Civil Government in the United States Considered with Some Reference to Its Origins Part 16

The discovery of these wholesale robberies, and of other villainies on a smaller scale in other cities, has led to much discussion of the problems of munic.i.p.al government, and to many attempts at practical reform. The present is especially a period of experiments, yet in these experiments perhaps a general drift of opinion may be discerned.

People seem to be coming to regard cities more as if they were huge business corporations than as if they were little republics. The lesson has been learned that in executive matters too much limitation of power entails destruction of responsibility; the "ring" is now more dreaded than the "one-man power;" and there is accordingly a manifest tendency to a.s.sail the evil by concentrating power and responsibility in the mayor.

[Sidenote: New government of Brooklyn.]

The first great city to adopt this method was Brooklyn. In the first place the city council was simplified and made a one-chambered council consisting of nineteen aldermen. Besides this council of aldermen, the people elect only three city officers,--the mayor, comptroller, and auditor. The comptroller is the princ.i.p.al finance officer and book-keeper of the city; and the auditor must approve bills against the city, whether great or small, before they can be paid. The mayor appoints, without confirmation by the council, all executive heads of departments; and these executive heads are individuals, not boards. Thus there is a single police commissioner, a single fire commissioner, a single health commissioner, and so on; and each of these heads appoints his own subordinates; so that the principle of defined responsibility permeates the city government from top to bottom,[14] In a few cases, where the work to be done is rather discretionary than executive in character, it is intrusted to a board; thus there is a board of a.s.sessors, a board of education, and a board of elections. These are all appointed by the mayor, but for terms not coinciding with his own; "so that, in most cases, no mayor would appoint the whole of any such board unless he were to be twice elected by the people." But the executive officers are appointed by the mayor for terms coincident with his own, that is for two years. "The mayor is elected at the general election in November; he takes office on the first of January following, and for one month the great departments of the city are carried on for him by the appointees of his predecessor.

On the first of February it becomes his duty to appoint his own heads of departments, and thus each incoming mayor has the opportunity to make an administration in all its parts in sympathy with himself."

[Footnote 14: Seth Low on "Munic.i.p.al Government," in Bryce's _American Commonwealth_, vol. i. p. 626.]

With all these immense executive powers entrusted to the mayor, however, he does not hold the purse-strings. He is a member of a board of estimate, of which the other four members are the comptroller and auditor, with the county treasurer and supervisor. This board recommends the amounts to be raised by taxation for the ensuing year.

These estimates are then laid before the council of aldermen, who may cut down single items as they see fit, but have not the power to increase any item. The mayor must see to it that the administrative work of the year does not use up more money than is thus allowed him.

[Sidenote: Some of its merits.]

This Brooklyn system has great merits. It ensures unity of administration, it encourages promptness and economy, it locates and defines responsibility, and it is so simple that everybody can understand it. The people, having but few officers to elect, are more likely to know something about them. Especially since everybody understands that the success of the government depends upon the character of the mayor, extraordinary pains are taken to secure good mayors; and the increased interest in city politics is shown by the fact that in Brooklyn more people vote for mayor than for governor or for president. Fifty years ago such a reduction in the number of elective officers would have greatly shocked all good Americans. But In point of fact, while in small towns.h.i.+ps where everybody knows everybody popular control is best ensured by electing all public officers, it is very different in great cities where it is impossible that the voters in general should know much about the qualifications of a long list of candidates. In such cases citizens are apt to vote blindly for names about which they know nothing except that they occur on a Republican or a Democratic ticket; although, if the object of a munic.i.p.al election is simply to secure an upright and efficient munic.i.p.al government, to elect a city magistrate because he is a Republican or a Democrat is about as sensible as to elect him because he believes in h.o.m.oeopathy or has a taste for chrysanthemums.[15] To vote for candidates whom one has never heard of is not to insure popular control, but to endanger it. It is much better to vote for one man whose reputation we know, and then to hold him strictly responsible for the appointments he makes. The Brooklyn system seems to be a step toward lifting city government out of the mire of party politics.

