The Story of the Philippines Part 2

The interpreter was a man shorter than the General, but not quite so slight. His hair was intensely black and he wore gla.s.ses. He is an accomplished linguist, speaks English with facility and is acknowledged by the priests to be the equal of any of them in reading and speaking Latin. It is to be remarked that while Aguinaldo is not a man of high education he has as a.s.sociates in his labors for Philippine independence a considerable number of scholarly men. It is related that in a recent discussion between a priest and an insurgent, the latter stated as a ground of rebellion that the Spaniards did nothing for the education of the people, and was asked, "Where did you get your education?" He had been taught by the Jesuits.

My first point in talking with Aguinaldo was that the people of the Philippines ought to be strongly represented in Paris, and of the reasons briefly presented, the foremost was that they sought independence, and should be heard before the commission by which their fate would be declared for the present, so far as it could be, by a tribunal whose work was subject to revision. The general's information was that the Paris conference would be opened September 15, an error of a fortnight, and his impression was that the terms regarding the Philippines would be speedily settled, so that there could not be time to send to Paris, but there had been a determination reached to have a man in Was.h.i.+ngton.

It is to be taken into account that this interview was before anything had been made known as to the mission which General Merritt undertook, and that in a few days he set forth to perform, and that the terms of the protocol had not been entirely published in Manila. I told the general it was not possible that the Philippine problem could speedily be solved, and made known to him that the transport China, which holds the record of quick pa.s.sage on the Pacific, was to sail for San Francisco in three days, and he would do well to have his men for Was.h.i.+ngton and Paris go on her if permission could be obtained, as there was no doubt it could, and I mentioned the time required to reach Was.h.i.+ngton and Paris--that one could be on a trans-Atlantic steamer in New York six hours after leaving Was.h.i.+ngton, that the Philippine commissioners going to Paris should make it a point to see the President on the way, and the whole matter one of urgency, but it was certainly not too late to act.

The General said it had been thought a representative of the islands and of the cause of the people should go to Was.h.i.+ngton, but the man was in Hongkong. He could, however, be telegraphed, so that he could catch the China at Nagasaka, j.a.pan, where she would have to stop two days to take coal. The Was.h.i.+ngton commissioner might go to Paris, but instructions could not reach him before he left Hongkong, as it would not be desirable to telegraph them. Upon this I stated if it suited his convenience and he would send instructions by me, I was going on the China, and would charge myself with the special confidential care of his dispatches and deliver them to the commissioner at the coaling station, when he should join the s.h.i.+p; and if it was the desire of the General to have it done I would telegraph the President that Philippine commissioners were on the way. These suggestions were received as if they were agreeable, and esteemed of value.

The conversation turned at this point to the main question of the future government of the Philippines, and I inquired what would be satisfactory to the General, and got, of course, the answer, "Philippine independence." But I said after the United States had sent a fleet and destroyed the Spanish fleet and an army in full possession of Manila she was a power that could not be ignored; and what would be thought of her a.s.suming the prerogative of Protector? She could not escape responsibility. His views as to the exact line of demarkation or distinction between the rights of the United States and those of the people of the islands should be perfectly clear, for otherwise there would be confusion and possibly contention in greater matters than now caused friction.

I endeavored to indicate the idea that there might be an adjustment on the line that the people of the Philippines could manage their local matters in their own way, leaving to the United States imperial affairs, the things international and all that affected them, the Filipinos looking to the administration of localities. I had asked questions and stated propositions as if it were the universal consent that General Aguinaldo was the dictator for his people and had the executive word to say; but when it came to drawing the fine lines of his relations with the United States as the embodiment of a revolutionary movement, he became shy and referred to those who had to be consulted.

His words were equivalent to saying his counselors must, in all matters of moment, be introduced. It came to the same thing at last as to his commissioner or commissioners to Was.h.i.+ngton or Paris, one or both, and he also a.s.serted the purpose of having the congress elected a.s.semble at a railroad town--Moroles, about fifty miles north of Manila--a movement it is understood that is under the guidance of others than the General, the bottom fact being that if there should be a Philippine Republic Aguinaldo's place, in the judgment of many who are for it, would be not that of chief magistrate, but the head of the army. There are others and many of them of the opinion that he is not a qualified soldier. The congress a.s.sembled at Moroles, and has made slow progress.

