The Ancient History of the Egyptians, Carthaginians, Assyrians Part 30

The two armies were very unequal in number. That of the Romans, including the allies, amounted to fourscore thousand foot, and a little above six thousand horse; and that of the Carthaginians consisted but of forty thousand foot, all well disciplined, and of ten thousand horse. aemilius commanded the right wing of the Romans, Varro the left, and Servilius, one of the consuls of the last year, was posted in the centre. Hannibal, who had the art of turning every incident to advantage, had posted himself, so as that the wind Vulturnus,(768) which rises at certain stated times, should blow directly in the faces of the Romans during the fight, and cover them with dust; then keeping the river Aufidus on his left, and posting his cavalry in the wings, he formed his main body of the Spanish and Gaulish infantry, which he posted in the centre, with half the African heavy-armed foot on their right, and half on their left, on the same line with the cavalry. His army being thus drawn up, he put himself at the head of the Spanish and Gaulish infantry; and having drawn them out of the line, advanced to give battle, rounding his front as he drew nearer the enemy; and extending his flanks in the shape of a half moon, in order that he might leave no interval between his main body and the rest of the line, which consisted of the heavy-armed infantry, who had not moved from their posts.

The fight soon began, and the Roman legions that were in the wings, seeing their centre warmly attacked, advanced to charge the enemy in flank.

Hannibal's main body, after a brave resistance, finding themselves furiously attacked on all sides, gave way, being overpowered by numbers; and retired through the interval they had left in the centre of the line.

The Romans having pursued them thither with eager confusion, the two wings of the African infantry, which were fresh, well armed, and in good order, wheeled about on a sudden towards that void s.p.a.ce in which the Romans, who were already fatigued, had thrown themselves in disorder; and attacked them vigorously on both sides, without allowing them time to recover themselves, or leaving them ground to draw up. In the mean time, the two wings of the cavalry, having defeated those of the Romans, which were much inferior to them, and having left in the pursuit of the broken and scattered squadrons, only as many forces as were necessary to keep them from rallying, advanced and charged the rear of the Roman infantry, which being surrounded at once on every side by the enemy's horse and foot was all cut to pieces, after having fought with unparalleled bravery. aemilius being covered with the wounds he had received in the fight, was afterwards killed by a body of the enemy to whom he was not known; and with him two quaestors; one and twenty military tribunes; many who had been either consuls or praetors; Servilius, one of the last year's consuls; Minucius, the late general of horse to Fabius; and fourscore senators. Above seventy thousand men fell in this battle;(769) and the Carthaginians, so great was their fury,(770) did not give over the slaughter, till Hannibal, in the very heat of it, called out to them several times; "Stop, soldiers, spare the vanquished." Ten thousand men, who had been left to guard the camp, surrendered themselves prisoners of war after the battle. Varro the consul retired to Venusia, with only seventy horse; and about four thousand men escaped into the neighbouring cities. Thus Hannibal remained master of the field, he being chiefly indebted for this, as well as for his former victories, to the superiority of his cavalry over that of the Romans. He lost four thousand Gauls, fifteen hundred Spaniards and Africans, and two hundred horse.

Maharbal, one of the Carthaginian generals, advised Hannibal to march without loss of time directly to Rome, promising him, that within five days they should sup in the Capitol. Hannibal answering, that it was an affair which required mature deliberation; "I see," replies Maharbal, "that the G.o.ds have not endowed the same man with all talents. You, Hannibal, know how to conquer, but not to make the best use of a victory."(771)

It is pretended that this delay saved Rome and the empire. Many authors, and among the rest Livy, charge Hannibal, on this occasion, as being guilty of a capital error. But others, more reserved, are not for condemning, without evident proofs, so renowned a general, who in the rest of his conduct was never wanting, either in prudence to make choice of the best expedients, or in readiness to put his designs in execution. They, besides, are inclined to judge favourably of him, from the authority, or at least the silence, of Polybius, who, speaking of the memorable consequences of this celebrated battle, says, that the Carthaginians were firmly persuaded, that they should possess themselves of Rome at the first a.s.sault; but then he does not mention how this could possibly have been effected, as that city was very populous, warlike, strongly fortified, and defended with a garrison of two legions; nor does he any where give the least hint that such a project was feasible, or that Hannibal did wrong in not attempting to put it in execution.

