Under The Loving Care Of The Fatherly Leader Part 3

Beyond that, probably the biggest reason for considering Korea vital to U.S. interests was the expectation that a communist Korea ruled by Kim Il-sung would be hostile to capitalist j.a.pan--which was beginning to fulfill its promise as an engine of economic growth for the noncommunist world. It was not only American officials who felt certain that South Korea's commu-nization would rock j.a.pan. Belief that Korean communism posed a grave danger was and remained a powerfully felt conviction among establishment figures and others in j.a.pan, also.99 As late as two decades later in a Tokyo conversation with an insider in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party I heard the matter-of-fact prediction that a communist takeover of Korea would shatter j.a.pan's fragile democracy, inspiring a quick reversion to dictatorial rule. As late as two decades later in a Tokyo conversation with an insider in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party I heard the matter-of-fact prediction that a communist takeover of Korea would shatter j.a.pan's fragile democracy, inspiring a quick reversion to dictatorial rule.100 In 1958, when the communists made their proposals, Was.h.i.+ngton saw them as representing, in part, efforts to drive a wedge between j.a.pan and the United States. At one meeting of top Pentagon bra.s.s and State Department officials, discussion turned to j.a.pan's reaction to Chinese troop withdrawal and the de-nuclearization proposal. Although the communist moves were calculated to appeal to the pacifism enshrined in the post-war j.a.panese const.i.tution, the Tokyo government was disturbed by a belligerent tone in North Korea's references to j.a.pan and the United States. "Since then the j.a.panese Foreign Office has been anxious of our a.s.sessment of the reasons for the Chinese Communist announcement and particularly whether we intend to withdraw our troops from Korea," says a memorandum of the meeting. "If so, the Foreign Office would be most distressed."101 Needing to respond somehow to the communist initiative, the Americans called a meeting of the sixteen countries that had contributed forces on the UN side in the Korean War. The sixteen sent the Chinese and North Koreans a note asking "whether, when the North Korean authorities speak of a 'neutral nations organization' to supervise the elections, they accept that these should be held under United Nations auspices." The Chinese responded by accusing the UN group of trying to s.h.i.+ft the focus. With Chinese forces being withdrawn, prospects for free elections and a peaceful reunification depended on corresponding withdrawal of the UN forces.102 Later in 1958, the Chinese dismissed the notion of holding UN-supervised elections. They charged-not without logic-that the United Nations, "under the domination of the United States, has been reduced to a belligerent in the Korean War and has lost all competence and moral authority to deal fairly and reasonably-with the Korean question." Later in 1958, the Chinese dismissed the notion of holding UN-supervised elections. They charged-not without logic-that the United Nations, "under the domination of the United States, has been reduced to a belligerent in the Korean War and has lost all competence and moral authority to deal fairly and reasonably-with the Korean question."103 The parties were getting nowhere toward the creation of the reunified, democratic Korea that both sides claimed to want. As usual, other priorities intervened. In this case the communist proposals most likely were indeed a ploy. Was.h.i.+ngton was justified in its concern that withdrawing its troops again would not advance its elections-and-reunification agenda, but merely make it easier for North Korea to carry out its own quite different version. Once the American troops were gone, an American president confronted with a crisis in Korea would find public and congressional opinion far more cautious and cynical than in 1950. The North Koreans knew that a quick, Truman-style intervention would be extremely difficult to arrange the second time around under such circ.u.mstances.

Basking in the praise he was hearing from people at home and abroad, and believing that he was gaining on his enemies across the DMZ, Kim took personal credit for the achievements of the period. There was more than a little justification for that, it appears. The 1997 defector Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, who had worked closely with Kim as party ideology secretary from 1958 to 1965, described Kim's leaders.h.i.+p in glowing terms.

Kim Il-sung "was conscientious, wise and dignified," Hw.a.n.g wrote. At the weekly party political bureau meeting, held in a meeting room next to his office, the premier "would personally brief the attendants on each item on the agenda and propose alternatives. He used easy words to give a thorough explanation so that there was no room for misunderstanding or question regarding an issue. I thought that whatever he said was reasonable. He fully presented his opinion and then asked the rest of the officials for theirs."

As an example of Kim's determination and persuasive powers once he had made up his mind, Hw.a.n.g cited a scheme, begun in 1958, in which the premier tried to deal with the consumer goods shortages by having small factories built in the countryside. He a.s.signed them to use whatever resources they could sc.r.a.pe together that might be left over from the big push in heavy industry. In his guidelines, Kim "strongly recommended the employment of women in these factories."

In a patriarchal society, that was revolutionary stuff. At a meeting, recalled Hw.a.n.g, factory managers said that it would be better to be understaffed than to employ women. After all, women would need paid maternity leave of 90 days (later 150 days). Besides, the managers complained, women "put their children before their work, they talk too much and work too little and they tend to talk behind the supervisor's back."

Kim replied that bringing women into the workplace was not simply a response to the country's labor shortage. "If our women, who make up half our population, all stay home to work in the kitchens, they will lag behind the men in social awareness. Naturally, they will not understand their working husbands and so become a hindrance to their husbands' careers." It was necessary, Kim said, to "liberate our women from the kitchen and turn them into masters of society and the nation."

Thenceforth, Hw.a.n.g noted, "child care centers, kindergartens and outpatient clinics were set up everywhere so that women need not worry about their children while at work, and this led to the flood of women entering the work force."

It was Kim himself who chose corn as the country's main imported subst.i.tute for scarce and prohibitively expensive rice-a choice he apparently made based not on nutritional a.n.a.lysis but on his long experience making do with rice subst.i.tutes before 1945. In 1959, according to Hw.a.n.g, "the issue of importing food was discussed during a political bureau meeting." Kim listened to the discussion for a while before he said: "I've eaten a variety of grains before, and I think the best is corn. How about importing corn?" Hw.a.n.g remembered being "quite impressed, because it was a judgment only someone who had gone through hard times could make."

According to Hw.a.n.g, Kim "made policy decisions after taking into consideration the opinions of his subordinates." When the premier started a new project, "he always gathered the party officials to explain his idea first. The secretaries would then write down his idea with more theoretical input and send the doc.u.ment down to the party organizations. And when giving instructions, Kim Il-sung always summoned the official in charge or called him on the phone. After setting the direction for a task, he left the details of execution to the independent decision of his subordinates. Kim Il-sung made frequent site inspections, from which he derived a lot of ideas. And when putting one of his ideas into practice, he would test it at a restricted level to gain more experience before making it the norm. He did not necessarily imitate other countries but tried to make adjustments to suit our situation. Thus he was not affected by the negative influence of other countries."

