The Story of the Philippines Part 7

The Archbishop, I was told, had much pleasure in meeting an American he was a.s.sured would attempt to be entirely just, and present him according to his own declarations to the people of the United States. He knew very well, unquestionably, the stories circulated in the American camps, that his voice had been loudest and last in urging hopeless war, in telling impossible tales of visionary Spanish reinforcements, and denouncing the Americans as "n.i.g.g.e.rs"

and "pigs." It is a fact that Spaniards have cultivated the notion among the rural Filipinos, that Americans are black men, and pigs is their favorite epithet for an American. The radical enemies of His Grace are, no doubt, responsible for unseemly stories about his animosities, for that he and those around him were sincere in their respect for, and grat.i.tude toward the American army of occupation, for its admirable bearing and good conduct, was in itself too obviously true to be doubted.

CHAPTER VIII

Why We Hold the Philippines.

The Responsibility of Admiral Dewey--We Owe It to Ourselves to Hold the Philippines--Prosperity a.s.sured by Our Permanent Possession--The Aguinaldo Question--Character Study of the Insurgent Leader--How Affairs Would Adjust Themselves for Us--Congress Must Be Trusted to Represent the People and Firmly Establish International Policy.

If Admiral Dewey, after obeying the order of the President to destroy the Spanish fleet at Manila, had steamed away and sought a station to get coal to drive him somewhere else, there would have been no Philippine question on the other side of the world from Was.h.i.+ngton City. The Admiral desired to keep open telegraphic communication, and made a proposition to that effect, but the Spanish authorities curtly refused. Then the cable was cut by order of the Admiral, a section removed, and both ends marked by buoys. Reflection caused the Spaniards to regret that they had not consented to keep open the cable, that it might be used under restrictions by both belligerents. They mentioned their change of mind, and were told they were too late. The American Admiral may have been apprehensive, and he had reason to be, that the Spaniards, knowing they would be crushed in the West Indies if they risked a decisive naval engagement there, might send all their available s.h.i.+ps of war to the Philippines, and secure a superiority of force, possibly to destroy their enemies at Manila. It is clear now that this is what the Spaniards ought to have tried to do. The Americans were committed to the blockade of Cuba, occupying all the vessels of war they had at hand, and the whole fleet of Spain could have been in the Suez Ca.n.a.l, on the way to Manila when the movement was known to our navy department. Then Admiral Dewey would, of course, have been warned by way of Hong Kong and a dispatch boat, that he should put to sea and take care of his men and s.h.i.+ps. The result might have been the temporary restoration of the Philippines to Spain. Our Admiral, six hundred miles from Hongkong, the closest cable connection, could not afford to leave Manila in direct communication with Madrid. It was for this reason and not that he desired to keep out of way or orders, as some able publicists have kindly promulgated, that the Admiral cut the cable.

The gravest of his responsibilities came upon him after his victory freed the harbor of declared enemies, and placed the great city at his mercy. If the Spaniards used their big Krupp guns against his s.h.i.+ps, he could bombard the city and burn it. He held the keys to the Philippines, with Manila under his guns, and the question before him then was the same before the country now. The question that incessantly presses is, whether the Dewey policy is to be confirmed, and the logic of the stay in the harbor, and the dispatch of troops to take the town made good. We hold the keys of the Philippines. Shall we continue to do so? This question transcends in immediate importance--inevitable consequence--remote as well as near, all the war with Spain has raised. So broad a matter should not be rested on narrow grounds, nor decided with haste. It ought to be scrutinized in all its bearings, and all susceptibilities and material affairs regarded, for it will affect all the people for all time.

