The Origins Of Political Order Part 11

European domains of the Habsburg Empire in the mid-sixteenth century

TAXATION AND NO REPRESENTATION.

Many contemporary Europeans, particularly the English, who were threatened by Spanish power were in awe of the supposedly absolutist powers of the Spanish Crown and believed the king to have "Turk-like" powers of taxation and prerogative. But the foundations of Spanish power rested on an extremely precarious fiscal foundation, and the king's authority over his own elites was limited by both law and custom. Spanish absolutism was too weak to take on its own elites frontally, unlike the Chinese and Russian versions, nor was it able to develop a system of legitimate taxation based on consent as the English were to do.

Like other European countries, the kingdoms that came together to become Spain possessed a medieval inst.i.tution of estates known as the Cortes. The kingdom of Leon had one of the earliest a.s.semblies in Europe, while that of Aragon was one of the best organized and powerful.16 The Cortes of Castile, which absorbed Leon, was less representative and more restricted than that of the English Parliament or the Estates-General in France, insofar as it did not regularly include the clergy or n.o.bility as corporate bodies that would meet in a single a.s.sembly with the commons. By the fourteenth century, only the The Cortes of Castile, which absorbed Leon, was less representative and more restricted than that of the English Parliament or the Estates-General in France, insofar as it did not regularly include the clergy or n.o.bility as corporate bodies that would meet in a single a.s.sembly with the commons. By the fourteenth century, only the procuradores procuradores (proctors) of one hundred towns would be summoned to the Cortes, a number that fell to two representatives of eighteen cities by the fifteenth century. These thirty-six individuals claimed that they spoke on behalf of the entire realm, but in fact they were representatives of the oligarchic factions that ruled in each of Spain's major regions. (proctors) of one hundred towns would be summoned to the Cortes, a number that fell to two representatives of eighteen cities by the fifteenth century. These thirty-six individuals claimed that they spoke on behalf of the entire realm, but in fact they were representatives of the oligarchic factions that ruled in each of Spain's major regions.17 The traditional powers of the Cortes were limited as well. It had no authority over legislation, which was a prerogative of the king. The Nueva Recopilacion (New Compilation), a collection of laws issued by Philip II in 1567, said that "no impositions, contributions, or other taxes are to be imposed on the whole Kingdom without the Cortes being summoned and without their being granted by the procuradores." But this authority was only over new, extraordinary taxes; existing taxes like the alcabala alcabala (a general excise tax), the (a general excise tax), the regalias regalias (customs duties), and the (customs duties), and the quintos quintos (taxes on mines, salt, and the like) did not need to be approved. The king also a.s.serted that the Cortes did not have the right to withhold a.s.sent to new imposts if the demand was just, the definition of "just" being up to him. (taxes on mines, salt, and the like) did not need to be approved. The king also a.s.serted that the Cortes did not have the right to withhold a.s.sent to new imposts if the demand was just, the definition of "just" being up to him.

The relative power of king and Cortes did not come out of the blue but was the result of political struggle. The alcabala had been farmed out by the central authorities, a practice opposed by the cities, which preferred a system known as the encabezamiento encabezamiento, in which they were responsible for the collection and apportionment of taxes. The encabezamiento was granted by Isabella, and then abolished in 1519 by Charles V, which provoked a popular uprising known as the revolt of the comuneros comuneros. Charles had stacked the Cortes with his own clients, and over opposition forced through the new tax system; part of the opposition was due to the fact that he was perceived as a foreign king (he had been born in Flanders) and would use Castile's tax money for foreign wars of little interest to the people of Castile. Cities all across Castile erupted and organized popular militias, and moved to establish an alternative elective Cortes while promoting the candidacy of a new monarch, Queen Joanna. Charles might well have lost control of his kingdom but for the fact that the comuneros turned on the n.o.bility. The latter s.h.i.+fted its support to the king, and Charles was finally able to reestablish military control.18 The aftermath of the comunero revolt was similar in certain ways to the consequences of the uprising of the Fronde in France that took place 130 years later. The king a.s.serted his authority over the cities in a decisive military victory. The idea of an elected, independent Cortes that would be the protector of Spanish liberties was dead. At the same time, the king realized that he needed to deal with the underlying sources of discontent and did so through the progressive and piecemeal buying off of potential opponents. He reinstated the encabezamiento, whose withdrawal had sparked the revolt, and left new taxes like the servicios servicios and the and the millones millones in the hands of local authorities. The latter tended to be patrimonial officeholders who could keep a percentage of the revenues they collected on behalf of the Crown. in the hands of local authorities. The latter tended to be patrimonial officeholders who could keep a percentage of the revenues they collected on behalf of the Crown.19 The Cortes would be summoned and consulted in later years, but it would never demand or receive powers over the purse. Their preferences nonetheless could influence public finance. They didn't want to pay property taxes and so new taxes took the form of imposts on commerce, taxation that fell more heavily on the poor and hindered Spanish economic growth. The Cortes would be summoned and consulted in later years, but it would never demand or receive powers over the purse. Their preferences nonetheless could influence public finance. They didn't want to pay property taxes and so new taxes took the form of imposts on commerce, taxation that fell more heavily on the poor and hindered Spanish economic growth.

The patrimonialization of the Spanish state started in the 1560s and reached its peak under Philip IV (16211665). As in France, the process was driven by the continual wars that Spain fought and its unending budget deficits. This process began at the time of the first Spanish bankruptcy in 1557, when the king sent his friend and courtier, Ruy Gomez, to sell as many munic.i.p.al offices as he could.20 Unlike in France, venal offices in Spain tended at first to be those of the cities and regions. The practice was widely condemned, as it was understood that the offices sold could not provide an adequate return except through the access they gave to outright corruption. Unlike in France, venal offices in Spain tended at first to be those of the cities and regions. The practice was widely condemned, as it was understood that the offices sold could not provide an adequate return except through the access they gave to outright corruption. 21 21 But fiscal stringency drove the state to further sales, nonetheless. By one estimate, the government had created thirty thousand proprietary officeholders by 1650, a number twice as high in per capita terms as in the France of that period. But fiscal stringency drove the state to further sales, nonetheless. By one estimate, the government had created thirty thousand proprietary officeholders by 1650, a number twice as high in per capita terms as in the France of that period.22 In addition, as much as 30 percent of the territory of Castile was returned to seigneurial jurisdiction, not for political purposes but simply as a result of the monarchy's need for ready cash. Authority over entire towns and cities, including the right to collect taxes and to administer justice, was sold to private individuals. Spanish state building went into reverse in a certain sense, with the central government losing control over much of its own territory as the simple consequence of fiscal improvidence. In addition, as much as 30 percent of the territory of Castile was returned to seigneurial jurisdiction, not for political purposes but simply as a result of the monarchy's need for ready cash. Authority over entire towns and cities, including the right to collect taxes and to administer justice, was sold to private individuals. Spanish state building went into reverse in a certain sense, with the central government losing control over much of its own territory as the simple consequence of fiscal improvidence.