It may as well be remembered, however, that the distinctions of civil and military power have been always hard to observe, in Central and South American states, whose early Spanish education has been outgrown gradually, and with halting and b.l.o.o.d.y steps. General Aguinaldo, then engaged in evolving a letter to General Merritt, has since issued proclamations that yield no share to the United States in the native government of the islands. But there are two things definitely known, as if decreed in official papers, and probably more so; that the Filipinos of influential intelligence would be satisfied with the direction of local affairs and gladly accept the protectorate of the United States on the terms which the people of the United States may desire and dictate.

The greater matter is that whenever it is the fixed policy of the United States to accept the full responsibility of ruling the Philippines, neither Aguinaldo nor any other man of the islands would have the ability to molest the steady, peaceable, beneficent development of the potentiality of our system of justice to the people, and the preservation by and through the popular will of the union of liberty under the law, and order maintained peaceably or forcibly according to needs.

In continuation of his explanation that he had to refer matters to others called his counselors, disclaiming the presumption in my questions of his personal responsibility for the conduct of the native insurrection, General Aguinaldo said with the greatest deliberation and the softest emphasis of any of his sayings, that the insurgents were already suspicious of him as one who was too close a friend of the Americans, and yielded too much to them, and that there was danger this feeling might grow and make way with his ability to do all that he would like in the way of keeping the peace. There were, he said, inquiries to the effect: What had the insurgents got for what they had done in the capture of Manila? Were they not treated by the Americans with indifference?

Major Bell interposed to say that the Americans were in the Philippines not as politicians, but as soldiers, and had the duty of preserving order by military occupation, and it was not possible there could be maintained a double military authority--two generals of equal powers in one city under martial law. There must be one master and no discussion. The United States could take no secondary att.i.tude or position--would treat the insurgents with great consideration, but they of necessity were exclusively responsible for the carrying out of the provisions of the capitulation.

This was exactly to the point, and the interpreter cut his rendering of it, using but few words, and they did not cheer up the General and those about him. Evidently they want to know when and where they realize. It had been noticeable that the greater importance Aguinaldo attaches to what he is saying the lower his voice and the more certainly he speaks in a half whisper with parted lips, show-in teeth and tongue; and he has a surprising faculty of talking with the tip of his tongue, extended a very little beyond his lips. There was something so reserved as to be furtive about his mouth, but his eyes were keen, straight and steady, showing decision, but guarding what he regarded the niceties of statement. However, his meaning that there were insurgents who were finding fault with him was not so much indicative of a rugged issue as a confession of impending inabilities.

He had nothing to say in response to Major Bell's explicit remark about the one-man and one-country military power, but the action of the insurgents in removing their headquarters--or their capital, as they call it--to a point forty miles from Manila, proves that they have come to an understanding that the soldiers of the United States are not in the Philippines for their health entirely, or purely in the interest of universal benevolence. The Filipinos must know, too, that they could never themselves have captured Manila. It is not inapt to say that the real center of the rebellion against Spain is, as it has been for years, at Hongkong.

I reserved what seemed the most interesting question of the interview with the Philippine leader to the last. It was whether a condition of pacification was the expulsion of the Catholic priests as a cla.s.s. This was presented with reference to the threats that had been made in my hearing that the priests must go or die, for they were the breeders of all trouble. Must all of them be removed in some way or another? If not, where would the line be drawn? The lips of the General were parted and his voice quite low and gentle, the tongue to a remarkable degree doing the talking, as he replied, plainly picking words cautiously and measuring them. The able and acute interpreter dealt them out rapidly, and his rendering gave token that the Filipinos have already had lessons in diplomacy--even in the Spanish style of polite prevarication--or, if that may be a shade too strong, let us say elusive reservation--the use of language that is more shady than silence, the framing of phrases that may be interpreted so as not to close but to continue discussion and leave wide fields for controversy. The General did not refer to his counselors, or the congress that is in the background and advertised as if it were a new force.