[Footnote 15: Of course from the point of view of the party politician, it Is quite different. Each party has its elaborate "machine" for electing state and national officers; and in order to be kept at its maximum of efficiency the machine must be kept at work on all occasions, whether such occasions are properly concerned with differences in party politics or not. To the party politician it of course makes a great difference whether a city magistrate is a Republican or a Democrat. To him even the political complexion of his mail-carrier is a matter of importance. But these ill.u.s.trations only show that party politics may be carried to extremes that are inconsistent with the best interests of the community. Once in a while it becomes necessary to teach party organizations to know their place, and to remind them that they are not the lords and masters but the servants and instruments of the people.]

This system went into operation in Brooklyn in January, 1882, and seems to have given general satisfaction. Since then changes in a similar direction, though with variations in detail, have been made in other cities, and notably in Philadelphia.

[Sidenote: Notion that the suffrage ought to be restricted.]

In speaking of the difficulties which beset city government in the United States, mention is often (and perhaps too exclusively) made of the great ma.s.s of ignorant voters, chiefly foreigners without experience in self-government, with no comprehension of American principles and traditions, and with little or no property to suffer from excessive taxation. Such people will naturally have slight compunctions about voting away other people's money; indeed, they are apt to think that "the Government" has got Aladdin's lamp hidden away somewhere in a burglar-proof safe, and could do pretty much everything that is wanted, if it only would. In the hands of demagogues such people may be dangerous, they are supposed to be especially accessible to humbug and bribes, and their votes have no doubt been used to sustain and perpetuate most flagrant abuses. We often hear it said that the only way to get good government is to deprive such people of their votes and limit the suffrage to persons who have some property at stake. Such a measure has been seriously recommended in New York, but it is generally felt to be impossible without a revolution.

[Sidenote: Testimony of Pennsylvania Munic.i.p.al Commission.]

Perhaps, after all, it may not be so desirable as it seems. The ignorant vote has done a great deal of harm, but not all the harm. In 1878 it was reported by the Pennsylvania Munic.i.p.al Commission, as a remarkable but notorious fact, that the acc.u.mulations of debt in Philadelphia and other cities of the state have been due, not to a non-property-holding, irresponsible element among the electors, but to the desire for speculation among the property-owners themselves. Large tracts of land outside the built-up portion of the city have been purchased, combinations made among men of wealth, and councils besieged until they have been driven into making appropriations to open and improve streets and avenues, largely in advance of the real necessities of the city. Extraordinary as the statement may seem at first, the experience of the past shows clearly that frequently property-owners need more protection against themselves than against the non-property-holding cla.s.s.[16] This is a statement of profound significance, and should be duly pondered by advocates of a restricted suffrage.

[Footnote 16: Allinson and Penrose, _Philadelphia, 1681-1887; a History of Munic.i.p.al Development_, p. 278.]

[Sidenote: Dangers of a restricted suffrage.]

It should also be borne in mind that, while ignorant and needy voters, led by unscrupulous demagogues, are capable of doing much harm with their votes, it is by no means clear that the evil would be removed by depriving them of the suffrage. It is very unsafe to have in any community a large cla.s.s of people who feel that political rights or privileges are withheld from them by other people who are their superiors in wealth or knowledge. Such poor people are apt to have exaggerated ideas of what a vote can do; very likely they think it is because they do not have votes that they are poor; thus they are ready to entertain revolutionary or anarchical ideas, and are likely to be more dangerous material in the hands of demagogues than if they were allowed to vote. Universal suffrage has its evils, but it undoubtedly acts as a safety-valve. The only cure for the evils which come from ignorance and s.h.i.+ftlessness is the abolition of ignorance and s.h.i.+ftlessness; and this is slow work. Church and school here find enough to keep them busy; but the vote itself, even if often misused, is a powerful educator; and we need not regret that the restriction of the suffrage has come to be practically impossible.