What are the Philippines? They are the richest prize of soil and climate that has been at hazard in the world for many years--one that would be seized, if it could be done without war, by any of the great nations other than our own without hesitation. The only scruple we need entertain, the sole reason for deliberation, is because it is a duty of the government to be sure when there are imperial considerations to be weighed, that the people should be consulted. It was on this account distinctly, that the President knew the issue of the permanency of the possession of the Philippines was one of peculiar novelty and magnitude, that he permitted it to exist. Spain must have been as acquiescent in this as in yielding the independence of Cuba, and the concession to us without any intermediate formality of Porto Rico. It is not inconsistent with the policy of magnanimity that is generally antic.i.p.ated after the victory of a great power over a lesser one, that we should hold the Philippines. We have only to keep the power we have in peace, and let it work as a wholesome medicine, and all the islands of the group of which Manila is the central point, will be ours without conflict. In our system there is healing for wounds, and attraction for the oppressed. The holding of the islands by Spain would signify the continued shedding of blood, and drainage of the vital resources of the peninsula. As against Spain the Philippines will be united and desperate unto death, while they would without coercion walk hand in hand with us, and become the greatest of our dependencies--not states, but territories.

It would be an act of mercy to Spain to send her soldiers and priests from the Philippines, home. Even if we consent that she may keep her South Sea possession, she will lose it as she has all the rest, for the story of the Philippines is that of Spanish South and Central America, and the modern story of Cuba is the old one of all countries South and West of the Gulf of Mexico and around by way of the Oceans to Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, Chili, and the rest had the same b.l.o.o.d.y stream of history to trace, and sooner or later the tale must all be told. Since Spain has already surrendered Cuba and Porto Rico, the record of the Philippines is the last chapter of her colonial experiences, by which she has dazzled and disgusted the world, attaining from the plunder of dependencies wealth that she invested in oppressive warfare to sustain a depraved despotism and display a grandeur that was unsound, sapping her own strength in colonial enterprises that could not be other than without profit, because the colonies were the property of the crown, and the prey of caste.

The Spanish nation was forbidden by their government, not of the people or for the people, to profit by the colonies, and the viceroys, the captain-generals, and the whole official cla.s.s were corrupted, and inefficient in all things, except methods of tyranny to procure a harvest of gold and silver not from the mines of the metals alone, but from the industries, whatever they were. The people at large were allowed no share in their own earnings, beyond a subsistence so scanty that deep humiliation and grievous hards.h.i.+p were the fateful rewards of labor.

It was because the colonial policy of Spain impoverished and degraded the Spaniards at home, through the injustice, greed and profligacy of those abroad, that the huge structure, once so great an imposition upon mankind, a rotten fabric so gilt that the inherent weakness was disguised, has finally fallen into universal and irretrievable ruin.

It is well Spain should retain the Canaries and the Balearic group, for they are as Spanish as any peninsular province, and legitimately belong therefore to the kingdom. The application of this principle excludes Spain from the Philippines, and their des- [NOTE: gap in original] been committed by the failure of war to our hands. There is no nation that will dispute our peaceable possession of the Philippines. Any other nation's proprietors.h.i.+p will be challenged.

Our authoritative presence in the islands will be a guarantee of peace.

Any other a.s.sertion of supremacy will be the signal for war. Our a.s.sumption of sovereignty over the islands would quickly establish tranquility. Any other disposition of the burning questions now smoldering will cause an outburst of the flames of warfare. The Spaniards in Manila have been transient. They are not rooted in the soil. They all come and go like Captain-Generals, a mere official cla.s.s, with the orders of the Church partic.i.p.ating actively in secular concerns, more active as politicians than as teachers of religion. In the view of the native population it is as indispensable that the priests of Spain shall return to their native land as that the soldiers should go. The deportation of these people would remove cla.s.ses of consumers and not affect unfavorably a productive industry, or the prosperity of a self-sustaining community, and there would be but rare instances of the severance of family ties.

