The Campaign of 1776 around New York and Brooklyn Part 16

[Footnote 170: A letter from Tilghman, Was.h.i.+ngton's aid, shows that the troops received the impression that they were to be relieved. The retreat, he says, "was conducted with so much Secrecy that neither Subalterns or privates knew that the whole army was to cross back again to N. York; they thought only a few regiments were to go back."--_Doc.u.ment_ 29.]

At dark, the withdrawal began. As one regiment moved away towards the ferry another would have its situation "changed" to fill the gap, or extended from right to left. Every move at first was conducted busily, yet quietly and without confusion. Colonel Little, referring to his part this night, leaves the simple record that the general ordered each regiment to be paraded on their own parades at seven o'clock P.M., and wait for orders. "We received orders," he says, "to strike our tents and march, with our baggage, to New York." Colonel Douglas writes: "I received orders to call in my guard _all_, and march immediately with the utmost silence." Hitchc.o.c.k's Rhode Islanders carried their baggage and camp equipage to the boats on their shoulders "through mud and mire and not a ray of light visible." The embarkation was made from the ferry--the present Fulton Ferry--where General McDougall superintended the movements. Between seven and eight o'clock the boats were manned by Glover's and Hutchinson's men, and they went to work with sailor-like cheer and despatch. The militia and levies were the first to cross, though there was some vexing delay in getting them off. Unluckily, too, about nine o'clock the adverse wind and tide and pouring rain began to make the navigation of the river difficult. A north-easter sprang up, and Glover's men could do nothing with the sloops and sail-boats. If the row-boats only were to be depended upon, all the troops could not be ferried over before morning. Discouraged at the prospect, McDougall sent Colonel Grayson, of Was.h.i.+ngton's staff, to inform the general as to how matters stood, but unable to find him Grayson returned, and McDougall went on with the embarkation in spite of its difficulties. Most fortunately, however, at eleven o'clock there was another and a favorable change in the weather. The north-east wind died away, and soon after a gentle breeze set in from the south-west, of which the sailors took quick advantage, and the pa.s.sage was now "direct, easy, and expeditious."

The troops were pushed across as fast as possible in every variety of craft--row-boats, flat-boats, whale-boats, pettiaugers, sloops, and sail-boats--some of which were loaded to within three inches of the water, which was "as smooth as gla.s.s."

[Ill.u.s.tration: [signature: J.W. Glover]

COLONEL FOURTEENTH REGIMENT OF FOOT (Ma.s.s.) BRIGADIER GENERAL 1777.

Steel Engr. F. von Egloffstein N.Y.]

Meanwhile nearly a fatal blunder occurred at the lines. Early in the evening, a force had been selected, consisting of Hand's, Smallwood's, Haslet's, Shee's, Magaw's, and Chester's regiments, to remain at the works to the last and cover the retreat. General Mifflin commanded the party. Smallwood's men were stationed in Fort Putnam, part of Hand's under Captain Miller in the redoubt on the left, and the rest at the lines on the right of the main road; and the other regiments near them. Brooklyn Church was to be the alarm-post, where the covering party was to concentrate in case the enemy attacked during the night.

About two o'clock in the morning, Major Scammell, one of Sullivan's aids now serving with Was.h.i.+ngton, mistook his orders and started Mifflin's entire command for the ferry. All the regiments had left the lines and were marching down the main road, when Was.h.i.+ngton, who seemed to be everywhere during the night, met them and exclaimed in astonishment that unless the lines were immediately re-manned "the most disagreeable consequences" might follow, as every thing then was in confusion at the ferry. Mifflin's party promptly faced about and reoccupied their stations until dawn, when Providence again "interposed in favor of the retreating army." To have attempted to withdraw in clear daylight would have been a hazardous experiment for these regiments, but just before dawn a heavy fog began to settle over Long Island, and the covering party was safe. So dense was this "heavenly messenger," as Gordon happily describes it, that it effectually hid the American lines from the British pickets. When the final order, therefore, came about sunrise for Mifflin's men to retire to the ferry, they were enabled to do so under cover of the fog without exciting any suspicion of their movements in the enemy's camp.[171] "We kept up fires, with outposts stationed," says Lieutenant-Colonel Chambers, "until all the rest were over. We left the lines after it was fair day and then came off." As our soldiers withdrew they distinctly heard the sound of pickaxe and shovel at the British works.[172] Before seven o'clock the entire force had crossed to New York, and among the last to leave was the commander-in-chief.