Hw.a.n.g acknowledged that he had "learned a great deal from Kim Il-sung." The premier "genuinely cared about us secretaries, and told us to accompany him whenever he made his rounds to the factories or farms." When the aides were able to make time from the press of other duties to accept his invitations, they found that "Kim Il-sung did a fine job when he went to visit faraway places to personally guide the workers. He paid attention to the opinions of the workers or farmers, and did not act in an overbearing manner."104 Still, for a dynamo of energy such as Kim Il-sung evidently was during the 1950s, seemingly no detail of the country's reconstruction was too small to deserve his "guidance." In July of 1955, visiting the newly built railway station at Kanggye, he complained that the station signboard-was too small- and so was the greenery. Disdaining the small saplings he found planted around the station, he said: "You've planted small trees though many good big trees are available. ... It'll be long before such young trees grow big enough for old people to enjoy the view." Thereupon he instructed that the saplings be replaced with bigger trees.105 In another wallow in the nitty-gritty details of running the country, in January of 1958, Kim met with construction officials to press for increased housing production through prefabrication. "If you reduce the per-unit rotation time of cranes to seven or eight minutes, finish plastering while the units are being made in the factories instead of doing it at the construction site, you'll be able to build houses cheaper and faster," he is supposed to have advised them. The builders, "upholding his teachings," refined their process to the point they could build an apartment in fourteen minutes-"Pyongyang speed," as it was called.106 Visiting one of the new flats, Kim asked a resident for a critique. At first the woman gave the formulaic praise, "We are living well with nothing to worry about, thanks to the State." But Kim noticed that the apartment did not have heated floors. Getting the woman to relax, he drew from her an acknowledgment that she would have preferred that traditional Korean heating system, called ondol. ondol. Kim told the construction officials accompanying him to try to incorporate Kim told the construction officials accompanying him to try to incorporate ondol ondol in future apartment projects. Then, using a measuring stick, the premier criticized the proportions of the rooms. "He taught them in detail that they had better part.i.tion the flat in such an appropriate way as to provide best convenience for the dwellers, and lower the ceilings a little. ... He told the building functionaries that they should make the kitchen bigger so that a wife could work at ease there even with a baby on her back. 'Madame, what else do you want me to do?' asked he. 'There is nothing else,' " the woman replied. in future apartment projects. Then, using a measuring stick, the premier criticized the proportions of the rooms. "He taught them in detail that they had better part.i.tion the flat in such an appropriate way as to provide best convenience for the dwellers, and lower the ceilings a little. ... He told the building functionaries that they should make the kitchen bigger so that a wife could work at ease there even with a baby on her back. 'Madame, what else do you want me to do?' asked he. 'There is nothing else,' " the woman replied.107 That is by no means the end of the tales of Kim Il-sung as Great Builder. Telling of one new apartment complex completed in Pyongyang around 1960, for example, Kim reported that he had "personally chosen the site of this block of flats for writers and anti-j.a.panese revolutionary veterans and had scrutinized its design." That is by no means the end of the tales of Kim Il-sung as Great Builder. Telling of one new apartment complex completed in Pyongyang around 1960, for example, Kim reported that he had "personally chosen the site of this block of flats for writers and anti-j.a.panese revolutionary veterans and had scrutinized its design."

On August 15, 1961, the sixteenth anniversary of liberation from j.a.panese rule, Kim "looked around the streets of the capital sunk in deep thought," he was to write in his memoirs. "There was an animated holiday atmosphere in the streets. Sungri Street and the People's Army Street, in which the movement to build 20,000 flats was launched, and all the main streets of Pyongyang had been improved with magnificent public buildings and multi-storeyed blocks of flats. In the eight years since the war, tens of thousands of Pyongyang citizens had left their dugouts and moved into the newly-built blocks of flats which were one of the wonderful achievements of post-war construction."

To be sure, Kim added, "the work of construction was only just beginning. As yet, most of the citizens of the capital were still living in shabby dugouts and old-fas.h.i.+oned one-room houses. They had made painful sacrifices and suffered appalling hards.h.i.+ps, enduring the crucible of the anti-j.a.panese and the anti-U.S. wars, trials which no other people in the world had ever experienced. No people in the world had shed so much blood, braved such cold winds and missed so many meals as our people did. For these people we had to build more good houses, make more nice clothes and build more fine schools, holiday homes and hospitals. And we had to bring home more of our compatriots in foreign lands, who yearned for their homeland. This was what I had to do with my life, for the sake of the people. ... These thoughts kept me awake at night."108

SEVEN.

When He Hugged Us Still Damp from the Sea Kim Il-sung might have gotten even less sleep if he had realized fully the meaning of an event in Seoul three months earlier, on May 16, 1961. Military officers led by Maj. Gen. Park Chung-hee took power in a coup d'etat. The coup snuffed out democratic rule, with which South Korea had been experimenting since Rhee's overthrow the previous year in a student-led revolution. The intensely security-conscious new leaders in Seoul not only cracked down on dissent; they also made it clear very quickly that they would raise higher barriers to inroads by Northern agents and indigenous leftists. That alone would have been bad news for Kim, who counted on subversion to spark the Southern revolution that would pave the way for unification on his terms.

Taking longer to become apparent were some even farther-reaching consequences of Park's ascension to power. Although the North had gotten the jump on the South economically in the postKorean War period, the military takeover in the South signaled a new phase in their contest. Within a few years Park's authoritarian regime had unleashed Western-trained economists-some of them no less than brilliant-and dynamic business leaders. Their mission: build a market economy modeled on that of j.a.pan, employing close bureaucratic guidance and taking full advantage of a low-cost, hardworking, well-trained labor force. The formula was not too different from the "state capitalism" that Kim Il-sung had rejected as inappropriate for the North. It worked for the South, producing a rapidly wealth-expanding, relatively free economy.1 There remained severe problems in the South, to be sure. A populace growing more prosperous, literate and sophisticated increasingly found itself in conflict with the repression that the military-backed dictators.h.i.+p used to preserve its power. The North cheered Southern dissidents and lost no opportunity to attack Park Chung-hee's legitimacy: the South Korean leader had served during colonial times in the hated j.a.panese Imperial Army. North Korean propaganda continued to portray the South as a puppet state, where the U.S. imperialist aggressors have planted themselves in the top-level places of the exploiters and traitors who ride the people, and lord it over them. In shanties and dugouts the people are bemoaning their poverty and hunger, while the plunderers satiate themselves with the blood and sweat of the people, in their palace-like mansions, indulging in orgies. Brandis.h.i.+ng their bayonets, the ruling cla.s.ses, who control the power and the wealth, oppress the people struggling for liberation and unification at will, making the land one of carnage.2 While the South's frequent political turmoil did not derail its astonis.h.i.+ngly rapid economic growth, the North started to b.u.mp up against the limits of what could be achieved with a command economy3 Mean-while, facing both real and imagined threats, Kim took it upon himself to militarize the economy to an unprecedented degree. "The turning point," according to Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, who was then his ideology secretary, "came in the late 1960s." Disillusioned by both the revisionists in the Soviet Union and the wild leftists then launching the Cultural Revolution in China, Kim Il-sung "decided that his party had to rely on its own strength to liberate South Korea and achieve reunification."4 Accordingly Kim began his militarization campaign. Accordingly Kim began his militarization campaign.

