The Origins Of Political Order Part 6

The Persian ideal of absolute monarchy posited a king so powerful that he could impose peace and restrain the armed, rapacious elites that were the major source of conflict and disorder in agrarian societies. Looking at such societies from a modern democratic perspective, we tend to see monarchs in agrarian societies as just other members of a predatory elite, perhaps designated by other oligarchs to protect their rents and interests.12 In fact, there was almost always a three-sided struggle going on in these societies, among the king, an aristocratic or oligarchic elite, and nonelite actors like peasants and townsmen. The king often took the side of the nonelite actors against the oligarchy, both to weaken potential political challenges and to claim his share of tax revenues. In this, we can see the germ of the notion of the monarchy as the representative of a general public interest. In China, we have seen how emperors felt threatened by the growth of latifundia under the control of oligarchic elites and used the power of the state to try to limit or break them up. So in the Sasanian Empire, where absolute monarchy was seen as a bulwark of order against the different elites whose quarrels would hurt the interests of ordinary citizens. There was thus a strong emphasis on the monarch's enforcement of law as a hallmark of justice. In fact, there was almost always a three-sided struggle going on in these societies, among the king, an aristocratic or oligarchic elite, and nonelite actors like peasants and townsmen. The king often took the side of the nonelite actors against the oligarchy, both to weaken potential political challenges and to claim his share of tax revenues. In this, we can see the germ of the notion of the monarchy as the representative of a general public interest. In China, we have seen how emperors felt threatened by the growth of latifundia under the control of oligarchic elites and used the power of the state to try to limit or break them up. So in the Sasanian Empire, where absolute monarchy was seen as a bulwark of order against the different elites whose quarrels would hurt the interests of ordinary citizens. There was thus a strong emphasis on the monarch's enforcement of law as a hallmark of justice.13 In making the transition from a tribal to a state-level society, then, the early Arab rulers had several things going for them. They had a model of absolute monarchy and centralized bureaucratic administration as the norm for the state-level societies that surrounded them. More important, they had a religious ideology that emphasized universal human equality under G.o.d. In a sense, the group that drew the most logical conclusion from the Prophet's teachings was the Kharijites, who established bases of power in Basra and in the Arabian Peninsula. They argued that it did not matter whether the successor to Muhammad was Arab or non-Arab, or what tribe he came from, as long as he was a Muslim. Had Muhammad's successors built upon this idea, they might have tried to create a transnational, multiethnic empire based on ideology rather than kins.h.i.+p along the lines of the Holy Roman Empire. But maintaining the unity of the empire, much less creating a single centralized administration across all of its different parts, proved an uphill task for the Umayyad dynasty. Powerful tribal loyalties trumped purely ideological considerations, and the Muslim state continued to be undermined by kins.h.i.+p quarrels and animosities.

One of the most important of these conflicts broke out shortly after the Prophet's death. Muhammad was part of the Hashemite lineage within the Quraysh tribe, related to a competing lineage, the Umayyads, via a common ancestor, Abd Manaf, great-grandfather of the Prophet. The Umayyads and Hashemites quarreled bitterly before and during the Prophet's lifetime, with the former taking up armed opposition to Muhammad and his Muslim followers in Medina. After the conquest of Mecca, the Umayyads converted to Islam, but the animosity between the lineages continued unabated. Muhammad had no son, but rather a daughter, Fatima, by his favorite wife, Aisha, who married the Prophet's cousin Ali. The third caliph, Uthman, was an Umayyad who brought many of his kinsmen to power, and was later a.s.sa.s.sinated. He was succeeded by Ali, who was himself forced out of Arabia and killed by a Kharijite while praying in Kufa (in present-day Iraq). A series of fitnas fitnas or civil wars broke out among the Hashemites, Kharijites, and Umayyads, with the latter finally consolidating their rule and dynasty after the death of Ali's son Husain at the Battle of Karbala in southern Iraq. The partisans of Ali, who would come to be known as s.h.i.+tes, were legitimists who believed that the caliphate should have been awarded to Muhammad's direct descendants. or civil wars broke out among the Hashemites, Kharijites, and Umayyads, with the latter finally consolidating their rule and dynasty after the death of Ali's son Husain at the Battle of Karbala in southern Iraq. The partisans of Ali, who would come to be known as s.h.i.+tes, were legitimists who believed that the caliphate should have been awarded to Muhammad's direct descendants.14 The followers of the Umayyad caliph Mu'awiya would evolve into the Sunnis, who claimed to be the partisans of orthodox theory and practice. The followers of the Umayyad caliph Mu'awiya would evolve into the Sunnis, who claimed to be the partisans of orthodox theory and practice.15 The great split between Sunnis and s.h.i.+tes, which in the twenty-first century still leads to car bombings and terrorist attacks on mosques, originated as an Arab tribal rivalry. The great split between Sunnis and s.h.i.+tes, which in the twenty-first century still leads to car bombings and terrorist attacks on mosques, originated as an Arab tribal rivalry.

The early caliphs tried to create state structures that transcended tribal loyalties, particularly in the army, where units of tens and hundreds were created that spanned tribal boundaries. But in the words of one historian, the new Muslim elite "realized that the tribal identification was too well rooted in Arabian society simply to be abolished by decree or swept aside by a few measures that tended to transcend the exclusiveness of the tribal bond. The success of their integration of the tribesmen into a state, then, depended as much upon their ability to use tribal ties for their own ends as it did upon their ability to override those ties."16 As the Americans occupying Iraq's Anbar province after the 2003 invasion discovered, it was easier to control tribal fighters using the traditional authority of the tribal chief than to create new impersonal units that did not take account of underlying social realities. A tribesman who quarreled with his commanding officer might simply decide to slip away and return to his kinsmen; not so if his officer was also his sheikh. As the Americans occupying Iraq's Anbar province after the 2003 invasion discovered, it was easier to control tribal fighters using the traditional authority of the tribal chief than to create new impersonal units that did not take account of underlying social realities. A tribesman who quarreled with his commanding officer might simply decide to slip away and return to his kinsmen; not so if his officer was also his sheikh.

