The Story of the Philippines Part 21

9. The minimum allowance of tentage and baggage as prescribed in General Orders 54, A.G.O., current series, will be taken.

10. In addition to the rations specified in paragraph 8 of this order, the chief commissary will provide sixty (60) days' field rations for the entire command.

11. All recruits and extra baggage, the latter to be stored, carefully piled and covered, will be left in camp, in charge of a commissioned officer, to be selected by the regimental commander. Where there are no recruits available the necessary guard only will be left.

12. Travel rations will be drawn, at once, by the several commands, as indicated in paragraph 8.

This was by command of Major-General Shafter. There were delays on account of inadequate facilities for embarkation at Tampa and Port Tampa. Orders for General Shafter to move with not less than 10,000 men were issued on the 7th, and there was delay on account of reports of Spanish s.h.i.+ps of war ready to strike a blow at the transports. Twelve squadrons of cavalry not mounted were added to the troops designated in the general order, and June 14th the expedition sailed with 815 officers and 16,072 enlisted men, and had a smooth and uneventful pa.s.sage. There were several demonstrations for the deception of the enemy, in one of which 500 Cubans were employed. General Shafter was committed by the movements and the ground, as he says in his official report:

"To approach Santiago from the east over a narrow road, at first in some places not better than a trail, running from Daiquiri through Siboney and Sevilla, and making attack from that quarter, was, in my judgment, the only feasible plan, and subsequent information and results confirmed my judgment."

The disembarkation commenced June 22nd, and all men were ordered to carry "on the person the blanket roll (with shelter tent and poncho), three days' field rations (with coffee, ground), canteens filled, and 100 rounds of ammunition per man. Additional ammunition, already issued to the troops, tentage, baggage, and company cooking utensils left under charge of the regimental quartermaster, with one non-commissioned officer and two privates from each company,"

Two days were occupied in getting the troops ash.o.r.e, and the first engagement was on the morning of the 24th, General Young's brigade taking the advance, and finding a Spanish force strongly intrenched on the Santiago road three miles from Siboney. Young's force was 964 officers and men. The enemy were driven from the field. Our loss, 1 officer and 15 men killed, and 6 officers and 46 men wounded. Spanish loss reported 9 killed and 27 wounded. General Shafter says the engagement had "an inspiring effect" upon the men, and "gave us a well-watered country further to the front, on which to encamp our troops," and the rest of the month was occupied in attempting to land rations enough to have a reserve, and "it was not until nearly two weeks after the army landed that it was possible to place on sh.o.r.e three days' supplies in excess of those required for the daily consumption."

General Shafter reconnoitered, and formed his plan of battle June 30th, and reports that in the opening of the engagement on July 1st "the artillery fire from El Pozo was soon returned by the enemy's artillery. They evidently had the range of this hill, and their first sh.e.l.ls killed and wounded several men. As the Spaniards used smokeless powder it was very difficult to locate the position of their pieces, while, on the contrary, the smoke caused by our black powder plainly indicated the position of our battery."

The advantages the Spaniards had in the use of smokeless powder were conspicuous throughout the scenes of fighting both at Santiago and Manila. We had, however, at Santiago a war balloon of the actual service, of which General Shafter says: "General Kent forced the head of his column alongside of the cavalry column as far as the narrow trail permitted, and thus hurried his arrival at the San Juan and the formation beyond that stream. A few hundred yards before reaching the San Juan the road forks, a fact that was discovered by Lieutenant-Colonel Derby of my staff, who had approached well to the front in a war balloon. This information he furnished to the troops, resulting in Sumner moving on the right-hand road, while Kent was enabled to utilize the road to the left."

General Shafter officially makes the following reference to his illness at the time: "My own health was impaired by overexertion in the sun and intense heat of the day before, which prevented me from partic.i.p.ating as actively in the battle as I desired; but from a high hill near my headquarters I had a general view of the battlefield, extending from El Caney on the right to the left of our lines on San Juan Hill. My staff officers were stationed at various points on the field, rendering frequent reports, and through them by the means of orderlies and the telephone, I was enabled to transmit my orders.