Patrimonialism also affected military organization. Spain had liberated itself from the Moors over many centuries, and when the crowns of Castile and Aragon were united, the military was reformed into infantry units known as tercios that were armed with pikes and, later, arquebuses.23 Spanish soldiers with this kind of training and equipment were the ones who conquered the indigenous empires of the New World under Cortes and Pizarro. They also served in many other parts of the empire, particularly from bases in northern Italy from which they could reach the Low Countries via the so-called Spanish Road. Spanish soldiers with this kind of training and equipment were the ones who conquered the indigenous empires of the New World under Cortes and Pizarro. They also served in many other parts of the empire, particularly from bases in northern Italy from which they could reach the Low Countries via the so-called Spanish Road.24 Castilian soldiers partic.i.p.ated in the defense of Vienna against the Ottomans in 1533, and Spanish sailors accounted for a small proportion of s.h.i.+ps in the attack on Tunis in 1535, the failed attempt to conquer Algiers in 1538, and the great Battle of Lepanto in 1571. But in the seventeenth century, the raising of armies and navies was increasingly outsourced to private individuals who recruited troops using their own resources, or to coastal towns that outfitted their own galleys or s.h.i.+ps. The logistical infrastructure that provisioned these forces came under the control of Genoese financiers and meant that by the mid-1600s the Spanish monarchy had little control over its own armed forces. Castilian soldiers partic.i.p.ated in the defense of Vienna against the Ottomans in 1533, and Spanish sailors accounted for a small proportion of s.h.i.+ps in the attack on Tunis in 1535, the failed attempt to conquer Algiers in 1538, and the great Battle of Lepanto in 1571. But in the seventeenth century, the raising of armies and navies was increasingly outsourced to private individuals who recruited troops using their own resources, or to coastal towns that outfitted their own galleys or s.h.i.+ps. The logistical infrastructure that provisioned these forces came under the control of Genoese financiers and meant that by the mid-1600s the Spanish monarchy had little control over its own armed forces.25 As in other western European countries, the rule of law played an important role in limiting the authority of the Spanish king to simply do as he pleased with property rights and communal liberties. In Spain, the tradition of Roman law had not been extinguished as completely as in northern Europe, and after the recovery of the Justinian Code in the eleventh century it developed a very strong civil law tradition. The civil law was seen as a codification of divine and natural law. Although the king could make positive law, the Recompilacion made clear that he was subject to existing legal precedents and that edicts contradicting those laws had no force. The Catholic church remained the custodian of ecclesiastical law and often challenged royal prerogatives. Royal commands that were contrary to customary rights or privileges were resisted under the rubric "Obedezcase, pero no se c.u.mpla" "Obedezcase, pero no se c.u.mpla" (obey, but do not put into effect), which was often invoked by the conquistadores in the New World when they received an order they didn't like from an imperial viceroy. Individuals who disagreed with royal commands had the right to appeal them to the Royal Council, which like its English counterpart const.i.tuted the highest judicial authority in the land. According to the historian I.A.A. Thompson, "The Council of Castile stood for legalism and due process against arbitrariness, and for a judicialist as against an administrative or executive mode of government, actively resisting any recourse to extraordinary or irregular procedures and consistently defending established rights and contractual obligations." (obey, but do not put into effect), which was often invoked by the conquistadores in the New World when they received an order they didn't like from an imperial viceroy. Individuals who disagreed with royal commands had the right to appeal them to the Royal Council, which like its English counterpart const.i.tuted the highest judicial authority in the land. According to the historian I.A.A. Thompson, "The Council of Castile stood for legalism and due process against arbitrariness, and for a judicialist as against an administrative or executive mode of government, actively resisting any recourse to extraordinary or irregular procedures and consistently defending established rights and contractual obligations."26 The impact of this legal tradition can be seen in the way that Spanish kings dealt with domestic enemies and with the property rights of their subjects. There was no Spanish counterpart of Qin s.h.i.+ Huangdi or Ivan the Terrible, who would arbitrarily execute members of their own courts together with their entire families. Like the French kings of this period, Spanish monarchs chipped away at property rights incessantly in their search for cash, but they did so within the framework of existing law. Rather than arbitrarily expropriate a.s.sets, they renegotiated interest rates and princ.i.p.al repayment schedules. Rather than risk confrontation over higher levels of direct taxes, they debased the currency and accepted a higher rate of inflation. Inflation via loose monetary policy is in effect a tax, but one that does not have to be legislated and that tends to hurt ordinary people more than elites with real rather than monetary a.s.sets.

TRANSFER OF INSt.i.tUTIONS TO THE NEW WORLD.

Conquest societies have different opportunities for inst.i.tutional development and reform than do ones with ancient customs and long patterns of settlement. Conquest societies can be subject to what in contemporary corporate lingo is called "greenfield development"-a refoundation of inst.i.tutions without the enc.u.mbrances of deeply entrenched stakeholders or patterns of behavior. The Ottomans could settle their sipahis (cavalry officers) on timars (estates) as a one-generation n.o.bility because the land had been recently taken from its previous owners. It is not surprising that when the Spanish conquered the New World, they brought existing inst.i.tutions with them. But they faced far fewer constraints from entrenched interests there than they did in Europe, as well as a different set of economic opportunities and resource endowments. So if governance in Latin America has come to resemble governance in old regime Spain, the process of inst.i.tutional transfer was not necessarily straightforward or immediate.

The Spanish conquest of the Americas followed hard on the heels of the final acts of the Reconquista of the peninsula itself: Christopher Columbus witnessed Ferdinand and Isabella's triumphal entry into Grenada, and Cortes's uncle and father partic.i.p.ated in the military campaign against the Moors. Cortes conducted his campaign against the Aztecs as if he were fighting the Moors and used similar strategies of divide and conquer.27 Many of the same techniques of settlement, colonization, and political organization were simply lifted from the experience of colonizing southern Spain. Indeed, the conquistadores had a habit of referring to indigenous temples as "mosques." Many of the same techniques of settlement, colonization, and political organization were simply lifted from the experience of colonizing southern Spain. Indeed, the conquistadores had a habit of referring to indigenous temples as "mosques."