"General Was.h.i.+ngton," adds Chambers, "saw the last over himself."

[Footnote 171: Mr. Reed, the biographer, states that the fog rose on the 29th. Dr. Stiles, in his "History of Brooklyn," says: "At midnight a dense fog arose, which remained motionless and impenetrable over the island during the whole of the next day [the 29th]." "A dense fog,"

writes Mr. Field, "hung over the island and river, when the morning of the 29th dawned." Now nothing is more certain than that the fog did not rise until shortly before dawn of the 30th, full six hours after the retreat had begun. The 28th and 29th, as already seen, were days of rain-storms, not mist, nor fog, but storm, "torrents," such rain at times the like of which could "hardly be remembered." Contemporary writers who mention the rains say nothing of fog on the 29th, whereas they do notice its appearance the next morning. Major Tallmadge writes: "As the dawn of the next day approached, those of us who remained in the trenches became very anxious for our own safety, and when the dawn appeared, there were several regiments still on duty. At this time a very dense fog began to rise, and it seemed to settle in a peculiar manner over both encampments. I recollect this peculiar providential occurrence perfectly well; and so very dense was the atmosphere that I could scarcely discern a man at six yards'

distance." This officer's regiment was one of the covering party, and he adds that after leaving the lines by mistake, and receiving orders to return, "Col. Chester immediately faced to the right about and returned, where we tarried until the sun had risen, but the fog remained as dense as ever." "At sunrise a great fog came up," says a spectator (_Stiles' MS. Diary_). An officer or soldier of either Shee's or Magaw's regiment, also of the covering party, wrote a few hours after crossing: "We received orders to quit our station about two o'clock this morning, and had made our retreat almost to the ferry when Gen. Was.h.i.+ngton ordered us back to that part of the lines we were first at, which was reckoned to be the most dangerous post. We got back undiscovered by the enemy, and continued there until daylight.

Providentially for us, a great fog arose, which prevented the enemy from seeing our retreat from their works which was not more than musket shot from us."--_Force_, 5th Series, vol. i., p. 1233. So also, Stedman, the British historian, referring to the events of the night of the 29th-30th, says: "Another remarkable circ.u.mstance was, that on Long Island hung a thick fog, which prevented the British troops from discovering the operations of the enemy." Was.h.i.+ngton did not, as often stated in popular accounts, take advantage of a fog to cover his retreat. More than half the army was over before the fog appeared; but it protected the covering party, and saved us the loss of considerable baggage and other material.]

[Footnote 172: An English patrol under Captain Montressor discovered the retreat of the Americans very soon after the latter left the lines, and reported the fact at once. But for some unexplained reason pursuit was delayed until too late. One boat with four stragglers was taken by the enemy.]

By the army the retreat was welcomed as a great relief, a salvation from probable calamity. Not a few appreciated its completeness and success as a strictly military move. "This evacuation," writes one, "is a masterpiece." "That grand retreat from the Island which will ever reflect honour to our Generals," says another. "Considering the difficulties," is Greene's criticism, "it was the best effected retreat I ever read or heard of." "It was executed," says Scott, "with unexpected success." But in the country at large it was generally a.s.sociated with the defeat of the 27th, and the skilfulness with which it was conducted little compensated for the fact that the retreat was forced upon us.

CHAPTER VI.

LOSS OF NEW YORK--KIP'S BAY AFFAIR--BATTLE OF HARLEM HEIGHTS.

Long Island surrendered, could New York be held? Columbia Heights, where Fort Stirling stood, had been regarded by Lee as the "capital point," the key of the position. Greene called the Brooklyn front "the pa.s.s," on the possession of which depended the security of the city.

