integrating women into the combat force have been successfully completed?

Admiral Johnson: Absolutely. We're through that. As a good example, the CVWs and carriers are already fully integrated. CVW-11 just came back off deployment on the Absolutely. We're through that. As a good example, the CVWs and carriers are already fully integrated. CVW-11 just came back off deployment on the Kitty Hawk Kitty Hawk [CV-63] fully integrated, and it was a marvelous deployment for them. Our surface combatant integration program is going well, though the pacing item is that we want the s.h.i.+ps to be properly built or modified so that the habitability standards we have established for the Women at Sea Program are followed. In addition, the crew must be shaped the right way, so that the proper critical ma.s.s and makeup of female personnel is maintained. There's a right way and a wrong way to do that, and we've learned how to do that. We're a little over halfway through that initiative right now, and it's going well. [CV-63] fully integrated, and it was a marvelous deployment for them. Our surface combatant integration program is going well, though the pacing item is that we want the s.h.i.+ps to be properly built or modified so that the habitability standards we have established for the Women at Sea Program are followed. In addition, the crew must be shaped the right way, so that the proper critical ma.s.s and makeup of female personnel is maintained. There's a right way and a wrong way to do that, and we've learned how to do that. We're a little over halfway through that initiative right now, and it's going well.

Keep in mind though that Women at Sea issues are not the only things that drive our overhauls. Environmental "Green" upgrades, as well as improvements to combat, habitability, and other systems are just as important. Our s.h.i.+p overhauls are the ultimate fifty thousand-mile checkup, and happen every five years that a s.h.i.+p is in the fleet.

Tom Clancy: As you go out into the fleet today, are the sailors having fun doing their jobs? As you go out into the fleet today, are the sailors having fun doing their jobs?

Admiral Johnson: I think that, overall, the forward-deployed forces are having fun. They're working hard, making a contribution; they're at the tip of the spear executing their missions, and they're doing the things that they came into the Navy to do. On the non-deployed side, we're doing pretty well, but we've got some work to do, some taking care of business. We owe those personnel a reasonable pace when they're not deployed and we owe them s.h.i.+ps and airplanes that are properly maintained. Those are the challenges that I'm working on right now. The "tip of the spear" is doing great. The non-deployed part of the force is doing well too, but I think that I owe them a bit more than they're getting right now. I think that, overall, the forward-deployed forces are having fun. They're working hard, making a contribution; they're at the tip of the spear executing their missions, and they're doing the things that they came into the Navy to do. On the non-deployed side, we're doing pretty well, but we've got some work to do, some taking care of business. We owe those personnel a reasonable pace when they're not deployed and we owe them s.h.i.+ps and airplanes that are properly maintained. Those are the challenges that I'm working on right now. The "tip of the spear" is doing great. The non-deployed part of the force is doing well too, but I think that I owe them a bit more than they're getting right now.

Tom Clancy: Obviously, the last ten years have been a roller-coaster ride for senior leaders in the services. Could you look into your crystal ball, and tell us what new roles and missions that you see the Navy taking on as it moves into the 21st century? Obviously, the last ten years have been a roller-coaster ride for senior leaders in the services. Could you look into your crystal ball, and tell us what new roles and missions that you see the Navy taking on as it moves into the 21st century?

Admiral Johnson: Well, to start with, I don't want to lose any of the core skills that we have right now. I think that we would be very shortsighted to lose any of those capabilities. ASW is a cla.s.sic example. A lot of people think that you can "take your pack off" now and not worry about it. Well, to start with, I don't want to lose any of the core skills that we have right now. I think that we would be very shortsighted to lose any of those capabilities. ASW is a cla.s.sic example. A lot of people think that you can "take your pack off" now and not worry about it. I do not concur! I do not concur! We're putting great focus and effort into undersea warfare and specifically ASW. We're the only ones in the world who can do that. That's Navy stuff! That gets back to my operational primacy guidestar: "We can never take our eyes off of that ball." The truth of it is, those core combat skills are things that we need to maintain. You've asked what is new. I give you one word: TBMD. That's something fundamentally new and different from what we are doing now. It's a brand-new capability that will reside in our fleet. We're putting great focus and effort into undersea warfare and specifically ASW. We're the only ones in the world who can do that. That's Navy stuff! That gets back to my operational primacy guidestar: "We can never take our eyes off of that ball." The truth of it is, those core combat skills are things that we need to maintain. You've asked what is new. I give you one word: TBMD. That's something fundamentally new and different from what we are doing now. It's a brand-new capability that will reside in our fleet.

