Fields of Victory Part 10

So the long ascent climbs, from the humblest platoon in the field, through company, battalion, division, corps, and Army to the General Staff, and the British Commander-in-Chief, moving and directing the whole; with beyond these, again, as the apex of the great construction, the figure of the ill.u.s.trious Frenchman, who for the last six months of the war, by the common consent of the Allies, and especially by the free will of England and her soldiers, held the general scheme of battle in his hands. In the British Army what we have been watching is an active hierarchy of duty, discipline, loyalty, intelligence--the creation of a whole people, bent on victory for a great cause. Must it, indeed, vanish with the war, like a dream at c.o.c.k-crow, or shall we yet see its marvellous training, its developments of mind and character, gradually take other shapes and enter into other combinations--for the saving and not the slaying of men?

EPILOGUE

_June 1st._

I have thus brought these rapid notes--partly of things seen, partly of things read--to an end. They might, of course, go on for ever, and as I write I seem to see rising before me those libraries of the future, into which will come crowding the vast throng of books dealing in ever greater and greater detail with the events of the war and the causes of victory. But this slight summary sketch of the military events, and especially of the final "effort" of England and the Empire, in the campaign of last year, which I set myself to do, is accomplished, however inadequately. Except, indeed, for one huge omission which every reader of these few pages will at once suggest. I have made only a few references here and there to the British Navy.

Yet on the British Navy, as we all know, everything hung. If the Navy could not have protected our sh.o.r.es, and broken the submarine peril; if the British Admiralty had not been able to hold the Channel against the enemy and ward him off from the coasts and ports of France; if the British s.h.i.+ps and British destroyers had not been there to bring over 70 per cent of the American Armies, and food both for ourselves and the Allies; if the sea-routes between us and our Colonies, between us and the East, could not have been maintained, Germany at this moment would have been ruling triumphant over a prostrate world. The existence and power of the Navy have been as vital to us as the air we breathed and the sun which kept us alive, and the pressure of the British blockade was, perhaps, the dominating element in the victory of the Allies. But these things are so great and so evident that it seemed in this little book best to take them for granted. They have been the presuppositions of all the rest. What has not yet been so clear--or so I venture to think--to our own people or our Allies, has been the full glory of the part played by the Armies of the British Empire in the concluding phases of the war. The temporary success of the German sortie of last spring--a mere episode in the great whole--made so deep an impression on the mind of this nation, that the real facts of an _annus mirabilis_, in their true order and proportion, are only now, perhaps, becoming plain to us. It was in order to help ever so little in this process that I have tried to tell, as it appears to me, the end of that marvellous story of which I sketched the beginnings in _England's Effort_.

These main facts, it seems to me, can hardly be challenged by any future pressure from that vast critical process which the next generation, and generations after, will bring to bear upon the war.

The mistakes made, the blunders here, or shortcomings there, of England's mighty effort, will be all canva.s.sed and exposed soon enough. The process indeed has already begun. And when the first mood of thankful relief from the constant pre-occupation of the war is over, we may expect to see it in full blast. It would have been easy here to repeat some of the current discontents of the day, all of which will have their legitimate hearing in future discussion. But this is not the moment, nor is mine the pen. We are but just emerging from the shadow of that peril from which the British and Imperial Armies--bone of our bone and flesh or our flesh--have saved us. Let us now, if ever, praise the "famous men" of the war, and gather into our hearts the daily efforts, the countless sacrifices of countless thousands, in virtue of which we now live our quiet lives.

Nor have I dwelt much upon the terrible background of the whole scene, the physical horror, the anguish and suffering of war. Our n.o.blest dead, to judge from the most impa.s.sioned and inspired utterances of the men who have suffered for us, would bid us indeed remember these things,--remember them with all the intensity of which we are capable--but with few words. They never counted the cost, though they knew it well; and what they set out to do, they have done.