"After the brilliant and important victory gained at El Caney, Lawton started his tried troops, who had been fighting all day and marching much of the night before, to connect with the right of the cavalry division. Night came on before this movement could be accomplished. In the darkness the enemy's pickets were encountered, and the Division Commander being uncertain of the ground and as to what might be in his front halted his command and reported the situation to me. This information was received about 12:30 a. m., and I directed General Lawton to return by my headquarters and the El Pozo House as the only certain way of gaining his new position.

"This was done, and the division took position on the right of the cavalry early next morning, Chaffee's brigade arriving first, about half-past 7, and the other brigades before noon."

Of the hottest of the fight on the 1st of July, General Shafter reports: "Great credit is due to Brigadier-General H. S. Hawkins, who, placing himself between his regiments, urged them on by voice and bugle calls to the attack so brilliantly executed.

"In this fierce encounter words fail to do justice to the gallant regimental commanders and their heroic men, for, while the generals indicated the formations and the points of attack, it was, after all, the intrepid bravery of the subordinate officers and men that planted our colors on the crest of San Juan Hill and drove the enemy from his trenches and blockhouses, thus gaining a position which sealed the fate of Santiago.

"In this action on this part of the field most efficient service was rendered by Lieutenant John H. Parker, Thirteenth Infantry, and the Gatling gun detachment under his command. The fighting continued at intervals until nightfall, but our men held resolutely to the positions gained at the cost of so much blood and toil.

"I am greatly indebted to General Wheeler, who, as previously stated, returned from the sick list to duty during the afternoon. His cheerfulness and aggressiveness made itself felt on this part of the battlefield, and the information he furnished to me at various stages of the battle proved to be most useful."

The report of the General Commanding of the further fighting is a model of forcible brevity, in these paragraphs:

"Soon after daylight on July 2 the enemy opened battle, but because of the intrenchments made during the night, the approach of Lawton's division, and the presence of Bates' brigade, which had taken position during the night on Kent's left, little apprehension was felt as to our ability to repel the Spaniards.

"It is proper here to state that General Bates and his brigade had performed most arduous and efficient service, having marched much of the night of June 30-July 1, and a good part of the latter day, during which he also partic.i.p.ated in the battle of El Caney, after which he proceeded, by way of El Pozo, to the left of the line at San Juan, reaching his new position about midnight.

"All day on the 2d the battle raged with more or less fury, but such of our troops as were in position at daylight held their ground, and Lawton gained a strong and commanding position on the right.

"About 10 p..m., the enemy made a vigorous a.s.sault to break through my lines, but he was repulsed at all points.

"On the morning of the 3d the battle was renewed, but the enemy seemed to have expended his energy in the a.s.sault of the previous night, and the firing along the lines was desultory;" and this was stopped by a letter sent by General Shafter, saying he would be obliged to "sh.e.l.l Santiago," if not surrendered, and non-combatants would be given until 10 o'clock July 4th to leave the city. The reply of the Spanish General was that he would not surrender. Then foreign consuls came within our lines asking more time to remove the women and children. The language of General Shafter reporting the situation at the time and the events following, is here reproduced as of permanent interest:

"My first message went in under a flag of truce at 12:30 p.m. I was of the opinion that the Spaniards would surrender if given a little time, and I thought this result would be hastened if the men of their army could be made to understand they would be well treated as prisoners of war. Acting upon this presumption, I determined to offer to return all the wounded Spanish officers at El Caney who were able to bear transportation, and who were willing to give their paroles not to serve against the forces of the United States until regularly exchanged. This offer was made and accepted. These officers, as well as several of the wounded Spanish privates, 27 in all, were sent to their lines under the escort of some of our mounted cavalry. Our troops were received with honors, and I have every reason to believe the return of the Spanish prisoners produced a good impression on their comrades.

"The cessation of firing about noon on the 3d practically terminated the battle of Santiago.

"A few Cubans a.s.sisted in the attack at El Caney, and fought valiantly, but their numbers were too small to materially change the strength, as indicated above. The enemy confronted us with numbers about equal to our own; they fought obstinately in strong and intrenched positions, and the results obtained clearly indicate the intrepid gallantry of the company, officers and men, and the benefits derived from the careful training and instruction given in the company in recent years in rifle practice and other battle exercises. Our losses in these battles were 22 officers and 208 men killed, and 81 officers and 1,203 men wounded; missing, 79. The missing, with few exceptions, reported later.