Tom Clancy: To wrap things up, I'd like to give you the opportunity to speak your mind about your vision for the Navy. What would you like to say to the readers, sir? To wrap things up, I'd like to give you the opportunity to speak your mind about your vision for the Navy. What would you like to say to the readers, sir?

Admiral Johnson: I think that we've touched on the big things already in this interview. One point that I would hope to make is that the capability that CVBGs and the Navy in general give to the country and the world is vital. We've talked a lot about the equipment, and that is vital. But I think more than anything, we've got to really represent all the people in the Navy. That's the story. When you go out and "tie on" with one of those groups, you'll see that people are the magic that makes it all happen. I think that we've touched on the big things already in this interview. One point that I would hope to make is that the capability that CVBGs and the Navy in general give to the country and the world is vital. We've talked a lot about the equipment, and that is vital. But I think more than anything, we've got to really represent all the people in the Navy. That's the story. When you go out and "tie on" with one of those groups, you'll see that people are the magic that makes it all happen.

I'd also like to say that we need to make the American people see the need for maintaining the greatest Navy in the world. There still still is a need. The lessons of history tell us that. So our commitment to them is that we will is a need. The lessons of history tell us that. So our commitment to them is that we will never never "take our packs off." Operational primacy will stay as one of our guiding stars as we head into the new century, and we'll do it with leaders.h.i.+p, teamwork, and pride. "take our packs off." Operational primacy will stay as one of our guiding stars as we head into the new century, and we'll do it with leaders.h.i.+p, teamwork, and pride.

For the first time in almost a decade, the Navy seems to be on a steady course, with a plan, and with stable leaders.h.i.+p to guide it through the uncertain waters between the 20th and 21st centuries. Like the early mariners who navigated from star to star, Admiral Johnson has found a constellation for the Navy to follow to the future. Along the way, he has proven himself a quiet but effective warrior. In a time when the Navy needed a champion and hero for the wars on the banks of the Potomac River, they seem to have found a winner-a steady hand on the helm, to guide the Navy into a new millennium.

Wings of Gold : A Naval Aviator's Life "Why is America lucky enough to have such men? They leave this tiny s.h.i.+p and fly against the enemy. Then they must seek the s.h.i.+p, lost somewhere on the sea. And when they find it, they have to land on its pitching deck. Where do we get such men?"

The Bridges at Toko-Ri (James A. Michener, 1953)

When James A. Michener wrote these words almost forty-five years ago, carrier decks were straight and made of wood, and the first generation of jet naval aviators were still learning to fly off them. Carriers, jets, and piloting have changed greatly since then, yet the words ring as true today as they did then.

Naval aviators are a national treasure. They are, first of all, America's front-line combat aviators. Much like their Marine Corps brethren, when there is trouble out there, they expect to be the first called. Though this is an attractive challenge for some people, there is more to the naval aviation profession than just being first in line to be shot at. Flying for the sea services requires unique dedication and skills (such as exceptional eyesight and hand-eye coordination under stress), and demands sacrifices that other military pilots don't even have to imagine-all of which has endowed naval aviation with a (mostly) well-justified mystique.

Flying on and off aircraft carriers is a big part of that mystique. There is an old saying among pilots that flying is not inherently dangerous, just very unforgiving. Though there are no truer words, there are also notable exceptions-"trapping" aboard a rolling and pitching aircraft carrier deck on a stormy night, for instance. It is this skill-landing aboard a moving flight deck in all sorts of conditions-that most clearly differentiates naval aviators from all other pilots. There is simply no way to compare flying from a runway on a land base with the stress and responsibility that sea service pilots have to contend with every time they launch. Every time you take off from a carrier, you leave knowing that you might not find your way back onto the "boat" and will have to eject into a hostile ocean. Clearly, there is more at stake than just a $50 million airplane (and a career). Mastering the stress and responsibility of such flying requires a special kind of flier.