But a state built on tribal foundations is inherently weak and unstable. Tribal leaders were famously touchy and ill disciplined, often disappearing with their kinsmen as a result of a slight or quarrel. The early caliphs were highly distrustful of tribal leaders they had recruited and often refused to put them in important command positions. The new state was moreover constantly threatened by unincorporated tribal nomads, for whom the Muslim leaders.h.i.+p felt considerable disdain; the caliph Uthman was said to have dismissed the opinion of an important tribal leader as the word of an "imbecile Bedouin."17 THE ORIGINS OF MILITARY SLAVERY.

The system of military slavery was developed in the Abbasid dynasty in the mid-ninth century as a means of overcoming the persistent weaknesses of tribal levies as the basis of Muslim military power.18 The Abbasids, who were of the Hashemite lineage, deposed the Umayyads in 750 with the help of s.h.i.+te and Khorasani forces based in Persia, and moved the capital from Damascus to Baghdad. The Abbasids, who were of the Hashemite lineage, deposed the Umayyads in 750 with the help of s.h.i.+te and Khorasani forces based in Persia, and moved the capital from Damascus to Baghdad.19 The early Abbasids were ruthless in their use of force to consolidate their rule, wiping out as much of the Umayyad lineage as they could and suppressing their erstwhile s.h.i.+te and Khorasani allies. State centralization increased, with the concentration of power in the hands of a prime minister known as a vizier. The size and luxury of the court grew as well, increasing the separation between the settled, urban empire and the tribal areas from which they sprang. The early Abbasids were ruthless in their use of force to consolidate their rule, wiping out as much of the Umayyad lineage as they could and suppressing their erstwhile s.h.i.+te and Khorasani allies. State centralization increased, with the concentration of power in the hands of a prime minister known as a vizier. The size and luxury of the court grew as well, increasing the separation between the settled, urban empire and the tribal areas from which they sprang.20 Early on, the Abbasid rulers had intimations that military slavery might be a way of overcoming the fickleness of political power based on kins.h.i.+p ties. The caliph al-Mahdi (775785) gave preference to a group of mawali mawali, or manumitted slaves, over kinsmen or his Khurasani allies as servants or a.s.sistants, explaining that

when I sit in a public audience, I may call a Mawla Mawla and raise him and seat him by my side, so that his knee will rub my knee. As soon, however, as the audience is over, I may order him to groom my riding animal, and he will be content with this, and will not take offence. But if I demand the same thing from somebody else, he will say: "I am the son of your supporter and intimate a.s.sociate," or "I am a veteran in your [Abbasid] cause ( and raise him and seat him by my side, so that his knee will rub my knee. As soon, however, as the audience is over, I may order him to groom my riding animal, and he will be content with this, and will not take offence. But if I demand the same thing from somebody else, he will say: "I am the son of your supporter and intimate a.s.sociate," or "I am a veteran in your [Abbasid] cause (da'wa)" or "I am the son of those who were the first to join your [Abbasid] cause." And I shall not be able to move him from his [obstinate] stand.21

Arab expansion under the early Caliphates

But the use of foreigners as the core of the state's military power did not come until the conquest of Transoxania in Central Asia under the caliphs al-Ma'mun (813833) and al-Mu'tasim (833842), when large numbers of Turkish tribesmen were incorporated into the empire. Arab expansion was checked when they ran into Turkish tribes living in the Central Asian steppe, whose superior fighting abilities many Arab authors recognized.22 But the Turks could not be recruited as tribal units to fight on the caliph's behalf, since they too shared in the defects of tribal organization. Rather, they were taken as individual slaves and trained as soldiers in a nontribal army. Al-Ma'mun created a guard of four thousand Turkish slaves known as Mamluks, a core that grew to nearly seventy thousand under al-Mu'tasim. But the Turks could not be recruited as tribal units to fight on the caliph's behalf, since they too shared in the defects of tribal organization. Rather, they were taken as individual slaves and trained as soldiers in a nontribal army. Al-Ma'mun created a guard of four thousand Turkish slaves known as Mamluks, a core that grew to nearly seventy thousand under al-Mu'tasim. 23 23 These tribesmen were tough nomads, recently converted to Islam and full of enthusiasm for the Muslim cause. They became the core of the Abbasid army "because of their superiority over other races in prowess, valour, courage, and intrepidity." One observer of al-Ma'mun's campaigns saw These tribesmen were tough nomads, recently converted to Islam and full of enthusiasm for the Muslim cause. They became the core of the Abbasid army "because of their superiority over other races in prowess, valour, courage, and intrepidity." One observer of al-Ma'mun's campaigns saw

two lines of hors.e.m.e.n on both sides of the road near the halting place ... . The line on the right-hand side of the road was composed of 100 Turkish hors.e.m.e.n. The line on the left-hand side of the road was composed of 100 hors.e.m.e.n of "others" [i.e., Arabs] ... All were arrayed in battle-order, awaiting the arrival of Ma'mun ... It was midday and the heat became intense. When Ma'mun reached the place he found all the Turks sitting on the backs of their horses, with the exception of three or four, whereas "all that medley" ... have thrown themselves on the ground.24

