What's Wrong With Eating People? Part 5

Love

16.

'MY BELOVED IS MINE' or or 'THE TROUBLE WITH FOOTBALL IS THE OTHER TEAM' 'THE TROUBLE WITH FOOTBALL IS THE OTHER TEAM'

Lovers are likened to the mad, the mad with seething brains - and not merely because lovers kiss, bite, and whisper intimate childish names. What lovers see in their beloved, the world often sees not at all. And that seems like a madness.

Lucy finds her man, Lenny, exciting and handsome, everything for which she longed. In Lucy's eyes, Lenny lives on the edge, has unusual thoughts - and, as for his ravis.h.i.+ng smile, well* The world, though, sees Lenny as no good, a layabout, a little lopsided in the lips' department. Ottone gazes at Poppea: she is charming, beautiful, coquettish, yet bountiful. The world spots Poppea as manipulative, scheming, and a bit overweight.

Lovers do not see what the world sees. 'Love looks not with the eyes, but with the mind.' Cupid is pictured blind, blind to rules and restraint. Of course, in quick response, we may reflect that love can reveal more than the world first sees: the love of a good woman, or man, may work wonders on those so beloved.

Lovers, of course, often l.u.s.t for each other. There is the urge to kiss, embrace, and much more; and, as the above portrays, lovers possess tendencies to project perfections. They may place each other on pedestals which, as the quip goes, have little scope for manoeuvre and considerable scope for falls. Imperfections may receive positive renderings. Lenny's lopsided smile is distinctively sweet to Lucy; and Poppea's slight weight problem is, for Ottone, an abundance to love. When things go well, misperceptions and renderings are mutually for the better.

Why does Ottone not spot Poppea's scheming nature? 'Ah, that's because he's in love.' The love is offered as explanation of Ottone's over - or under - sight; it explains why he finds the weight appealing.Yet, why does Ottone love Poppea? 'Ah, that is because he sees her as such a beautiful, bountiful woman.' This two-way explanation is no true explanation at all, for it loops round: the positive rendering is explained by the love; yet the love is explained by the positive rendering.

Explaining lovers' perceptions forms one puzzle. Maybe the solution needs recognition of the role of time: love develops. A particular feature of Poppea sparks desire in Ottone and, if things go well, other features come to the fore, seen in the light of developing desire. Things spiral and grow - and features become embellished and enhanced, intensifying the flushes and fervour. Desires fan out, turning to a more 'my beloved is mine' 103 embracing love. Whatever best explains the spiral and other changes, another puzzle remains: what is it that lovers yearn and l.u.s.t after, when they speak of wanting each other?

What do lovers desire?

What brings desires to an end may not be what is desired.You may desire a holiday, yet the desire is quelled by an emergency intervening, the holiday forgotten. You yearn for another drink, but the sight of a drunk brings a halt to that yearning: you no longer feel like a drink at all. The emergency and the sight of the drunk brought the desires to an end, but the emergency and the sight were not the objects of those desires.

Consider two lovers l.u.s.ting after each other. People tend to believe that, because o.r.g.a.s.m typically brings an end to immediate l.u.s.ts, it is the o.r.g.a.s.mic end that the lovers really desire.Yet, with the holiday and drink examples in mind, that may be a mistaken belief.

When the l.u.s.ting is also a loving, what, indeed, is desired? Lovers, metaphorically, devour each other with their eyes, wanting to possess each other - but what is going on?

There may be no simple answer. Certainly, lovers take pleasure in each other, in each other's body, thought, and personality; but pleasurable sensations are not the sole end. Were pleasurable sensations all that mattered, a sensation-generating machine would do just as well; but few people love and l.u.s.t after machines - and machines l.u.s.t not at all.

Lovers, as with friends, may value simply walking quietly through a glade, hand in hand, eating together, and sharing music. They are doing something together, but not merely in that they are each taking part in the same activity. Rather, there is a 'we'; we we are walking along the seash.o.r.e. are walking along the seash.o.r.e. We We are at a party - even though in different corners of the room. Two people may play chess together, yet not in the loving sense just proffered - for the players may be held together solely by the chess. Two (or more) lovers or friends, though, may play and delight - just as they may dance and sing - as one. And, when it is love and not mere friends.h.i.+p, the 'we' involves, of course, intimacies of body. are at a party - even though in different corners of the room. Two people may play chess together, yet not in the loving sense just proffered - for the players may be held together solely by the chess. Two (or more) lovers or friends, though, may play and delight - just as they may dance and sing - as one. And, when it is love and not mere friends.h.i.+p, the 'we' involves, of course, intimacies of body.

