The Story of the Philippines Part 12

Under this there was clearly no authority for discriminating in favor of American goods, either coming direct from a United States Port or by transs.h.i.+pment at Hongkong.

The Collector of Customs was directed to act accordingly.

Another question was in regard to the importation of Chinamen into Manila. The Consul at Hongkong telegraphed to know if they would be admitted. As there had been no time for examining the treaties and laws in force on this subject, I replied with General Merritt's approval that for the present it was not practicable to admit Chinese laborers into Manila.

Another very important question which arose was in regard to trade with the other Philippine islands. Nearly all the hemp and the greater part of the sugar is grown in the Visayas. The hemp is bought by foreign merchants in Manila, who bring it there from the other islands, and export it, paying large duties to the Manila Custom House. These merchants were anxious to bring up their stock, of which a large amount had acc.u.mulated during the war, and s.h.i.+p it abroad. The s.h.i.+ps engaged in this island trade were idle in the Pasig. They belonged to a Spanish corporation, owned entirely by Scotch capital, and had a Spanish Register. The owners were ready to transfer them to the American flag. Could these vessels be allowed to clear for the ports of Cebu and Iloilo, which were in Spanish possession? The Judge Advocate advised me that they could not, without the express authority of the President. I so notified the owners of the s.h.i.+ps and the hemp merchants. The day before I left Manila, however, Admiral Dewey received a cable from the Navy Department stating that Spanish s.h.i.+ps had been granted the privilege of trading to American ports during the suspension of hostilities, and that American s.h.i.+ps could be granted a similar privilege for Spanish ports. I understood that on the strength of this cable General Otis intended to allow the United States Consul at Manila to grant these vessels an American Register and then allow them to clear for the other islands. I do not know what the arrangement, if any was made, in regard to the payment of export duties at Iloilo. Clearly the hemp cannot pay export duties at both Iloilo and Manila, and the Spaniards are not likely to allow it to leave Iloilo free while we collect an export duty on it at Manila. Incidentally, this ill.u.s.trates the complications and loss that will arise if the islands are subdivided. The princ.i.p.al merchants for all the islands are at Manila, and 90 per cent, of the duties in imports and exports are collected at its Custom House. A large part of the imports are redistributed through the islands; and all the hemp and sugar, which form the princ.i.p.al exports, come to Manila from other islands. If, then, we retain Luzon and give the other islands back to Spain or some other nation, that nation will impose import and export duties on everything coming from or to Manila. The foreign trade of that city as a distributing and collecting point for all the islands will be lost, and its prosperity will be destroyed; moreover, the Government revenue from that trade will be lost.

In view of the fact that Spanish officials declined to co-operate or a.s.sist in any way in the American government of Manila, the ease and rapidity with which order was maintained, the machinery of government put in operation and business reestablished, after our entry into Manila is very remarkable. For every position in the Government service, legal, administrative, financial, mechanical, clerical, men could be found in our volunteer ranks who were experienced in just that cla.s.s of work at home, and they took charge of their Spanish positions with promptness and confidence.

Even in the matter of language no serious difficulty was encountered, for no less than 30 good interpreters were found in the California and Colorado regiments.

The Military Government as now organized and administered, fulfills all the requirements of preserving order and collecting the public revenue.

The civil courts, however, have yet to be organized, and their organization will present many difficulties.

CHAPTER X

Official History of the Conquest of Manila.

The Pith of the Official Reports of the Capture of Manila, by Major-General Wesley Merritt, Commanding the Philippine Expedition; General Frank V. Greene, General Arthur McArthur, and General Thomas Anderson, With the Articles of Capitulation, Showing How 8,000 Americans Carried an Intrenched City With a Garrison of 13,000 Spaniards, and Kept Out 14,000 Insurgents--The Difficulties of American Generals With Philippine Troops.

One of the most interesting events in the records of the fall of cities, that carried with them decisive factors affecting nations, is that of the conquest of Manila, by the army and navy of the United States in the memorable year of 1898. The victory of Admiral George Dewey May 1st, in the bay of Manila, nigh Cavite, has been celebrated in every clime and in all languages, and the great story if related in this book as one of universal fame, and given in outline and also in pen pictures meant to show the local coloring, and these are incidents most ill.u.s.trative that are not familiar. The names of the s.h.i.+ps and the officers of the victorious fleet, and the force of the contending squadrons in men and guns are herewith presented as an indisputable record.