Al-Mu'tasim organized the Turks into a Mamluk regiment and moved the capital from Baghdad to Samara because of violence between the local inhabitants and the Turkish fighters. He gave them special training in their own academies, bought Turkish slave girls for them to marry, and forbade them from mixing with any local people, thus creating a military caste sharply separated from its surrounding society.25 The idea that there is a tension between loyalty to the family and a just political order goes back a long way in Western political philosophy. Plato's Republic Republic is a discussion between the philosopher Socrates and a group of young men about the nature of a "just city" that they are attempting to create "in speech." Socrates leads them to agree that the just city would need a cla.s.s of guardians who are particularly spirited or proud in their defense of the city. The guardians are warriors whose first principle is to do good to friends and harm to enemies; they must be carefully trained to be public-spirited through the proper use of music and gymnastics. is a discussion between the philosopher Socrates and a group of young men about the nature of a "just city" that they are attempting to create "in speech." Socrates leads them to agree that the just city would need a cla.s.s of guardians who are particularly spirited or proud in their defense of the city. The guardians are warriors whose first principle is to do good to friends and harm to enemies; they must be carefully trained to be public-spirited through the proper use of music and gymnastics.

Book V of the Republic Republic contains the famous discussion of the communism of women and children of the guardians. Socrates points out that s.e.xual desire and the desire for children are natural, but that ties to the family compete with loyalty to the city that the guardians protect. It is for that reason, he argues, that they must be told the "n.o.ble lie" that they are children of the earth, and not of biological parents. He argues that they must live in common, and that they not be allowed to marry individual women but rather have s.e.x with different partners and raise their children in common. The natural family is the enemy of the public good: contains the famous discussion of the communism of women and children of the guardians. Socrates points out that s.e.xual desire and the desire for children are natural, but that ties to the family compete with loyalty to the city that the guardians protect. It is for that reason, he argues, that they must be told the "n.o.ble lie" that they are children of the earth, and not of biological parents. He argues that they must live in common, and that they not be allowed to marry individual women but rather have s.e.x with different partners and raise their children in common. The natural family is the enemy of the public good:

So, as I am saying, doesn't what was said before and what's being said now form them into true guardians, still more and cause them not to draw the city apart by not all giving the name "my own" to the same thing, but different men giving it to different things-one man dragging off to his own house whatever he can get his hands on apart from the others, another being separate in his own house with separate women and children, introducing private pleasures and griefs of things that are private?26

It is not at all clear that either Socrates or Plato believed that such a communism is possible; indeed, Socrates' interlocutors later express considerable skepticism as to whether the just city "in speech" can be constructed as a real city. The purpose of the discussion was to highlight the permanent tensions that exist between people's private kins.h.i.+p ties and their obligations to a broader public political order. The implication is that any successful order needs to suppress the power of kins.h.i.+p through some mechanism that makes the guardians value their ties to the state over their love for their families.

It is doubtful whether al-Ma'mun, al-Mu'tasim, or any of the other early Muslim leaders read Plato or knew of his ideas. But the inst.i.tution of military slavery responded to the same imperatives as Plato's just city. The slaves were not told they were born of the earth; rather, they were born very far away and told they had no other loyalty than to their caliph, who was the embodiment of the state and the public interest. The slaves did not know their biological parents; they knew their master only and were intensely loyal to him alone. They were given nondescript new names, usually Turkish, that left them unconnected to any lineage in a society based on lineage. They did not practice a communism of women and children, but they were segregated from Arab society and not allowed to sink roots into it. In particular, they were not permitted to set up private households to which they could drag off "whatever they could get their hands on"; the problem of nepotism and conflicting tribal loyalties that was pervasive in traditional Arab society was thus overcome.

The development of the Mamluks as a military inst.i.tution came too late in the Abbasid dynasty to secure its position or prevent its decline. Already by the mid-ninth century the empire was breaking down into a series of independent sovereignties. This began in 756 when a fleeing Umayyad prince set up an independent caliphate in Spain. In the late eighth and early ninth centuries, independent dynasties were established in Morocco and Tunisia, as well as in eastern Iran in the late ninth and early tenth centuries. By the mid-tenth century, Egypt, Syria, and Arabia were lost as well, reducing the Abbasid state to ruling only over parts of Iraq. Never again would an Arab regime, dynastic or modern, unite either the Muslim or Arab worlds. This would happen only under the Turkish Ottomans.

But while the Abbasid empire did not survive, the inst.i.tution of military slavery did, and in fact became crucial to the survival of Islam itself in subsequent centuries. Three new power centers emerged, each based on the effectiveness of military slavery. The first was the Ghaznavid empire centered in Ghazni (Afghanistan), discussed in the previous chapter, which united parts of eastern Persia and Central Asia. The Ghaznavids penetrated northern India and paved the way for the Muslim domination of the subcontinent. The second was the Mamluk sultanate in Egypt, which played a crucial role in stopping both the Christian Crusaders and the Mongols, and in so doing arguably saved Islam as a world religion. And finally there were the Ottomans themselves, who perfected the inst.i.tution of military slavery and used it as the basis for their rise as a world power. In all three cases, military slavery solved the problem of creating a durable military instrument in what were fundamentally tribal societies. But in the Ghaznavid and Egyptian Mamluk cases, the inst.i.tution declined because kins.h.i.+p and patrimonialism reinserted themselves within the Mamluk inst.i.tution itself. Moreover, the Mamluks, as the most powerful social inst.i.tution in Egyptian society, failed to remain under civilian control and succeeded in taking over the state in a manner prefiguring the military dictators.h.i.+ps of twentieth-century developing countries. Only the Ottomans saw clearly the need to banish patrimonialism from their state machinery, which they did for nearly three centuries. They also kept the military under firm civilian control. But they too began to decline when patrimonialism and the hereditary principle rea.s.serted themselves from the late seventeenth century onward.