Both pa.s.s and heights were now in the enemy's hands, and New York was at their mercy. "We are in hourly expectation," wrote Commissary Trumbull, September 1st, "that the town will be bombarded." Lieutenant Jasper Ewing, of Hand's riflemen, saw that the British could reduce the place to "a heap of ashes" in a day's time. Colonel Douglas looked for an immediate cannonade from Fort Stirling, "which," he says, "I have the mortification to think I helped build myself." But the enemy kept their guns quiet, as they wished neither to injure the city nor drive our army away. They contented themselves at first with stretching their troops along the water front from Red Hook to h.e.l.l Gate, Newtown, and Flus.h.i.+ng on Long Island, and threatening to land at any point on Manhattan Island from the Battery to Harlem, or beyond on the Westchester sh.o.r.e.

As for Was.h.i.+ngton, the successful retreat had not in the least relieved him from care or anxiety. He had escaped one trap: it was of the utmost consequence now to see that he did not fall into another.

What he feared most was a sudden move upon his rear in Westchester County, for in that case he would be hopelessly hemmed in on Manhattan Island. "The enemy," continued Trumbull on the 1st, "are drawing their men to the eastward on Long Island, as if they intended to throw a strong party over on this island, near h.e.l.l Gate, so as to get on the back of the city. We are preparing to meet them." Haslet wrote August 31st: "I expect every moment orders to march off to Kingsbridge to prevent the enemy crossing the East River and confining us on another nook.... If they can coop us up in N. York by intrenching from river to river, horrid will be the consequences from their command of the rivers." General Heath pressed the matter of watching the Westchester coast, and Was.h.i.+ngton, concurring with him "as to the probability of the enemy's endeavoring to land their forces at Hunt's Point," above h.e.l.l Gate, wrote him on the 31st: "In order to prevent such an attempt from being carried into execution I have sent up General Mifflin with the troops he brought from your quarters, strengthened by reinforcements. With this a.s.sistance I hope you will be able to defeat their intentions. I beg you will exert yourself to the utmost of your abilities on this momentous occasion." Several days pa.s.sing without any demonstration by the enemy, Was.h.i.+ngton's suspense was only protracted, and on September 5th he wrote again to Heath as follows:

"As everything in a manner depends upon obtaining intelligence of the enemy's motions, I do most earnestly entreat you and General Clinton to exert yourselves to accomplish this most desirable end. Leave no stone unturned, nor do not stick at expense to bring this to pa.s.s, as I never was more uneasy than on account of my want of knowledge on this score.

"Keep, besides this precaution, constant lookouts (with good gla.s.ses) on some commanding heights that look well on to the other sh.o.r.e (and especially into the bays, where boats can be concealed), that they may observe, more particularly in the evening, if there be any uncommon movements. Much will depend upon early intelligence, and meeting the enemy before they can intrench. I should much approve of small hara.s.sing parties, stealing, as it were, over in the night, as they might keep the enemy alarmed, and more than probably bring off a prisoner, from whom some valuable intelligence may be obtained."[173]

[Footnote 173: "The Heath Correspondence," Ma.s.s. Hist. Soc. Coll., 1878.]

To add to his burdens, the commander-in-chief found the condition of his army growing worse instead of improving. The experiences on Long Island had disheartened many of the troops, and their escape had not revived their spirits.[174] The militia became impatient and went home in groups and whole companies, and indeed in such numbers as to materially diminish the strength of the army. To restore order and confidence, Was.h.i.+ngton exerted himself to the utmost. Tilghman, one of his aids, speaks of "the vast hurry of business" in which the general was engaged at this time. "He is obliged," he writes, "to see into, and in a manner fill every department, which is too much for one man."

To Rodney, Haslet wrote: "I fear Genl Was.h.i.+ngton has too heavy a task, a.s.sisted mostly by beardless boys."[175] But fortunately for the country the general's shoulders were broad enough for these great duties, and his faith and resolution remained unshaken.