Fortunately for Navy fliers, achieving that mastery is not laid solely on their shoulders. They don't have to do it alone. Since naval aviation is only a fraction of the size of the U.S. Air Force, everyone knows everyone else-and pays attention to everyone else. It's a lot like being part of a college fraternity (for good and for bad). Or-to put it more precisely-U.S. Naval aviation is a collection of small communities (F-14, F/A-18, EA-6B, etc.) in which an aviator spends his or her life for upwards of two decades. The good news here is that there's lots of support. The bad news is that aviators are hugely compet.i.tive. Your peers are always keeping score.

Such a world creates larger-than-life personalities-powerfully evolved human beings at the top of the food chain. To succeed you need a cast-iron ego, a lightning intellect, an excess of ambition, and fluent social skills. And the most successful have the ability to spread all this to others in their profession.

A Navy pilot (in legend, at any rate) began shouting, " I've got a MiG at zero! A MiG at zero!"-meaning that it had maneuvered in behind him and was locked in on his tail. An irritated voice cut in and said, "Shut up and die like an aviator." One had to be a Navy pilot to appreciate the final nuance. A good Navy pilot was a real aviator; in the Air Force they merely had pilots and not precisely the proper stuff. irritated voice cut in and said, "Shut up and die like an aviator." One had to be a Navy pilot to appreciate the final nuance. A good Navy pilot was a real aviator; in the Air Force they merely had pilots and not precisely the proper stuff.

The Right Stuff (Tom Wolfe, 1979) (Tom Wolfe, 1979)

The Navy likes to train its air crews hard. Frankly, they train the h.e.l.l out of them. While other services emphasize providing officers with a "well-rounded" career, naval aviators in front-line units focus on getting ready for battle. This is not to say that Navy fliers are liberated from down-to-earth duties. They do paperwork like anybody else. Rather, the forward-deployed focus of the Navy requires more emphasis on combat training than usually is provided for the "garrison" units of the Army and USAF. An average naval aviator will spend fully half of his time getting ready to fight and staying proficient. While naval aviators fly about the same number of hours every month as their USAF counterparts, how and when they fly is vastly different. More of their flying is focused on actual combat and tactical training. And there is an almost manic devotion to flight safety, requiring extraordinary amounts of study and practice.

When a carrier air wing (CVW) is preparing to deploy, the air crews spend fully six months training and qualifying to prove their readiness for the job. This is concentrated training, with the entire CVW deploying to a special air warfare training center at Naval Air Station (NAS) Fallon, Nevada, for several weeks to learn composite strike warfare. Just before their deployment, they fly in a series of joint war games, which normally have higher operations tempos (Optempos) than actual warfare. Thus, by the time a naval aviator heads out to the carrier to begin his six-month overseas deployment, he is one of the best-prepared combat aviators in the world. That is not bragging. Consider, for instance, that no U.S. naval aviator has been shot down in air-to-air combat since 1972, and that in a generation of combat from Vietnam to Desert Storm, naval aviators have acc.u.mulated an average kill-loss ratio in the neighborhood of 17:1.

Along with the dangerous flying, the life of a naval aviator brings with it the expectation of long overseas deployments, usually lasting six months or more. A "normal" twenty-year career might send an officer on eight or ten of these "cruises." Once a carrier group is forward-deployed, even in relatively "friendly" waters like the western Pacific or the Mediterranean, the aircraft always (even when training) fly with live ordnance loaded. This means that when you are on cruise, the only difference between peacetime and combat flying is the position of the Master Arm switch on the control panel in front of you. As a result, national leaders have to put a lot of trust in individual naval aviators. With only the judgment of a young pilot between the President and a potential act of war, you can understand why they are trained so hard, and held to such exacting standards.

Naval Aviation Culture Though I've met fighter pilots that enjoy getting shot at and being missed (they love living at that high pitch of excitement), by any true measure, no war is a good war. War is in no way "fun." Still, for the young men who served in it, World War II was the best of wars. They had good airplanes to fly, enemies to fight who were real real enemies, and a just victory to win. American industry produced splendid aircraft (like the F-6F h.e.l.lcat and TBF/TBM Avenger) in which a young man with a couple of years of college and five hundred hours of flight training could expect to fly safely into combat, return to base, and go up to fight again. All kinds of young men flew into combat off carrier decks, from movie actors and Kansas farm boys to future U.S. Presidents. The string of victories that they achieved-Midway, Coral Sea, Leyte Gulf, and many others-testifies to the Navy's skill and wisdom in deploying and fighting naval aviation. enemies, and a just victory to win. American industry produced splendid aircraft (like the F-6F h.e.l.lcat and TBF/TBM Avenger) in which a young man with a couple of years of college and five hundred hours of flight training could expect to fly safely into combat, return to base, and go up to fight again. All kinds of young men flew into combat off carrier decks, from movie actors and Kansas farm boys to future U.S. Presidents. The string of victories that they achieved-Midway, Coral Sea, Leyte Gulf, and many others-testifies to the Navy's skill and wisdom in deploying and fighting naval aviation.