These early expeditions were sponsored by the Spanish king but driven by the entrepreneurial energy of the private individuals who organized them. The development of Latin American inst.i.tutions was the result of an interplay between the individuals on the ground in the new territories and an increasingly powerful government back in Madrid that tried to keep tight control over its colonies. Mining rights to the gold and silver that were discovered were of special interest; no land grants to private individuals included subsurface rights, which all stayed in state hands. The bulk of the new settlers in Peru and Mexico were not, however, involved in the extraction of specie; rather, they wanted to establish themselves as the overlords of land and the agricultural resources that land provided. The novel situation they faced was that the land they conquered was densely populated compared to southern Spain and therefore conducive to a different mode of exploitation.

The inst.i.tution devised by the Spanish authorities to both reward and control the conquistadores was the encomienda encomienda, a grant of people rather than of land. As in the case of the Ottoman timar, the Crown's intention was to prevent the emergence of an entrenched local n.o.bility; the grant of the encomienda was conditional and noninheritable.28 Some 40 percent of the survivors of Cortes's conquest of the Aztec capital of Tenocht.i.tlan were granted encomiendas, as were a substantial number of Pizarro's followers in Peru. The encomienda did not technically enslave the indigenous people given in grant, but it required their labor in return for the Some 40 percent of the survivors of Cortes's conquest of the Aztec capital of Tenocht.i.tlan were granted encomiendas, as were a substantial number of Pizarro's followers in Peru. The encomienda did not technically enslave the indigenous people given in grant, but it required their labor in return for the encomenderos encomenderos instructing them in the Christian religion and treating them well. The Spanish Crown had a paternalistic concern about the mistreatment of indigenous workers by their new overlords, and by the precipitous decline in their numbers as a result of smallpox and other diseases to which the Indian population was particularly vulnerable. Thus a hierarchical relations.h.i.+p of lords.h.i.+p and bondage, based on race, was built into early Latin American inst.i.tutions. instructing them in the Christian religion and treating them well. The Spanish Crown had a paternalistic concern about the mistreatment of indigenous workers by their new overlords, and by the precipitous decline in their numbers as a result of smallpox and other diseases to which the Indian population was particularly vulnerable. Thus a hierarchical relations.h.i.+p of lords.h.i.+p and bondage, based on race, was built into early Latin American inst.i.tutions.

The Spanish quickly established a modern and, for the times, relatively efficient administrative system for ruling its American colonies. The legitimacy of the Spanish New World empire was based on the bull of Pope Alexander VI in 1493, which gave the Indies (of unspecified geographical extent) to the Crown of Castile and Leon in perpetuity. Authority rested with the Spanish king and his Council of the Indies in Madrid, and pa.s.sed through the viceroyalties that had been established in Mexico and Peru. The laws that were applied in the New World were those of Castile alone, not other parts of the empire, despite the fact that many conquistadores and settlers were born elsewhere. Cortes began his conquest of Mexico in 1519, the year before the outbreak of the great comunero revolt; as a result of the outcome of that struggle, the political inst.i.tutions transferred to the Americas would not include a strong Cortes or other types of representative bodies. The only early bid for political independence was the revolt of Francisco Pizarro's brother Gonzalo, who tried to set himself up as an independent king of Peru. He was defeated and executed by royal troops in 1548, and no further challenges to central authority from the New World Spaniards occurred until the wars of independence of the early nineteenth century.

The Spanish authorities did transfer their Roman legal system, establis.h.i.+ng high courts or audiencias audiencias in ten places, including Santo Domingo, Mexico, Peru, Guatemala, and Bogota. A large number of the administrators sent over to help govern the colonies were lawyers and judges with long experience in civil law. The administrators were not permitted to marry local women or establish family ties in their territories, much like the Chinese prefects or Ottoman sanjakbeys. Of the system of colonial administration as a whole, the historian J. H. Elliott writes, "If the 'modernity' of the modern state is defined in terms of its possession of inst.i.tutional structures capable of conveying the commands of a central authority to distant localities, the government of colonial Spanish America was more 'modern' than the government of Spain, or indeed of that of almost every Early Modern European state." in ten places, including Santo Domingo, Mexico, Peru, Guatemala, and Bogota. A large number of the administrators sent over to help govern the colonies were lawyers and judges with long experience in civil law. The administrators were not permitted to marry local women or establish family ties in their territories, much like the Chinese prefects or Ottoman sanjakbeys. Of the system of colonial administration as a whole, the historian J. H. Elliott writes, "If the 'modernity' of the modern state is defined in terms of its possession of inst.i.tutional structures capable of conveying the commands of a central authority to distant localities, the government of colonial Spanish America was more 'modern' than the government of Spain, or indeed of that of almost every Early Modern European state."29 It contrasts in this respect with the rather laissez-faire att.i.tude of the English monarchy to its new colonies in North America. It contrasts in this respect with the rather laissez-faire att.i.tude of the English monarchy to its new colonies in North America.

THE IRON LAW OF LATIFUNDIA.

Although Spain's administrative system in the New World seemed more modern than contemporary European systems in the year 1570, this situation was not to last. The patrimonialization of Spain's own political system kicked into high gear only in the seventeenth century, and it was inevitable that inst.i.tutions like venal office would be transferred to the Americas. The basic dynamic driving this process was, however, initiative on the part of local actors in the colonies seeking to increase their rents and privileges, and the fact that the central government back in Madrid was too weak and too far away to prevent them from doing so.

The iron law of the large estate or latifundia-the rich tend to get richer, in the absence of state intervention-applied in Latin America much as in other agrarian societies like China and Turkey. The one-generation encomiendas were strongly resisted by the settler cla.s.s, who not surprisingly wanted to be able to pa.s.s on their ent.i.tlements to their children and who in the 1540s revolted against a law mandating their automatic reversion to the Crown. t.i.tle over people enabled certain encomenderos to get rich by commanding their labor, and they began to purchase large tracts of land. Unlike the encomienda, land was heritable. By the late sixteenth century, the Americas were facing a depopulation crisis of the indigenous populations; Mexico went from 20 million to 1.6 million inhabitants in this period.30 This meant that a lot of lightly populated land suddenly became available. This meant that a lot of lightly populated land suddenly became available.