It will be said of the affirmation that, the avowal of the possession of the Philippines as a responsibility without end would be a peace measure, and anything else make for war, does not take into account the att.i.tude of the Philippine Dictator, by proclamation, General Aguinaldo, and his followers. We desire to speak with respect of the General, for he has shown in trying times, under strong temptations, the presence in his character of personal integrity in public matters, and reference is made to his refusal to consent to the division among insurgents alleged to be leaders, of the money paid by the Spaniards for the disarmament of the rebels, when two years ago there was an agreement upon the terms of a truce. This money transaction has been referred to as the sale of their cause by Aguinaldo and his a.s.sociates, as if they, as individuals, had pocketed the usufruct of the bargain. The money was paid by Spain as an earnest of her sincerity, the Captain-General representing the force and good faith of the kingdom, in granting reforms to the Philippines. On condition of insurgent disarmament the people of the island were to be allowed representation in the Spanish Cortes, the orders of the Church were to be removed from relations to the Government that were offensive to the people. There was a long list of articles of specification of the reforms that were to be granted, the usual liberality of words of promise always bestowed by Spain upon her colonists. The representatives of Spain denied nothing that was asked; and to give weight to the program of concessions, there was paid in hand to Aguinaldo, through a transaction between banks in Manila and Hongkong, four hundred thousand dollars, the first installment of eight hundred thousand dollars agreed upon. [1] The Spaniards probably understood that they were bribing the insurgents and paying a moderate sum to cheaply end the war; and it did not cost the authorities of Spain anything, for they exacted the money from the Manila Bank of Spain, and still owe the bank. Aguinaldo's understanding, acted upon, was different. He accepted the money as a war fund, and has held and defended it for the purchase of arms, and resumed hostilities when all promises of reform were broken, and nothing whatever done beyond the robbery of the bank to bribe the rebel chiefs, which was the Spanish translation. Of course, it was claimed by the enemies of Aguinaldo that he was bought and paid for, but he has maintained the fund, though there were those professors of rebellion, who made claims to a share of the money. The second installment of the money that the rebels were to have been paid is yet an obligation not lifted, and the hostilities were revived as soon as the craft of the Spanish negotiators in promising everything because they meant to do nothing, became obvious. The actual proceedings in this case can be summed up in a sentence: The Spaniards took four hundred thousand dollars out of the Bank of Spain and gave it to the insurgents, for a temporary armistice. General Aguinaldo, though he appears very well in refusing to employ the money paid by Spain as a bribe for himself, has not the elements of enduring strength as the leader of the insurgents. As against the Spaniards he can keep the field, and carry on a destructive guerilla warfare, hopeless on both sides, like that going on in Cuba, when that island was invaded by the American army. But as against American rule the Philippines would cease to be insurgents. The islanders will not be controlled by sentimentalism. Government by the United States would differ from that by Spain, as the two nations are different in character, in the nature of their political inst.i.tutions, in their progressive movement. America is all active and free, and her freedom would be extended to the islanders. The transformation would be one from the paralysis of despotism to the life of liberty. The words despotism and freedom would instantly have a distinct business meaning. Make known in the city of Manila that the Americans will abandon it, and the reviving hopes of the men of affairs would be instantly clouded, and the depression deepen into despondency and despair. Let it be the news of the day that the Americans will stay, and the intelligence of the city would regard its redemption as a.s.sured, every drooping interest revive, and an era of prosperity unknown under the dismal incompetency of Spain, open at once. It is legitimate that there should be freedom of speech as to the details of the proceedings. If our Government should do what Admiral Dewey did when he was the master of Manila, because he had annihilated the Spanish fleet and had the power to destroy the city--cast anchor and stay where we are already in command--the task is neither so complex nor costly as its opponents claim. Our