[Footnote 174: Pastor Shewkirk notes in his diary that immediately after the retreat "a general damp" seemed to spread over the army.

"The merry tones on drums and fifes had ceased, and they were hardly heard for a couple of days." The wet clothes, accoutrements, and tents were lying about in front of the houses and in the streets, and every thing was in confusion. But this was to be expected. General Scott, referring evidently to expressions heard among his own men, says that some declared that they had been "sold out," and others longed to have Lee back from the South.--_Scott's MS. Letter_, September 6th, 1776.]

[Footnote 175: Was.h.i.+ngton's aids were most of them quite young men.]

As soon as possible the army was reorganized and stationed to meet the new phase of the situation. Several changes were made in the brigades, and the whole divided into three grand divisions, under Putnam, Spencer, and Heath. Putnam's, consisting of five brigades, remained in the city and guarded the East River above as far as Fifteenth Street; Spencer's, of six brigades, took up the line from that point to Horn's Hook and Harlem; and Heath with two brigades watched King's Bridge and the Westchester sh.o.r.e. Greene had not sufficiently recovered from his illness, and his old troops, under Nixon and Heard, were temporarily doing duty with Spencer's command.[176] This disposition was effected by the 2d of September, and by it our army again occupied an extended line, endeavoring to protect every point on the east side from the battery to King's Bridge, or the entire length of the island, a distance of fourteen and a half miles.

[Footnote 176: A large number of changes were made in the organization of the army after the retreat. The Connecticut militia were divided up and formed into brigades with the levies under General Wadsworth, Colonel Silliman, Colonel Douglas, and Colonel Chester. A brigade was given also to Colonel Sargent, of Ma.s.sachusetts. Putnam's division included Parsons', Scott's, James Clinton's (Glover's), Fellows', and Silliman's brigades; Spencer's and Greene's divisions included Nixon's, Heard's, McDougall's, Wadsworth's, Douglas', Chester's and Sargent's brigades; while Heath had his former brigades, with a change of some regiments, under Mifflin and George Clinton.]

The question of abandoning New York and all that part of the island below Harlem Heights was, meanwhile, under consideration. The city would obviously be untenable under a bombardment, and the island equally so if the British crossed into Westchester County. Yet Was.h.i.+ngton, strangely, we may say, expressed the conviction that he could hold both provided his troops could be depended upon.[177] Among his generals, Greene earnestly opposed any such attempt, and advocated the evacuation and destruction of the place. "The City and Island of New York," he wrote to his chief, September 5th, "are no objects for us; we are not to bring them into compet.i.tion with the general interests of America.... The sacrifice of the vast property of New York and the suburbs, I hope has no influence on your Excellency's measures. Remember the King of France. When Charles the Fifth, Emperor of Germany, invaded his Kingdom, he laid whole Provinces waste; and by that policy he starved and ruined Charles's army, and defeated him without fighting a battle. Two-thirds of the property of the City of New York and the suburbs belong to the tories. We have no very great reason to run any considerable risk for its defence.... I would give it as my opinion that a general and speedy retreat is absolutely necessary, and that the honour and interest of America require it. I would burn the city." John Jay before this also proposed its destruction. Scott urged abandonment of the place for sound military reasons, though the move would ruin him. Was.h.i.+ngton, however, on the 2d, presented the whole question to Congress. Also convinced by the condition of the army, that the city must be evacuated, he asked, "If we should be obliged to abandon the town, ought it to stand as winter quarters for the enemy?" Congress voted, in reply, that "it should in no event be damaged, for they had no doubt of being able to recover it, even though the enemy should obtain possession of it for a time."