And indeed, if we examine matters more narrowly, we shall find, that according to the common maxims of war it could not be undertaken. It is certain, that Hannibal's whole infantry, before the battle, amounted but to forty thousand men; and, as six thousand of these had been slain in the action, and doubtless, many more wounded and disabled, there could remain but six or seven and twenty thousand foot fit for service; now this number was not sufficient to invest so large a city as Rome, which had a river running through it; nor to attack it in form, because they had neither engines, ammunition, nor any other things necessary for carrying on a siege. For want of these, Hannibal, even after his victory at Thrasymenus, miscarried in his attempt upon Spoletum;(772) and soon after the battle of Cannae, was forced to raise the siege of a little city,(773) of no note, and of no great strength. It cannot be denied, but that had he miscarried on the present occasion, nothing less could have been expected but that he must have been irrecoverably lost. However, to form a just judgment of this matter, a man ought to be a soldier, and a soldier, perhaps, of those times. This is an old dispute, on which none but those who are perfectly well skilled in the art of war should pretend to give their opinion.

Soon after the battle of Cannae, Hannibal had despatched his brother Mago to Carthage, with the news of his victory, and at the same time to demand succours, in order that he might be enabled to put an end to the war.(774) Mago, on his arrival, made, in full senate, a lofty speech, in which he extolled his brother's exploits, and displayed the great advantages he had gained over the Romans. And, to give a more lively idea of the greatness of the victory, by speaking in some measure to the eye, he poured out, in the middle of the senate, a bushel(775) of gold rings, which had been taken from the fingers of such of the Roman n.o.bility as had fallen in the battle of Cannae. He concluded with demanding money, provisions, and fresh troops. All the spectators were struck with an extraordinary joy; upon which Imilcon, a great stickler for Hannibal, fancying he had now a fair opportunity to insult Hanno, the chief of the contrary faction, asked him, whether he was still dissatisfied with the war they were carrying on against the Romans, and was for having Hannibal delivered up to them?

Hanno, without discovering the least emotion, replied, that he was still of the same mind; and that the victories of which they so much boasted (supposing them real) could not give him joy, but only in proportion as they should be made subservient to an advantageous peace: he then undertook to prove, that the mighty exploits, on which they insisted so much, were wholly chimerical and imaginary. "I have cut to pieces," says he (continuing Mago's speech,) "the Roman armies: send me some troops.-What more could you ask had you been conquered? I have twice seized upon the enemy's camp, full (no doubt) of provisions of every kind.-Send me provisions and money.-Could you have talked otherwise had you lost your camp?" He then asked Mago, whether any of the Latin nations had come over to Hannibal, and whether the Romans had made him any proposals of peace? To this Mago answering in the negative: "I then perceive," replied Hanno, "that we are no farther advanced, than when Hannibal first landed in Italy." The inference he drew from hence was, that neither men nor money ought to be sent. But Hannibal's faction prevailing at that time, no regard was paid to Hanno's remonstrances, which were considered merely as the effect of prejudice and jealousy; and, accordingly, orders were given for levying, without delay, the supplies of men and money which Hannibal required. Mago set out immediately for Spain, to raise twenty-four thousand foot, and four thousand horse in that country; but these levies were afterwards stopped, and sent to another quarter; so eager was the contrary faction to oppose the designs of a general whom they utterly abhorred. While in Rome, a consul,(776) who had fled, was thanked because he had not despaired of the commonwealth; at Carthage, people were almost angry with Hannibal, for being victorious.

But Hanno could never forgive him the advantages he had gained in this war, because he had undertaken it in opposition to his counsel. Thus being more jealous for the honour of his own opinions than for the good of his country, and a greater enemy to the Carthaginian general than to the Romans, he did all that lay in his power to prevent future success, and to render of no avail that which had been already gained.

_Hannibal takes up his Winter Quarters in Capua._(_777_)-The battle of Cannae subjected the most powerful nations of Italy to Hannibal, drew over to his interest Graecia Magna,(778) with the city of Tarentum; and thus wrested from the Romans their most ancient allies, among whom the Capuans held the first rank. This city, by the fertility of its soil, its advantageous situation, and the blessings of a long peace, had risen to great wealth and power. Luxury, and a fondness for pleasure, (the usual attendants on wealth,) had corrupted the minds of all its citizens, who, from their natural inclination, were but too much inclined to voluptuousness and excess.