Let us then, at this particular moment, dwell, above all, on _the thing achieved_. To that end, a few colossal figures must still be added to those already given. Since the beginning of the war, the total forces employed by the British Empire in the various theatres of war, have amounted to a total of _eight million, six hundred and fifty-four thousand_ (24 per cent of the total white male population), of which the United Kingdom supplied 5,704,416 (25.36 per cent), and the Dominions, and Colonies, 1,425,864. The Indian and Coloured troops amounted to 1,524,000. If the Navy, the Merchant Service, and the men and women employed in various auxiliary military services at home are added, the total recruiting effort of the Empire reaches to much more than _ten millions_.

As to the financial part of this country in the war, by March 22nd, 1919, the war expenditure of Great Britain had reached a total of 9,482,442,482, of which rather more than _two thousand five hundred millions_ have been raised by taxation. Included in this total are sums amounting to 1,683,500,000, lent to our Allies and Dominions.

For the total casualties of the war, in an earlier chapter I have given the approximate figures so far as they can as yet be ascertained, amounting to at least some _twenty millions_. At such appalling cost then, in death, suffering and that wealth which represents the acc.u.mulated labour of men, have the liberties of Europe been rescued from the German attack. We are victors indeed; we have won to the sh.o.r.e; but the wreck of the tempest lies all round us; and what is the future to be?

It is four months now, since, in the splendid rooms of the Villa Murat, I listened to President Wilson describing the sitting of the Conference at which the Resolution was pa.s.sed const.i.tuting the League of Nations--four months big with human fate. The terms of peace are published, and at the present moment no one knows whether Germany will sign them or no. The League of Nations is in existence. It has a home, a Const.i.tution, a Secretariat. But the outlook over Europe is still dark and troubled, and the inner League of Three is still the surest ground in the chaos, the starting-point of the future. The Peace Terms are no final solution--how could they be? On their practical execution, on their adaptation year by year to the new world coming into being, all will depend. German militarism has met its doom. The triumph of the Allies is more absolute than any of them could have dreamed four years ago. Nor can the German crime ever be forgotten in this generation, or the German peril ignored. The whole civilised world must be--will be--the s.h.i.+eld of France should any fresh outrage threaten her. But after justice comes mercy. Because Germany has shown herself a criminal nation, not all Germans are criminal. That same British Army which as it fought its victorious way through the German defences in the last four months of the war, and, while it fought the enemy, fed and succoured at the same time 800,000 French civilians--men and officers dividing their rations with starving women and children, and in every pause of fighting, spending all their energies in comforting the weak, the hungry, and the sick:--that very Army is sorry now for the German women and children, as it sees them in the German towns. It is our own soldiers who have been demanding food and pity.

The Allies, indeed, have been for some time sending food to their starving enemies. Mr. Hoover--all honour to the great man!--is ceaselessly at work. If only no hitch in the Peace interrupts the food-trains and the incoming s.h.i.+ps, so that no more children die!

Some modifications in the Peace Terms would, clearly, be accepted by the public opinion of the Allied countries. No one, I believe, who has seen the Lens district, and the deliberate and cruel destruction of the French industrial north, will feel many qualms about the Saar valley. We may hold a personal opinion that it might have been wiser for France in her own interests to claim the coal only. But it is for France to decide, and it will be for the League of Nations to watch over the solution she has insisted on, in the common interest. But concessions as to Upper Silesia and East Prussia would be received, I have little doubt, with general relief and a.s.sent; and the common sense of Europe will certainly see both the wisdom and expediency of setting German industry to work again as speedily as possible, and of so arranging and facilitating the payment of her huge money debt to the Allies that it should not weigh too intolerably on the life of an unborn generation--an innocent generation, who will grow up, as it is, inevitably, under one of the darkest shadows ever cast by history.

Meanwhile now that the just and stern verdict of Europe has been given on the war and its authors, the second and greater half of the Allied task remains. Vast questions are left to the League of Nations, outside the Peace; the re-settlement, politically, of large tracts of Europe; the whole problem of disarmament, involving the future of British and American sea-power; the responsibilities of America in Europe; the economic adjustment of the world. But perhaps the greatest problem of all is the ethical one. How long shall we keep our wrath?