Admiral Dewey held on to his command of the bay and city of Manila, braving all dangers--and they were many--and as fast as the army could be organized and equipped, reinforcements were forwarded. General Wesley Merritt was appointed the Commander in Chief of the expedition to the Philippines, and arrived at Cavite, July 25th. The official history of the operations that forced the surrender of the old Spanish capital in the East Indies has not received the public attention its unusual and instructive character demands, because the reports were not received in the States and given to the public until the Paris peace commission was a.s.sembling, and this singularly suggestive detail has been almost neglected. It is here for the first time consecutively arranged, annotated and adjusted, so as to tell the whole story. The part played by the insurgents is one that has not been stated by authority and with precision combining narrative form with the internal evidence of authenticity.

The first expeditionary force of the United States to arrive was that of General Thomas Anderson, on June 30, sixty days after Dewey's victory. The second expeditionary force, under General Frank V. Greene, arrived July 17, and the third, under General McArthur, July 30th, five days later than General Merritt, who found Rear Admiral George Dewey's war s.h.i.+ps "anch.o.r.ed in line off Cavite, and just outside of the transports and supply vessels engaged in the military service." He was "in full control of the navigation of the bay, and his vessels pa.s.sed and repa.s.sed within range of the water batteries of the town of Manila without drawing the fire of the enemy." This immunity of protected cruisers from the fire of nine-inch Krupp guns with an abundance of ammunition that was, and some that was not serviceable, was due to the terrible prestige of the American Admiral and the consequent power of his word that if fired upon he would destroy the city. Anderson's Americans were, General Merritt reports, disposed as follows:

The Second Oregon, detachments of California Heavy Artillery, Twenty-third Infantry, and Fourteenth Infantry occupied the town of Cavite; while Brigadier General F.V. Greene, United States Volunteers, was encamped with his brigade, consisting of the Eighteenth Infantry, Third United States Artillery, Company A, Engineer Battalion, First Colorado, First California, First Nebraska, Tenth Pennsylvania, and Batteries A and B of the Utah Artillery, along the line of the bay sh.o.r.e near the village of Paranaque, about five miles by water and twenty-five miles by the roads from Cavite.

The Major General commanding visited General Greene's camp and made a reconnaissance of the position held by the Spanish, and also the opposing lines of the insurgent forces, finding General Greene's command encamped on a strip of sandy land running parallel to the sh.o.r.e of the bay and not far distant from the beach, but owing to the great difficulties of landing supplies "the greater portion of the force had shelter tents only, and were suffering many discomforts, the camp being in a low, flat place, without shelter from the heat of the tropical sun or adequate protection during the terrific downpours of rain so frequent at this season." The General commanding was at once struck "by the exemplary spirit of patient, even cheerful, endurance shown by the officers and men under such circ.u.mstances, and this feeling of admiration for the manner in which the American soldier, volunteer and regular alike, accept the necessary hards.h.i.+ps of the work they have undertaken to do, has grown and increased with every phase of the difficult and trying campaign which the troops of the Philippine expedition have brought to such a brilliant and successful conclusion."

The left or north flanks of General Green's camp extended to a point on the "Calle Real," about 3,200 yards from the outer line of Spanish defenses of the city of Manila. This Spanish line began at the powder magazine, or old fort San Antonio, within a hundred yards of the beach and just south of the Malate suburb of Manila, and stretched away to the Spanish left in more or less detached works, eastward, through swamps and rice fields, covering all the avenues of approach to the town and encircling the city completely."