"The arrival of General Escario on the night of July 2, and his entrance into the city was not antic.i.p.ated, for although it was known, as previously stated, that General Pando had left Manzanillo with reinforcements for the garrison of Santiago, it was not believed his troops could arrive so soon. General Garcia, with between four and five thousand Cubans, was intrusted with the duty of watching for and intercepting the reinforcements expected. This, however, he failed to do, and Escario pa.s.sed into the city along on my extreme right and near the bay."

On the 11th, when the firing ceased and was not resumed "the sickness in the army was increasing very rapidly, as a result of exposure in the trenches to the intense heat of the sun and the heavy rains. Moreover, the dews in Cuba are almost equal to rains. The weakness of the troops was becoming so apparent I was anxious to bring the siege to an end, but in common with most of the officers of the army I did not think an a.s.sault would be justifiable, especially as the enemy seemed to be acting in good faith in their preliminary propositions to surrender.

"July 12 I informed the Spanish Commander that Major-General Miles, Commander-in-Chief of the American army, had just arrived in my camp, and requested him to grant us a personal interview on the following day. He replied he would be pleased to meet us. The interview took place on the 13th."

The Spanish raised many points, as is their habit, and were tenacious about retaining their arms, but yielded, and "the terms of surrender finally agreed upon included about 12,000 Spanish troops in the city and as many more in the surrendered district."

July 17th "we met midway between the representatives of our two armies, and the Spanish Commander formally consummated the surrender of the city and the 24,000 troops in Santiago and the surrendered district.

"After this ceremony I entered the city with my staff and escort, and at 12 o'clock noon the American flag was raised over the Governor's palace."

The men and material surrendered by the Spaniards at Santiago largely exceeded the two English armies and their equipments at Saratoga and Yorktown.

The yellow fever appeared in the American camp at Siboney July 4th, and the fact was soon known to the army. General Shafter says of the wounded and sick: "They received every attention that it was possible to give them. The medical officers without exception worked night and day to alleviate the suffering, which was no greater than invariably accompanies a campaign. It would have been better if we had more ambulances, but as many were taken as was thought necessary, judging from previous campaigns."

General Joe Wheeler's report of the action of July 1st is a paper full of striking points. The movement into battle began in wading the San Juan river under heavy fire, and the General says:

"We were as much under fire in forming the line as we would be by an advance, and I therefore pressed the command forward from the covering which it was formed. It merged into open s.p.a.ce, in full view of the enemy, who occupied breastworks and batteries on the crest of the hill which overlooked Santiago, officers and men falling at every step. The troops advanced gallanty, soon reached the foot of the hill and ascended, driving the enemy from their works and occupying them on the crest of the hill.

"Colonel Carroll and Major Wessels were both wounded during the charge, but Major Wessels was enabled to return and resume command. General Wyckoff, commanding Kent's Third Brigade, was killed at 12:10. Lieutenant-Colonel Worth took command and was wounded at 12:15. Lieutenant-Colonel Lisc.u.m then took command and was wounded at 12:20, and the command then devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers, Ninth Infantry.

"Upon reaching the crest I ordered breastworks to be constructed, and sent to the rear for shovels, picks, spades, and axes. The enemy's retreat from the ridge was precipitate, but our men were so thoroughly exhausted that it was impossible for them to follow. Their shoes were soaked with water by wading the San Juan River; they had become drenched with rain, and when they reached the crest they were absolutely unable to proceed further. Notwithstanding this condition these exhausted men labored during the night to erect breastworks, furnished details to bury the dead and carry the wounded back in improvised litters."

Wheeler's loss was 6 officers and 40 men killed, 29 officers and 288 men wounded, and 10 men missing--total 372, out of a force of 127 officers and 2,536 men.

General Bates says that after his brigade remained for some time in the first cross road after wading the San Juan river: "We moved to the right to a.s.sault a small hill, occupied upon the top by a stone fort and well protected by rifle pits. General Chaffee's brigade charged them from the right, and the two brigades, joining upon the crest, opened fire from this point of vantage, lately occupied by the Spanish, upon the village of El Caney.