On the 7th, a council of war, inferring that Congress wished the place to be held, decided to retain five thousand troops in the city and concentrate the rest around and above Harlem; but on the 12th the matter was reconsidered, and a second council voted to evacuate the city and retire to Harlem Heights. The removal of stores and the sick had already commenced; and on the 14th, when the enemy appeared to be on the point of crossing from Montressor's, now Randall's, Island to the mainland, all the teams and wagons that could be found were impressed by the quartermasters to remove the remaining stores. In one day more the removal would have been complete and the troops all withdrawn to the heights. In the evening of the 14th Was.h.i.+ngton left the city, and established his headquarters at the Morris Mansion, at One Hundred and Sixty-first Street, overlooking Harlem River and the plains.[178]

[Footnote 177: "Till of late I had no doubt in my own mind of defending this place, nor should I have yet, if the men would do their duty, but this I despair of. It is painful, and extremely grating to me, to give such unfavorable accounts; but it would be criminal to conceal the truth at so critical a juncture."--_Was.h.i.+ngton to Congress_, September 2d, 1776.]

[Footnote 178: Colonel Reed, the adjutant-general, wrote to his wife, September 14th, from New York: "My baggage is all at King's bridge. We expect to remove thither this evening. I mean our headquarters."--_Reed's Reed._ Was.h.i.+ngton, writing of the events of the 15th, says: "I had gone the night before to the main body of the army which was posted on the plains and heights of Harlem." These references fail to confirm the common statement that Was.h.i.+ngton made the Murray House on Thirty-sixth Street his quarters for a short time after leaving the city.]

The enemy made no advance from Long Island until more than two weeks after the battle. Howe's preparations were delayed because dependent upon the co-operation of the fleet. On the night of the 3d of September, the frigate Rose, of thirty-two guns, sailed up the East River convoying thirty boats, and running through the fire of our guns at the Grand Battery, the s.h.i.+p-yards, and Corlears Hook, anch.o.r.ed close into Wallabout Bay, where on the 5th our artillerists "briskly cannonaded" her. After dark on the 12th, thirty-six additional boats pa.s.sed our batteries to Bushwick Creek, and the night after forty more followed. Then towards sunset on the 14th, the frigates Roebuck, Phoenix, Orpheus, and Carysfort, with six transports, joined the Rose without receiving material injury from the heavy fire poured upon them by our gunners.

On the following morning, the 15th, the British moved against Manhattan Island, and in the afternoon New York City fell into their possession. What occurred beforehand during the day is known as the "Kip's Bay affair."[179]

[Footnote 179: According to the Hessian major, Baurmeister, the 13th had been first named as the date for the attack. "On this day," he writes, "General Howe wished to land upon the island of New York, because 18 years ago on this day General Wulff [Wolfe] had conquered at Quebec, but also lost his life. The watchword for this end was 'Quebec' and the countersign 'Wulff,' but the frigates were too late for this attack as they only sailed out of the fleet at five o'clock on the evening of the 14th."

The sailing up of these s.h.i.+ps is described as follows by the Hon.

Joshua Babc.o.c.k, one of the Rhode Island Committee who had come down to consult with Was.h.i.+ngton in regard to military matters: "Just after Dinner 3 Frigates and a 40 Gun s.h.i.+p (as if they meant to attack the city) sail'd up the East River under a gentle Breeze towards h.e.l.l-Gate, & kept up an incessant Fire a.s.sisted with the Cannon at Governrs Island: The Batteries from the City return'd the s.h.i.+ps the like Salutation: 3 Men agape, idle Spectators had the misfortune of being killed by one Cannon-Ball, the other mischief suffered on our Side was inconsiderable Saving the making a few Holes in some of the Buildings; one shot struck within 6 Foot of Genl Was.h.i.+ngton, as He was on Horseback riding into the Fort."--_MS. Letter in R.I. Public Archives._ Also in _Force_.

Baurmeister preserves the incident that Was.h.i.+ngton was often to be seen at the East River batteries in New York, and on one occasion "provoked the Hessian artillery Captain Krug [on the Long Island side]

to fire off 2 Cannon at him and his suite." "A third shot too would not have been wanting, if the horses of the enemy had been pleased to stay," adds the major.]