Hannibal(779) made choice of this city for his winter quarters. Here it was that those soldiers, who had sustained the most grievous toils, and braved the most formidable dangers, were overthrown by abundance and a profusion of luxuries, into which they plunged with the greater eagerness, as they, till then, had been strangers to them. Their courage was so greatly enervated in this bewitching retirement, that all their after efforts were owing rather to the fame and splendour of their former victories than to their present strength. When Hannibal marched his forces out of the city, one would have taken them for other men, and the reverse of those who had so lately marched into it. Accustomed, during the winter season, to commodious lodgings, to ease and plenty, they were no longer able to bear hunger, thirst, long marches, watchings, and the other toils of war; not to mention that all obedience, all discipline, were entirely laid aside.

I only transcribe on this occasion from Livy. If we are to adopt his opinion on this subject, Hannibal's stay at Capua was a capital blemish in his conduct; and he pretends, that this general was guilty of an infinitely greater error, than when he neglected to march directly to Rome after the battle of Cannae. For this delay,(780) says Livy, might seem only to have r.e.t.a.r.ded his victory; whereas this last misconduct rendered him absolutely incapable of ever defeating the enemy. In a word, as Marcellus observed judiciously afterwards, Capua was to the Carthaginians and their general, what Cannae(781) had been to the Romans. There their martial genius, their love of discipline, were lost: there their former fame, and their almost certain hopes of future glory, vanished at once. And, indeed, from thenceforth the affairs of Hannibal advanced to their decline by swift steps; fortune declared in favour of prudence, and victory seemed now reconciled to the Romans.

I know not whether Livy has just ground to impute all these fatal consequences to the delicious abode of Capua. If we examine carefully all the circ.u.mstances of this history, we shall scarce be able to persuade ourselves, that the little progress which was afterwards made by the arms of Hannibal, ought to be ascribed to his wintering at Capua. It might, indeed, have been one cause, but a very inconsiderable one: and the bravery with which the forces of Hannibal afterwards defeated the armies of consuls and praetors; the towns they took even in sight of the Romans; their maintaining their conquests so vigorously, and staying fourteen years after this in Italy, in spite of the Romans: all these circ.u.mstances may induce us to believe, that Livy lays too great a stress on the delights of Capua.

The real cause of the decline of Hannibal's affairs, was owing to his want of necessary recruits and succours from Carthage. After Mago's speech, the Carthaginian senate had judged it necessary,(782) in order for the carrying on the conquests in Italy, to send thither a considerable reinforcement of Numidian horse, forty elephants, and a thousand talents; and to hire, in Spain, twenty thousand foot, and four thousand horse, to reinforce their armies in Spain and Italy. Nevertheless, Mago could obtain an order but for twelve thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred horse:(783) and even when he was just going to march to Italy with this reinforcement, so much inferior to that which had been promised him, he was countermanded and sent to Spain. So that Hannibal, after these mighty promises, had neither infantry, cavalry, elephants, nor money sent him; but was left to depend upon his own personal resources. His army was now reduced to twenty-six thousand foot, and nine thousand horse. How could it be possible for him, with so inconsiderable an army, to seize, in an enemy's country, on all the advantageous posts; to awe his new allies; to preserve his old conquests and form new ones; and to keep the field, with advantage, against two armies of the Romans which were recruited every year? This was the true cause of the declension of Hannibal's affairs, and of the ruin of those of Carthage. Was the part where Polybius treated this subject extant, we doubtless should find, that he lays a greater stress on this cause, than on the luxurious delights of Capua.