Germany has done things in this war which shame civilisation, and seem to make a mockery of all ideas of human progress. But yet!--we must still believe in them; or the sun will go out in heaven. We must still believe that in the long run hatred kills the civilised mind, and to put it at its lowest, is a mortal waste of human energies. Has Christianity, swathed as it is in half-decayed beliefs, any longer power to help us? Yet whatever else in the Christian system is breaking down, the Christian idea of a common fellows.h.i.+p of man holds the field as never before. And both the Christian idea and common sense tell us that till there is again some sort of international life in Europe, Europe will be unsound and her wounds unhealed. We call it impossible. But the good man, the just man, the merciful man is still among us, and--

"What he wills, he does; and does so much That proof is called impossibility."

MARY A. WARD.

APPENDIX[14]

A CHART OR DIAGRAM OF THE WAR PROM JANUARY, 1916, TO THE ARMISTICE, WITH AN EXPLANATION

[14] As I have already stated, in a footnote, I owe permission to publish this small reproduction of an interesting and unique doc.u.ment to the kindness of Lieut.-General the Hon. Sir Herbert Lawrence, K.C.B., etc., Chief of the General Staff.

APPENDIX

EXPLANATION OF CHART[15]

[15] [My readers will be as grateful as I am to Captain W.O. Barton, lately at work at G.H.Q., for this vivid explanation of the Chart.]

THE CHART.--This Chart is a small scale reproduction of one used and corrected from day to day at British G.H.Q. in France. It shows graphically the actual position at any given date of the British forces in FIGHTING STRENGTH, FRONT HELD, and HEAVY GUN POWER: when big operations are in progress it gives at a glance the number of CASUALTIES incurred and PRISONERS taken, perhaps the surest indication of the measure of success gained. Owing to the size of the reproduction, the horizontal scale lines of the original Chart cannot be given. To calculate a number at any particular date from the Chart as reproduced, it is only necessary to measure with a rule the height of the desired line at the given date. Reference to the appropriate numerical scale at the side will then give the number.

1916, STRENGTH AND FRONT.--Begin with the FRONT and FIGHTING STRENGTH lines. The _Strength_ line tells the Commander his actual numbers (by reference to scale 2), but he needs more. He looks at the line representing _Front_ and marks the proportion it bears to _Fighting Strength_. Measure these lines in mid-June, 1916. Since January, FRONT (scale 1) has expanded by about one-fifth--from 67 to 90 miles. The Chart shows the reason. But meanwhile _Fighting Strength_, then the vital factor for attack, has risen from 470,000 to 680,000, nearly one-half. The Army has been built up by new Divisions for the great Somme offensive.

CASUALTIES.--The battle opens. The red line of casualties leaps into prominence and, with its ascent, STRENGTH falls. Reinforcements are needed. They arrive to replace casualties, and STRENGTH goes up again.

So through the long conflict these lines act and react. Ground is won, but hardly and at great cost: the ascent of the Front line is slow.

PRISONERS.--What are the enemy losses? How are his men fighting? The PRISONERS line (scale 5) tells best. Gradually the proportion of prisoners to (British) casualties increases: his casualties are growing, his resistance becoming less effective: the wearing-out process tells. Mark the concluding phases of the Somme battle. The PRISONERS line is nearer to that of casualties. The Tank has been introduced, and here is ocular evidence of its effectiveness. More tanks is one of the lessons of the lines.

1917, ARRAS.--The Somme fighting ends. Again our armies are built up, until the 760,000 point is reached. FRONT, increased to nearly 120 miles by a relief of French troops, falls again to 105, owing to the German retirement about ARRAS. Heavy guns have increased from just over 300 to 1,500. Again our armies are ready, and the Battle of ARRAS opens the ALLIED SPRING OFFENSIVE. It is immediately effective, for casualties never reach the same height as in the Somme, and prisoners are much more numerous. The lines for the two battles show the difference vividly. But mark the big curve downward of the STRENGTH line. Casualties are now not so easily replaced.