This new creole elite tended to live in cities, and they exploited their land as absentee landlords using hired labor. Customary land tenure in Latin America was not essentially different from what existed in other tribal societies, being communal and tied to extended kins.h.i.+p groups. The remaining Indians were tricked into selling their lands, or else simply forced off them. Communal lands were turned into private estates, and the environment was dramatically changed as native crops like maize and manioc were replaced by European cash crops. A lot of agricultural land was given over to cattle ranching, with often devastating effects on soil fertility. The government back in Madrid was committed to protecting the rights of the indigenous owners, but was far away and unable to control things on the ground. Oftentimes local Spanish authorities worked hand in hand with the new cla.s.s of landowners to help them evade regulation. This was the origin of the Latin American latifundia, the hacienda, which in later generations would become the source both of inequality and persistent civil strife.31 The concentration of land in the hands of a small elite was promoted by the Spanish practice of mayorazgo mayorazgo, a system of primogeniture that prevented large haciendas from being broken up and sold piecemeal. The seventeenth century saw the acc.u.mulation of large landholdings, including entire towns and villages, by wealthy individuals, who then introduced the mayorazgo to prevent land from slipping out of family control through endless division to children. This practice was introduced into the New World as well. The Spanish authorities tried to limit the number of licenses for mayorazgos under the same theory that led them to take back encomiendas. The local creole or settler population responded by making use of the mejora mejora, by which parents could favor one child over another in order to maintain the power and status of the family's lineage.32 A cla.s.s of powerful landed families emerged, but they failed to operate as a coherent political actor. As in ancien regime France, the tax system helped to bind individual settlers to the state and to break up the solidarity they might have felt with any of their non-European fellow citizens. The large numbers of single men who const.i.tuted early waves of settlers ended up marrying or having children with indigenous women, producing a cla.s.s of mestizos. The mulatto offspring of whites and the black slaves that were being transported to the New World in increasing numbers const.i.tuted yet another separate caste. Against these groups, the creole offspring of Hispanic settlers claimed tax exemptions for themselves, a status enjoyed in Spain only by n.o.bles and hidalgos (lower gentry). As in North America, the simple fact of being white conferred status on people and marked them off from tribute-paying Indians and blacks.33 Given the dire fiscal condition of the Crown back in Madrid, it was perhaps inevitable that the European inst.i.tution of venal office would eventually cross the Atlantic. Fiscal administration in Spanish America had been reasonably good through much of the sixteenth century, since the colonies were, after all, a major source of precious metals and, increasingly, agricultural goods. But mining output began to decline by the end of the century, and the Spanish king's need for revenues increased as the Thirty Years' War got under way. The monarchy's efforts to prevent the formation of a New World aristocracy thus faded. J. H. Elliott describes this s.h.i.+ft:

Making use of their special connections to the royal administration, leading urban families built up their resources, established entails where it suited their purposes, and consolidated their dominance over the cities and their hinterland. They took advantage, too, of the crown's growing financial difficulties to buy their way into public office. Private traffic in regimientos regimientos-aldermans.h.i.+ps-in city councils had long been standard practice, and from 1591 they were put up for public sale. From 1559 notarial posts were placed on the market, and these were followed in 1606 by almost all local offices. Philip II and Philip III had held the line against the sale of treasury offices, but in 1633 Philip IV began putting these too up for sale. Eventually, in the second half of the seventeenth century, even the highest posts came onto the market, with posts in the Audiencias being systematically sold from 1687.34

As in France and Spain, sale of public offices became a route to upward mobility for the merchant cla.s.s, who could now think of themselves as caballeros and pa.s.s that status down to their children. The older families could still protect their relative status by buying their way into the Spanish n.o.bility. The seventeenth-century Spanish monarchs opened the floodgates and permitted the entry of hundreds of creoles into the prestigious Spanish military orders, while making others marquises and counts.

By the eighteenth century, when doctrines of equality and the Rights of Man began to penetrate into New World colonies, the Spanish political and social system had succeeded in reproducing itself in Latin America. The irony was that this transfer of patrimonial inst.i.tutions happened despite despite the wishes of colonial administrators in Madrid. Through much of the 1500s, they had tried to create a more modern, impersonal political order in the colonies, only to have these schemes undone by the deteriorating fiscal position of the Crown, which prevented them from exercising stronger control. The same erosion of boundaries between public and private interest that occurred in the peninsula took place in America. the wishes of colonial administrators in Madrid. Through much of the 1500s, they had tried to create a more modern, impersonal political order in the colonies, only to have these schemes undone by the deteriorating fiscal position of the Crown, which prevented them from exercising stronger control. The same erosion of boundaries between public and private interest that occurred in the peninsula took place in America.

In France, the capture of the state by rentiers and venal officeholders undermined the state's power and eventually produced the social explosion that was the French Revolution. In Spain, the same political evolution produced a long-term decline in Spanish power, but the equivalent political revolution never came to either the metropole or the colonies. The wars of independence from Spain that were fought in the early nineteenth century took up ideas of liberty and equality from the French and American revolutions. But they were led by a creole elite-exemplified by individuals like Simon Bolivar-that was heavily implicated in the patrimonial political system of the old regime.

The French Revolution was able to reestablish a bright line between public and private interest by simply expropriating all of the old venal officeholders' patrimonies and lopping off the heads of the recalcitrant ones. A new political system in which recruitment into public office was to be based on merit and impersonality-something the Chinese had discovered nearly two millennia earlier-was then brought to the rest of Europe by a man on horseback. Napoleon's defeat of a patrimonial Prussian army at Jena-Auerstadt in 1806 convinced a new generation of reformers like Baron vom Stein and Karl August von Hardenberg that the Prussian state would have to be rebuilt on modern principles.35 The nineteenth-century German bureaucracy that became Max Weber's model for modern, rational public administration did not evolve out of patrimonial officeholding, but rather styled itself as a conscious break with that tradition. The nineteenth-century German bureaucracy that became Max Weber's model for modern, rational public administration did not evolve out of patrimonial officeholding, but rather styled itself as a conscious break with that tradition.36 In Latin America, the social revolution never occurred before independence was achieved. Patrimonialism was left embedded in many of the postindependence regimes. Even though practices like the sale of offices and aristocratic t.i.tles were abolished, and formal democratic inst.i.tutions established, the same mind-set lived on. Very few of the new states in nineteenth-century Latin America were strong enough to confront their own elites, or able to tax and regulate them. Those elites had succeeded in penetrating and controlling the state itself and found ways of pa.s.sing on their social and political privileges to their children. Up through the late twentieth century, the fiscal bad habits of old regime Spain like persistent budget deficits, excessive borrowing, debt renegotiation, and taxation via inflation lived on in Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia. Formal democracy and const.i.tutionalism was not based on confrontation and negotiated consensus between social cla.s.ses, but was granted from above by elites who could take it back when it no longer suited their interests. This led to the emergence of highly unequal and polarized societies in the twentieth century, a situation that generated truly revolutionary social forces-in the form of Mexican and Cuban revolutions. Periodically over the last century, Latin American states have been roiled by the demand for a fundamental renegotiation of the entire social contract.