[Sidenote: Baneful effects of mixing city politics with national politics.]

The purification of our city governments will never be completed until they are entirely divorced from national party politics. The connection opens a limitless field for "log-rolling," and rivets upon cities the "spoils system," which is always and everywhere incompatible with good government. It is worthy of note that the degradation of so many English boroughs and cities during the Tudor and Stuart periods was chiefly due to the encroachment of national politics upon munic.i.p.al politics. Because the borough returned members to the House of Commons, it became worth while for the crown to intrigue with the munic.i.p.al government, with the ultimate object of influencing parliamentary elections. The melancholy history of the consequent d.i.c.kering and dealing, jobbery and robbery, down to 1835, when the great Munic.i.p.al Corporations Act swept it all away, may be read with profit by all Americans.[17] It was the city of London only, whose power and independence had kept it free from complications with national politics, that avoided the abuses elsewhere prevalent, so that it was excepted from the provisions of the Act of 1835, and still retains its ancient const.i.tution.

[Footnote 17: See _Parliamentary Reports_, 1835, "Munic.i.p.al Corporations Commission;" also Sir Erskine May, _Const. Hist._, vol. ii. chap, xv.]

In the United States the entanglement of munic.i.p.al with national politics has begun to be regarded as mischievous and possibly dangerous, and attempts have in some cases been made toward checking it by changing the days of election, so that munic.i.p.al officers may not be chosen at the same time with presidential electors. Such a change is desirable, but to obtain a thoroughly satisfactory result, it will be necessary to destroy the "spoils system" root and branch, and to adopt effective measures of ballot reform. To these topics I shall recur when treating of our national government. But first we shall have to consider the development of our several states.

QUESTIONS ON THE TEXT.

Give an account of city government in the United States, under the following heads:--

1. The American city:--

a. The mayor.

b. The heads of departments.

c. The city council.

d. The judges.

e. Appropriations.

f. The power of committees.

2. The practical workings of city governments:--

a. The contrast they show between theory and practice.

b. Various complaints urged against city governments.

c. Their effect upon the old-time confidence in the perfection of our inst.i.tutions.

3. The growth of American cities:--

a. The cities of Was.h.i.+ngton's time and those of to-day.

b. The population of cities in 1790 and their population to-day.

c. City growth since 1840.

4. Some consequences of rapid city growth:-- a. The pressure to construct public works.

b. The incurring of heavy debts.

c. The wastefulness due to a lack of foresight.

d. The increase in government due to the complexity of a city.

e. An ill.u.s.tration of this complexity in Boston.

f. The consequent mystery that enshrouds much of city government.

5. Some evils due to the fear of a "one-man" power:-- a. The objection to such power a century ago.

b. Restrictions imposed upon the mayor's power.

c. The division and weakening of responsibility.

d. The lack of unity in the administration of business.

e. The inefficiency of committees for executive purposes.

f. The alarming increase in city debts.

6. Attempts to remedy some of the evils of city government:-- a. The power of veto granted to the mayor.

b. The limitation of city indebtedness.

c. State control of some city departments.

7. Difficulties inherent in state control of cities:-- a. Lack of familiarity with city affairs.

b. The tendency to "log-rolling."

c. Lack of time due to the pressure of state affairs.

d. The failure of state control as shown in the rule of the Tweed ring.

8. The government of the city of Brooklyn:-- a. The elevation of the "one-man" power above that of the "ring."

b. Officers elected by the people.

c. Officers appointed by the mayor.

d. The principle of well-defined responsibility.

e. The appointment of certain boards by the mayor.

f. The holding of the purse-strings.

g. The inadequacy of the towns.h.i.+p elective system, in a city like Brooklyn.

9. Restriction of the suffrage:-- a. The dangers from large ma.s.ses of ignorant voters.

b. The responsibility for the debt of Philadelphia and other cities.

c. The dangers from large cla.s.ses who feel that political rights are denied them.