The key to this success was the vast array of training bases, which turned out naval aviators and crews by the tens of thousands. By comparison, as the war went more and more against them, the j.a.panese and Germans turned out air crews with ever fewer and fewer flying hours of training. American naval aviation leaders considered it a crime to let a young "nugget"16 into the fleet with less than five hundred hours of flight time. Instead of leaving combat veterans in the fight until they died, as the Axis nations did, American naval aviators (often against their wishes) were sent home after a combat tour to rest and train new pilots before returning to combat. In that way, the veterans got a chance to recharge their batteries while the rookies got the benefit of their experience. into the fleet with less than five hundred hours of flight time. Instead of leaving combat veterans in the fight until they died, as the Axis nations did, American naval aviators (often against their wishes) were sent home after a combat tour to rest and train new pilots before returning to combat. In that way, the veterans got a chance to recharge their batteries while the rookies got the benefit of their experience.

This meant practically that late in the war (the Battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf in 1944, for example), American carrier air groups were being led by second- and third-tour commanders (O-5's). The j.a.panese units were lucky to have lieutenants (O-2's) with a few hundred flying hours. The results were predictable. In repeated one-sided victories, the Americans shot their opponents out of the air at a ratio of over ten to one.17 So effective was the American juggernaut that the j.a.panese had to resort to Kamikaze suicide planes to try to stop the onslaught. But this too failed. Naval aviation had won the Great Pacific War, making the island a.s.saults by Marine and Army units possible, as well as helping sweep the seas of enemy naval units. When surrender finally came, following the atomic bombs on Hiros.h.i.+ma and Nagasaki, the bombs were more an excuse than a reason. So effective was the American juggernaut that the j.a.panese had to resort to Kamikaze suicide planes to try to stop the onslaught. But this too failed. Naval aviation had won the Great Pacific War, making the island a.s.saults by Marine and Army units possible, as well as helping sweep the seas of enemy naval units. When surrender finally came, following the atomic bombs on Hiros.h.i.+ma and Nagasaki, the bombs were more an excuse than a reason.

How, you might ask, did the war impact on the culture of naval aviation in the U.S.? It gave it a tradition of success and confidence-success and confidence built on intense training. This tradition would hold, even in the dark days of Vietnam and the years following that horror.

Corrosion: The Vietnam Years Even before the end of the Korean War, new carriers had been laid down, and a new generation of supersonic jets began to appear on their decks. Every month seemed to bring a new carrier aircraft, weapon, or innovation. This was a very good time for Naval aviation. Out of it came, for example, many of the astronauts who would take America into s.p.a.ce and to the moon. There was a downside, however. The new jets were unreliable-their new engines being both underpowered and p.r.o.ne to fires and explosions. The practical consequence: Naval aviation, always a dangerous profession, became truly deadly. Naval aviators, always high-spirited and daring both in the air and their personal lives, began to take on a fatalistic att.i.tude about their chances of reaching retirement age. The result was a "live for today" mentality, which they took with them into the 1960's and Vietnam.

This fatalism grew exponentially with the start of the Vietnam conflict, when losses to naval aviators who flew missions over Southeast Asia were staggering (due to enemy ground fire, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and MiG interceptors), and the chances of surviving a twenty-year Navy flying career became almost nil. Desperate for combat-ready air crews, and unable to send veteran Naval aviators on more than two "war" cruises because of personnel policies, the Navy suffered a severe pilot "crunch" during the conflict. Worse than just a shortage of fliers were the corrosive effects of the conflict itself on the culture of the community as a whole. Atlantic Fleet air crews, whose carriers rarely rotated to Southeast Asia, became almost second-cla.s.s citizens next to the combat-hardened veterans from the Pacific Fleet. Even worse was the effect on the morale and morals of the aviators who went to Vietnam and came home.