Many new social actors have emerged in recent generations, like trade unions, business groups with strong international ties, urban intellectuals, and newly mobilized indigenous groups seeking to reclaim the status and power taken from them by colonization. Latin America's political systems, both democratic and authoritarian, have tended to accommodate them not through a genuine reordering of political power but by buying them off through their piecemeal incorporation into the state. For example, in Argentina, the rise of the working cla.s.s in the early decades of the twentieth century was fiercely resisted by the traditional landed agrarian elite. In Europe, the working cla.s.s was incorporated through the formation of broad social democratic parties pus.h.i.+ng for redistributive agendas that laid the basis for modern welfare states. In Argentina, by contrast, the working cla.s.s was represented by a military caudillo, Juan Peron, whose political party (the Partido Justicialista) provided selective benefits to networks of supporters. The country bounced from periods of populist fervor to military dictators.h.i.+p, without putting in place a true European-style welfare state. Something similar happened in Mexico under the long dominance of the Inst.i.tutional Revolutionary Party (the Partido Revolucionario Inst.i.tucional, or PRI), which doled out patronage to select groups of organized supporters. Mexico was more stable than Argentina, but it similarly failed to solve its deep problems of social exclusion and poverty. The patrimonial legacy of old regime Spain thus lives on in the twenty-first century.

25.

EAST OF THE ELBE.

Why Hungary is of interest as an alternative route to failed accountability; how serfdom was imposed in Eastern Europe just as it was being abolished in the West; the emergence of const.i.tutionalism and n.o.ble dominance in Hungary; why it is important to have a strong central state as well as constraints on that state if liberty is to flourish

Early modern France and Spain were examples of weak absolutism and failed accountability. The states that were formed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were absolutist because their monarchies centralized power in a way that was not formally accountable to a parliament or any other representative body. There were political and social actors like the parlements and Cortes, the comuneros and Frondeurs, who opposed the state's centralizing project, but all were eventually defeated. The way they were defeated underscores a basic weakness of the absolutist authority. Elite actors had to be individually co-opted by offering them a piece of the state. This co-optation weakened their capacity for acting collectively, but it also limited the authority the state could exercise over them. Their property and privileges, while constantly challenged and eroded, remained largely intact.

Hungary and Russia, by contrast, offer two alternative paths of development that are different both from each other and from the French and Spanish models. All four of these cases ultimately terminate in an absence of political accountability. In Hungary, the absolutist project initially failed because a strong and well-organized n.o.ble cla.s.s succeeded in imposing const.i.tutional limits on the king's authority. The Hungarian Diet, like its English counterpart, made the Hungarian king accountable to itself. Accountability was not sought on behalf of the whole realm but rather on behalf of a narrow oligarchic cla.s.s that wanted to use its freedom to squeeze its own peasants harder and to avoid onerous taxes to the central state. The result was the spread of an increasingly harsh serfdom for nonelites, and a weak state that ultimately could not defend the country from the Turks. Freedom for one cla.s.s, in other words, resulted in a lack of freedom for everyone else and the carving up of the country among stronger neighbors.

We are taking the time to consider the Hungarian case for a simple reason: to show that const.i.tutional limits on a central government's power do not by themselves necessarily produce political accountability. The "freedom" sought by the Hungarian n.o.ble cla.s.s was the freedom to exploit their own peasants more thoroughly, and the absence of a strong central state allowed them to do just that. Everyone understands the Chinese form of tyranny, one perpetrated by a centralized dictators.h.i.+p. But tyranny can result from decentralized oligarchic domination as well. True freedom tends to emerge in the interstices of a balance of power among a society's elite actors, something that Hungary never succeeded in achieving.

LORDs.h.i.+P AND BONDAGE.

One of the great puzzles of European history is the very different development of relations between master and bondsman in the two halves of Europe at the beginning of the early modern period, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the lands west of the Elbe River-that is, in the western German states, the Low Countries, France, England, and Italy-the serfdom that had been imposed on peasants during the Middle Ages was gradually abolished. It never existed in the first place in Spain, Sweden, and Norway. By contrast, east of the river (in Bohemia, Silesia, Hungary, Prussia, Livonia, Poland, Lithuania, and Russia), formerly free peasants were progressively enserfed at virtually the same historical moment.1 Serfdom, like feudalism, has been defined in a wide variety of ways. According to the historian Jerome Blum, "A peasant was recognized as unfree if he was bound to the will of his lord by ties that were degrading and socially incapacitating, and that were recognized as a fundamental part of the legal and social structure of the land, rather than the result of an agreement or contract between lord and peasant." It was the lord and not the state who had legal jurisdiction over the peasant, and while their relations.h.i.+p might be defined by detailed customary rules, lords could change the rules to the peasants' disadvantage. While the serf retained some minimal legal rights that distinguished him from a slave, the practical distinction was not very great.2 The serfs of Western Europe had won their freedom at different times and to different degrees from the twelfth century on. Serfs usually first graduated to the status of renters on the property of their lords, whose usufructuary rights might be limited to their lifetimes or sometimes transmissible to their children. Some rights to land were mainmortable-that is, they pa.s.sed to their children only if their children lived with them; otherwise they reverted to the landowner. In the eighteenth century, the abolition of mainmort became one of the great causes of liberal reformers. In other cases, peasants graduated to the status of landowners with complete rights to buy, sell, and hand down their land as they saw fit. On the eve of the French Revolution, peasants owned 50 percent of the land in France, more than twice as much as the n.o.bles.3 Tocqueville points out that lords by then had long since ceased to play any real role in governing their peasants, which is why their residual rights to collect a variety of fees or to force the peasants to use their mills or winepresses was so bitterly resented. Tocqueville points out that lords by then had long since ceased to play any real role in governing their peasants, which is why their residual rights to collect a variety of fees or to force the peasants to use their mills or winepresses was so bitterly resented.4 Precisely the opposite happened in Eastern Europe. There was a considerably higher degree of freedom there in the late Middle Ages than in the west, largely because much of this region was an underpopulated frontier zone where colonists from Western Europe and Eurasia could live under their own laws. But beginning in the fifteenth century, new rules were established throughout Eastern Europe limiting the peasants' mobility. Peasants were forbidden to leave their holdings, or were under threat of big fines; heavy punishments were set for those aiding runaways, and restrictions were put on cities' abilities to shelter peasants from manorial obligations.