14.

THE MAMLUKS SAVE ISLAM.

How the Mamluks came to power in Egypt; the curious fact that power in the Arab Middle East lay in the hands of Turkish slaves; how the Mamluks saved Islam from the Crusaders and Mongols; defects in the Mamluk implementation of military slavery that led to the regime's ultimate decline

The inst.i.tution of military slavery anch.o.r.ed Muslim power in Egypt and Syria for three hundred years, from the end of the Ayyubid dynasty in 1250 up to 1517, when the Mamluk sultanate was defeated by the Ottomans. Today we take the existence of Islam and a large global community of Muslims-now numbering about a billion and a half people-for granted. But the spread of Islam did not depend simply on the appeal of its underlying religious ideas. It depended also very much on political power. The extent of Muslim belief was determined in the first instance by Muslim armies waging jihad, or holy war, against nonbelievers in the Dar-ul Harb (Land of War), bringing them into the Dar al-Islam (Land of Islam). Just as the Muslims themselves eliminated Christianity and Zoroastrianism as major religions in the Middle East, so too might Islam have been relegated to the status of a minor sect had the Christian Crusaders succeeded in dominating the region, or had the Mongols swept all the way to North Africa. The border of Muslim communities in the northern parts of Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Togo, and Ghana was determined by the reach of Muslim armies. The countries of Pakistan and Bangladesh, and the sizable Muslim minority in India, might not exist but for the fighting ability of Muslim armies. That military prowess in turn did not emerge only on the basis of a fanatical commitment to religion. It was based on states that were able to organize effective inst.i.tutions to concentrate and use power-and above all, the inst.i.tution of military slavery.

The opinion that the survival of Islam itself depended on the use of military slavery was shared by the great Arab historian and philosopher Ibn Khaldun, who lived in North Africa in the fourteenth century, contemporaneously with the Mamluk sultanate in Egypt. In the Muqadimmah Muqadimmah, Ibn Khaldun says the following:

When the [Abbasid] state was drowned in decadence and luxury and donned the garments of calamity and impotence and was overthrown by the heathen Tatars, who abolished the seat of the Caliphate and obliterated the splendor of the lands and made unbelief prevail in place of belief, because the people of the faith, sunk in self-indulgence, preoccupied with pleasure and abandoned to luxury, had become deficient in energy and reluctant to rally in defense, and had stripped off the skin of courage and the emblem of manhood-then, it was G.o.d's benevolence that He rescued the faith by reviving its dying breath and restoring the unity of the Muslims in the Egyptian realms, preserving the order and defending the walls of Islam. He did this by sending to the Muslims, from this Turkish nation and from among its great and numerous tribes, rulers to defend them and utterly loyal helpers, who were brought from the House of War to the House of Islam under the rule of slavery, which hides in itself a divine blessing. By means of slavery they learn glory and blessing and are exposed to divine providence; cured by slavery, they enter the Muslim religion with the firm resolve of true believers and yet with nomadic virtues unsullied by debased nature, unadulterated with the filth of pleasure, undefiled by the ways of civilized living, and with their ardor unbroken by the profusion of luxury.1

The Mamluk inst.i.tution was created at the end of the Kurdish Ayyubid dynasty that ruled Egypt and Syria briefly in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, and whose most famous offspring was Salah al-Din, known in the West as Saladin. The Ayyubids had used Turkish slave soldiers in their wars against the Crusaders in Palestine and Syria, but it was the last sultan, al-Salih Ayyub, who created the Bahri regiment, named after a fortress on an island in the Nile River where it was headquartered. He reportedly turned to the Turks because of the unreliability of his Kurdish soldiers.2 The regiment, consisting of eight hundred to one thousand cavalry soldiers, were slaves of primarily Kipchak Turkish origin. Turkish tribes like the Kipchaks were coming to play an increasing role in the Middle East due to the pressure they were feeling from another powerful group of pastoral nomads, the Mongols, who were pus.h.i.+ng them out of their traditional tribal ranges in Central Asia. The regiment, consisting of eight hundred to one thousand cavalry soldiers, were slaves of primarily Kipchak Turkish origin. Turkish tribes like the Kipchaks were coming to play an increasing role in the Middle East due to the pressure they were feeling from another powerful group of pastoral nomads, the Mongols, who were pus.h.i.+ng them out of their traditional tribal ranges in Central Asia.

The Bahri regiment proved its fighting abilities very early on. The French king Louis IX launched the Seventh Crusade, landing in Egypt in 1249. He was met and defeated the following year by the Bahri regiment, led by a Kipchak Turk named Baybars who had been captured by the Mongols, sold as a slave in Syria, and recruited as a leader of the new Mamluk force. The Crusaders were expelled from Egypt, and Louis had to be ransomed for an amount equal to a year's national product of France.