Pleasures in love - and friends.h.i.+ps - also require reciprocation. Lenny's pleasure in Lucy typically heightens Lucy's pleasure in Lenny which heightens Lenny's pleasure - and so on. However far we may spiral - presumably the limit falls well below 'the sky's the limit' - its familiarity reminds us that love is between people, people who can delight in the other's delight. That is one reason why the lonely night-time cuddles of the pillow fail to transform that pillow into a subst.i.tute lover.

Love typically involves at least two two people, not one - yet that too creates puzzle. Lovers want more than pillows, yet when lovers speak of 'we', they endanger the individual, the individual being swallowed. We sometimes hear cries, 'Give me s.p.a.ce; let me be me.' The stronger may devour or overwhelm the weaker, the cries silenced, yet the stronger, the dominant, is now alone, unloved, and unloving. How much more so would our human selves be lost, were we to engage in the ecstatic love of a being as dominant as G.o.d - for that is an unequal relations.h.i.+p indeed. That relations.h.i.+p would certainly endanger our individuality. Maybe that is why certain religious believers and mystics, when antic.i.p.ating eternal survival through G.o.d, do not antic.i.p.ate personal survival at all. people, not one - yet that too creates puzzle. Lovers want more than pillows, yet when lovers speak of 'we', they endanger the individual, the individual being swallowed. We sometimes hear cries, 'Give me s.p.a.ce; let me be me.' The stronger may devour or overwhelm the weaker, the cries silenced, yet the stronger, the dominant, is now alone, unloved, and unloving. How much more so would our human selves be lost, were we to engage in the ecstatic love of a being as dominant as G.o.d - for that is an unequal relations.h.i.+p indeed. That relations.h.i.+p would certainly endanger our individuality. Maybe that is why certain religious believers and mystics, when antic.i.p.ating eternal survival through G.o.d, do not antic.i.p.ate personal survival at all.

They will be lost in the One.

Images of love often display the body as territory. John Donne writes: Licence my roving hands, and let them go, Before, behind, between, above, below. O my America! My new-found-land*

Jean-Paul Sartre, the French intellectual of the twentieth century, goes pessimistically and metaphysically further. s.e.xual desire is intrinsically unstable and, in some way, contradictory. In desiring the other, we seek to turn that person into a thing, into flesh, while still wanting that other to be a free agent, loving us.

'I want all of you' we, as lovers, might say; but how can we possess the person, the beloved, with his or her subjective gaze upon the world? Sartre hence quips, 'The trouble with football is the other team.' Yet, with a paradoxical 'of course', the other team is essential to the game and to love.

Plato offers a different picture, a picture of lovers seeking their other halves, perhaps resulting in a mutual unified transformation, the original whole found, with both individuals then lost within that whole.

And so it is that different approaches to love paint love as, in one way or another, endangering individuality - either through conquering the other or losing the self.

Images of love also involve mysterious flights. 'My beloved is mine, and I am his: he feedeth among the lilies,' sings the Song of Solomon Song of Solomon. 'Behold, thou art fair, my love; behold, thou art fair; thou hast doves' eyes within thy locks: thy hair is as a flock of goats that appear from Mount Gilead.'

Love puzzles. With a Sartrean sense, well before Sartre, John Dryden speaks of lovers: They gripe, they squeeze, their humid tongues they dart, As each would force their way to t'other's heart, In vain; they only cruise about the coast, For bodies cannot pierce, nor be in bodies lost, As sure they strive to be.

Love puzzles, yet matters to us all. That it matters creates more puzzlement. When in love, love has huge significance, even though we may be able to step back and recognize its absurdity. With that absurdity in mind, although we are probably unaware of Lord Chesterfield's name, his famous quip may yet spring to the fore.

'In the act of love, the pleasure is momentary, the position ridiculous and the expense d.a.m.nable.'

Rationality

17.

G.o.d, CHOCOLATE, AND NEWCOMB: TAKE THE BOX?.

A paradox seemingly miles away from G.o.d and chocolate has fascinated philosophers for the last forty years; it is Newcomb's. Before we connect it with the everyday, here comes the paradox.

A mind-reader seems able to read minds. You are presented with two boxes. In one, 10,000 is clearly in view.The other, the surprise box, is closed, its contents concealed. What you know is that the mind-reader, after reading your mind, will either have popped 1 million or nothing at all into the surprise box. So, in front of you there are two boxes: one with 10,000 clearly visible; another, the closed surprise box, with either zero or 1 million already there.