(M123) _Transactions relating to Spain and Sardinia._(_784_)-The two Scipios still continued in the command of Spain, and their arms were making a considerable progress there, when Asdrubal, who alone seemed able to cope with them, received orders from Carthage to march into Italy to the relief of his brother. Before he left Spain, he writ to the senate, to convince them of the absolute necessity of their sending a general in his stead, who was capable of making head against the Romans. Imilcon was therefore sent thither with an army; and Asdrubal set out upon his march with his, in order to go and join his brother. The news of his departure was no sooner known, than the greatest part of Spain was subjected by the Scipios. These two generals, animated by such signal success, resolved to prevent him, if possible, from leaving Spain. They considered the danger to which the Romans would be exposed, if, being scarce able to resist Hannibal alone, they should be attacked by the two brothers, at the head of two powerful armies. They therefore pursued Asdrubal, and, coming up with that general, forced him to fight against his inclination. Asdrubal was overcome; and, so far from being able to continue his march for Italy, he found that it would be impossible for him to continue with any safety in Spain.

The Carthaginians had no better success in Sardinia. Designing to take advantage of some rebellions which they had fomented in that country, they lost twelve thousand men in a battle fought against the Romans, who took a still greater number of prisoners, among whom were Asdrubal, surnamed Calvus, Hanno, and Mago,(785) who were distinguished by their birth as well as military exploits.

(M124) _The ill Success of Hannibal. The Sieges of Capua and Rome._(_786_)-From the time of Hannibal's abode in Capua, the Carthaginian affairs in Italy no longer supported their former reputation. M.

Marcellus, first as praetor, and afterwards as consul, had contributed very much to this revolution. He hara.s.sed Hannibal's army on every occasion, seized upon his quarters, forced him to raise sieges, and even defeated him in several engagements; so that he was called the Sword of Rome, as Fabius had before been named its Buckler.

(M125) But what most affected the Carthaginian general, was, to see Capua besieged by the Romans. In order, therefore, to preserve his reputation among his allies, by a vigorous support of those who held the chief rank as such, he flew to the relief of that city, brought forward his forces, attacked the Romans, and fought several battles to oblige them to raise the siege. (M126) At last, seeing all his measures defeated, he marched hastily towards Rome, in order to make a powerful diversion. He was not without hope of being able, in case he could have an opportunity, in the first consternation, to storm some part of the city, of drawing the Roman generals with all their forces from the siege of Capua, to the relief of their capital; at least he flattered himself, that if, for the sake of continuing the siege, they should divide their forces, their weakness might then offer an occasion, either to the Capuans or himself, of engaging and defeating them. Rome was surprised, but not confounded. A proposal being made by one of the senators, to recall all the armies to succour Rome; Fabius(787) declared, that it would be shameful in them to be terrified, and forced to change their measures upon every motion of Hannibal. They therefore contented themselves with only recalling part of the army, and one of the generals, Q. Fulvius the proconsul, from the siege. Hannibal, after making some devastations, drew up his army in order of battle before the city, and the consul did the same. Both sides were preparing to signalize themselves in a battle, of which Rome was to be the recompense, when a violent storm obliged them to separate. They were no sooner returned to their respective camps, than the face of the heavens grew calm and serene. The same incident happened frequently afterwards; insomuch that Hannibal, believing that there was something supernatural in the event, said, according to Livy, that sometimes(788) his own will, and sometimes fortune, would not suffer him to take Rome.

But the circ.u.mstance which most surprised and intimidated him, was the news, that, whilst he lay encamped at one of the gates of Rome, the Romans had sent out recruits for the army in Spain at another gate; and that the ground, whereon his camp was pitched, had been sold, notwithstanding that circ.u.mstance, for its full value. So barefaced a contempt stung Hannibal to the quick; he, therefore, on the other side, put up to auction the shops of the goldsmiths round the Forum. After this bravado he retired, and, in his march, plundered the rich temple of the G.o.ddess Feronia.(789)

Capua, thus left to itself, held out but very little longer. After that such of its senators as had the chief hand in the revolt, and consequently could not expect any quarter from the Romans, had put themselves to a truly tragical death,(790) the city surrendered at discretion. The success of this siege, which, by the happy consequences wherewith it was attended, proved decisive, and fully restored to the Romans their superiority over the Carthaginians; displayed, at the same time, how formidable the power of the Romans was,(791) when they undertook to punish their perfidious allies; and the feeble protection which Hannibal could afford his friends at a time when they most wanted it.