I doubt that Mister McNamara and his crew have a morale setting on their computers.Rear Admiral Daniel V. Gallery, 1965

Vietnam was a winless war for naval aviators. They lost their first comrades months prior to the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in 1964, and were the last Americans "feet dry" during the evacuation from Saigon in 1975. During the intervening dozen or so years, the Navy kept two or three aircraft carriers continually on "Yankee Station" (the U.S. code name for the carrier operating area in the northern Tonkin Gulf) as part of the bombing campaigns against North Vietnamese forces. It was a new kind of war for the Airedales,18 most of who had grown up in the "Doomsday" mentality of the Cold War. Now they were saddled by absurd ROE ("rules of engagement"), guidance on targets, tactics, and weapons use. The brilliant but ultimately wrongheaded Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, and his crew of "whiz kids" devised this absurd situation. In one of the greatest military blunders in a century full of military misfortune, they failed to listen to on-scene commanders about how the air war should be fought. Instead, they tried to "micro-manage" the war from afar, and turned it into one of the worst military fiascos in America's history. most of who had grown up in the "Doomsday" mentality of the Cold War. Now they were saddled by absurd ROE ("rules of engagement"), guidance on targets, tactics, and weapons use. The brilliant but ultimately wrongheaded Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, and his crew of "whiz kids" devised this absurd situation. In one of the greatest military blunders in a century full of military misfortune, they failed to listen to on-scene commanders about how the air war should be fought. Instead, they tried to "micro-manage" the war from afar, and turned it into one of the worst military fiascos in America's history.

Denied the means to victory, the pilots on the carriers flew daily from Yankee Station, getting shot down, captured, and killed in numbers that still numb modern-day historians.19 Their mission: not to take effective military action that could lead to victory, but to deliver to an enemy "political messages" from leaders in Was.h.i.+ngton who did not understand that the enemy did not care to listen to those messages. To say that air crews suffered a great deal of job-related stress is an understatement. Their mission: not to take effective military action that could lead to victory, but to deliver to an enemy "political messages" from leaders in Was.h.i.+ngton who did not understand that the enemy did not care to listen to those messages. To say that air crews suffered a great deal of job-related stress is an understatement.

A fighter pilot soon found he wanted to a.s.sociate only with other fighter pilots. Who else could understand the nature of the little proposition (right stuff/death) they were all dealing with? And what other subject could compare with it? It was riveting!

The Right Stuff (Tom Wolfe, 1979) (Tom Wolfe, 1979)

In any group that regularly undergoes stress, tragedy, and the insanity of a "limited" war, the survivors bond in unique ways. Thus it was with Vietnam-era naval aviators. They had faced off with death, and won (never forget that fighter pilots are incredibly compet.i.tive). They were the possessors of "the Right Stuff," the keepers of the magic combination of courage, ego, and skills that allowed them to accomplish with fiendish precision actions that no machine could reliably repeat day after day. They were true warriors who-after the day's fighting was over-could imagine nothing better than to spend their off-duty time only with each other.

Soon, the entire naval aviation community had isolated itself, not only from American society in general, but even from the Navy that took them into battle. The result was a subculture that lived in the air wing s.p.a.ces aboard s.h.i.+p and in the officers' clubs of the liberty ports (like Cubi Point in the Philippines) and home bases. Quite simply, naval aviators fresh from combat were permitted almost any any behavior short of murder. This included drinking parties in the air wing berthing s.p.a.ces on Yankee Station and wild s.e.xual antics back at base, as long as they could get up the next day and fly again. s.h.i.+ps' captains and squadron commanders were not simply turning a blind eye on this madness of youth. The wild behavior of naval aviators was actually sanctioned and tolerated by senior Navy leaders all the way up to the Pentagon. The rationale was that the ugly nature of the Vietnam war ent.i.tled naval aviators to "blow off steam" in an equally ugly fas.h.i.+on. The fallout was a dozen years of drunken antics, womanizing, and wild partying anytime the air crews were not actually flying or in combat. behavior short of murder. This included drinking parties in the air wing berthing s.p.a.ces on Yankee Station and wild s.e.xual antics back at base, as long as they could get up the next day and fly again. s.h.i.+ps' captains and squadron commanders were not simply turning a blind eye on this madness of youth. The wild behavior of naval aviators was actually sanctioned and tolerated by senior Navy leaders all the way up to the Pentagon. The rationale was that the ugly nature of the Vietnam war ent.i.tled naval aviators to "blow off steam" in an equally ugly fas.h.i.+on. The fallout was a dozen years of drunken antics, womanizing, and wild partying anytime the air crews were not actually flying or in combat.

