The Story of the Philippines Part 23

From messages received by the Admiral from the department about May 20 it appears that reports had reached the United States that the Spanish fleet was at Santiago, so the department advised Sampson to send immediately word to Schley to proceed to that place, leaving one small vessel off Cienfuegos.

On May 21 instructions were written by Samnson for Commodore Schley and sent to him via the Marblehead regarding the possibility of the Spanish fleet being at Santiago. They are in part as follows:

United States Flags.h.i.+p New York, First Rate, Key West, Fla., May 21.--Sir: Spanish squadron is probably at Santiago de Cuba--four s.h.i.+ps and three torpedo boat destroyers. If you are satisfied they are not at Cienfuegos proceed with all dispatch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and if the enemy is there blockade him in port. You will probably find it necessary to establish communication with some of the inhabitants--fishermen or others--to learn definitely that the s.h.i.+ps are in port, it being impossible to see into it from the outside.

The Admiral said he felt much concerned as to the delivery of these orders and sent a duplicate by the Hawk with an additional memorandum. The Admiral suggested that if the information did not reach Commodore Schley before daylight of May 23 to mask the real direction he should take as much as possible. He adds: "Follow the Spanish squadron whichever direction they take."

The Admiral off Havana gives copies of orders of battle which were to be followed in the event that Cervera left Santiago on the approach of Schley's fleet from Cienfuegos and attempted to cruise around the coast to Havana, in which case the Havana squadron would attempt to intercept him by going east about 200 miles beyond the junction of Santiren and Nicholas Channels. Strict orders were given for screening lights and to see that none were accidentally shown.

The squadron was to cruise generally to the eastward in the day and westward during the night.

On May 23, as shown by the report, Commodore Schley expressed the belief that the Spaniards were at Cienfuegos. On the 27th the Admiral sent word to Schley, directing him to proceed with all possible speed to Santiago because of information received that the Spaniards were there. The same time orders were sent to have the collier Sterling dispatched to Santiago with an expression of opinion that the Commodore should use it to obstruct the channel at its narrowest part leading into the harbor.

The details of the plan were left to the Commodore's judgment, as he (Sampson) had "the utmost confidence in his ability to carry this plan to a successful conclusion, and earnestly wished him good luck."

Sampson apparently felt certain of the presence of the Spaniards at Santiago and urged that the harbor must be blockaded at all hazards. Schley in the meantime had proceeded to Santiago, although it appears not the same day Admiral Sampson expected.

At one time Commodore Schley contemplated going to Key West with the squadron for coal, but this was abandoned, his collier having been temporarily repaired, and the necessity for a trip to Key West being avoided Santiago was then blockaded.

Admiral Sampson arrived at Santiago June 1st. June 8 the Admiral urged upon the department, as he had previously done, to expedite the arrival of the troops for Santiago, the difficulty of blockading the Spanish s.h.i.+ps daily increasing.

In a memorandum dated June 15, the Admiral says:

"The Commander-in-Chief desires again to call the attention of the commanding officers to the positions occupied by the blockading fleet, especially during the daytime, and it is now directed that all s.h.i.+ps keep within a distance of the entrance to Santiago of four miles, and this distance must not be exceeded.

"If the vessel is coaling or is otherwise restricted in its movements it must nevertheless keep within this distance. If at any time the flags.h.i.+p makes signal which is not visible to any vessel, such vessel must at once approach the flags.h.i.+p or retreating vessel to a point where it can read the signal.

"Disregard of the directions which have already been given on this head has led to endless confusion. Many times during the day the fleet is so scattered that it would be perfectly possible for the enemy to come out of the harbor and meet with little opposition.

"The Commander-in-Chief hopes that strict attention will be given this order."

In the order of battle incidental to the landing of Shafter's army corps June 22, when s.h.i.+ps were sent to sh.e.l.l the beach and cover the landing of the men" the following occurs:

"The attention of commanding officers of all vessels engaged in blockading Santiago de Cuba is earnestly called to the necessity of the utmost vigilance from this time forward, both as to maintaining stations and readiness for action and as to keeping a close watch upon the harbor mouth. If the Spanish Admiral ever intends to attempt to escape that attempt will be made soon."