(M127) _The Defeat and Death of the two Scipios in Spain._(_792_)-The face of affairs was very much changed in Spain. The Carthaginians had three armies in that country; one commanded by Asdrubal, the son of Gisgo; the second by Asdrubal, son of Hamilcar; and a third under Mago, who had joined the first Asdrubal. The two Scipios, Cneus and Publius, were for dividing their forces, and attacking the enemy separately, which was the cause of their ruin. They agreed that Cneus, with a small number of Romans, and thirty thousand Celtiberians, should march against Asdrubal, the son of Hamilcar; whilst Publius, with the remainder of the forces, composed of Romans and the Italian allies, should advance against the other two generals.

Publius was vanquished first. To the two leaders whom he had to oppose, Masinissa, elate with the victories he had lately gained over Syphax, joined himself; and was to be soon followed by Indibilis, a powerful Spanish prince. The armies came to an engagement. The Romans, being thus attacked on all sides at once, made a brave resistance as long as they had their general at their head; but the moment he fell, the few troops which had escaped the slaughter, secured themselves by flight.

The three victorious armies marched immediately in quest of Cneus, in order to put an end to the war by his defeat. He was already more than half vanquished by the desertion of his allies, who all forsook him; and left to the Roman generals this important instruction;(793) _viz._ never to let their own forces be exceeded in number by those of foreigners. He guessed that his brother was slain, and his army defeated, upon seeing such great bodies of the enemy arrive. He survived him but a short time, being killed in the engagement. These two great men were equally lamented by their citizens and allies; and Spain deeply felt their loss, because of the justice and moderation of their conduct.

These extensive countries seemed now inevitably lost; but the valour of L.

Marcius,(794) a private officer of the equestrian order, preserved them to the Romans. Shortly after this, the younger Scipio was sent thither, who severely revenged the death of his father and uncle, and restored the affairs of the Romans in Spain to their former flouris.h.i.+ng condition.

(M128) _The Defeat and Death of Asdrubal._(_795_)-One unforeseen defeat ruined all the measures, and blasted all the hopes of Hannibal with regard to Italy. The consuls of this year, which was the eleventh of the second Punic war, (for I pa.s.s over several events for brevity's sake,) were C.

Claudius Nero, and M. Livius. The latter had, for his province, the Cisalpine Gaul, where he was to oppose Asdrubal, who, it was reported, was preparing to pa.s.s the Alps. The former commanded in the country of the Brutians, and in Lucania, that is, in the opposite extremity of Italy, and was there making head against Hannibal.

The pa.s.sage of the Alps gave Asdrubal very little trouble, because his brother had cleared the way for him, and all the nations were disposed to receive him. Some time after this, he despatched couriers to Hannibal, but they were intercepted. Nero found by their letters, that Asdrubal was hastening to join his brother in Umbria. In a conjuncture of so important a nature as this, when the safety of Rome lay at stake, he thought himself at liberty to dispense with the established rules(796) of his duty, for the welfare of his country. In consequence of this, it was his opinion, that such a bold and unexpected blow ought to be struck, as might be capable of striking terror into the enemy; by marching to join his colleague, in order that they might charge Asdrubal unexpectedly with their united forces. This design, if the several circ.u.mstances of it are thoroughly examined, should not be hastily charged with imprudence. To prevent the two brothers from joining their armies, was to save the state.

Very little would be hazarded, even though Hannibal should be informed of the absence of the consul. From his army, which consisted of forty-two thousand men, he drew out but seven thousand for his own detachment, which indeed were the flower of his troops, but, at the same time, a very inconsiderable part of them. The rest remained in the camp, which was advantageously situated, and strongly fortified. Now could it be supposed that Hannibal would attack, and force a strong camp defended by thirty-five thousand men?

Nero set out without giving his soldiers the least notice of his design.

When he had advanced so far, as that it might be communicated without any danger, he told them, that he was leading them to certain victory: that, in war, all things depended upon reputation; that the bare rumour of their arrival would disconcert all the measures of the Carthaginians; and that the whole honour of this battle would fall to them.