General Merritt defines with firmness and perspicuity his position regarding the Filipinos in these terms:

"The Filipinos, or insurgent forces at war with Spain, had, prior to the arrival of the American land forces, been waging desultory warfare with the Spaniards for several months, and were at the time of my arrival in considerable force, variously estimated and never accurately ascertained, but probably not far from 12,000 men. These troops, well supplied with small arms, with plenty of ammunition and several field guns, had obtained positions of investment opposite to the Spanish line of detached works throughout their entire extent; and on the particular road called the "Calle Real," pa.s.sing along the front of General Greene's brigade camp and running through Malate to Manila, the insurgents had established an earthwork or trench within 800 yards of the powder-magazine fort. They also occupied as well the road to the right, leading from the village of Pa.s.say, and the approach by the beach was also in their possession. This anomalous state of affairs, namely, having a line of quasi-hostile native troops between our forces and the Spanish position, was, of course, very objectionable, but it was difficult to deal with, owing to the peculiar condition of our relations with the insurgents, which may be briefly stated as follows:

"Shortly after the naval battle of Manila Bay, the princ.i.p.al leader of the insurgents, General Emilio Aguinaldo, came to Cavite from Hongkong, and, with the consent of our naval authorities, began active work in raising troops and pus.h.i.+ng the Spaniards in the direction of the city of Manila. Having met with some success, and the natives flocking to his a.s.sistance, he proclaimed an independent government of republican form, with himself as president, and at the time of my arrival in the islands the entire edifice of executive and legislative departments and subdivision of territory for administration purposes had been accomplished, at least on paper, and the Filipinos held military possession of many points in the islands other than those in the vicinity of Manila.

"As General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival, nor offer his services as a subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and stated that "the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants," I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce my authority, in the event that his pretensions should clash with my designs.

"For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city were pressed, and military operations conducted without reference to the situation of the insurgent forces. The wisdom of this course was subsequently fully established by the fact that when the troops of my command carried the Spanish intrenchments, extending from the sea to the Pasay road on the extreme Spanish right, we were under no obligations, by prearranged plans of mutual attack, to turn to the right and clear the front still held against the insurgents, but were able to move forward at once and occupy the city and suburbs."

General Anderson was the first officer of the American army to arrive, and says Admiral Dewey gave him "every possible a.s.sistance," and favored him "with a clear statement of the situation." On the second day after he appeared at Cavite, which was one day after General Merritt's departure from San Francisco, he had "an interview with the insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, and learned from him that the Spanish forces had withdrawn, driven back by his army as he claimed, to a line of defense immediately around the city and its suburbs. He estimated the Spanish forces at about 14,000 men, and his own at about the same number. He did not seem pleased at the incoming of our land forces, hoping, as I believe, that he could take the city with his own army, with the co-operation of the American fleet.

"Believing that however successful the insurgents may have been in guerilla warfare against the Spaniards, that they could not carry their lines by a.s.sault or reduce the city by siege, and suspecting, further, that a hearty and effective co-operation could not be expected, I had at once a series of reconnaissances made to exactly locate the enemy's lines of defense and to ascertain their strength."

The date of the impression made on General Anderson's mind as to the displeasure of Aguinaldo is important. The insurgent chief would have preferred the military distinctions to have been reserved for himself. General Anderson says of the Spanish attacks on General Greene's lines:

"These conflicts began on the night of July 31, as soon as the enemy had realized that we had taken the places of the Filipinos, and began a system of earthworks to the front of their old line. It may have been merely coincident, but these attacks and sorties began at the time the Captain General of Manila was relieved by his second in command. For more than six weeks the insurgents had kept up a bickering infantry fire on the Spanish trenches, firing occasionally some old siege pieces captured by Admiral Dewey at Cavite and given to Aguinaldo. These combats were never serious, and the Spaniards, so far as I know, made no sorties upon them. But there is no doubt of the fact that the Spaniards attacked our lines with force and vindictiveness, until they were informed that the bringing on of a general engagement would lead to a bombardment of the city. After this there was for several days a tacit suspension of hostilities."

As to the situation of General Greene, Brigadier General Merritt says:

"The difficulty in gaining an avenue of approach to the Spanish line lay in the fact of my disinclination to ask General Aguinaldo to withdraw from the beach and the 'Calle Real,' so that Greene could move forward. This was overcome by instructions to General Greene to arrange, if possible, with the insurgent brigade commander in his immediate vicinity to move to the right and allow the American forces un.o.bstructed control of the roads in their immediate front. No objection was made, and accordingly General Greene's brigade threw forward a heavy outpost line on the "Calle Real" and the beach and constructed a trench, in which a portion of the guns of the Utah batteries was placed.