Although militarism would, over time, cripple the civilian economy, North Korea in the '60s still enjoyed some momentum. As late as 1965 the North's $292 per capita GNP was more than three times the South's $88, according to one set of estimates.5 Those were the golden years of North Korean life, to hear former residents reminisce. In the 1950s and '60s, "even though it was difficult to have an easy and comfortable lifestyle, at least the rations came regularly-never delayed," Lee Ok-keum, who was born in 1949 and defected to the South with her husband and family in 1994, told me. "There were actually goods made in North Korea that you could buy in the stores- clothing, material, underwear, candy." Those were the golden years of North Korean life, to hear former residents reminisce. In the 1950s and '60s, "even though it was difficult to have an easy and comfortable lifestyle, at least the rations came regularly-never delayed," Lee Ok-keum, who was born in 1949 and defected to the South with her husband and family in 1994, told me. "There were actually goods made in North Korea that you could buy in the stores- clothing, material, underwear, candy."

As South Korean economic growth accelerated, growth rates in the North gradually declined. While the multi-year state economic plans of the late 1940s and the mid- to late '50s were deemed to have achieved their goals more or less as planned, growth from then on failed to meet planners' expectations. The first "seven-year plan," begun in 1961, dragged on for three extra years. Subsequent plans like-wise could not be completed without extensions of two or three years.

Those disappointing results came despite a series of campaigns and ma.s.s movements intended to wring greater output from the economy. Kim's Chol-lima movement had brought serious confusion around 1959, when planners misallocated resources to various sectors of the economy. Quality of production dropped, and eager-to-please economic units turned in inflated claims for their quant.i.tative production. Kim added incentives, short of money bonuses. He combined ideological indoctrination with prizes, including free vacations, and awards of medals and honorific t.i.tles for exceeding production quotas. Those incentives proved insufficient.6 Kim's "Tae-an work system," named for a power plant he was visiting in 1961 when he gave the instructions, was supposed to reduce bureaucratic inefficiency. In practice, it focused all power in party secretaries who, in turn, represented the will of the Great Leader. Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, who held high posts in both the party and the administration before he defected in 1997, explained how it worked: Say the prime minister has given a certain factory manager some instructions. The factory manager will immediately report to the factory party committee and follow the committee's instructions. ... The prime minister does not have the authority to give instructions to the factory party committee. The factory party committee will deliberate on whether or not the prime minister's instructions are commensurate with the will of the Great Leader, and if it decides not, then it will not carry out those instructions but report to its supervising party committee and await instructions from there before proceeding any further.

Hw.a.n.g further ill.u.s.trated his point by noting that as president of Kim Il-sung University he had held cabinet ministerial status. "I was also the Speaker of the Supreme People's a.s.sembly and member of the party's central committee, and was therefore one notch above the rest of the cabinet ministers. Thus, in terms of status in the party and the state, the party secretary supervising the university was far below me. And still all power in the university was in the hands of the party secretary, and the university president was under his command." The Tae-an work system, Hw.a.n.g said, "only served to paralyze the creativity and spontaneity of administrative and economic officials and legitimize the bureaucracy of party officials."7 Economic strength translates into political and military power. Park Chung-hee's reinvigoration of the Southern economy meant that the South now would have a shot at achieving ultimate reunification on its terms. The contest was becoming clearer. Most Koreans believed that reunification was inevitable sooner or later. One possibility now was that the South, by overtaking and overwhelming the North economically would set the stage for a demoralized North to fall into its lap. The other possibility-that the North would "win the prize by patiently pursuing its tactics of subversion, then intervening in a moment of Southern weakness to help communize the South-depended on dislodging or neutralizing the South's U.S. backers.

After using the term juche juche in 1955 to describe his self-reliant policy in 1955 to describe his self-reliant policy8 Kim had said little about it for a while. By the early 1960s, though, Kim was tilting toward the Beijing side in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Khrushchev in Moscow was promoting the line that communist countries should de-emphasize military preparations. Instead they should focus on peaceful compet.i.tion with capitalist countries to develop their economies. Moscow a.s.sured the smaller communist countries that they need not worry; the nuclear-armed might of the Soviet superpower deterred Western attack. Kim had said little about it for a while. By the early 1960s, though, Kim was tilting toward the Beijing side in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Khrushchev in Moscow was promoting the line that communist countries should de-emphasize military preparations. Instead they should focus on peaceful compet.i.tion with capitalist countries to develop their economies. Moscow a.s.sured the smaller communist countries that they need not worry; the nuclear-armed might of the Soviet superpower deterred Western attack.

To Kim such talk had one highly unwelcome meaning: He could expect no help from the Soviet Bloc in a forcible reunification of Korea. The notion of peaceful coexistence--whether the Soviet Union's coexistence with the hated imperialist Americans or North Korea's coexistence with South Korea--was anathema to him as it had been since the 1950s.9 He still had on his agenda the big-ticket items of pus.h.i.+ng the Americans to withdraw their troops, fomenting a Southern revolution and unifying Korea under his rule. (As an official biography put it, he was "leading to victory the revolutionary struggles of the South Korean people, to sweep away U.S. imperialism and its agents, and the struggle of the entire Korean people for national unification." He still had on his agenda the big-ticket items of pus.h.i.+ng the Americans to withdraw their troops, fomenting a Southern revolution and unifying Korea under his rule. (As an official biography put it, he was "leading to victory the revolutionary struggles of the South Korean people, to sweep away U.S. imperialism and its agents, and the struggle of the entire Korean people for national unification."10) In 1963, under such circ.u.mstances, Kim picked up the theme of juche juche again. Afterward he never tired of talking about it. "In a nutsh.e.l.l," according to Kim, again. Afterward he never tired of talking about it. "In a nutsh.e.l.l," according to Kim, juche juche means "having the att.i.tude of master toward revolution and construction in one's own country." It means "refraining from dependence upon others." It means "using your own brains, believing your own strength and displaying the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance, and thus solving your own problems for yourself on your own responsibility under all circ.u.mstances." Kim went on to emphasize the importance for any socialist country of "applying the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism and the experience of other countries to suit the historical conditions and national peculiarities of your own country." means "having the att.i.tude of master toward revolution and construction in one's own country." It means "refraining from dependence upon others." It means "using your own brains, believing your own strength and displaying the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance, and thus solving your own problems for yourself on your own responsibility under all circ.u.mstances." Kim went on to emphasize the importance for any socialist country of "applying the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism and the experience of other countries to suit the historical conditions and national peculiarities of your own country."11 In other words: Don't let Moscow or Beijing pull your strings. In other words: Don't let Moscow or Beijing pull your strings.