The words of the interpreter for him were:

"The General says the priests to whom objection is made, and with whom we have a mortal quarrel, are not our own priests, but the Spaniards'

and those of the orders. We respect the Catholic church. We respect our own priests, and, if they are friends of our country, will protect them. Our war is not upon the Catholic church, but upon the friars, who have been the most cruel enemies. We cannot have them here. They must go away. Let them go to Spain. We are willing that they may go to their own country. We do not want them. There is no peace until they go."

I said my information was that the objectionable Orders expressly proscribed by the insurgents were the Dominicans, Augustines, Franciscans and Recollects, but that the Jesuits were not included. This was fully recited to the General, and with his eyes closing and his mouth whispering close to the interpreter's cheek he gave his answer, and it was quickly rendered:

"The Jesuits, too, must go. They also are our enemies. We do not want them. They betray. They can go to Spain. They may be wanted there, not here; but not here, not here."

The question whether the friars must make choice between departure and death was not met directly, but with repet.i.tions--that they might be at home in Spain, but could not be a part of the independent Philippines; and, significantly, they should be willing to go when wanted, and would be. Two Catholic priests--Americans, not Spaniards--were at this moment waiting in the ante room, to ask permission for the priests Aguinaldo has in prison to go back to Spain, and the General could not give an answer until he had consulted his council. Probably he would not dare to part with the priests, and an order from him would be disregarded. They have many chances of martyrdom, and some of them have already suffered mutilation.

Something had been said about my cabling the President as to the Filipinos' determination to send a representative to Paris, and I had tendered my good offices in bearing instructions to a commissioner from Hongkong to meet the China at Nagasaki, the j.a.panese railway station, where the American transports coal for their long voyage across the Pacific. But that matter had been left in the air. General Aguinaldo had said he would be obliged if I would telegraph the President, and I thought if the decision was that there was to be a Philippine representative hurried to Paris, it was something the President would be glad to know. I was aware there might be a difficulty in getting permission for a special messenger to go on the China to j.a.pan to meet the commissioners going from Hongkong, and I would be willing to make the connection, as I had offered the suggestion. But it was necessary to be absolutely certain of General Aguinaldo's decision before I could cable the President; therefore, as I was, of course, in an official sense wholly irresponsible, I could communicate with him without an abrasion of military or other etiquette. It was the more needful, as it would be a personal proceeding, that I should be sure of the facts. Therefore I asked the General, whose time I had occupied more than an hour, whether he authorized me to telegraph the President that a commission was going to Paris, and desired me to render any aid in conveying information.

The General was troubled about the word "authorized," and instead of saying so concluded that I must have a deep and possibly dark design and so he could not give me the trouble to cable. The a.s.surance that it would not be troublesome did not remove the disquiet. I could not be troubled, either, as a bearer of dispatches. The General could not authorize a telegram without consulting. In truth, the General had not made up his mind to be represented in Paris, holding that it would be sufficient to have an envoy extraordinary in Was.h.i.+ngton.

Others, without full consideration, in my opinion, concur in this view. I can imagine several situations at Paris in which a representative Filipino would be of service to the United States, simply by standing for the existence of a state of facts in the disputed islands. I dropped the matter of being a mediator, having planted the Paris idea in the mind of the Philippine leader, who is of the persuasion that he is the dictator of his countrymen, for the sake of his country, until he wishes to be evasive, and then he must consult others who share the burdens of authority, and told him when taking my leave I would like to possess a photograph with his autograph and the Philippine flag. In a few minutes the articles were in my hands, and pa.s.sing out, there were the American priests in the ante-room, the next callers to enter the General's apartment. Their business was to urge him to permit the Catholic priests held as prisoners by the insurgents--more than 100, perhaps nearly 200 in number--to go home.