"The Spanish, observing this activity on our part, made a very sharp attack with infantry and artillery on the night of July 31. The behavior of our troops during this night attack was all that could be desired, and I have, in cablegrams to the War Department, taken occasion to commend by name those, who deserve special mention for good conduct in the affair. Our position was extended and strengthened after this and resisted successfully repeated night attacks, our forces suffering, however, considerable loss in wounded and killed, while the losses of the enemy, owing to the darkness, could not be ascertained.

"The strain of the night fighting and the heavy details for outpost duty made it imperative to re-enforce General Greene's troops with General MacArthur's brigade, which had arrived in transports on the 31st of July. The difficulties of this operation can hardly be overestimated. The transports were at anchor off Cavite, five miles from a point on the beach where it was desired to disembark the men. Several squalls, accompanied by floods of rain, raged day after day, and the only way to get the troops and supplies ash.o.r.e was to load them from the s.h.i.+p's side into native lighters (called 'cascos') or small steamboats, move them to a point opposite the camp, and then disembark them through the surf in small boats, or by running the lighters head on to the beach. The landing was finally accomplished, after days of hard work and hards.h.i.+p; and I desire here to express again my admiration for the fort.i.tude and cheerful willingness of the men of all commands engaged in this operation.

"Upon the a.s.sembly of MacArthur's brigade in support of Greene's, I had about 8,500 men in position to attack, and I deemed the time had come for final action. During the time of the night attacks I had communicated my desire to Admiral Dewey that he would allow his s.h.i.+ps to open fire on the right of the Spanish line of intrenchments, believing that such action would stop the night firing and loss of life, but the Admiral had declined to order it unless we were in danger of losing our position by the a.s.saults of the Spanish, for the reason that, in his opinion, it would precipitate a general engagement, for which he was not ready. Now, however, the brigade of General MacArthur was in position and the Monterey had arrived, and under date of August 6 Admiral Dewey agreed to my suggestion that we should send a joint letter to the Captain General notifying him that he should remove from the city all non-combatants within forty-eight hours."

The joint note of General Merritt and Admiral Dewey was as follows:

_Headquarters U.S. Land and Naval Forces_, Manila Bay, Philippine Islands, August 7, 1898.

The General in Chief Commanding Spanish Forces in Manila.

Sir: We have the honor to notify your excellency that operations of the land and naval forces of the United States against the defenses of Manila may begin at any time after the expiration of forty-eight hours from the hour of receipt by you of this communication, or sooner if made necessary by an attack on your part.

This notice is given in order to afford you an opportunity to remove all non-combatants from the city.

Very respectfully,

_Wesley Merritt_, Major-General, United States Army, Commanding Land Forces of the United States.

_George Dewey_, Rear-Admiral, United States Navy, Commanding United States Naval Forces on Asiatic Station.

The notable words in this are those "against the defenses of Manila,"

instead of against the city itself--the usual way--the city was to be spared if possible.

Manila, August 7, 1898.

The Governor-General and Captain-General of the Philippines to the Major-General of the Army and the Rear Admiral of the Navy, commanding, respectively, the Military and Naval Forces of the United States.

Gentlemen: I have the honor to inform your excellencies that at half-past 12 to-day I received the notice with which you favor me, that after forty-eight hours have elapsed you may begin operations against this fortified city, or at an earlier hour if the forces under your command are attacked by mine.

As your notice is sent for the purpose of providing for the safety of non-combatants, I give thanks to your excellencies for the humane sentiment you have shown, and state that, finding myself surrounded by insurrectionary forces, I am without places of refuge for the increased numbers of wounded, sick, women, and children who are now lodged within the walls.

Very respectfully, and kissing the hands of your excellencies,

_Formire Jaudenes_, Governor-General and Captain-General of the Philippines.

The second paragraph of the Governor-General and Captain-General's letter indicates a sense of helplessness, and credits the insurgents with surrounding the city so that there was no refuge. August 9th there was a second joint note from Major-General Merritt and Rear Admiral Dewey, in the terms following:

"The Governor-General and Captain-General of the Philippines.

"Sir: The inevitable suffering in store for the wounded, sick, women, and children, in the event that it becomes our duty to reduce the defenses of the walled town in which they are gathered, will, we feel a.s.sured, appeal successfully to the sympathies of a general capable of making the determined and prolonged resistance which your excellency has exhibited after the loss of your naval forces and without hope of succor.