Baybars and the Bahri regiment won a far more important victory, however, when they defeated a Mongol army at the Battle of Ayn Jalut in Palestine in 1260. The Mongol tribes, united by Genghis Khan prior to his death in 1227, had conquered much of Eurasia by this point. They destroyed the Jin Dynasty, which had been ruling the northern third of China in the 1230s, defeated the Khwarazm empire in central Asia, as well as kingdoms in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia the same decade; invaded and occupied much of Russia, sacking the city of Kiev in 1240; and advanced into Eastern and Central Europe in the 1240s. They were stopped there not so much by the power of Christian armies, but because the Great Khan Ogedei (Genghis's son) died and the Mongol commander withdrew to consult over the succession. Hulagu Khan, grandson of Genghis, had been ordered to conquer the Middle East by his brother the Great Khan Mongke in 1255. He occupied Iran, where he established the Ilkhanid dynasty, and pushed on toward Syria with the intention of eventually conquering Egypt. Baghdad was occupied and utterly devastated in 1258, and the last Abbasid caliph executed there.

The Mamluk victory at Ayn Jalut was partly due to numbers, since Hulagu had to withdraw with the bulk of his army on the death of Mongke. Nonetheless, he left a substantial force under one of his best commanders to attack the Mamluks. The Mongols were superb tacticians and strategists, using their high degree of mobility and lean logistics trains to maneuver around their enemies. The Mamluks, by contrast, were better equipped, riding larger horses than the Mongols' ponies, having heavier armor and bows, lances, and swords. They were also extremely well disciplined.3 The victory at Ayn Jalut was no fluke: the Mamluks defended Syria from the Ilkhanids in a series of battles until the end of the war in 1281, and fended off three further Mongol invasions, in 1299, 1300, and 1303. The victory at Ayn Jalut was no fluke: the Mamluks defended Syria from the Ilkhanids in a series of battles until the end of the war in 1281, and fended off three further Mongol invasions, in 1299, 1300, and 1303.4 Mamluk sultanate, Bahir dynasty, 12501392

The Mamluks had displaced the Ayyubids and taken power in their own right at the beginning of the war with the Ilkhanids, with Baybars as their first sultan.5 The regime that was set up on the basis of Mamluk power was far more stable than the previous dynasty. Though Saladin was a great military leader and hero to the Muslims, the polity he a.s.sembled was extremely fragile. It was more a federation of princ.i.p.alities based on kins.h.i.+p links than a state, and its army was not a loyal servant of the dynasty. On Saladin's death, his army disintegrated into a group of competing militias. By contrast, the Mamluks ran a real state, with a centralized bureaucracy and a professional army-indeed, the army The regime that was set up on the basis of Mamluk power was far more stable than the previous dynasty. Though Saladin was a great military leader and hero to the Muslims, the polity he a.s.sembled was extremely fragile. It was more a federation of princ.i.p.alities based on kins.h.i.+p links than a state, and its army was not a loyal servant of the dynasty. On Saladin's death, his army disintegrated into a group of competing militias. By contrast, the Mamluks ran a real state, with a centralized bureaucracy and a professional army-indeed, the army was was the state, which was both a strength and a weakness. the state, which was both a strength and a weakness.6 The Mamluks did not divide the state in any way, or give away parts of it as appanages to kinsmen or royal favorites the way the Ayyubids did. Syria did not quickly split off from Egypt under the Mamluks, the way it did after the death of Saladin. The Mamluks did not divide the state in any way, or give away parts of it as appanages to kinsmen or royal favorites the way the Ayyubids did. Syria did not quickly split off from Egypt under the Mamluks, the way it did after the death of Saladin.7 The inst.i.tution of Mamluk slavery was further strengthened under the Egyptian Mamluk regime. Key to its success was the sultanate's ability to capture fresh waves of new recruits from the Central Asian steppe and from the Byzantine lands to the north and northwest. Some of the recruits were Muslim already, others were still pagan, and others Christian. The process of conversion to Islam was vital to remaking their loyalties and tying them to their new masters. Key too was the fact that the recruits were completely cut off from access to or communication with their families and tribes. As a result of their boyhood training, they acquired a new family, the family of the sultan and the Mamluk brotherhood.8 Eunuchs played a critical role in the functioning of the system as well. Unlike eunuchs in China or the Byzantine Empire, Muslim eunuchs were almost all foreigners who were born outside of Muslim lands. In the words of one observer, "No Muslim had ever given birth to him. Neither did he ever give birth to a Muslim."9 Unlike the Mamluks, who were almost all Turkish or European, the eunuchs could be black Africans recruited from Nubia or other places to the south of the empire. They shared with the Mamluks the situation of being cut off from their families and hence were devotedly loyal to their masters. But their s.e.xual condition allowed them to play an important function as educators of young Mamluks. The latter were chosen in part for their physical beauty, as well as for their strength and military prowess; as a military fraternity with restricted access to women, h.o.m.os.e.xual advances by older Mamluks were a constant problem against which the eunuchs could act as a barrier. Unlike the Mamluks, who were almost all Turkish or European, the eunuchs could be black Africans recruited from Nubia or other places to the south of the empire. They shared with the Mamluks the situation of being cut off from their families and hence were devotedly loyal to their masters. But their s.e.xual condition allowed them to play an important function as educators of young Mamluks. The latter were chosen in part for their physical beauty, as well as for their strength and military prowess; as a military fraternity with restricted access to women, h.o.m.os.e.xual advances by older Mamluks were a constant problem against which the eunuchs could act as a barrier. 10 10 In addition to the way they were educated, a key to the success of the Mamluks as a political inst.i.tution was the fact that they were a one-generation n.o.bility. They could not pa.s.s on their Mamluk status to their children; their sons would be ejected into the general population and their grandsons would enjoy no special privileges at all. The theory behind this was straightforward: a Muslim could not be a slave, and all of the Mamluks' children were born Muslims. Moreover, the Mamluk children were born in the city and raised without the rigors of nomadic life on the steppe, where the weak died young. Were Mamluk status to become hereditary, it would violate the strict meritocratic grounds on which young Mamluks were selected.11 MAMLUK DECAY.