MESSINES, YPRES, Pa.s.sCHENDAELE.--Before STRENGTH is fully restored the Messines ridge is rent with mines (June 7th) and taken. July is devoted to preparation: STRENGTH reaches its zenith, guns still increase, and on July 31st the Battle of YPRES opens the great northern offensive. Fighting is bitter, and more costly than at Arras; CASUALTIES are at first high in relation to prisoners, but the PRISONERS line, as in the Somme, but more consistently, tends upward.

The German is not "sticking" the terrible conditions and fierce fighting so well as the Britisher.

CAMBRAI.--Then, in December, comes our surprise attack at Cambrai: it is effective, for PRISONERS nearly approaches CASUALTIES. LINE increases, owing to the salient formed by the British advance. Then, the _German_ counter-attack, with CASUALTIES high, PRISONERS few, and LINE decreasing. The Germans have reduced the salient made by our attack.

ITALY'S PLIGHT.--But meanwhile, the enemy has struck at Italy, and Italy, reeling under his blows, is clamant for aid. Division after Division hurries off! STRENGTH falls, never again to ascend. The handicap is permanent.

1918. With STRENGTH almost at its lowest since 1916, after a year of ceaseless fighting and heavy casualties, with five Divisions diverted to Italy, miles of FRONT have to be taken over from the French. Line held reaches its maximum, 130 miles. _Fighting strength_ has fallen by mid-March--when Divisions have been reorganised from 12 to 9 battalions, owing to the dwindling of reinforcements--to 580,000.

THE GERMAN THRUSTS.--The Chart has shown when we might attack. Now it gives the warning to expect attack. Now, if ever, is Germany's moment, and her first great blow falls on March 21st--the thrust at Amiens.

CASUALTIES soar to a height never before approached. The red line predominates--STRENGTH falls and falls. Divisions are summoned from Italy and Egypt. The second German blow falls on the Lys. CASUALTIES are again immense, though not so high as in the first attack. STRENGTH falls again. The Lys salient increases the line held, but by the end of May the Line is firm throughout. Some few thousand Americans for a time reinforce the war-weary British Divisions; but the Portuguese cease to be reckoned in our _fighting strength_, though still in France. Reorganisation follows. STRENGTH is built up a little, though CASUALTIES are still heavy. The IXth Corps is fighting fiercely on the French Front to stem the Paris Thrust in May, and four British Divisions help in Foch's July counter-thrust. Guns, despite our losses to the enemy, have again increased. Guns are now more easily replaced than men.

THE FINAL PHASES.--Then the final phase. With decreased FIGHTING STRENGTH but with abundant GUNS (and, be it added, Tanks), we strike our first great blow in the Battle of Amiens on August 8th. STRENGTH falls abruptly, CASUALTIES are many, but high above the casualty line soars--for the first time--the line of PRISONERS. The toll taken of the German armies increases, as Bapaume and the Scarpe swiftly follow Amiens.

THE VITAL LINE.--Now the PRISONERS line has become vital. Consider the position in December before what is, perhaps, the decisive battle of the world war, the breaking of the Hindenburg line. GUNS are ever increasing, LINE has fallen somewhat, but lower even than in the dark days of spring has fallen the line of FIGHTING STRENGTH. To the General, studying this line alone, attack upon a position vaunted as impregnable would seem sheer madness. But he sees the Chart as a whole, with the PRISONERS line dominating everything in its sustained height. The enemy's total casualties are incalculable; never have ours been so few in comparison with prisoners taken: the hammering of previous years has borne fruit: the German _morale_, such is the lesson of the line, has gone irretrievably.

THE GREAT DECISION.--So, despite his own weakness, despite heavy losses not made good, the Commander takes the great decision and stakes all. He strikes, lets loose the tempest of his guns, and his infantry, diminished but indomitable, sweep through the vast fortresses of the Hindenburg line, hurl the enemy from defence after defence, pa.s.s from victory to victory.

Such is the story of the Chart.