In the end, however, juche, juche, Kim's homegrown twist, was to prove just as limiting for the North's economic growth as the Stalinist-style planned economy. The limitations were to become especially apparent in view of-what Park Chung-hee was starting to do in the South. The Korean peninsula's own natural resources were concentrated in the North, out of the Southerners' grasp. Even if that had not been the case, the peninsula-lacking petroleum and another industrial essential, c.o.king coal-could not be self-sufficient and therefore could never be completely self-reliant. The Southerners turned to international trade, at the opposite pole Kim's homegrown twist, was to prove just as limiting for the North's economic growth as the Stalinist-style planned economy. The limitations were to become especially apparent in view of-what Park Chung-hee was starting to do in the South. The Korean peninsula's own natural resources were concentrated in the North, out of the Southerners' grasp. Even if that had not been the case, the peninsula-lacking petroleum and another industrial essential, c.o.king coal-could not be self-sufficient and therefore could never be completely self-reliant. The Southerners turned to international trade, at the opposite pole from.ju.che from.ju.che. They would import the basic commodities, then reprocess them using borrowed capital and cheap local labor. Finally, they would export the finished products.

In 1965, South Korea normalized relations with j.a.pan, which provided $300 million in grants and $200 million in loans as compensation for damages inflicted during the colonial period. That money, plus enhanced business ties with j.a.pan, gave South Korea a running start toward the "miracle" that was to make it the leader of Asia's fast-developing "tiger" economies. According to one a.n.a.lysis, the South's growth rate outpaced the North's from 1966-and in 1976 the South's per capita GNP surpa.s.sed that of the North for the first time.12 After somewhat de-emphasizing the military following the Korean War, Kim Il-sung in the 1960s resumed with a vengeance the policy of building up his armed forces.13 While the psychic costs are hard to measure, it is clear enough that Kim's growing obsession with security-was terribly expensive in economic development terms. His policy of maintaining military superiority over the far more populous South proved to be a crus.h.i.+ng burden-and, in the long run, countercompet.i.tive. While the psychic costs are hard to measure, it is clear enough that Kim's growing obsession with security-was terribly expensive in economic development terms. His policy of maintaining military superiority over the far more populous South proved to be a crus.h.i.+ng burden-and, in the long run, countercompet.i.tive.14 Many South Korean and Western a.n.a.lysts argued that the militarization drive represented nothing but Kim's continuing dream of military conquest of the South. The North, on the other hand, always maintained that it arose from the prospect that South Korea and its American backers would start a new war and Pyongyang would have to defend itself.15 My view is that Kim's policy combined offensive and defensive elements-although his defensive concerns to a large extent represented his fears of the consequences of his offensive policies. Despite military alliances with China and the USSR, and Khrushchev's a.s.surances of protection, Kim feared he might not be able to count on allies to rescue him in case his contest with the South should lead to renewed war with the Americans. Without an impenetrable defense, he could not feel secure in taking offensive measures. My view is that Kim's policy combined offensive and defensive elements-although his defensive concerns to a large extent represented his fears of the consequences of his offensive policies. Despite military alliances with China and the USSR, and Khrushchev's a.s.surances of protection, Kim feared he might not be able to count on allies to rescue him in case his contest with the South should lead to renewed war with the Americans. Without an impenetrable defense, he could not feel secure in taking offensive measures.

Kim became downright nervous from the early 1960s as he was finding it difficult to get along with his Soviet allies. An opportunity for a second south-ward strike came during the confusion of the South Korean student uprising against Rhee in April of 1960. Both China and Russia urged against acting, however, according to Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop's reported later testimony. The Pyongyang leaders.h.i.+p lacked the stomach to go it alone, particularly since it had just finished rebuilding the country from the ruins of the first Korean War.16 In 1962, 1962, U.S. President John F. Kennedy went eyeball-to-eyeball with Khrushchev in the Cuban Missile Crisis; it was the Russian who blinked, agreeing to eliminate the Soviet missile bases in Cuba that had sparked the crisis. Kim Il-sung's growing concern that he could not depend on his biggest supposed backer in the communist world inspired a major round of diplomacy to find friends among the smaller communist and Third World countries. U.S. President John F. Kennedy went eyeball-to-eyeball with Khrushchev in the Cuban Missile Crisis; it was the Russian who blinked, agreeing to eliminate the Soviet missile bases in Cuba that had sparked the crisis. Kim Il-sung's growing concern that he could not depend on his biggest supposed backer in the communist world inspired a major round of diplomacy to find friends among the smaller communist and Third World countries.

Just as he split with Moscow over its challenge to the doctrine of continuing revolution, so Kim eventually turned on Beijing-for failing to put aside its own disputes with Moscow in the interest of the Vietnamese revolution.17 Before that dispute could be cooled off Chinese Red Guards would attack Kim's very un-communist lifestyle, deriding him as "fat," a "counterrevolutionary," "a millionaire, an aristocrat and a leading bourgeois element in Korea." Before that dispute could be cooled off Chinese Red Guards would attack Kim's very un-communist lifestyle, deriding him as "fat," a "counterrevolutionary," "a millionaire, an aristocrat and a leading bourgeois element in Korea."18 Mean-while, American attempts to remove Fidel Castro in Cuba and to defeat the Viet Cong made Kim wonder if he might be next. His att.i.tude was not mere paranoia. In addition to whatever concern he felt over the new U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, he had to worry about less direct means the United States and South Korea were using to attack his regime. While the North Koreans hoped to subvert South Korea, that was also precisely what South Korea and its American backers hoped to do to North Korea. As a control measure, the Soviet occupation regime in the 1940s had initiated what proved to be a pattern of North Korean isolation that would last for decades. Was.h.i.+ngton sought to intensify that isolation as part of its efforts to exert pressure that might cause the Northern system to break down.19 The installation of the new, military-backed regime across the DMZ in South Korea in 1961 certainly did not ease Kim's worries on this score. It was around that time that Kim draped over the North a shroud of secrecy and exclusivity comparable to the centuries of isolationism that had preceded the nineteenth century opening to the West and earned Korea the sobriquet "hermit kingdom."20 A large part of his objective clearly was to make the population inaccessible to propaganda and other subversion efforts. While the South Koreans and Americans liked to imagine that isolation would threaten his rule, Kim believed that even more isolation was the way to preserve his system. In more than four decades to come, he was never proved wrong about that. A large part of his objective clearly was to make the population inaccessible to propaganda and other subversion efforts. While the South Koreans and Americans liked to imagine that isolation would threaten his rule, Kim believed that even more isolation was the way to preserve his system. In more than four decades to come, he was never proved wrong about that.