There were at least two problems in the design of Mamluk political inst.i.tutions that weakened them over time. The first was that there was no well-inst.i.tutionalized governance mechanism within the Mamluk fraternity itself. There was a hierarchical chain of command descending from the sultan but no clear rules for selection of a sultan. Indeed, there were two competing principles at play, a dynastic principle in which rule was pa.s.sed down to a son chosen by the current sultan, and a nonhereditary one under which the various Mamluk factions sought to reach consensus even as they jockeyed for power.12 The latter was the more powerful; sultans often acted as figureheads chosen by the senior emirs who headed the factions. The latter was the more powerful; sultans often acted as figureheads chosen by the senior emirs who headed the factions.

The second key defect in the structure of the Mamluk state was the lack of an overarching political authority. The Mamluks were created as the Ayyubid's military instrument, but when the last Ayyubid sultan died, the Mamluks stepped forward and took over the state themselves. This created a kind of reverse agency problem. In most political hierarchies, princ.i.p.als hold authority and delegate the implementation of their policies to agents whom they appoint. Many governance dysfunctions arise because the agents have different agendas from the princ.i.p.als, and the problem of inst.i.tutional design is related to incentivizing the agents to do the princ.i.p.als' bidding.13 In the Mamluk case, by contrast, the agents were were the princ.i.p.als; they were simultaneously part of a military hierarchy serving the sultan and contenders for the role of sultan. This meant that they had to do their jobs as officers while conspiring to gain power and weaken the influence of rival Mamluks. This naturally had a terrible effect on discipline and hierarchy, not unlike the situation that emerges in contemporary developing countries run by military juntas. This problem became acute in 1399, when the Mongol Tamerlane invaded Syria and sacked Aleppo; the Mamluks were too busy feuding with each other to mount a defense, and retreated to Cairo. They also lost control of Upper Egypt to the local tribes there, and were saved in the end only by the fact that Tamerlane needed to turn his attention to the threat posed by a new power, the Ottomans. the princ.i.p.als; they were simultaneously part of a military hierarchy serving the sultan and contenders for the role of sultan. This meant that they had to do their jobs as officers while conspiring to gain power and weaken the influence of rival Mamluks. This naturally had a terrible effect on discipline and hierarchy, not unlike the situation that emerges in contemporary developing countries run by military juntas. This problem became acute in 1399, when the Mongol Tamerlane invaded Syria and sacked Aleppo; the Mamluks were too busy feuding with each other to mount a defense, and retreated to Cairo. They also lost control of Upper Egypt to the local tribes there, and were saved in the end only by the fact that Tamerlane needed to turn his attention to the threat posed by a new power, the Ottomans.14 Had the Mamluks been subordinated to a civilian political authority, as was the case in the Ottoman Empire, the civilians could have taken steps to fix this problem. Had the Mamluks been subordinated to a civilian political authority, as was the case in the Ottoman Empire, the civilians could have taken steps to fix this problem.15 It was the decay of the antihereditary principle that eventually led to the breakdown of the Egyptian Mamluk state. As time went on, hereditary succession came to be practiced not just within the sultan's family but by other Mamluks as well who sought to establish dynasties of their own. The one-generation n.o.bility principle worked against the basic imperatives of human biology, just as the impersonal Chinese examination system did: each Mamluk sought to protect the social position of his family and descendants. Wealthy Mamluks found they could get around the one-generation principle by endowing Islamic charities or waqfs waqfs in the form of mosques, madra.s.sas (schools), hospitals, or other kinds of trusts, putting their descendants in charge of their administration. in the form of mosques, madra.s.sas (schools), hospitals, or other kinds of trusts, putting their descendants in charge of their administration.16 Furthermore, while Mamluks had no immediate family, they developed ethnic ties as a basis for solidarity. Sultan Qalawun began importing Circa.s.sian and Abkhaz slaves rather than Kipchaks and formed them into an alternative Burji regiment. The Circa.s.sian faction was ultimately to take over the sultanate from the Kipchaks. Furthermore, while Mamluks had no immediate family, they developed ethnic ties as a basis for solidarity. Sultan Qalawun began importing Circa.s.sian and Abkhaz slaves rather than Kipchaks and formed them into an alternative Burji regiment. The Circa.s.sian faction was ultimately to take over the sultanate from the Kipchaks.17 Serious deterioration of the Mamluk inst.i.tution was evident by the middle of the fourteenth century. The background condition was actually the peace and prosperity of the time, which had a disastrous effect on Mamluk discipline. The Christian presence in the Holy Land had largely disappeared by this time, and the Mamluks signed a peace treaty with the Mongols in 1323. The sultan al-Nasir Muhammad, himself not a Mamluk, began appointing non-Mamluks loyal to himself to senior military positions and purging the ranks of capable officers whose loyalty he doubted.18 The regime was briefly reinvigorated with the rise of Sultan Barquq in 1390, who came to power with the help of the Burji or Circa.s.sian Mamluks and restored the old system of foreign recruitment. But problems of a different sort emerged when later sultans, using resources from a number of state monopolies, greatly expanded the recruitment of younger Mamluks, which created a generational rift. The older Mamluks began to evolve into a military aristocracy, beating back the challenge from the younger recruits and, like tenured professors in contemporary American universities, entrenching their positions in the hierarchy. The average age of senior emirs began to rise, the turnover of personnel slowed markedly, and the elder aristocracy began dividing up into clans. Mamluks started to promote their families and establish their status through sumptuous displays of wealth, and women began to play a greater role in promoting the interests of their offspring. Thus the Mamluk system, which was originally created to overcome tribalism in military recruitment, managed to retribalize itself.19 The new tribes were not necessarily kins.h.i.+p based, but they reflected a deep-seated human urge to promote and protect the interests of descendants, friends, and clients against the requirements of an impersonal social system. The new tribes were not necessarily kins.h.i.+p based, but they reflected a deep-seated human urge to promote and protect the interests of descendants, friends, and clients against the requirements of an impersonal social system.