They marched with extraordinary diligence, and joined the other consul in the night, but did not pitch separate camps, the better to impose upon the enemy. The troops which were newly arrived joined those of Livius. The army of Porcius the praetor was encamped near that of the consul, and in the morning a council of war was held. Livius was of opinion, that it would be better to allow the troops some days to refresh themselves; but Nero besought him not to ruin, by delay, an enterprise to which despatch only could give success; and to take advantage of the error of the enemy, as well absent as present. This advice was complied with, and accordingly the signal for battle was given. Asdrubal, advancing to his foremost ranks, discovered, by several circ.u.mstances, that fresh troops were arrived; and he did not doubt but that they belonged to the other consul.

This made him conjecture, that his brother had sustained a considerable loss, and, at the same time, fear, that he was come too late to his a.s.sistance.

After making these reflections, he caused a retreat to be sounded, and his army began to march in great disorder. Night overtaking him, and his guides deserting, he was uncertain what way to go. He marched at random, along the banks of the river Metaurus,(797) and was preparing to cross it, when the three armies of the enemy came up with him. In this extremity, he saw it would be impossible for him to avoid coming to an engagement; and therefore did every thing which could be expected from the presence of mind and valour of a great captain. He seized an advantageous post, and drew up his forces on a narrow spot, which gave him an opportunity of posting his left wing (the weakest part of his army) in such a manner, that it could neither be attacked in front, nor charged in flank; and of giving to his main battle and right wing a greater depth than front. After this hasty disposition of his forces, he posted himself in the centre, and was the first to march to attack the enemy's left wing; well knowing that all was at stake, and that he must either conquer or die. The battle lasted a long time, and was obstinately disputed by both parties.

Asdrubal, especially, signalized himself in this engagement, and added new glory to that he had already acquired by a series of s.h.i.+ning actions. He led on his soldiers, trembling and quite dispirited, against an enemy superior to them both in numbers and resolution. He animated them by his words, supported them by his example, and, with entreaties and menaces, endeavoured to bring back those who fled; till, at last, seeing that victory declared for the Romans, and being unable to survive the loss of so many thousand men, who had quitted their country to follow his fortune, he rushed at once into the midst of a Roman cohort, and there died in a manner worthy the son of Hamilcar, and the brother of Hannibal.

This was the most b.l.o.o.d.y battle the Carthaginians had fought during this war: and, whether we consider the death of the general, or the slaughter made of the Carthaginian forces, it may be looked upon as a reprisal for the battle of Cannae. The Carthaginians lost fifty-five thousand men,(798) and six thousand were taken prisoners. The Romans lost eight thousand.

These were so weary of killing, that some person telling Livius, that he might very easily cut to pieces a body of the enemy who were flying: "It is fit," says he, "that some should survive, in order that they may carry the news of this defeat to the Carthaginians."

Nero set out upon his march, on the very night which followed the engagement. Through every place where he pa.s.sed, in his return, shouts of joy and loud acclamations welcomed him, instead of those fears and uneasiness which his coming had occasioned. He arrived in his camp the sixth day. Asdrubal's head being thrown into the camp of the Carthaginians, informed Hannibal of his brother's unhappy fate. Hannibal perceived, by this cruel stroke, the fortune of Carthage: "All is over,"

says he,(799) "I shall no longer send triumphant messages to Carthage. In losing Asdrubal, I have lost at once all my hope, all my good fortune." He afterwards retired to the extremities of the country of the Brutians, where he a.s.sembled all his forces, who found it a very difficult matter to subsist there, as no provisions were sent them from Carthage.

(M129) _Scipio conquers all Spain. Is appointed Consul, and sails into Africa. Hannibal is recalled._(_800_)-The fate of arms was not more propitious to the Carthaginians in Spain. The prudent vivacity of young Scipio had restored the Roman affairs in that country to their former flouris.h.i.+ng state, as the courageous slowness of Fabius had before done in Italy. The three Carthaginian generals in Spain, Asdrubal son of Gisco, Hanno, and Mago, having been defeated with their numerous armies by the Romans in several engagements, Scipio at last possessed himself of Spain, and subjected it entirely to the Roman power. It was at this time that Masinissa, a very powerful African prince, went over to the Romans, and Syphax, on the contrary, to the Carthaginians.

(M130) Scipio, at his return to Rome, was declared consul, being then thirty years of age. He had P. Licinius Cra.s.sus for his colleague. Sicily was allotted to Scipio, with permission for him to cross into Africa, if he found it convenient. He set out with all imaginable expedition for his province; whilst his colleague was to command in the country whither Hannibal was retired.