The change Kim put into effect was dramatic. During Rumanian diplomat Izidor Urian's first stay in Pyongyang, from 1954 to 1959, "the people in North Korea treated me kindly and I could meet people freely. At that time I was allowed to travel freely almost anywhere in North Korea." Urian returned to Pyongyang in 1963 and found quite a different atmosphere. Even diplomats dispatched from friendly communist countries such as his were confined to the capital and permitted only minimal contact with North Koreans. Without special permits they could visit only a few sites such as a swimming pool at Nampo, west of Pyongyang, and a Kim Il-sung museum at Mount Myohyang, some 150 kilometers north of the capital. Urian later wrote that from 1963 he "managed to meet government officials only in the Foreign Affairs Ministry and some other departments, and a few reporters." Until he ended his duties in Pyongyang in 1983, he had no further chances to meet ordinary people in Pyongyang. Even at banquets for foreigners, the North Koreans kept to themselves instead of mixing with their guests.21 If resident and visiting Rumanians and Cubans felt themselves isolated and restricted in Pyongyang, citizens of Western countries were barred, for the most part, from even entering North Korea in the first place. For them and for the South Koreans, the battles above the 38th parallel in the Korean War would prove to have been the last chance to glimpse North Korea for decades. Even if they should manage to get in, they-would encounter a population trained to tell them nothing.

Feeling a need to know what was happening in the North, but finding human intelligence increasingly hard to come by, Was.h.i.+ngton and Seoul resorted to electronic and photographic surveillance by plane and s.h.i.+p.22 Some a.n.a.lysts have sought to explain what was happening in North Korea almost entirely in terms of the threat facing the country from the nuclear-armed American forces and their South Korean colleagues. Indeed, the North Koreans were being pushed extremely hard. In the end, though, the argument is not convincing. Other countries have felt themselves under siege without going to such extremes of self-isolation, of one-man rule systematically built on enormous lies and on whipping up ma.s.s hatred.23 Whatever they were telling their people, for propaganda purposes, about diabolical American schemes, could Pyongyang's leaders really not understand that the American nuclear weapons were in Korea to deter the North from provoking or starting another war? From the other side it seemed clear that the weapons were there precisely because the United States had no desire to fight another full-fledged war-much less (for the time being, at least) initiate one. Was.h.i.+ngton just as obviously-was determined to keep Seoul from sparking a Second Korean War. Whatever they were telling their people, for propaganda purposes, about diabolical American schemes, could Pyongyang's leaders really not understand that the American nuclear weapons were in Korea to deter the North from provoking or starting another war? From the other side it seemed clear that the weapons were there precisely because the United States had no desire to fight another full-fledged war-much less (for the time being, at least) initiate one. Was.h.i.+ngton just as obviously-was determined to keep Seoul from sparking a Second Korean War.

Whatever threat he might have felt from American and South Korean subversion and espionage efforts, Kim Il-sung was doing his share of threatening. In September 1961, he sounded an anti-American theme, calling upon South Koreans to reject military service, to struggle against U.S. military bases and to shut down factories with strikes and sabotage. Simultaneously he ordered reconstruction of a communist party in the South. In 1964, an underground revolutionary group, the Revolutionary Party for Reunification, was founded in the South with a twelve-point program that read very much like the program of South Vietnam's National Liberation Front. The party had the mission of attracting Southerners, particularly intellectuals, to the communist movement under Kim Il-sung's leaders.h.i.+p.

Having failed to take advantage of the South Korean student revolution in 1960, or to prevent the military coup of 1961, Kim appears to have been determined to be ready the next time opportunity might knock. In December 1962 the North Korean party leaders.h.i.+p formally raised military preparation to equal status with economic development, citing both the international situation and South Korea's "acute crisis."24 As the North Korean military built its strength, its soldiers involved themselves increasingly in small-scale a.s.saults on the enemy along the DMZ. One theory was that those clashes were intended for domestic consumption-to keep tensions high. Thus, the regime could justify the sacrifices being made to build up the military at a time when strained relations with the Soviet Union also contributed to economic hards.h.i.+p.25 Border skirmishes became especially frequent starting in 1967 when the number of reported incidents exceeded 550-a tenfold increase over the 1966 figure. between 1967 and 1969, thirty-eight Americans were killed and 144 wounded, with South Korean casualties in proportional numbers. Border skirmishes became especially frequent starting in 1967 when the number of reported incidents exceeded 550-a tenfold increase over the 1966 figure. between 1967 and 1969, thirty-eight Americans were killed and 144 wounded, with South Korean casualties in proportional numbers.26 No doubt there was a connection between North Korea's redoubled militancy and the Vietnam War. Kim Il-sung decried the ma.s.sive U.S. commitment in Indochina as imperialism at its worst. From 1965, South Korean troops were dispatched to take some of the burden off the Americans-and to give the South Korean soldiers valuable combat experience. Kim followed suit, dispatching fighter planes and pilots to Vietnam. At the same time, though, the Vietnamese quagmire was a distraction of his enemies of the sort Kim had been awaiting. Weakening those enemies would be one dividend from his own support of the Vietnamese communists. Kim's identification with Ho Chi Minh and his close ties with North Vietnam suggest that Hanoi's strategy for liberating South Vietnam impressed him as valid for use against South Korea, if sufficient preparations could be made.27 Apparently hoping to reduce South Korea to leaderless chaos, and thus to set in motion a social revolution that would pave the way for unification under his regime, Kim unleashed a bold terrorist plot. In January of 1968, thirty-one Korean People's Army commandos crossed the DMZ disguised as South Korean soldiers. Their orders were to a.s.sa.s.sinate South Korean President Park, and they had memorized the floor plans of the Blue House, the presidential palace. On the way they happened upon some South Korean woodcutters, who guessed their ident.i.ties. Overruling others in the group who wanted to kill them, the commando leader let the woodcutters go with a warning not to report what they had seen. That bit of generosity proved fatal to the mission. The woodcutters reported the sighting to the South Korean authorities. The commandos entered Seoul and got within one kilometer of the Blue House, where police intercepted them on the night of January 21. Most of the commandos were killed, with only a few escaping back through the mountains.