As time went on, the Mamluk system degenerated from a centralized state to something resembling a rent-seeking coalition of warlord factions. The younger Mamluks were no longer bound by ties of personal loyalty to their sultan. They had become, in the words of one historian,

an interest group whose field reliability was dubious but whose propensity for revolt was endemic. The chronicles compiled from daily accounts of events in Cairo during the sultanate's final decades tell a tale of unremitting pressure on the monarch for payments in return for a modic.u.m of domestic tranquility. Pillaging by his mamluk recruits ... greeted al-Ghawri [a late sultan] on the day of his accession; the trainees burned the palaces of five senior officers, a gesture of their irritation over their perception of low wages received, in contrast to the immense fortunes grand amirs routinely ama.s.sed.20

The moral ties that had bound the Mamluks to earlier sultans were replaced by a purely economic calculus. Senior Mamluks bought the loyalty of junior recruits, who then expected their patrons to reward them through their ability to extract rents from the state or from the civilian population. The sultan was simply the first among equals; several had been a.s.sa.s.sinated or removed by Mamluk cliques, and all of the later sultans had to watch their backs for conspiracies.

In addition to political instability, the regime faced a fiscal crisis in the late fifteenth century. As a result of disruption of the spice trade by Portuguese naval primacy in the Indian Ocean, the sultan's revenues began to decline toward the end of the fourteenth century and he turned to increasingly higher rates of taxation. This then compelled economic agents-farmers, traders, and craftsmen-to hone their skills in hiding a.s.sets and evading taxes. The civilian bureaucrats who administered the tax system lowered tax rates in return for kickbacks; the result was that higher attempted tax rates yielded lower actual levels of tax revenues. The regime resorted to sweeping confiscations of whatever a.s.sets could be found, including those of the charitable Islamic waqfs that Mamluk grandees had used to shelter wealth for their descendants.21 STATES AS ORGANIZED CRIMINALS.

A number of political scientists have compared the early modern European state to organized crime. They mean that rulers of states seek to use their expertise in the organization of violence to extract resources from the rest of the society, what economists call rents.22 Other writers use the term "predatory state" to describe a range of more recent developing world regimes like Zaire under Mobutu Sese Seko or Liberia under Charles Taylor. In a predatory state, the elites in charge seek to extract the highest level of resources they can from the underlying society and divert them to their own private uses. The reason these elites seek power in the first place is the access that power gives them to economic rents. Other writers use the term "predatory state" to describe a range of more recent developing world regimes like Zaire under Mobutu Sese Seko or Liberia under Charles Taylor. In a predatory state, the elites in charge seek to extract the highest level of resources they can from the underlying society and divert them to their own private uses. The reason these elites seek power in the first place is the access that power gives them to economic rents.23 There is no question that some states are highly predatory, and that all states are predatory to some degree. An important question in understanding political development, however, is whether all states seek to maximize rents from predation, or whether they are driven by other considerations to extract rents at a level well below the theoretical maximum. This predatory, rent-maximizing model of state behavior was not necessarily characteristic of mature agrarian societies like Ottoman Turkey, Ming China, or France under the Old Regime. But it is certainly an accurate picture of certain political orders, such as the conquest regimes set up by tribal nomads like the Mongols. And it increasingly came to characterize the late Mamluk regime. The confiscatory and arbitrary taxes imposed by Mamluk sultans clearly made any long-term investment unthinkable and induced property owners to put their a.s.sets into less than optimally productive uses like religious waqfs. It is interesting to speculate whether commercial capitalism was thereby smothered in its crib in Egypt, just at a moment when it was beginning to take off in other places such as Italy, the Netherlands, and England.24 On the other hand, the fact that these high levels of taxation were reached only toward the end of a three-hundred-year period of rule by the Egyptian Mamluks suggests that earlier sultans were taxing at levels well below the highest possible rate. In other words, maximum rent extraction was not an inevitable characteristic of premodern states ruling over agrarian societies. In the Persian theory of the Middle Eastern state that was adopted by the Arabs, one of the monarch's functions was in fact to protect the peasantry from the rapacious behavior of landlords and other elites who wanted to maximize their rents, in the interests of justice and political stability. The state was thus less a stationary bandit than a guardian of an incipient public interest. The Mamluk state was eventually driven to fully predatory behavior, but only by a constellation of internal and external forces.