Kip's Bay was the large cove which then set in from the East River at about the foot of Thirty-fourth Street. It took its name from the old Kip family, who owned the adjacent estate. From this point breastworks had been thrown up along the river's bank, wherever a landing could be made, down as far as Corlears Hook or Grand Street. Five brigades had been distributed at this front to watch the enemy. Silliman's was in the city; at Corlears Hook was Parsons' brigade, to which Prescott's Ma.s.sachusetts men had now been added; beyond, in the vicinity of Fifteenth Street, on the Stuyvesant estate, Scott's New York brigade took post; above him, at about Twenty-third Street, was Wadsworth's command, consisting of Sage's, Selden's, and Gay's Connecticut levies; and further along near Kip's Bay was Colonel Douglas, with his brigade of three Connecticut militia regiments under Cooke, Pettibone, and Talcott, and his own battalion of levies.[180] Up the river a chain of sentinels communicated with the troops at Horn's Hook, and every half hour they pa.s.sed the watchword to each other, "All is well."

[Footnote 180: We know the position of the troops from the statements of their officers. Douglas says: "I lay with my brigade a little below Turtle [Kips] Bay where we hove up lines for more than one mile in length. Gen'l Wadsworth managed the lines on the right and I on the left." Brigade-Major Fish says of Scott's brigade that they were "marched to the lines back of Stuyvesant's," about the foot of Fifteenth Street. Parsons was below at Corlears Hook as appears from _Doc.u.ment_ 32. Silliman himself says that he was in the city. Consult map of New York, Part II., where the position at the time of the British attack is given.]

Very early on the morning of the 15th, which was Sunday, the five British frigates which had anch.o.r.ed under the Long Island sh.o.r.e sailed up and took position close within musket-shot of our lines at Kip's Bay, somewhat to the left of Douglas. This officer immediately moved his brigade abreast of them. The s.h.i.+ps were so near, says Martin, one of Douglas' soldiers, that he could distinctly read the name of the Phoenix, which was lying "a little quartering." Meanwhile, on the opposite sh.o.r.e, in Newtown Creek, the British embarked their light infantry and reserves, and Donop's grenadiers and yagers, all under Clinton and Cornwallis, in eighty-four boats, and drew up in regular order on the water ready to cross to the New York side.[181] The soldier just quoted remembered that they looked like "a large clover field in full bloom." All along the line our soldiers were watching these movements with anxious curiosity--that night they would have been withdrawn from the position--when suddenly between ten and eleven o'clock the five frigates opened a sweeping fire from their seventy or eighty guns upon the breastworks where Douglas and his brigade were drawn up. It came like "a peal of thunder," and the militiamen could do nothing but keep well under cover. The enemy fired at them at their pleasure, from "their tops and everywhere," until our men soon found it impossible to stay in that position. "We kept the lines," says Martin, "till they were almost levelled upon us, when our officers, seeing we could make no resistance, and no orders coming from any superior officer, and that we must soon be entirely exposed to the rake of the guns, gave the order to leave." At the same time the flotilla crossed the river, and getting under cover of the smoke of the s.h.i.+ps' guns, struck off to the left of Douglas, where the troops effected a landing without difficulty. Howe says: "The fire of the s.h.i.+pping being so well directed and so incessant, the enemy could not remain in their works, and the descent was made without the least opposition." The ordeal the militia were subjected to was something which in similar circ.u.mstances veteran troops have been unable to withstand.[182] Retreating from the lines, Douglas's men scattered to the rear towards the Post Road, and the enemy who landed and formed rapidly were soon after them. Douglas himself, who was an excellent officer, was the last to leave, and all but escaped capture.[183]

There was no collecting the brigade, however, in any new position in the field, for the thought of being intercepted had created a panic among the militia, and they fled in confusion.