A law of nature holds that alcohol fuels all wars. And the lads at Cubi never suffered a fuel crisis. They got knee-walking, commode-hugging drunk the first couple of days, then recuperated with golf, swimming, or deep breathing.

On Yankee Station (Commander John B. Nichols and (Commander John B. Nichols and Barrett Tillman, 1987) The effects of the Vietnam-inspired debauchery remained an integral part of naval aviation culture for a generation. Even though the end of the war restored a modic.u.m of peacetime decorum to life aboard s.h.i.+p (alcohol under way became a major no-no!), it left a lasting mark on the souls of naval aviators. They now saw themselves as the keepers of a special tribal knowledge-the deep and esoteric knowledge only they possessed, that told them how wartime carrier operations had to be run. As tribal elders, they saw it as an imperative of their calling to pa.s.s their tribal knowledge on to the next generation of naval aviation leaders. Thus, when the junior officers who came of age during Vietnam became squadron commanders and carrier captains, they pa.s.sed on to the new aviators they commanded the hard-drinking, hard-living, womanizing, daredevil culture that they grew up with. It would become a ticking time bomb.

The remaining years of the Cold War saw naval aviation and its personnel safely insulated from the great social changes that were taking place in American society. While the air crews went out on their regular rotations and cruises, thanks to the protection of their senior leaders, they lived in a virtual stasis, immune to outside forces, totally disconnected from the civilian culture. A disaster was waiting to happen. The storm hit in 1991 at the Las Vegas Hilton.

Dry Rot: The End of the Cold War During the two decades following Vietnam, the civil rights and women's movements transformed American society. During those same two decades, those revolutions barely touched the military in general, the sea services in particular, and naval aviation least of all. In spite of reformers like Admiral Elmo Zumwalt (Chief of Naval Operations in the early 1970's), the culture of naval aviation remained unchanged.20 As ever, it was a professional haven for middle-cla.s.s white males, with strong second- and third-generation family a.s.sociations. But a funny thing happened on the way to Desert Storm: Naval aviation found itself-slowly, reluctantly-setting off on the same road the rest of America was traveling. As ever, it was a professional haven for middle-cla.s.s white males, with strong second- and third-generation family a.s.sociations. But a funny thing happened on the way to Desert Storm: Naval aviation found itself-slowly, reluctantly-setting off on the same road the rest of America was traveling.

The desegregation of the military began as far back as the late 1940s, when President Harry S. Truman issued an executive order to that effect. However the order had very little immediate effect on Naval aviation, for few Americans of color chose to make that a profession. Still, a tiny cadre of brave young men took the plunge; and the first of these, Jesse Brown, gave his life in combat while flying during the Korean War. Sacrifices like Brown's and others' went a long way toward validating minority naval aviators. The admission of women into naval aviation took much longer. Un-fortunately,their acceptance there, with anything like real equality, remains to be achieved. All the same, the feminist revolution changed the U.S. military-even naval aviation-forever.

Broader questions still remain: Does humankind need women to be warriors? Does human nature demand it? Do equal rights before the law demand it? I'm not going to hazard an answer to these questions. But there's a much easier one I can safely field: Will women serve in combat in United States military services? The answer to that one, of course, is "yes." They already have and do. In principle, at least, there is no combat action that qualified women cannot handle. Meanwhile, fueled by the new all-volunteer military of the 1970s, the military began to recruit large numbers of women into the ranks. Initially they were limited to non-combatant and support jobs. But before long, the understanding of "non-combatant" and "support" began to change, and with those changes came an expansion of women's roles. By the early 1980s, they were flying transport aircraft and helicopters, as well as training and support aircraft.

But female naval aviators still remained landlocked, due to restrictions on women serving aboard s.h.i.+ps. These restrictions, I should point out, were legal, not naval. That is to say, the legislation that restricted the role of women aboard s.h.i.+ps-and still restricts the roles of women in combat-is contained in t.i.tle 10 of the U.S. Federal Code, which must be amended and approved by Congress. Professional military officers may have opinions about the rights and wrongs of these restrictions (which they are obligated to keep to themselves), but the ultimate responsibility for them goes higher up the ladder of government than the rungs they occupy.