The taking of New Carthage, where Scipio had displayed all the prudence, the courage, and capacity which could have been expected from the greatest generals, and the conquest of all Spain, were more than sufficient to immortalize his name: but he had considered these only as so many steps by which he was to climb to a n.o.bler enterprise: this was the conquest of Africa. Accordingly, he crossed over thither, and made it the seat of the war.

The devastation of the country, the siege of Utica, one of the strongest cities of Africa; the entire defeat of the two armies under Syphax and Asdrubal, whose camp was burnt by Scipio; and afterwards the taking Syphax himself prisoner, who was the most powerful resource the Carthaginians had left; all these things forced them at last to turn their thoughts to peace. For this purpose they deputed thirty of their princ.i.p.al senators, who were selected from that powerful body at Carthage, called the _council of the hundred_. Being introduced into the Roman general's tent, they all threw themselves prostrate on the earth, (such was the custom of their country,) spoke to him in terms of great submission, accusing Hannibal as the author of all their calamities, and promising, in the name of the senate, an implicit obedience to whatever the Romans should please to ordain. Scipio answered, that though he was come into Africa not for peace, but conquest, he would however grant them a peace, upon condition that they should deliver up all the prisoners and deserters to the Romans; that they should recall their armies out of Italy and Gaul; should never set foot again in Spain; should retire out of all the islands between Italy and Africa; should deliver up all their s.h.i.+ps, twenty excepted, to the victor; should give to the Romans five hundred thousand bushels of wheat, three hundred thousand of barley, and pay fifteen thousand talents: that in case they were pleased with these conditions, they then, he said, might send amba.s.sadors to the senate. The Carthaginians feigned a compliance, but this was only to gain time, till Hannibal should be returned. A truce was then granted to the Carthaginians, who immediately sent deputies to Rome, and at the same time an express to Hannibal, to order his return into Africa.

(M131) He was then, as was observed before, in the extremity of Italy.

Here he received the orders from Carthage, which he could not listen to without groans, and almost shedding tears; and was exasperated almost to madness, to see himself thus forced to quit his prey. Never banished man(801) showed so much regret at leaving his native country, as Hannibal did in going out of that of an enemy. He often turned his eyes wishfully to Italy, accusing G.o.ds and men of his misfortunes, and calling down a thousand curses, says(802) Livy, upon himself, for not having marched his soldiers directly to Rome, after the battle of Cannae, whilst they were still reeking with the blood of its citizens.

At Rome, the senate, greatly dissatisfied with the excuses made by the Carthaginian deputies, in justification of their republic, and the ridiculous offer which they made, in its name, of adhering to the treaty of Lutatius; thought proper to refer the decision of the whole to Scipio, who, being on the spot, could best judge what conditions the welfare of the state required.

About the same time, Octavius the praetor sailing from Sicily into Africa with two hundred vessels of burden, was attacked near Carthage by a furious storm, which dispersed all his fleet. The citizens, not bearing to see so rich a prey escape them, demanded importunately that the Carthaginian fleet might sail out and seize it. The senate, after a faint resistance, complied. Asdrubal, sailing out of the harbour, seized the greatest part of the Roman s.h.i.+ps, and brought them to Carthage, although the truce was still subsisting.

Scipio sent deputies to the Carthaginian senate, to complain of this, but they were little regarded. Hannibal's approach had revived their courage, and filled them with great hopes. The deputies were even in great danger of being ill treated by the populace. They therefore demanded a convoy, which was granted, and accordingly two s.h.i.+ps of the republic attended them. But the magistrates, who were absolutely against peace, and determined to renew the war, gave private orders to Asdrubal, (who was with the fleet near Utica,) to attack the Roman galley when it should arrive in the river Bagrada near the Roman camp, where the convoy was ordered to leave them. He obeyed the order, and sent out two galleys against the amba.s.sadors, who nevertheless made their escape, but with difficulty and danger.

This was a fresh subject for a war between the two nations, who now were more animated, or rather more exasperated, one against the other, than ever: the Romans, from a desire of taking vengeance for so black a perfidy; and the Carthaginians, from a persuasion that they were not now to expect a peace.