When the news came that General Merritt had been ordered to Paris, and would pa.s.s through the Red sea en route, taking the China to Hongkong to catch a peninsular and oriental steamer, I telegraphed the fact to General Aguinaldo over our military wires and his special wire, and his commissioner, duly advised, became, with General Merritt's aid, at Hongkong a pa.s.senger on the China.

He is well known to the world as Senor Filipe Agoncillo, who visited Was.h.i.+ngton City, saw the President and proceeded to Paris.

CHAPTER V

The Philippine Mission.

Correspondence With Aguinaldo About It--Notes by Senor Felipe Agoncillo--Relations Between Admiral Dewey and Senor Aguinaldo--Terms of Peace Made by Spanish Governor-General with Insurgents, December, 1897--Law Suit Between Aguinaldo and Artacho--Aguinaldo's Proclamation of May 24, 1898.

When General Merritt decided to hold the China for a day to take him to Hongkong on the way to Paris, I telegraphed Aguinaldo of the movements of the s.h.i.+p, arid received this dispatch from the General:

"War Department, United States Volunteer Signal Corps, sent from Bakoor August 29, 1898.--To Mr. Murat Halstead, Hotel Oriente, Manila: Thankful for your announcing China's departure. We are to send a person by her if possible, whom I recommend to you. Being much obliged for the favor.

"_A. G. Escamilla_," "Private Secretary to General Aguinaldo."

On the same day the General sent the following personal letter:

"Dear Sir: The bearer, Dr. G. Apacible, is the person whom was announced to you in the telegram.

"I am desirous of sending him to Hongkong, if possible, by the China, recommending him at the same time to your care and good will. Thanking you for the favor, I'm respectfully yours,

_Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy_.

"Mr. Murat Halstead, Manila.

"Bakoor, 29th August, 1898."

General Aguinaldo proceeded vigorously to make use of his knowledge that the China would go to Hongkong for General Merritt and sent his secretary and others to me at the Hotel Oriente, but they arrived after I had left the house. They came to the China and General Merritt had not arrived and did not appear until within a few minutes of the start. Then the deputation from the insurgent chieftain had an interview with him, asking that two of their number should go to Hongkong on the China to express fully the views of the insurgent government to to the commissioner, Don Felipe Agoncillo, chosen to represent the Filipinos at Was.h.i.+ngton and Paris and to ask that he be allowed to go to the United States on the China. When the committee saw General Merritt he was taking leave of Admiral Dewey, and the General, who had not heard of this movement until that moment--the question being entirely new--invited the opinion of the Admiral, who said there was "certainly no objection," and on the contrary, it would be very well to permit the pa.s.sage of the deputation to Hongkong and of the commissioner appointed from that city to Was.h.i.+ngton. General Merritt at once in half a dozen words gave the order, and the journey began.

General Greene, who reads and translates Spanish with facility and whose Spanish speech is plain, treated with marked courtesy the Filipino committee to Hongkong and thence the commissioner and his secretary from Hongkong to San Francisco, on the way to Was.h.i.+ngton and Paris. General Greene, while according distinction to the representatives of the insurgents, stated to them that his attentions were personal and he could not warrant them official recognition at Was.h.i.+ngton or anything more than such politeness as gentlemen receive from each other. The commissioner was Don Felipe Agoncillo, and his secretary, Sixto Lopez.

Sat.u.r.day, September 24, the Salt Lake newspapers contained stories to the effect that the Germans had entered into an alliance offensive and defensive with the Aguinaldo government and would furnish equipments for an army of 150,000 men. We were on the Union Pacific Railroad at the time, and I called the attention of Don Felipe Agoncillo to this remarkable intelligence and asked him what he thought of it. He said emphatically that it was "Nothing," "No true," "Nothing at all,"

and he laughed at the comic idea. There was also in the Salt Lake newspapers a statement that the Aguinaldo 'government' had sent to President McKinley a letter strongly expressing good-will and grat.i.tude. There did not seem to be much news in this for Don Felipe, but it gave him much pleasure, and he, not perhaps diplomatically but enthusiastically, p.r.o.nounced it good.

_What Agoncillo Approved_.