Nowhere was the loss of peasant freedom greater than in Russia. There had been slaves and serfs going all the way back to Kievan Rus in the twelfth century, but with the rise of the Muscovite state in the fifteenth century, the obligations of peasants increased steadily. Their freedom of movement diminished until it was limited to a single yearly occasion around St. George's day (provided their debts were paid), though even this opportunity was canceled in the next century.5 The rights that Russian lords had over their serfs steadily increased through the end of the eighteenth century, just as the doctrine of the Rights of Man was spreading throughout the West. Serfs were permanently bound to their owners; they had no rights of movement, and indeed could be arbitrarily moved from one property to another, or exiled to Siberia and then just as arbitrarily returned. The Russian ruling cla.s.s began to measure its status by the numbers of serfs an individual owned. The upper reaches of the Russian n.o.bility were staggeringly rich: Count N. P. Sheremetov owned 185,610 serfs, while his son, Count D. N. Sheremetov, managed to increase that number to more than 300,000. Count Vorontsov owned 54,703 serfs of both s.e.xes at the end of the eighteenth century, while his successor had 37,702 male serfs alone in the decade prior to the abolition of serfdom in the mid-nineteenth century. The rights that Russian lords had over their serfs steadily increased through the end of the eighteenth century, just as the doctrine of the Rights of Man was spreading throughout the West. Serfs were permanently bound to their owners; they had no rights of movement, and indeed could be arbitrarily moved from one property to another, or exiled to Siberia and then just as arbitrarily returned. The Russian ruling cla.s.s began to measure its status by the numbers of serfs an individual owned. The upper reaches of the Russian n.o.bility were staggeringly rich: Count N. P. Sheremetov owned 185,610 serfs, while his son, Count D. N. Sheremetov, managed to increase that number to more than 300,000. Count Vorontsov owned 54,703 serfs of both s.e.xes at the end of the eighteenth century, while his successor had 37,702 male serfs alone in the decade prior to the abolition of serfdom in the mid-nineteenth century.6 Why did the inst.i.tution of serfdom develop so differently in the two halves of Europe? The explanation lies in a combination of economic, demographic, and political factors that made serfdom untenable in the west and highly profitable in the east.

Western Europe was much more densely populated, with three times the population of the east in the year 1300. In the economic boom that had started in the eleventh century, it had also become much more urbanized. The existence of urban centers radiating from northern Italy up through Flanders was first and foremost the product of political weakness and the fact that kings found it useful to protect the independence of cities as a means of undercutting the great territorial lords who were their rivals. Cities were also protected by ancient feudal rights, and the urban tradition from Roman times had never been entirely lost. Thus sheltered, the cities evolved as independent communes that, through growing trade, developed their own resources independent of the manorial economy.7 The existence of free cities in turn made serfdom increasingly difficult to maintain; they were like an internal frontier to which serfs could escape to win their freedom (hence the medieval saying, "Stadtluft macht frei"-City air makes you free). The existence of free cities in turn made serfdom increasingly difficult to maintain; they were like an internal frontier to which serfs could escape to win their freedom (hence the medieval saying, "Stadtluft macht frei"-City air makes you free).8 In the less densely populated parts of Eastern Europe, by contrast, cities were smaller and served more as administrative centers for the existing political powers, as they did in China and the Middle East. In the less densely populated parts of Eastern Europe, by contrast, cities were smaller and served more as administrative centers for the existing political powers, as they did in China and the Middle East.

The trend toward freedom in the west and unfreedom in the east was stimulated by the disastrous population decline that occurred in the fourteenth century as recurring waves of plague and famine struck Western Europe harder and earlier than the east. As economic growth returned in the fifteenth century, Western Europe saw regeneration of towns and cities, which offered sanctuary and economic opportunities that prevented the n.o.bility from squeezing its own peasantry harder. Indeed, to keep labor on the land, lords had to offer peasants greater freedom in what was becoming a modern labor market. The centralizing monarchies of the region found they could weaken their aristocratic rivals by protecting the rights of cities and towns. Increased demand had to be met instead by imports of food and precious metals from Eastern and Central Europe. But east of the Elbe, the weakness of both independent cities and kings permitted the n.o.bility to develop export agriculture on the backs of their own peasantry. In the words of the historian Jeno Szucs, "The regions beyond the Elbe paid, in the long run, for the West's recovery ... The legislative omens of the 'second serfdom' appeared with awesome synchrony in Brandenburg (1494), Poland (1496), Bohemia (1497), Hungary (1492 and 1498), and also in Russia (1497)."9 This, then, is the most salient explanation for the different pattern of peasant rights in the two halves of Europe. In the west, aristocratic power was offset by the existence of cities supported by increasingly powerful kings. In France and Spain, kings eventually prevailed in this long struggle, but the interelite compet.i.tion opened up greater opportunities for peasants and other social actors who had grievances or conflicts with the local lords. In Eastern Europe, cities and kingly power were weak, leaving the n.o.ble cla.s.s a free hand to dominate their peasants. This was the pattern that emerged in Hungary and Poland, where kings were elected by the n.o.ble cla.s.s. States were strong in two places in the east: in Russia from the fifteenth century on, and in Brandenburg-Prussia after the eighteenth century. In both of these cases, however, the state did not act to counter the aristocracy on behalf of the commons. Instead, the state allied itself with the aristocracy against the peasantry and the bourgeoisie, and increased its own power through the recruitment of n.o.bles into its own service.

In later years, peasants would be liberated in sweeping gestures like Tsar Alexander II's emanc.i.p.ation manifesto in 1861. But genuine freedom for nonelites-and this includes not just peasants but also artisans and the bourgeoisie of cities-depended on the existence of deadlock or balance of power among existing elite actors. These nonelite groups were crushed under two circ.u.mstances: when a decentralized oligarchy became too powerful, which was the case in Hungary and Poland, and when the central government became too powerful, the case in Russia.

CONSt.i.tUTIONALISM AND DECLINE IN HUNGARY.