Earlier that same day off North Korea's east coast port of Wonsan, a North Korean sub-chaser had spotted the Pueblo, Pueblo, a small, only perfunctorily armed U.S. Navy spy s.h.i.+p on its maiden voyage. Outfitted with sophisticated electronic gear, the a small, only perfunctorily armed U.S. Navy spy s.h.i.+p on its maiden voyage. Outfitted with sophisticated electronic gear, the Pueblo Pueblo was checking up on North Korean coastal defenses, trying to pinpoint the locations, missions and frequencies of North Korean radar installations. Such intelligence could help the Americans prepare to jam or trick those radars in the event of another war. The s.h.i.+p was also monitoring coded communications, to gather material for code breakers in Was.h.i.+ngton, and listening in on noncoded communications that might help in evaluating North Korean forces' order of battle, equipment and morale. Oceanographers on board were gathering information on the waters off North Korea. was checking up on North Korean coastal defenses, trying to pinpoint the locations, missions and frequencies of North Korean radar installations. Such intelligence could help the Americans prepare to jam or trick those radars in the event of another war. The s.h.i.+p was also monitoring coded communications, to gather material for code breakers in Was.h.i.+ngton, and listening in on noncoded communications that might help in evaluating North Korean forces' order of battle, equipment and morale. Oceanographers on board were gathering information on the waters off North Korea.

Unaware of the aborted a.s.sa.s.sination attempt in Seoul and the way it had quite suddenly heightened tensions in Korea, the Pueblo's Pueblo's skipper continued with his mission. Cdr. Lloyd M.. Bucher was confident the s.h.i.+p was in international waters and, therefore, in no danger. However, on January 23, North Korean wars.h.i.+ps fired on the skipper continued with his mission. Cdr. Lloyd M.. Bucher was confident the s.h.i.+p was in international waters and, therefore, in no danger. However, on January 23, North Korean wars.h.i.+ps fired on the Pueblo. Pueblo. Overwhelmingly outgunned, Bucher did not return the fire but concentrated on evasive action, while his crewmen destroyed sensitive gear and data. His radioman alerted the U.S. Air Force, and help was supposed to be on the way. However, no American rescuers were actually dispatched. President Lyndon B. Johnson reportedly said to a Overwhelmingly outgunned, Bucher did not return the fire but concentrated on evasive action, while his crewmen destroyed sensitive gear and data. His radioman alerted the U.S. Air Force, and help was supposed to be on the way. However, no American rescuers were actually dispatched. President Lyndon B. Johnson reportedly said to a Time Time magazine correspondent during the first day of the crisis: "If we started sending gunboats out to protect everybody gathering information we'd have a budget of $500 billion every year. That hara.s.sment is part of the job. magazine correspondent during the first day of the crisis: "If we started sending gunboats out to protect everybody gathering information we'd have a budget of $500 billion every year. That hara.s.sment is part of the job.28 With himself and three of his men wounded, one of them so critically that he would die soon, Bucher surrendered his s.h.i.+p. It was the first surrender of a U.S. Navy s.h.i.+p in peacetime since that of the USS Chesapeake Chesapeake in 1807- and the in 1807- and the Chesapeake's Chesapeake's skipper had given up only after firing "one gun for the honor of the flag." skipper had given up only after firing "one gun for the honor of the flag."29 The attackers took the The attackers took the Pueblo Pueblo into port and held its crew, charging that they had been spying inside North Korean territorial waters. The crew members, blindfolded, were marched off the s.h.i.+p toward a waiting bus. Along the way they were subjected to the shouts and blows of hundreds of civilians lined up on either side of the road. into port and held its crew, charging that they had been spying inside North Korean territorial waters. The crew members, blindfolded, were marched off the s.h.i.+p toward a waiting bus. Along the way they were subjected to the shouts and blows of hundreds of civilians lined up on either side of the road.30 In a meeting at the truce village of Panmunjom, the United States protested first the Blue House raid and then the Pueblo's Pueblo's seizure, demanding immediate return of the vessel and men. The North Korean representative, Maj. Gen. Pak Chung-kuk, replied, seizure, demanding immediate return of the vessel and men. The North Korean representative, Maj. Gen. Pak Chung-kuk, replied, Our saying goes, "A mad dog barks at the moon." ... I cannot but pity you who are compelled to behave like a hooligan, disregarding even your age and honor to accomplish the crazy intentions of the war maniac Johnson for the sake of bread and dollars to keep your life. In order to sustain your life, you probably served Kennedy who is already sent to h.e.l.l. If you want to escape from the same fate of Kennedy who is now a putrid corpse, don't indulge yourself desperately in invective.

Rear Adm. John Victor Smith, the senior U.S. representative in Pan-munjom, at a hearing much later was to testify in kind that the North Koreans were "only one step above animals." While meeting with Pak, though, he had to content himself for the moment with blowing cigar smoke in his antagonist's face. Smith believed that the a.s.sa.s.sination attempt in Seoul, followed in such quick succession by the Pueblo's Pueblo's seizure, showed that Kim Il-sung wanted war. seizure, showed that Kim Il-sung wanted war.31 Higher-ranking U.S. officials, having failed to stop the seizure of the s.h.i.+p while it was in progress, mean-while were frustrated by their inability to come up with a plan to help the eighty-two imprisoned crewmen and, at the same time, punish Pyongyang for its effrontery. Hawkish politicians wanted to go to war.32 By 1968, to a considerable extent, the nuclear option had come to dominate American thinking about Korean security. One reported reason why the U.S. Air Force did not go to the aid of the By 1968, to a considerable extent, the nuclear option had come to dominate American thinking about Korean security. One reported reason why the U.S. Air Force did not go to the aid of the Pueblo Pueblo during the North Korean attack was that the seven F-4s it had based in South Korea were all loaded with nuclear weapons. But some Americans were ready to use such weapons. Congressman L. Mendel Rivers, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, called for a nuclear bombing of one North Korean city. "Bomb, bomb, bomb," he demanded. during the North Korean attack was that the seven F-4s it had based in South Korea were all loaded with nuclear weapons. But some Americans were ready to use such weapons. Congressman L. Mendel Rivers, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, called for a nuclear bombing of one North Korean city. "Bomb, bomb, bomb," he demanded.33 Even some of the captured crewmen said later that they had hoped for American nuclear retaliation against the North Koreans. Even some of the captured crewmen said later that they had hoped for American nuclear retaliation against the North Koreans.34 In South Korea, too, newspapers and officials called upon the United States to help avenge the Blue House raid- and perhaps unify the country in the process. In South Korea, too, newspapers and officials called upon the United States to help avenge the Blue House raid- and perhaps unify the country in the process.