You are given the following choice. You may take either both boxes or just the surprise. Thousands of people have been given the choice. Those who have taken both have always found the surprise box empty; they have always ended upwith just the 10,000. People who have taken only the surprise box have happily found the 1 million within.

People speculate. Maybe the mind-reader a.s.sesses people's characters. If she judges that players are not hugely greedy, settling for the surprise box alone, she rewards them accordingly by popping the 1 million into that box. If she judges players to be greedy, wanting as much as possible, likely to grab both boxes, she leaves the surprise box empty. To date, she has always been right. Who knows how she does it - but she does. It is known that it is possible for her to make mistakes, but she has not made one yet.

You want to get the most money you can. You do not want to risk losing the 1 million; yet you do not want to end up with nothing. The 10,000 is certainly worth having, but winning the 1 million is better still - and getting both the 10,000 and the 1 million would be best. What is it rational to do? Which way are you jumping? Try it on friends.

Should you open both boxes or solely the surprise box?

Many philosophers follow the 'already there' approach: Look, either the surprise box already contains the 1 million or it's already empty. If it's already empty, then obviously I should take both boxes - in order to get the 10,000. If the surprise box already contains the 1 million, then I should also take both boxes, securing both the 1 million and the 10,000. There can be no dispute. Any rational person - and I, being a philosopher - must take both boxes.

The retort is the 'evidential' approach: Consider the evidence. Whenever people have taken both boxes, the surprise box is empty. Who knows how the mind-reader works it out, but somehow she does. Obviously, the rational thing to do, given the evidence, is to take just the surprise box. Only by my doing that will I secure the 1 million. All I can say about your 'already there' reasoning is: if it's so very clever, how come people who reason as you do aren't rich?

We may reel with the reasoning, between the 'already there' and 'evidential' approaches.

Perhaps, we decide to take the surprise box only; but then reason's teeny voice whispers that the mind-reader will therefore have already filled the surprise box with the 1 million, given the way we have decided. Hence, we may as well take both boxes after all, the 'already there' approach coming to the fore. But now we reflect that the mind-reader, being so clever, would have judged that we would take that next step in the reasoning, switching to favouring both boxes; so, it would be better after all to remain faithful to the original decision to take the surprise box only. But, the 'already there' reasoning cuts in again. And so on* The reasoning loops round.

My approach questions the puzzle's casual beginning. How is the mind-reader so successful? At least, how could she be successful when dealing with rational players? As we have seen, rational philosophers reach opposing or unstable conclusions about what to do. Of course, so-called rational philosophers - heaven forbid? - may end up defending one line of reasoning over another because of their psychological tendencies: risk- takers or greedy, overawed by evidence or cautious, committed to one type of philosophical theory or another. And we can seek to explain other reasoners' choices also on the basis of their psychological tendencies. Paradoxically, though, when a.s.sessing what it is rational rational for me to do, I cannot see my own decisions as the results of such tendencies. for me to do, I cannot see my own decisions as the results of such tendencies.

The mind-reader, though, is back in business, if decisions, even of so-called rational players, result from players' psychological tendencies; but if they result purely from what it is rational to do - well, players and mind-reader are at sea. Our mind-reader would indeed be a phantasy - though the underlying puzzle is not, in that we now have a deep puzzle of how psychology and biology connect with rational and logical reasoning.

Whatever happened to G.o.d and genetics? Some G.o.dly believers, when tragedy has struck, pray or make sacrifices to their G.o.d, hoping that, for example, their daughter was not killed in a recent disaster. Maybe they reason that, through prayer or sacrifice, their daughter will have been saved, G.o.d having foreseen their actions, their pleas and sacrifices. This is akin to the evidential approach: take the surprise box only; sacrifice the definite 10,000. Some believers, however, may reason that their daughter is already saved or not; so why lose time or money through prayer or sacrifice? This is the 'already there' approach.

Some religious believers hold that it is predestined whether they gain eternal bliss or not - yet they still judge it important to lead G.o.dly lives to secure that eternal bliss. In that case, they are rejecting the 'already there' approach and following the evidential approach.