The Admiral says trouble was experienced in the landing of Shafter's army on account of the wandering proclivities of some of the transports. The progress of the disembarkation was rendered somewhat difficult by a heavy sea, the heaviest during the three weeks the fleet had been stationed there, owing to a stiff blow off the coast of Jamaica.

According to a dispatch to Secretary Long, dated June 26, the channel at Santiago not having been obstructed by the sinking of the Merrimac, Admiral Sampson was preparing a torpedo attack to hasten the destruction of the Spanish vessels, although he regretted resorting to this method because of its difficulties and small chance of success. He would not do this, he says, were the present force to be kept there; as it then insured a capture, which he believed would terminate the war.

There was contemplated at this time sending a fleet to the Spanish coast; and this expedition was to consist of the Iowa, Oregon, Newark, Yosemite, Yankee, and Dixie, and they were to go to the Azores for orders, en route to Tangier, Morocco. The colliers were to join the fleet at the Azores.

On June 30 the Admiral received a communication from Major-General Shafter announcing that he expected to attack Santiago the following morning, and asking that he (Sampson) bombard the forts at Aguadores in support of a regiment of infantry, and make such demonstrations as he thought proper at the harbor's mouth, so as to keep as many of the enemy there as possible.

This request was complied with, and on July 1 General Shafter asked that the Admiral keep up his fight on the Santiago water front. On July 2 the following was received from General Shafter.

"Terrible fight yesterday, but my line is now strongly intrenched about three-fourths of a mile from town. I urge that you make effort immediately to force the entrance to avoid future losses among my men, which are already heavy. You can now operate with less loss of life than I can. Please telephone answer."

A reply was telephoned General Shafter from Admiral Sampson, through Lieutenant Stanton, which said the Admiral had bombarded the forts at the entrance of Santiago and also Punta Gorda battery inside, silencing their fire, and asked whether he (Shafter) wanted further firing on the Admiral's part. The explanation was made that it was impossible to force an entrance until the channel was cleared of mines--a work of some time after the forts were taken possession of by the troops. To this General Shafter replied:

"It is impossible for me to say when I can take batteries at entrance of harbor. If they are as difficult to take as those which we have been pitted against it will be some time and at great loss of life. I am at a loss to see why the navy cannot work under a destructive fire as well as the army. My loss yesterday was over 500 men. By all means keep up fire on everything in sight of you until demolished. I expect, however, in time and with sufficient men to capture the forts along the bay."

On the 2nd of July, Sampson wrote to Shafter.

"An officer of my staff has already reported to you the firing which we did this morning, but I must say in addition to what he told you that the forts which we silenced were not the forts which would give you any inconvenience in capturing the city, as they cannot fire except to seaward. They cannot even prevent our entrance into the harbor of Santiago. Our trouble from the first has been the channel to the harbor is well strewn with observation mines, which would certainly result in the sinking of one or more of our s.h.i.+ps if we attempted to enter the harbor, and by the sinking of a s.h.i.+p the object of attempting to enter the harbor would be defeated by the preventing of further progress on our part.

"It was my hope that an attack on your part of these sh.o.r.e batteries from the rear would leave us at liberty to drag the channel for torpedoes.

"If it is your earnest desire that we should force our entrance I will at once prepare to undertake it. I think, however, that our position and yours would be made more difficult if, as is possible, we fail in our attempt.

"We have in our outfit at Guantanamo forty countermining mines, which I will bring here with as little delay as possible, and if we can succeed in freeing the entrance of mines by their use I will enter the harbor.

"This work, which is unfamiliar to us, will require considerable time.

"It is not so much the loss of men as it is the loss of s.h.i.+ps which has until now deterred me from making a direct attack upon the s.h.i.+ps within the port."

The Admiral says he began making preparations to countermine, and, with the object of arranging an attack upon the batteries at the entrance a visit was arranged to General Shafter, so that the matter might be thoroughly discussed, and combined action take place.