Present-day Hungary const.i.tutes only a truncated portion of what was once an extensive medieval kingdom that at various times included parts of what are now Austria, Poland, Romania, Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia. The Hungarians were a tribal people who invaded Europe toward the end of the first millennium. Comprising seven tribes, the rulers of the leading one, the Megyeri, provided the ruling arpad dynasty. An arpad prince, Istvan, was baptized a Christian and crowned king of Hungary in the year 1000; he oversaw the conversion of the country to Christianity and was later canonized as St. Stephen, Hungary's patron saint.10 The persistent pattern of oligarchic dominance in Hungary was the flip side of the dynastic struggles that consumed the monarchy and weakened it. The monarchy had initially come to possess sizable estates with the dissolution of the tribes' communal property, as well as income from royal mines that gave the Hungarian ruler resources comparable to those of the kings of France and England. Particularly toward the end of the reign of King Bela III (c. 11481196), the Crown began to give away royal estates, large segments of the counties into which the country was organized, income from customs and fairs, and the like. These donations were not feudal grants in exchange for service, as in Western Europe, but rather grants of allodial property owned outright by an emerging cla.s.s of barons. The dissipation of royal property continued through the power struggles among Bela's successors, who vied with each other to bestow gifts on the aristocracy.11 This provided the setting for the proclamation by King Andrew II in 1222 of the Golden Bull Golden Bull, noted earlier.12 It was in fact a const.i.tutional doc.u.ment limiting the king's power, though it was driven by a rather different set of social actors. In the case of the Magna Carta, the powerful English barons, speaking in the name of the entire realm, forced King John to accept limitations on his own authority over them. The Golden Bull was forced not by Hungary's barons but by the cla.s.s of royal soldiers and the garrisons of the counties' castles, who actually wanted the king to protect them from the power of the barons. It was in fact a const.i.tutional doc.u.ment limiting the king's power, though it was driven by a rather different set of social actors. In the case of the Magna Carta, the powerful English barons, speaking in the name of the entire realm, forced King John to accept limitations on his own authority over them. The Golden Bull was forced not by Hungary's barons but by the cla.s.s of royal soldiers and the garrisons of the counties' castles, who actually wanted the king to protect them from the power of the barons.13 The Hungarian church, supported by the powerful post-Gregorian papacy, was also a significant political actor pressing for changes in royal policy. The church wanted to protect its own lands and privileges from further erosion, and also sought the ouster of Muslim and Jewish merchants from the kingdom and their replacement with Christians. The politics of the Golden Bull thus ill.u.s.trated the degree to which Hungarian society was already organized into powerful competing groups outside of the state, including the barons or upper n.o.bility, the lower gentry, and the clergy. The Hungarian church, supported by the powerful post-Gregorian papacy, was also a significant political actor pressing for changes in royal policy. The church wanted to protect its own lands and privileges from further erosion, and also sought the ouster of Muslim and Jewish merchants from the kingdom and their replacement with Christians. The politics of the Golden Bull thus ill.u.s.trated the degree to which Hungarian society was already organized into powerful competing groups outside of the state, including the barons or upper n.o.bility, the lower gentry, and the clergy.14 The first result of this weakness of central authority was Hungary's devastation by the Mongols, who after conquering Russia entered Hungary in 1241.15 King Beling Bela IV had tried to strengthen his hand by inviting large numbers of pagan c.u.mans into Hungary, which enraged the n.o.bles and led them to refuse to fight on his behalf. The c.u.mans failed to fight in any event, and the Hungarian army was then annihilated at the Battle of Mohi. The Mongols occupied the whole of the country and turned back only because they received word of the death of the great khan back in Mongolia. King Beling Bela IV had tried to strengthen his hand by inviting large numbers of pagan c.u.mans into Hungary, which enraged the n.o.bles and led them to refuse to fight on his behalf. The c.u.mans failed to fight in any event, and the Hungarian army was then annihilated at the Battle of Mohi. The Mongols occupied the whole of the country and turned back only because they received word of the death of the great khan back in Mongolia.

Huingary at the beginning of the fourtenth century

Hungary's military vulnerability served to drive some degree of state building.16 The Hungarians had no idea whether the Mongols might return, or indeed whether they might be a.s.saulted by some new invader from the east. Antic.i.p.ating future threats, later kings like Louis I engaged in substantial military operations to extend Hungary's dominion over the Balkans and even as far afield as Naples. The state undertook numerous reforms to protect itself from invasions. This included building a large number of stone castles and fortified cities to replace the wooden and brick structures that had proved to be so vulnerable to the Mongols, and the replacement of the army's light cavalry with more heavily armored knights on a Western European model. The Hungarians had no idea whether the Mongols might return, or indeed whether they might be a.s.saulted by some new invader from the east. Antic.i.p.ating future threats, later kings like Louis I engaged in substantial military operations to extend Hungary's dominion over the Balkans and even as far afield as Naples. The state undertook numerous reforms to protect itself from invasions. This included building a large number of stone castles and fortified cities to replace the wooden and brick structures that had proved to be so vulnerable to the Mongols, and the replacement of the army's light cavalry with more heavily armored knights on a Western European model.

Military pressure led the Hungarian king to promote the interests of the lower gentry. However, this cla.s.s of soldiers and officials was not incorporated directly into the central state structure. Weak kings in later years allowed them to enter the service of the great barons, facilitating the emergence of a single, large n.o.ble cla.s.s. The royal soldiers and castle guardians who had promoted the Golden Bull by the 1300s saw their interests aligned not with the king but with the barons.17 The result was an extremely weak state and a strong society dominated by oligarchic landowning interests. The Hungarian n.o.bility, including the recently enn.o.bled gentry, owned their property outright and had no service obligations to the king. By the end of the arpad dynasty in 1301, the king, although elected, was essentially a figurehead; he could command no significant forces or resources of his own and did not dispose of a powerful centralized bureaucracy. Under the succeeding Angevin dynasty, the process of decentralization was momentarily reversed, but when the Angevin line ended in 1386, the n.o.bility made a quick comeback.