Turning to genetics, suppose there is a correlation between certain genes and p.r.o.neness to heart disease. Perhaps people so p.r.o.ne also eat lots of chocolate. Therefore, perhaps we should give up our chocolate consumption, hoping that we are thereby unlikely to have the undesirable genetic factor. In such reasoning, we are, so to speak, foregoing the chocolate box, the 10,000 box, in the hope that genetically our surprise box is filled with health. Here, this is a highly dubious argument. It would be better to argue that the genetic factor is indeed already fixed; so, if the factor is the cause of the p.r.o.neness, we may as well have the chocolate and hope - maybe against hope - that the surprise box is yet filled with health. Of course, it may be that the genetic factor causes the chocolate desire, but it is the chocolate that actually causes the disease p.r.o.neness; then, it could be rational to try to resist the chocolates.

These puzzles arise because we are uncertain which are causal factors, which irrelevant side-effects, and which accidental correlations. We often lack understanding of how nature works.The Newcomb paradox baffles because we lack understanding of how the mind-reader works.

Newcomb's weirdness is shown by embellis.h.i.+ng the tale, making the surprise box also open to view, with players seeing whether the 1 million is present. We then add to the story: yet, even when the 1 million is present and on view, players take only that box instead of taking both. This highlights the tale's mystery - a mystery present in Newcomb from the very beginning.

Genetic research seeks to eradicate mystery, distinguis.h.i.+ng causes from coincidences, but we still live with one central mystery, namely, how causes relate to free choices and reasoning. Richard Dawkins of The Selfish Gene The Selfish Gene fame seems to find room for freedom through 'our brains rebelling against our genes'; but whatever does that mean and how does it provide room for free choices? How causes relate to free choices and, indeed, reasoning, is the deep mystery lurking within Newcomb's paradox, and indeed with our succ.u.mbing to chocolate, yet doing so freely. Or not so freely* fame seems to find room for freedom through 'our brains rebelling against our genes'; but whatever does that mean and how does it provide room for free choices? How causes relate to free choices and, indeed, reasoning, is the deep mystery lurking within Newcomb's paradox, and indeed with our succ.u.mbing to chocolate, yet doing so freely. Or not so freely*

Metaphysics/Mind

18.

THE BRAIN.

I've recently lost my appet.i.te. That's unsurprising, I suppose, given that I'm just a brain in a vat - well, so they tell me. In fact, I reside in a precious Grecian vase, size large, and not just any old vat. At first I thought they were making fun of me, but then my experiences started to go haywire. Sometimes they cut out completely and I just experience a blank. They tell me not to worry. I'm in good hands. They promise to let me see me one day, but currently they feed me experiences as if I were at home, gazing through the window, feeding the pigeons - or out dancing and prancing, drinking champagne with young men of my dreams. Ah, that's the life.

Of course, I do worry. I sometimes dwell on my vase-free days, when I was more than just a brain. But that way of looking at things is mistaken - so they insist. I've always just been a brain - but now I am a brain in a vase and not a brain in a typical human body. 'Typical' did they say? I'll have them know that mine was highly desired and desirable, more so than any Grecian vase, however precious.

I guess we all knew that things like this could happen.Years ago, when my arm was chopped off, I continued to have experiences as if I had an arm, despite being armless. I experienced what is called a 'phantom limb'. Technology was developing fast, and I soon had an impulse machine plugged into my nervous system. By tinkering with the machine's settings, I could give myself experiences as if the missing arm, the phantom limb, were in the right place, even as if it were holding a book. With my body's deterioration - more bits falling off - neurologists thought it best to concentrate on preserving my brain. That is how I, brain, ended up in a vase - antique, let me remind you. I undergo experiences - they seem real enough - which the neurologists judge to cohere with my former life. The experiences result from their stimulating my brain's cells.

So, here I am. Well, I am not sure what that means these days. I am here in the vase, but my experiences are, as I said, mainly as if I am carrying on normally. And I do have a say in what happens.They can tell from the neural activities how my vocal chords would then be moving, if I had any, to express what I am thinking and wanting.

News has, though, just come in of an incident. My brain was accidentally sliced in the night, right down the middle. Apparently, that's no problem. They had contingency plans. The neurological changes transmitted from one hemisphere to another continue - this time by some wireless transmitters attached to each hemisphere. They have sorted out the right speed of transmission. Mind you, I am feeling queasy.What if such accidents happen again - and again*?

Can a brain have experiences?

Many believe that we essentially are our brains. Hearts, livers, and lungs can be transplanted; arms and legs can be chopped off. What is responsible for my continuing to have my experiences is my brain. Science fiction and horror stories of the 'brain in vat' ilk abound. As philosophers, we are concerned with whether the idea even makes sense.