[Footnote 181: "The first landing was of 84 boats with English infantry and Hessian grenadiers under command of Lieut-General Clinton. Commodore Hotham conducted this landing, under cover of 5 frigates anch.o.r.ed close before Kaaps [Kip's] Bay above Cron Point, and maintained a 3 hours cannonade on the enemy's advanced posts in the great wood. The signal of the red flag denoted the departure of the boats, the blue on the contrary the stoppage of the pa.s.sage, and if a retreat should become necessary, a yellow flag would be shown."--_Baurmeister._ "Sunday morning at break of day, five s.h.i.+ps weighed anchor and fell in close within a musket shot of our lines quite to the left of me. I then moved my brigade abreast of them. They lay very quiet until 10 o'clock and by that time they had about 80 of their boats from under Long Island sh.o.r.e full with men which contained about five or six thousand and four transports full ready to come in the second boats."--_Col. Douglas._

Major Fish wrote September 19th that the enemy's s.h.i.+ps of war were drawn up "in line of Battle parallel to the sh.o.r.e, the Troops to the amount of about 4000 being embarked in flat bottom Boats, and the Boats paraded."--_Hist. Mag._]

[Footnote 182: All accounts agree that it was next to impossible to remain under the fire of the men-of-war. Major Fish says that "a Cannonade from the s.h.i.+ps began, which far exceeded my Ideas, and which seemed to infuse a Panic thro' the whole of our Troops, &c." Silliman speaks of the "incessant fire on our lines" with grapeshot as being "so hot" that the militia were compelled to retreat. Douglas's description is as quaint as it is expressive: "They very suddenly began as heavy a cannonade perhaps as ever was from no more s.h.i.+ps, as they had nothing to molest them." Martin thought his head would "go with the sound." Lieutenant John Heinrichs, of the Hessian yagers, writes: "Last Sunday we landed under the thundering rattle of 5 men-of-war."]

[Footnote 183: The enemy's boats, says Douglas, "got under cover of the smoke of the s.h.i.+pping and then struck to the left of my lines in order to cut me off from a retreat. My left wing gave way which was formed of the militia. I lay myself on the right wing waiting for the boats until Capt. Prentice came to me and told me, if I meant to save myself to leave the lines, for that was the orders on the left and that they had left the lines. I then told my men to make the best of their way as I found I had but about ten left with me. They soon moved out and I then made the best of my way out."--See further in _Doc.u.ments_, Part II., p. 71.]

When the cannonade at Kip's Bay began, Was.h.i.+ngton was four miles distant, at Harlem. At the first sound of the guns he mounted his horse and rode with all possible despatch to the scene. At about the same time, General Parsons, probably by Putnam's order, directed Prescott's, Tyler's, and the remnant of Huntington's regiment, not over eighty strong, to march immediately to the a.s.sistance of the troops where the enemy were landing.[184] Fellows' brigade was also ordered along for the same purpose.

[Footnote 184: _Doc.u.ment_ 32.]

At about the corner of the present Thirty-sixth Street and Fourth Avenue stood at that time the residence of Robert Murray, the Quaker merchant, on what was known as "Inclenberg" heights, now Murray Hill.

His grounds extended to the Post Road, which there ran along the line of Lexington Avenue. Just above him a cross-road connected the Post and Bloomingdale roads, which is represented to-day by the line of Forty-second and Forty-third streets. On the south side of the cross-road where it intersected the Post Road was a large corn-field adjoining or belonging to Murray's estate. When Was.h.i.+ngton reached this vicinity he found the militia retreating in disorder along both the cross and the Post roads, and Fellows' brigade just coming on to the field. The general, with Putnam and others, was then on the rising ground in the vicinity of the present Forty-second Street reservoir.

In a very short time Parsons and his regiments arrived by the Bloomingdale Road, and Was.h.i.+ngton in person directed them to form along the line of the Post Road in front of the enemy, who were rapidly advancing from Kip's Bay. "Take the walls!" "Take the corn-field!" he shouted; and Parsons' men quickly ran to the walls and the field, but in a confused and disordered manner. Their general did his best to get them into line on the ground, but found it impossible, they were so dispersed, and, moreover, they were now beginning to retreat. The panic which had seized the Connecticut militia was communicated to Fellows' Ma.s.sachusetts men, who were also militia; and now it was to sweep up Parsons' Continentals, including Prescott's men of Bunker Hill. The latter brigade had been brought on to the ground in bad shape through the fugitive militiamen, and when the British light infantry appeared they broke and retreated with the rest.