Johnson called up reserve military units but in the end decided against a military response. Top officials dismissed not only nuclear warfare but also even conventional options-bombings, sh.e.l.lings, unleas.h.i.+ng the angry South Koreans for a battalion-sized raid across the DMZ. Any such action would be unlikely to help get the Pueblo's Pueblo's crew back safely, and would risk inspiring Soviet or Chinese retaliation that could lead to another world war. The South Koreans considered attacking with their own aircraft, but the problem was that their airfields were "soft"-unprotected, vulnerable to attack--while the North's airfields had been hardened. In the end Seoul agreed to exercise restraint in exchange for a U.S. promise of $100 million in aid, which was directed mainly to preventing future infiltration from the North. crew back safely, and would risk inspiring Soviet or Chinese retaliation that could lead to another world war. The South Koreans considered attacking with their own aircraft, but the problem was that their airfields were "soft"-unprotected, vulnerable to attack--while the North's airfields had been hardened. In the end Seoul agreed to exercise restraint in exchange for a U.S. promise of $100 million in aid, which was directed mainly to preventing future infiltration from the North.35 After thirty-six hours of imprisonment, beatings and torture, Bucher signed a "confession" that the North Koreans had written in stilted English. The captors were not satisfied with that early effort. Backing their demands with coercion, for the next eleven months they kept insisting on increasingly abject confessions and statements. The Americans sometimes submitted- but they inserted inside jokes in those doc.u.ments to rea.s.sure people at home that their confessions were not sincere but coerced. Required to list partners and mentors in espionage, they kept straight faces as they named the likes of comic strip character Buzz Sawyer and television spy Maxwell Smart. One statement purporting to admit that the Pueblo Pueblo had violated North Korean waters was, unbeknownst to the North Koreans, a direct quotation from the legal definition of rape: "Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the act." had violated North Korean waters was, unbeknownst to the North Koreans, a direct quotation from the legal definition of rape: "Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the act."

In what could pa.s.s as a metaphor for the decades-long history of Americans and North Koreans talking past one another, Pueblo Pueblo crew members in a press conference mimicked the bombastic formulations of their captors to poke fun at the uncomprehending North Koreans. The Americans spoke longingly of "our motherland," of returning to "the bosom of the fatherland." Such stunts backfired when crew members in a press conference mimicked the bombastic formulations of their captors to poke fun at the uncomprehending North Koreans. The Americans spoke longingly of "our motherland," of returning to "the bosom of the fatherland." Such stunts backfired when Time Time ran a photo of ran a photo of Pueblo Pueblo captives extending their middle fingers. The magazine explained that this was "the U.S. hand signal of derisiveness and contempt." That was an unpleasant surprise for Pyongyang, since crewmen had described the gesture as a Hawaiian good-luck sign. The crew's treatment during the following week, according to its commander, was "the most concentrated form of terror that I've ever seen or dreamed is possible." captives extending their middle fingers. The magazine explained that this was "the U.S. hand signal of derisiveness and contempt." That was an unpleasant surprise for Pyongyang, since crewmen had described the gesture as a Hawaiian good-luck sign. The crew's treatment during the following week, according to its commander, was "the most concentrated form of terror that I've ever seen or dreamed is possible."36 The Pueblo's Pueblo's crew members finally got their freedom on December 23, 1968, after U.S. officials. .h.i.t on a formula for agreement with North Korea. It was a bizarre formula indeed. Maj. Gen. Gilbert H. Wood-ward, the senior U.S. representative at Panmunjom, signed a doc.u.ment that day admitting illegal intrusion and espionage in North Korean waters, apologizing for the crew members finally got their freedom on December 23, 1968, after U.S. officials. .h.i.t on a formula for agreement with North Korea. It was a bizarre formula indeed. Maj. Gen. Gilbert H. Wood-ward, the senior U.S. representative at Panmunjom, signed a doc.u.ment that day admitting illegal intrusion and espionage in North Korean waters, apologizing for the Pueblo's Pueblo's actions and a.s.suring Pyongyang that no U.S. s.h.i.+ps would intrude again. But before signing it, the American general announced: actions and a.s.suring Pyongyang that no U.S. s.h.i.+ps would intrude again. But before signing it, the American general announced: The position of the United States government with regard to the Pueblo ... Pueblo ... has been that the s.h.i.+p was not engaged in illegal activities and that there is no convincing evidence that the s.h.i.+p at any time intruded into the territorial waters claimed by North Korea, and that we could not apologize for actions which we did not believe took place. The doc.u.ment which I am going to sign was prepared by the North Koreans and is at variance with the above position. My signature will not and cannot alter the facts. I will sign the doc.u.ment to free the crew and only to free the crew. has been that the s.h.i.+p was not engaged in illegal activities and that there is no convincing evidence that the s.h.i.+p at any time intruded into the territorial waters claimed by North Korea, and that we could not apologize for actions which we did not believe took place. The doc.u.ment which I am going to sign was prepared by the North Koreans and is at variance with the above position. My signature will not and cannot alter the facts. I will sign the doc.u.ment to free the crew and only to free the crew.