Some cells in the brain die, but the millions that remain end up, through nutrition, having their molecules, atoms, and electrons changed over time. The particular brain stuff is not important to our ident.i.ty; what seems key is the configuration of electrical activity, properties, and chemical levels. Let us sum this up: experiences depend upon various neurological changes occurring in certain sequences. If that is true, then why should it matter whether the brain is kept as one unit, or sliced - as happened to poor Biv, 'Brain in Vase', as we may call her? All that matters seems simply to be the right configuration of billions of neurological changes of the right type. How the individual changes are brought about is irrelevant - so long as they are brought about. After all, particular changes do not have impressed upon them how they have been caused.

The above line of thought brings trouble. To see how, let us reduce the billions of neurological changes a little - well, radically - down to three changes, A, B, and C, that are of the right configuration, intensity, and so on, for Biv to have a certain experience. We can rebuild the complexity by multiplying what is said about A, B, and C billions of times.

A particular experience results from A being followed by B being followed by C. If we think of A, B, C being of certain types, then perhaps that type of experience for Biv results from an A-type change being followed by a B-type and then a C-type. That event A causes B and B then causes C does not seem essential to the story, but just that A, B, and C occur in the right sequence. Of course, usually such events occur inside a single human body. For Biv, though, such events now occur in a vase; but, in theory, it seems, A could have been in America, B in Britain, and C in China. So long as the neurological features are of the right type, manifested at the right time, then the relevant experience should occur for Biv. Any A-type change cannot tell, so to speak, how close a B-type is - and so on.Thinking more, is the time sequence even important? After all, A, B, and C do not register the existence of each other as being before or after.

We could take further puzzling steps. Given the billions of neurological changes happening in each human being and the billions of human beings, do we need even to contrive the special existence of A, B, and C? Will not changes of those types be occurring in the skulls of populations in any case, maybe A in American Angela's brain, B in British Bernie's, and C in Chinese Chou's? If that is so, then our Biv is undergoing experiences without the need to retain even her brain, however much broken and dispersed. Indeed, a whole mishmash of experiences must be occurring for a vast number of unknown people with neither bodies nor brains. What an incredible and crazy thought.

Modesty and humility - well, the conclusion's bizarre features - suggest that the reasoning is radically faulty. One obvious thought is that, for experiences, we need the body after all; but that alone does not save us from weird results. We could imagine a brainless human body linked in the right way, by wireless, to neurological changes such as our A, B, and C thousands of miles away. That body would then be moved by the wireless transmissions, as if a brain undergoing those changes were present within it. Does a person with experiences result?

See the depths and intrigues of philosophical reasoning - and the dangers when philosophers fear not the darkness lurking within those depths.

The error would seem to be the casual separation of a human being, a person, into parts.Yes, we can amputate limbs, and engage in organ transplants, while retaining the same person. However, it does not follow that a brain in a vase would have experiences, even if the brain were undergoing the same internal changes that, when properly humanly embodied, would have ensured experiences for a person.

We confront bizarre puzzles, even without 'brain in vase' tales. Consider some of your current experiences, of the sight of chairs, the taste of coffee, the sounds of rustling papers. Experiences of the same type and configuration, it seems, could well be occurring elsewhere. If they are distinct experiences of the same type, what makes them someone else's rather than yours? What makes jour jour experiences yours? experiences yours?

Perhaps when two people have the same thought, there really is just one thought, one thought shared by two people. That approach, even if right for thoughts, would seem simply wrong, if applied to pains. My pain, however similar to yours, is still the one that I experience and you do not. But could human biology have been differently const.i.tuted? Might human biology have been such that you, for example, could experience headaches located in the Queen's head - and the Queen also experience those very aches? Consider Siamese twins, joined at the hip. They could both experience the 'same' pain at the join, but, however similar, must there be two distinct pains?

The answer is probably 'yes'. A pain is not logically separable from the individual experiencing the pain. It seems impossible that my experiencing the pain in the Queen's head could be identical with the Queen's experiencing.

Ethics/Animals/Cuisine

19.

WHAT'S WRONG WITH EATING PEOPLE? or even or even WHO'S FOR DINNER? WHO'S FOR DINNER?

'I could eat you,' she said, she with the sparkling white teeth and devouring eyes, her arms flung round my neck. How could I not be flattered, receiving such warm and welcoming attention, in the club that had just so eagerly admitted me as member?