At the same time, Laelius and Fulvius, who carried the full powers with which the senate and people of Rome had invested Scipio, arrived in the camp, accompanied by the deputies of Carthage. As the Carthaginians had not only infringed the truce, but violated the law of nations, in the person of the Roman amba.s.sadors, it might naturally be expected that they should order the Carthaginian deputies to be seized by way of reprisal.

However, Scipio,(803) more attentive to what was required by the Roman generosity, than by the perfidy of the Carthaginians, in order not to deviate from the principles and maxims of his own countrymen, nor his own character, dismissed the deputies, without offering them the least injury.

So astonis.h.i.+ng an instance of moderation, and at such a juncture, terrified the Carthaginians, and even put them to the blush; and made Hannibal himself entertain a still higher idea of a general, who, to the dishonourable practices of his enemies, opposed only a rect.i.tude and greatness of soul, that was still more worthy of admiration than all his military virtues.

In the mean time, Hannibal, being strongly importuned by his fellow-citizens, advanced forward into the country; and arriving at Zama, which is five days' march from Carthage, he there pitched his camp. He thence sent out spies to observe the position of the Romans. Scipio having seized these, so far from punis.h.i.+ng them, only commanded them to be led about the Roman camp, in order that they might take an exact survey of it, and then sent them back to Hannibal. The latter knew very well whence so n.o.ble an a.s.surance flowed. After the strange reverses he had met with, he no longer expected that fortune would again be propitious. Whilst every one was exciting him to give battle, himself only meditated a peace. He flattered himself that the conditions of it would be more honourable, as he was at the head of an army, and as the fate of arms might still appear uncertain. He, therefore, sent to desire an interview with Scipio, which accordingly was agreed to, and the time and place fixed.

(M132) _The Interview between Hannibal and Scipio in Africa, followed by a Battle._(_804_)-These two generals, who were not only the most ill.u.s.trious of their own age, but worthy of being ranked with the most renowned princes and warriors that had ever lived, having met at the place appointed, continued for some time in a deep silence, as though they were astonished, and struck with a mutual admiration at the sight of each other. At last Hannibal spoke, and after having praised Scipio in the most artful and delicate manner, he gave a very lively description of the ravages of the war, and the calamities in which it had involved both the victors and the vanquished. He conjured him not to suffer himself to be dazzled by the splendour of his victories. He represented to him, that how successful soever he might have hitherto been, he ought, however, to be aware of the inconstancy of fortune: that without going far back for examples, he himself, who was then speaking to him, was a glaring proof of this: that Scipio was at that time what Hannibal had been at Thrasymenus and Cannae: that he ought to make a better use of opportunity than himself had done, by consenting to a peace, now it was in his power to propose the conditions of it. He concluded with declaring, that the Carthaginians would willingly resign Sicily, Sardinia, Spain, and all the islands between Africa and Italy, to the Romans: that they must be forced, since such was the will of the G.o.ds, to confine themselves to Africa; whilst they should see the Romans extending their conquests to the most remote regions, and obliging all nations to pay obedience to their laws.

Scipio answered in few words, but not with less dignity. He reproached the Carthaginians for their perfidy, in plundering the Roman galleys before the truce was expired. He imputed to them alone, and to their injustice, all the calamities with which the two wars had been attended. After thanking Hannibal for the admonition he had given him, with regard to the uncertainty of human events, he concluded with desiring him to prepare for battle, unless he chose rather to accept of the conditions that had been already proposed; to which (he observed) some others would be added, in order to punish the Carthaginians for their having violated the truce.

Hannibal could not prevail with himself to accept these conditions, and the generals left one another, with the resolution to decide the fate of Carthage by a general battle. Each commander exhorted his troops to fight valiantly. Hannibal enumerated the victories he had gained over the Romans, the generals he had slain, the armies he had cut to pieces. Scipio represented to his soldiers, the conquest of both the Spains, his successes in Africa, and the confession the enemies themselves made of their weakness, by thus coming to sue for peace. All this he spoke(805) with the tone and air of a conqueror. Never were motives more powerful to prompt troops to behave gallantly. This day was to complete the glory of the one or the other of the generals; and to decide whether Rome or Carthage was to prescribe laws to all other nations.