Demonstrating the contingency of human inst.i.tutions, the growth of a powerful state in the princ.i.p.ality of Moscow was aided greatly by the fact that the founding dynasty consistently produced male heirs up through the end of the sixteenth century. Hungary, by contrast, faced repeated succession struggles due to its short-lived dynasties and the foreign origin of many of its kings.18 Royal pretenders gained power only by turning back resources to the n.o.bility; under King Sigismund, a large number of the monarchy's castles reverted to n.o.ble control. Royal pretenders gained power only by turning back resources to the n.o.bility; under King Sigismund, a large number of the monarchy's castles reverted to n.o.ble control.19 Indeed, the n.o.ble estate in Hungary succeeded in inst.i.tutionalizing its power in the form of a diet, whose power exceeded that of the French sovereign courts, the Spanish Cortes, or the Russian zemskiy sobor.20 In antic.i.p.ation of John Locke, the n.o.ble estate "proclaimed their right to defend the welfare of the kingdom even against the king should he seek to act in opposition to the common interest," and even jailed a king on these grounds. In antic.i.p.ation of John Locke, the n.o.ble estate "proclaimed their right to defend the welfare of the kingdom even against the king should he seek to act in opposition to the common interest," and even jailed a king on these grounds.21 The precedent for holding diets went all the way back to the days of the Golden Bull, and by the mid-1400s a national diet met annually and held the power to select kings. Unlike the English Parliament, however, the Hungarian Diet was dominated by the large n.o.ble landowners and represented only the interests of the n.o.ble cla.s.s. In the words of the historian Pal Engel, "The essence of the new system was the radical extension of the right of decision-making, in theory to all the landowners of the kingdom, but in practice to that part of them which was involved in politics-the n.o.bility." The precedent for holding diets went all the way back to the days of the Golden Bull, and by the mid-1400s a national diet met annually and held the power to select kings. Unlike the English Parliament, however, the Hungarian Diet was dominated by the large n.o.ble landowners and represented only the interests of the n.o.ble cla.s.s. In the words of the historian Pal Engel, "The essence of the new system was the radical extension of the right of decision-making, in theory to all the landowners of the kingdom, but in practice to that part of them which was involved in politics-the n.o.bility."22 The cities had earlier been permitted to partic.i.p.ate, but they gradually ceased doing so as their influence waned. The cities had earlier been permitted to partic.i.p.ate, but they gradually ceased doing so as their influence waned.23 (The configuration of political power in medieval Hungary is shown in (The configuration of political power in medieval Hungary is shown in Figure 3 Figure 3.) FIGURE 3. HUNGARY.

The last possibility for creating a more powerful state in Hungary occurred just as the Ottoman threat to the southeast was gathering in the second half of the fifteenth century. Janos Hunyadi, a n.o.ble landowner who was elected regent by the diet in 1446, gained enormous prestige by engineering a series of military victories over the Turks, including a heroic defense of Belgrade in 1456.24 As a result, Janos's son Matyas (Matthias Corvinus) was elected king in 1458, and in the course of a more than thirty-year rule he succeeded in modernizing the central Hungarian state. This included the creation of a powerful Black Army under the direct control of the king, replacing the poorly disciplined, semiprivate n.o.ble armies on which military capacity had been based; the development of the royal chancery and its staffing with university-trained officials, who replaced the old n.o.ble patrimonial officeholders; and the imposition of national customs and direct taxes, and a sharp rise in the tax burden levied by the central government. As a result, Janos's son Matyas (Matthias Corvinus) was elected king in 1458, and in the course of a more than thirty-year rule he succeeded in modernizing the central Hungarian state. This included the creation of a powerful Black Army under the direct control of the king, replacing the poorly disciplined, semiprivate n.o.ble armies on which military capacity had been based; the development of the royal chancery and its staffing with university-trained officials, who replaced the old n.o.ble patrimonial officeholders; and the imposition of national customs and direct taxes, and a sharp rise in the tax burden levied by the central government.25 Using these new instruments of power, Matyas Hunyadi was able to score significant military victories against the Turks in Bosnia and Transylvania, as well as against the Austrians, Poles, and Silesians. Using these new instruments of power, Matyas Hunyadi was able to score significant military victories against the Turks in Bosnia and Transylvania, as well as against the Austrians, Poles, and Silesians.26 Matyas Hunyadi was driven by military necessity to do what other modernizing, absolutist monarchs of the period were doing. But unlike the kings of France and Spain, he still faced a highly powerful and well-organized n.o.ble estate. He was compelled to consult regularly with the diet that elected him. While his military successes forced the n.o.bles to grant him considerable leeway, they resented the increasing tax burden he was imposing on them, as well as the erosion of their influence in decision making. As a result, when Matyas died in 1490, the n.o.bles took back most of the gains made by the central state in the preceding half century. They were angry at their loss of privileges and eager to restore the status quo ante. The barons placed a weak foreign prince on the throne, starved the Black Army of funds, and then sent it into battle against the Turks, whereupon it was destroyed. The n.o.ble estate succeeded in reducing its tax burden by 7080 percent, at the expense of the country's ability to defend itself.

Hungary had reverted to a decentralized, aristocratic mean. The consequence was felt very soon thereafter, when a poorly disciplined n.o.ble-based army was defeated by Suleiman the Magnificent at the Battle of Mohacs in 1526, and the Hungarian king was killed. The spectacle of squabbling barons more interested in pursuing an agenda against the state than defending the country, which had played a role in the Mongol conquest, repeated itself. Hungary lost its independent existence as a nation and was divided up into three parts controlled by the Austrian Habsburgs, the Ottomans, and a Turkish va.s.sal state in Transylvania.

FREEDOM AND OLIGARCHY.

I have covered the case of Hungary in some detail to make a relatively simple point: that political freedom is not necessarily achieved by a strong, cohesive, and well-armed civil society that is able to resist the power of the central government. Nor is it always achieved by a const.i.tutional arrangement that puts strict legal limits on executive authority. Hungary was all of these things, and it succeeded in weakening central authority to the point that the country could not defend itself from a clear and present foreign enemy. A similar situation materialized in Poland, where weak kings were controlled by a n.o.ble council; Poland as well lost its national independence two centuries after Hungary.

Hungary's loss of national independence was not the only type of freedom lost. Hungary was facing, after all, a huge and well-organized Turkish empire that had absorbed most of the neighboring kingdoms and princ.i.p.alities in southeastern Europe. Even a more centralized, modern country might not have been able to withstand the Turkish onslaught. But the weakness of the central Hungarian state condemned the Hungarian peasantry and cities to servitude as well. After the chaos and depopulation brought on by the Mongol invasion, peasants were largely free people, particularly those living on the large royal domains. They had fixed rights and obligations as royal "guests," and could either serve as soldiers or pay a tax in lieu of service. The most important freedom they had was that of movement, as well as the right to elect their own judges and priests.27 But both the lay and ecclesiastical landowners wanted to tie their peasants to the land and turn them into a salable commodity. The transfer