territorial system is one easy of application to colonies. We have had experience of it from the first days of our Government. There is no commandment that a Territory shall become a State in any given time, or ever. We can hold back a Territory, as we have Arizona and New Mexico, or hasten the change to Statehood according to the conditions, and the perfect movement of the machinery requires only the presence in Congress of dominant good sense. Congress is easily denounced, but no one has found a subst.i.tute for it, and it is fairly representative of the country. Congress will never gamble away the inheritance of the people. It will probably, in spite of all shortcomings, have its average of ability and utility kept up. Congress may go wrong, but will not betray. Our outlying possessions must be Territories until they are Americanized, and we take it Americans know what that word means. If a specification is wanted as a definition, we have to say the meaning is just what has happened in California since our flag was there. In the case of the Philippines, if we stick, and we do not see how we can help doing so, the President will, in regular course, appoint a Territorial Governor, and as a strong Government capable of quick and final decisions must be made, the Governor should be a military man, and have a liberal grant, by special Act of Congress, of military authority. He should be a prompt, and all around competent administrator. He will not have to carry on war offensive or defensive. He need not be in a hurry to go far from Manila. He will not be molested there. The country will gravitate to him. The opponents of the Republican form of Government, as it is in the United States and the Territories of the Nation will become insignificant in the Philippines. They will have no grievances, except some of them may not be called at once to put on the trappings of personal potentiality. General Aguinaldo would find all the reforms the Spanish promised when they paid him four hundred thousand dollars to prove their good intentions, free as the air. He could not make war against the benignancy of a Government, Republican in its form and its nature, which simply needs a little time, some years maybe, before erasing the wrongs that have had a growth of centuries. The American Governor-General need not send out troops to conquer districts, coercing the people. The people will soon be glad to see the soldiers of the United States, the representatives of the downfall and departure of the instruments of Spain. Aguinaldo and his party have a Congress. It might be an approved beginning of a Territorial Legislature, and the insurgent General might be the presiding officer. There would be abundant reason for the auspicious exercise of all his rights in the public service. As for the cost of the Philippines under our Government, that would fall upon the treasury of the United States. There can be no doubt that it would be for several years a considerable sum, but the public men who favored peace for the liberation of Cuba, did not make counting the cost the most prominent feature of the war they advocated, but accepted the fact that the national honor and fame, the glory of heroism and deeds of daring and sacrifice, are priceless, and their achievement beyond price. There is to be said under this head, that the Philippine Islands are of natural riches almost without parallel. The great isle of Luzon teems with productions that have markets the world over, and it is commonplace for the savages in the mountains to come out of their fastnesses with nuggets of gold to make purchases. Cotton, sugar, rice, hemp, coffee and tobacco, all tropical fruits and woods, are of the products. There is profusion of the riches that await the freedom of labor and the security of capital, and the happiness of the people. Under American government the Philippines would prosper, and it would be one of our tasks to frame legislation. The laws of Congress would be the higher code of law, and the Philippines would desire, and be invited, of course, to send their ablest men to be Territorial representatives in the Congress of the United States. In the name of peace, therefore, and in behalf of the dignity and authority of this Nation--in mercy to the Spaniards, in justice to the Filipinos, it is due ourselves, and should have the favor of all who would see our country expand with the ages, and walking in the footsteps of Was.h.i.+ngton and Jefferson, finding the path of empire that of freedom and taking our place as a great Power, accepting the logic of our history, and the discharge of the duties of destiny--we should hold on to the Philippines--and when the great distance of those islands from this continent is mentioned, remember that the Pacific may now be crossed in as few days as was the Atlantic forty years ago.