In other words, General Woodward was telling the world that the doc.u.ment he was about to sign was nothing but an expedient lie. But the North Koreans did not mind that part. "It satisfied their one condition, a signature on a piece of paper," the general explained to an interviewer later. "Never mind the oral repudiation. In the Orient, you know, nothing is more important than the written word. Besides, the North Korean people would never hear about that repudiation. Their propaganda boys would take care of that. As for the rest of the world, well, they just didn't care." Or as Secretary of State Dean Rusk put it, "Apparently the North Koreans believe there is propaganda value even in a worthless doc.u.ment. It is a strange procedure. The North Koreans would have to explain it. I know of no precedent in my nineteen years of public service.37 Why did Pyongyang seize the Pueblo? Pueblo? Perhaps fear of retaliation for the Blue House raid further inflamed an already increasingly bellicose att.i.tude in Pyongyang. Or was the seizure coolly calculated, as a diversionary maneuver and perhaps as a test of U.S. resolve? Even decla.s.sified U.S. government doc.u.ments from the period have failed to clarify North Korean motivation. State Department historians can only note that some U.S. intelligence estimates and reports "suggest that Pyongyang saw the Vietnam War as an opportunity to challenge the United States, knowing that the United States was overextended in Southeast Asia and lacked the ability to respond. The North Koreans could have hoped to disrupt relations between Was.h.i.+ngton and Seoul or, perhaps, to have started a series of events that might have paved the way for the collapse of South Korea, thus succeeding where the Blue House raid failed." Perhaps fear of retaliation for the Blue House raid further inflamed an already increasingly bellicose att.i.tude in Pyongyang. Or was the seizure coolly calculated, as a diversionary maneuver and perhaps as a test of U.S. resolve? Even decla.s.sified U.S. government doc.u.ments from the period have failed to clarify North Korean motivation. State Department historians can only note that some U.S. intelligence estimates and reports "suggest that Pyongyang saw the Vietnam War as an opportunity to challenge the United States, knowing that the United States was overextended in Southeast Asia and lacked the ability to respond. The North Koreans could have hoped to disrupt relations between Was.h.i.+ngton and Seoul or, perhaps, to have started a series of events that might have paved the way for the collapse of South Korea, thus succeeding where the Blue House raid failed."38 Perhaps it is more useful to ask what the North Koreans gained from the incident, regardless of whether they planned it that way Besides humiliating the United States and distracting attention from their own deadly intrusion into South Korea, they were able to drive at least a small wedge between Seoul and Was.h.i.+ngton. That came about when the United States--which did not officially recognize their country's existence-negotiated with North Korean officials directly on the issue at Panmunjom, without South Korean partic.i.p.ation.

No doubt, too, Kim Il-sung and company learned several very important lessons about American preparedness, unity and resolve. One was that Was.h.i.+ngton's trigger finger-seventeen years after Truman had intervened in the Korean War, and mid-way through a new and more frustrating and divisive Asian land war--was not as itchy as some might have imagined. When it came to nuclear weapons, there was much greater reluctance to push the b.u.t.ton, even with provocation. It was possible from Pyongyang's perspective to see in the United States a muscle-bound opponent, a foe unable to use his strength effectively. Over time, with cleverness and patience, even American nuclear weapons could be made to lose their deterrent power.

Another lesson was that the U.S. government was in such bad repute with its own people, over Vietnam especially, that some Americans were ready to believe the North Korean version of events, including the Pueblo Pueblo crew's coerced confessions. Never mind that the official U.S. denials were backed by radio intercepts, in which North Korean s.h.i.+ps about to be involved in the attack on the crew's coerced confessions. Never mind that the official U.S. denials were backed by radio intercepts, in which North Korean s.h.i.+ps about to be involved in the attack on the Pueblo Pueblo gave their locations as outside North Korean waters. gave their locations as outside North Korean waters.39 In coming years, segments of American public opinion could (and did) prove more receptive than in the past to viewpoints at least somewhat sympathetic to North Korea. In coming years, segments of American public opinion could (and did) prove more receptive than in the past to viewpoints at least somewhat sympathetic to North Korea.

Pyongyang surely pondered with great interest the overriding American concern for the safety of the crew. No doubt an element of timing heightened that concern. The Pueblo Pueblo incident began just as public protest over the war in Indochina was reaching a peak of intensity. Americans were in no mood to send young warriors to die in another part of far-off Asia, and especially without clear purpose. The priority that the United States put on safeguarding its military men found reflection in actions ranging from Bucher's decision to surrender the s.h.i.+p--without firing even one shot, and before the last of the sensitive materials aboard could be destroyed-up to Was.h.i.+ngton officials' shying away from any military action that might endanger the captives. As President Johnson heatedly vowed to an aide, the United States would "do anything to get those men back-including meeting naked in the middle of the street at high noon, if that's what it takes. incident began just as public protest over the war in Indochina was reaching a peak of intensity. Americans were in no mood to send young warriors to die in another part of far-off Asia, and especially without clear purpose. The priority that the United States put on safeguarding its military men found reflection in actions ranging from Bucher's decision to surrender the s.h.i.+p--without firing even one shot, and before the last of the sensitive materials aboard could be destroyed-up to Was.h.i.+ngton officials' shying away from any military action that might endanger the captives. As President Johnson heatedly vowed to an aide, the United States would "do anything to get those men back-including meeting naked in the middle of the street at high noon, if that's what it takes.40 A country may be more civilized when the safety of members of the armed forces starts to become more important than the policy objectives they are sent to fight for, but there is a price to pay: Even the might of a superpower loses deterrent value. That is especially true regarding an enemy who has no qualms about sending men on a virtual suicide mission, such as the Blue House raid.

No wonder navy traditionalists were dismayed with Bucher's conduct. The commander "could have been the greatest hero in the history of the U.S. Navy," said one American admiral who partic.i.p.ated in the navy's court of inquiry into the Pueblo Pueblo case. "For a commanding officer to do anything other than guard his s.h.i.+p with his life is indefensible. I'll admit it takes guts; that's what you gotta have. The thought of saving his crew is interesting, humane, but it had nothing at all to do with the job he was a.s.signed to do." Said another: "If he had only fired one shot it would have made all the difference. Just one little bitty squirt of machine-gun fire, and that whole thing might have been over. They might not have had that boarding party in the first place. case. "For a commanding officer to do anything other than guard his s.h.i.+p with his life is indefensible. I'll admit it takes guts; that's what you gotta have. The thought of saving his crew is interesting, humane, but it had nothing at all to do with the job he was a.s.signed to do." Said another: "If he had only fired one shot it would have made all the difference. Just one little bitty squirt of machine-gun fire, and that whole thing might have been over. They might not have had that boarding party in the first place.41 They did have that boarding party, however, and the most immediate lesson Pyongyang apparently drew from the Pueblo Pueblo incident was that it could mount a significant but limited attack on American forces and get away with it. Fifteen months after the capture of the incident was that it could mount a significant but limited attack on American forces and get away with it. Fifteen months after the capture of the Pueblo, Pueblo, North Korean forces shot down an unarmed American EC-121 reconnaissance plane. North Korean forces shot down an unarmed American EC-121 reconnaissance plane.42 For decades the North Korean regime would show off the For decades the North Korean regime would show off the Pueblo Pueblo as a shrine recalling its triumph over "the most vicious enemy in the world. as a shrine recalling its triumph over "the most vicious enemy in the world.43 Both the seizure of the Pueblo Pueblo and the shooting down of the EC-121 were high-risk gambles in which Kim was prepared to deal with whatever response might issue from the United States. In both cases, according to reported later testimony by a North Korean official who defected to the South, the authorities believed war might be imminent, sent civilians to shelters and prepared the military to fight. and the shooting down of the EC-121 were high-risk gambles in which Kim was prepared to deal with whatever response might issue from the United States. In both cases, according to reported later testimony by a North Korean official who defected to the South, the authorities beli