He adds: "I had in view the employment of the marines for an a.s.sault an either the Morro or Socapa battery, while at the same time a.s.saulting the defenses at the entrance with the fleet."

The Admiral says of the sortie and destruction of Cervera's fleet:

"This event closes the purely naval campaign, crowning with complete success the anxious work of almost exactly two months."

The error of Commodore Schley as to the location of Cervera's fleet, his hesitation in accepting the report of the Spaniards' presence at Santiago, appears to have caused the advancement of Admiral Sampson and subordinated Schley. Out of this came differences of opinion about facts among the close friends of the two distinguished officers. Schley was close at hand when Cervera's run from Santiago took place, while Sampson was out of the way on other duty, and Schley has been charged with an evasive movement of the New York just then that lost valuable time. It is related by the Was.h.i.+ngton staff correspondent of the Chicago Times-Herald that just after the battle of Santiago, Commodore Schley went aboard the Iowa and hailed Captain Evans with the remark that it had been a great day for the American navy.

"But why didn't you obey orders and close in on the mouth of the harbor instead of heading out to sea?" inquired Evans.

Commodore Schley's reply was that he was afraid the Vizcaya would ram the Brooklyn. This colloquy referred to a striking maneuver of the flags.h.i.+p Brooklyn early in the engagement at Santiago, which has been commented on before. In justice to Commodore Schley the navy department officers admit the Spanish officers after the battle said that it had been their purpose, on emerging from the harbor, to have the Vizcaya ram the Brooklyn, believing that the Spanish cruisers could outrun the remaining vessels in the American fleet, most of which were battles.h.i.+ps, supposed to be of a lower rate of speed than the Spanish cruisers.

The action of the Vizcaya as she headed toward the Brooklyn indicated her determination to carry out this programme. But the remark of Captain Evans to the nominal commander of the squadron would under ordinary circ.u.mstances have been an act of insubordination and only ill.u.s.trates the feeling of some of the captains of the fleet toward the Commodore.

It has been said that Schley, being ordered to Key West when Cervera appeared in Cuban waters, "proceeded to Cienfuegos, which was thought to be the destination of the Spanish wars.h.i.+ps. That port commanded the only direct railroad connection with Havana, and had the Spanish fleet gone there Admiral Cervera could have relieved General Blanco with money and munitions of war and received in return supplies necessary for his squadron. It is believed even now that had the Spanish s.h.i.+ps been properly supplied and equipped they would have gone to Cienfuegos instead of to Santiago. But subsequent developments have shown that Admiral Cervera was permitted to take only enough coal to carry him to the nearest port, Santiago."

Schley credited Cervera with knowing enough to know that Cienfuegos was the better port for his purposes, and therefore adhered to his opinion, and Sampson was made his superior officer. So important have the differences seemed that the Wainwright Board was convened to investigate the parts taken in the Santiago naval battle respectively by Admiral Sampson and Admiral Schley. But in official phrase this board was convened for the purpose of determining the position and courses of the s.h.i.+ps engaged in the action at Santiago July 3, and reporting to the Secretary of the Navy.

The report is:

"U.S.F.S. New York, First Rate, Navy Yard, New York, Oct. 8, 1898.--Sir: In obedience to your order of Sept. 2, 1898, appointing us a board to plot the positions of the s.h.i.+ps of Admiral Cervera's squadron and those of the United States fleet in the battle of July 3, off Santiago de Cuba, we have the honor to submit the following report, accompanied by a chart, showing the positions of the s.h.i.+ps at seven different times.

"These times, as taken by the United States s.h.i.+ps engaged, with the incidents noted, are as follows:

"No. 1, 9:35 a.m.--Maria Teresa came out of the harbor.

"No. 2, 9:50 a.m.--Pluton came out.

"No. 3, 10:15 a.m.--Maria Teresa turned to run ash.o.r.e.

"No. 4, 10:20 a.m.--Oquendo turned to run ash.o.r.e.