The labor questions and the silver questions even come into the Philippines problem to be scanned and weighed. In Eastern Asia, which we have invaded, and a part of which we have appropriated for a time, the people use silver for the measure of value, and in the islands that interest us, as they do not deal in the mysteries of rupees, but in dollars, the facts in the case are plainly within the common understanding. In Manila the Mexican dollar goes in ordinary small exchanges, payment of wages and settlement of bills, for fifty cents; but the banks sell the Mexicans twenty-one of them for ten gold dollars--an American eagle! So far as the native people go, labor and produce are counted in silver, and the purchaser, or employer gets as much for a silver dollar as for a gold dollar. The native will take ten dollars in gold for ten dollars only in all settlements of accounts, and would just as willingly--even more so, accept ten Mexican dollars as ten American dollars in gold coin. Salaries are paid and goods delivered according to the silver standard. Of course, in due time this state of things will pa.s.s away, if we hold to the gold standard, but as the case stands the soldiers and sailors of our army and fleet, paid under the home standard, receive double pay, and get double value received for clothing, tobacco and whatever they find they want--indeed, for the necessaries and luxuries of life. The double standard in this shape is not distasteful to the boys.

We have both theories and conditions confronting us in these aspects of the silver and labor questions. The Oriental people are obdurate in their partiality for silver. It is the cheaper labor that adheres to the silver standard, partially, it is held, because silver is the more convenient money for the payment of small sums. But labor cannot be expected, at its own expense, to sustain silver for the profit of capital, or rather of the middle man between labor and capital. Labor, so far as it is in politics in this country, should not, without most careful study and deliberation, conclude that its force in public affairs would be abated, and its policy of advancing wages antagonized by the absorption of the Philippines in our country. On the contrary, the statesmans.h.i.+p that is representative of labor may discover that it is a great fact, one of the greatest of facts, that the various countries and continents of the globe are being from year to year more and more closely a.s.sociated, and that to those intelligently interested, without regard to the application of their views of justice or expediency, in the labor and silver questions--the convictions, the fanaticisms, of the vast silver nations--and enormous mult.i.tudes of the people of Asia, touching the silver standard--and the possible progress of labor, as a guiding as well as plodding ability increases incessantly in interest, and must grow in inheritance. As the conditions of progressive civilization are developed our interests cannot be wholly dissevered from those of the Asiatics. We would be unwise to contemplate the situation of to-day as one that can or should perpetuate itself. Suppose we accept, the governing responsibility in the Philippines. It is not beyond the range of reasonable conjecture that American labor can educate the laborers of the Philippines out of their state of servitude as cheap laborers, and lead them to co-operate rather than compete with us, and not to go into the silver question further than to consent that it exists, and is in the simplest form of statement, whether the change in the market value of the two money metals is natural or artificial. It is necessary in common candor to state that the most complete solution of the money metal embarra.s.sments would be through the co-operation of Asia and America. Europe is for gold, Asia for silver, and the Americas divided. j.a.pan is an object lesson, her approximation to the gold standard has caused in the Empire an augmentation of the compensation of labor. This is not wholly due to the change in the standard. The war with China, the increase in the army and navy, and the absorption of laborers in Formosa, the new country of j.a.pan, have combined with the higher standard of value, to elevate wages. All facts are of primary excellence in the formation of the policies of nations.

CHAPTER IX

The Philippine Islands As They Are.

Area and Population--Climate--Mineral Wealth--Agriculture--Commerce and Transportation--Revenue and Expenses--Spanish Troops--Spanish Navy--Spanish Civil Administration--Insurgent Troops--Insurgent Civil Administration--United States Troops--United States Navy--United States Civil Administration--The Future of the Islands.

General Frank V. Greene made an exhaustive study of all reports of an official character regarding the area, population, climate, resources, commerce, revenue and expenses of the Philippines Islands, and prepared a memorandum for the general information that is the most thorough and complete ever made, and is the latest and highest authority on all the subjects to which it relates, and they include the solid information the business men of the United States want respecting our Asiatic a.s.sociations. The memorandum is herewith submitted in substance, and all the particulars of public concern.

Area and Population.

These islands, including the Ladrones, Carolinas and Palaos, which are all under the Government of Manila, are variously estimated at from 1,200 to 1,300 in number. The greater portion of these are small and of no more value than the islands off the coast of Alaska. The important islands are less than a dozen in number, and 90 per cent. of the Christian population live on Luzon and the five princ.i.p.al islands of the Visayas group.

The total population is somewhere between 7,000,000 and 9,000,000. This includes the wild tribes of the mountains of Luzon and of the islands in the extreme south. The last census taken by the Spanish Government was on December 31, 1887, and this stated the Christian population to be 6,000,000 (in round numbers). This is distributed as follows:

Per Area. Population. Sq. Mile.

Luzon 44,400 3,426,000 79 Panay 4,700 735,000 155 Cebu 2,400 504,000 210 Leyte 3,300 279,000 71 Bohol 1.300 245,000 188 Negros 3,300 242,000 73 ====== ========= === 59,800 5,422,000 91

The density of population in these six islands is nearly 50 per cent. greater than in Illinois and Indiana (census of 1890), greater than in Spain, about one-half as great as in France, and one-third as great as in j.a.pan and China, the exact figures being as follows:

Area. Population. Per Sq. Mile.