The dispatch marked with his approbation by the Philippine commissioner was the following from Was.h.i.+ngton, under date of September 23:

"The President doubtless would be glad to hear any views these Filipinos might care to set forth, being fresh from the islands and thoroughly acquainted with the wishes of the insurgents. But it would be plainly impolitic and inconsistent for the President, at this date and pending the conclusion of the peace conference at Paris, to allow it to be understood, by according a formal reception to the delegates, that he had thereby recognized the Philippine government as an independent nationality. His att.i.tude toward the Filipinos would be similar to that a.s.sumed by him toward the Cubans. As the Filipinos have repeatedly, by public declaration, sought to convey the impression that the United States representatives in Manila have at some time during the progress of the war recognized Aguinaldo as an independent ally, and entered into formal co-operation with him, it may be stated that the government at Was.h.i.+ngton is unaware that any such thing has happened. Admiral Dewey, who was in command of all the United States forces during the most critical period, expressly cabled the Secretary of the Navy that he had entered into no formal agreement with Aguinaldo. If General Otis followed his instructions, and of that there can be no doubt, he also refrained from entering into any entangling agreements. As for Consul-General Wildman, any undertaking he may have a.s.sumed with Aguinaldo must have been upon his own personal and individual responsibility, and would be without formal standing, inasmuch as he has not the express authorization from the State Department absolutely requisite to negotiations in such cases. Therefore, as the case now stands, the peace commissioners are free to deal with the Philippine problem at Paris absolutely without restraint beyond that which might be supposed to rise from a sense of moral obligation to avoid committing the Filipinos again into the hands of their late rulers."

Senor Agoncillo, the commissioner of the Philippine insurgents at Paris, made, in conversations on the steamer China, when crossing the Pacific Ocean from "Nagasaka to San Francisco, this statement in vindication of Aguinaldo, and it is the most complete, authoritative and careful that exists of the relations between Admiral Dewey and the insurgent leader:

_Brief Notes By Senor Agoncillo_.

"On the same day that Admiral Dewey arrived at Hongkong Senor Aguinaldo was in Singapore, whither he had gone from Hongkong, and Mr. Pratt, United States Consul-General, under instructions from the said Admiral, held a conference with him, in which it was agreed that Senor Aguinaldo and other revolutionary chiefs in co-operation with the American squadron should return to take up arms against the Spanish government of the Philippines, the sole and most laudable desire of the Was.h.i.+ngton government being to concede to the Philippine people absolute independence as soon as the victory against the Spanish arms should be obtained.

"By virtue of this argument Senor Aguinaldo proceeded by the first steamer to Hongkong for the express purpose of embarking on the Olympia and going to Manila; but this intention of his was not realized, because the American squadron left Hongkong the day previous to his arrival, Admiral Dewey having received from his government an order to proceed immediately to Manila. This is what Mr. Wildman, United States Consul-General in Hongkong, said to Senor Aguinaldo in the interview which took place between them. A few days after the Spanish squadron had been totally destroyed in the Bay of Manila by the American squadron, the latter obtaining a most glorious triumph, which deserved the fullest congratulations and praise of the Philippine public, the McCullough arrived at Hongkong and her commander said to Senor Aguinaldo that Admiral Dewey needed him (le necesitaba) in Manila and that he brought an order to take him on board said transport, as well as other revolutionary chiefs whose number should be determined by Senor Aguinaldo, and, in fact, he and seventeen chiefs went to Cavite on the McCullough.

"Senor Aguinaldo began his campaign against the Spaniards the very day that he received the 1,902 Mauser guns and 200,000 cartridges, which came from Hongkong. The first victory which he obtained from the Spaniards was the surrender or capitulation of the Spanish General, Senor Pena, who was the Military Governor of Cavite, had his headquarters in the town of San Francisco de Malabon, and his force was composed of 1,500 soldiers, including volunteers.

"The revolutionary army in six days' operations succeeded in getting possession of the Spanish detachments stationed in the villages of Bakoor, Imus, Benakayan, Naveleta, Santa Cruz de Malabon, Rosario and Cavite Viejo.