"From this advantageous position the Spanish were easily driven from place to place in the village proper, and as fast as they sought shelter in one building were driven out to seek shelter elsewhere. The sharpshooters of my command were enabled to do effective work at this point. The town proper was soon pretty thoroughly cleaned out of Spanish, though a couple of blockhouses upon the hill to the right of the town offered shelter to a few, and some could be seen retreating along a mountain road leading to the northwest. A part of these made a stand in a field among some bowlders.

General Lawton observes: "The light battery first opened on a column of Spanish troops, which appeared to be cavalry moving westward from El Caney, and about 2 miles range, resulting, as was afterwards learned, in killing 16 in the column."

The General has much to say of a pleasing personal nature.

The report of General Kent is of extraordinary merit for the exact detail and local color. Colonel McClernand, he says, "pointed out to me a green hill in the distance which was to be my objective on my left," and as he moved into action, "I proceeded to join the head of my division, just coming under heavy fire. Approaching the First Brigade I directed them to move alongside the cavalry (which was halted). We were already suffering losses caused by the balloon near by attracting fire and disclosing our position.

"The enemy's infantry fire, steadily increasing in intensity, now came from all directions, not only from the front and the dense tropical thickets on our flanks, but from sharpshooters thickly posted in trees in our rear, and from shrapnel apparently aimed at the balloon. Lieutenant-Colonel Derby, of General Shafter's staff, met me about this time and informed me that a trail or narrow way had been discovered from the balloon a short distance back leading to the left to a ford lower down the stream. I hastened to the forks made by this road, and soon after the Seventy-first New York Regiment of Hawkins' brigade came up. I turned them into the by path indicated by Lieutenant-Colonel Derby, leading to the lower ford, sending word to General Hawkins of this movement. This would have speedily delivered them in their proper place on the left of their brigade, but under the galling fire of the enemy the leading battalion of this regiment was thrown into confusion and recoiled in disorder on the troops in the rear."

The Second and Third Battalions "came up in better order," but there was some delay, and General Kent says:

"I had received orders some time before to keep in rear of the cavalry division. Their advance was much delayed, resulting in frequent halts, presumably to drop their blanket rolls and due to the natural delay in fording a stream. These delays under such a hot fire grew exceedingly irksome, and I therefore pushed the head of my division as quickly as I could toward the river in column files of twos parallel in the narrow way by the cavalry. This quickened the forward movement and enabled me to get into position as speedily as possible for the attack. Owing to the congested condition of the road, the progress of the narrow columns was, however, painfully slow. I again sent a staff officer at a gallop to urge forward the troops in rear."

The Second Brigade and Third "moved toward Fort San Juan, sweeping through a zone of most destructive fire, scaling a steep and difficult hill, and a.s.sisting in capturing the enemy's strong position (Fort San Juan) at 1:30 p.m. This crest was about 125 feet above the general level, and was defended by deep trenches and a loop-holed brick fort surrounded by barbed-wire entanglements."

General Hawkins, after General Kent reached the crest, "reported that the Sixth and Sixteenth Infantry had captured the hill, which I now consider incorrect. Credit is almost equally due the Sixth, Ninth, Thirteenth, Sixteenth, and Twenty-fourth regiments of infantry. Owing to General Hawkins' representations, I forwarded the report sent to corps headquarters about 3 p.m. that the Sixth and Sixteenth infantry regiments captured the hill. The Thirteenth Infantry captured the enemy's colors waving over the fort, but, unfortunately, destroyed them, distributing the fragments among the men, because, as was a.s.serted, 'It was a bad omen,' two or three men having been shot while a.s.sisting private Arthur Agnew, Company H, Thirteenth Infantry, the captor. All fragments which could be recovered are submitted with this report.

"I have already mentioned the circ.u.mstances of my Third Brigade's advance across the ford, where in the brief s.p.a.ce of ten minutes it lost its brave commander (killed) and the next two ranking officers by disabling wounds. Yet, in spite of these confusing conditions the formations were effected without hesitation, although under a stinging fire, companies acting singly in some instances, and by battalion and regiments in others, rus.h.i.+ng through the jungle, across the stream waist deep, and over the wide bottom thickly set with barbed wire."