Illinois 56,000 3,826,351 68 Indiana 35,910 2,192,494 61 ------ --------- --- 91,910 6,018,755 64

Spain 197,670 17,565,632 88 France 204,092 38,517,975 189 j.a.pan 147,655 42,270,620 286 China 1,312,328 383,253,029 292

The next most important islands, in the order of population, are:

Area. Population. Per Sq. Mile.

Mindanao 34,000 209,000 6 Samar 4,800 186,000 38 Mindoro 4,000 67,000 17 Nomblon 600 35,000 58 Masbate 1,400 21,000 15 ------ ------- -- 44,800 518,000 11

Various smaller islands, including the Carolinas, Ladrones and Palaos, carry the total area and Christian population to--

140,000 6,000,000 43

This is considerably greater than the density of population in the States east of the Rocky Mountains. Owing to the existence of mountain ranges in all the islands, and lack of communication in the interior, only a small part of the surface is inhabited. In many provinces the density of population exceeds 200 per square mile, or greater than that of any of the United States, except Ma.s.sachusetts and Rhode Island. The total area of the Philippines is about the same as that of j.a.pan, but its civilized population is only one-seventh.

In addition to the Christian population, it is estimated (in the Official Guide) that the islands contain the following:

Chinese (princ.i.p.ally in Manila) 75,000 Moors or Mohametans in Paragon and Jok 100,000 Moors or Mohametans in Mindanao and Basilan 209,000 Heathen in the Philippines 830,000 Heathen in the Carolinas and Palaos 50,000 --------- 1,264,000

The Official Guide gives a list of more than thirty different races, each speaking a different dialect; but five-sixths of the Christian population are either Tagalos or Visayas. All the races are of the Malay type. Around Manila there has been some mixture of Chinese and Spanish blood with that of the natives, resulting in the Mestizos or Half-breeds, but the number of these is not very great.

As seen in the provinces of Cavite and Manila, the natives (Tagalos) are of small stature, averaging probably 5 feet 4 inches in height, and 120 pounds in weight for the men, and 5 feet in height, and 100 pounds in weight for the women. Their skin is coppery brown, somewhat darker than that of the mulatto. They seem to be industrious and hard-working, although less so than the Chinese. By the Spaniards they are considered indolent, crafty, untruthful, cowardly and cruel, but the hatred between the Spaniards and the native races is so intense and bitter that the Spanish opinion of the natives is of little or no value. To us they seem industrious and docile, but there are occasional evidences of deceit and untruthfulness in their dealings with us. The bulk of the population is engaged in agriculture, and there were hardly any evidences of manufactures, arts or mining. The greater number seemed to be able to read and write, but I have been unable to obtain any exact figures on this subject. They are all devout Roman Catholics, although they hate the monastic orders.

In Manila (and doubtless also in Cebu and Iloilo) are many thousands of educated natives, who are merchants, lawyers, doctors and priests. They are well informed and have acc.u.mulated property. They have not traveled much, but there is said to be quite a numerous colony of rich Filipinos in Madrid, as well as in Paris and London. The bibliography of the Philippines is said to number 4,500 volumes, the greater part of which have been written by Spanish priests and missionaries. The number of books on the subject in the English language is probably less than a dozen.

Climate.

The climate is one of the best known in the tropics. The islands extend from 5 to 21 deg. north lat.i.tude, and Manila is in 14d. 35m. The thermometer during July and August rarely went below 79 or above 85. The extreme ranges in a year are said to be 61 and 97, and the annual mean, 81. There are three well-marked seasons, temperate and dry from November to February, hot and dry from March to May, and temperate and wet from June to October. The rainy season reaches its maximum in July and August, when the rains are constant and very heavy. The total rainfall has been as high as 114 inches in one year.

Yellow fever appears to be unknown. The diseases most fatal among the natives are cholera and smallpox, both of which are brought from China. Low malarial fever is brought on by sleeping on the ground or being chilled by remaining, without exercise, in wet clothes; and diarrhea is produced by drinking bad water or eating excessive quant.i.ties of fruit. Almost all of these diseases are preventable by proper precautions, even by troops in campaign. The sickness in our troops was very small, much less than in the cold fogs at camp in San Francisco.

Mineral Wealth.