There were many causes contributing to the political decay of the Mamluk regime and its destruction at the hands of the Ottomans in 1517. Egypt endured twenty-six years of plagues between 1388 and 1514. One of the immediate consequences of the rise of the Ottomans was that it became harder and harder for the Mamluks to recruit young slave-soldiers since the Ottomans sat directly astride the trade routes to Central Asia. And finally, the Mamluk system proved too inflexible to adopt new military technologies, particularly the use of firearms by infantry forces. The Ottomans, facing a European enemy, began to use firearms in 1425, perhaps a century after the innovation was first explored in Europe.25 They quickly mastered these weapons, and cannons played a key role in the fall of Constantinople in 1453. The Mamluks, by contrast, did not seriously begin to experiment with firearms until the sultanate of Qansuh al-Ghawri (15011516), just prior to their defeat by the Ottomans. The Mamluk cavalry found the use of firearms beneath their dignity, and the regime was constrained by its lack of access to iron and copper deposits. After some abortive tests (in one, fifteen of fifteen cannons exploded on being fired), the sultanate managed to deploy a limited number of cannons and recruited a non-Mamluk Fifth Corps armed with muskets. They quickly mastered these weapons, and cannons played a key role in the fall of Constantinople in 1453. The Mamluks, by contrast, did not seriously begin to experiment with firearms until the sultanate of Qansuh al-Ghawri (15011516), just prior to their defeat by the Ottomans. The Mamluk cavalry found the use of firearms beneath their dignity, and the regime was constrained by its lack of access to iron and copper deposits. After some abortive tests (in one, fifteen of fifteen cannons exploded on being fired), the sultanate managed to deploy a limited number of cannons and recruited a non-Mamluk Fifth Corps armed with muskets.26 But these technological innovations came too late to save a cash-strapped, corrupt, and tradition-bound regime. But these technological innovations came too late to save a cash-strapped, corrupt, and tradition-bound regime.

The Ayyubid sultan who recruited the initial Bahri regiment was trying to solve the same problem as the early Chinese state builders: how to create an army that would be loyal to the state, represented by his person, rather than to their tribe, in a highly tribal society. He did this by buying young foreigners and breaking their loyalties to their families. Once they entered the Mamluk slave family, promotion within the Mamluk hierarchy was done on a meritocratic basis; new entrants would feed into the system every year and rise on the basis of ability. The military machine built on this basis was very impressive. It was able to withstand a twogeneration-long war with the Mongols, expel the Crusaders from the Holy Land, and defend Egypt from Tamerlane. As Ibn Khaldun said, the Mamluks saved Islam itself at a historical moment when the religion might have been marginalized.

On the other hand, the design of the Mamluk inst.i.tution contained the seeds of its own undoing. The Mamluks took power directly, rather than remaining agents of the state. There was no princ.i.p.al to discipline them; each Mamluk could aspire to become sultan himself and spent time conniving to achieve power. A dynastic principle reinserted itself early on among the top leaders.h.i.+p and soon spread to the entire Mamluk upper ranks, which became entrenched as a hereditary aristocratic elite. At the same time, this elite did not have secure property rights and spent a great deal of energy trying to figure out how to s.h.i.+eld income from the sultan so as to be able to turn it over to descendants. Under the Burji Mamluks, the elite split along age lines, and younger Mamluks were recruited into the patrimonial networks of the older ones. The training that once bonded a young Mamluk to the state gave way to outright rent seeking on the part of factions within the elite, who used their coercive power to extract resources from the civilian population and from each other. The Mamluk elite became so consumed with these internal power struggles that it by necessity had to adopt an extremely cautious foreign policy. By luck it faced no powerful external threats from the invasion of Tamerlane early in the fifteenth century until the appearance of the Ottomans and Portuguese at the century's end. But its resources were declining through plague-induced depopulation and loss of external trade. Absence of outside threats also provided no incentives for military modernization. So the Mamluks' 1517 defeat by the Ottomans, who perfected the use of the inst.i.tution of military slavery and organized a much more powerful state, was overdetermined.

15.

THE FUNCTIONING AND DECLINE OF THE OTTOMAN STATE.

How the Ottomans centralized power in a way that eluded European monarchs; how the Ottomans perfected the system of military slavery; instability of the Turkish state and its reliance on continued foreign expansion; causes of the decay of the Ottoman system; military slavery as a developmental dead end

Niccol Machiavelli's famous treatise on politics, The Prince The Prince, was written in 1513. The Ottomans were then at the height of their power, about to conquer Hungary and to launch their first a.s.sault on Vienna, the seat of the Habsburg Empire. In chapter 4 4 Machiavelli makes the following observation: Machiavelli makes the following observation:

In our times the examples of these two diverse kinds of government are the Turk and the king of France. The whole monarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord; the others are his servants. Dividing his kingdom into sanjaks [provinces], he sends different administrators to them, and he changes and varies them as he likes. But the king of France is placed in the midst of an ancient mult.i.tude of lords, acknowledged in that state by their subjects and loved by them: they have their privileges, and the king cannot take them away without danger to himself. Thus, whoever considers the one and the other of these states will find difficulty in acquiring the state of the Turk, but should it be conquered, great ease in holding it. So inversely, you will find in some respects more ease in seizing the state of France, but great difficulty in holding it.1

Machiavelli captures the essence of the Ottoman state: it was far more centralized and impersonally managed than France in the early sixteenth century, and in that way more modern. Later in the sixteenth century, French monarchs would seek to create a similarly centralized and administratively uniform regime by attacking the privileges of the landed aristocracy. Like the Turkish bey (governor) governing a sanjak, the French king sent out intendents-the forerunners of modern prefects-from Paris to administer the kingdom directly in place of the local patrimonial elites. The inst.i.tutions used by the Ottoman state were different, being based on the devs.h.i.+rme and the military slave system. But the Ottomans succeeded in creating a highly powerful and stable state that was the rival of any power in Europe at the time, and presided over a huge empire larger than anything created by an Arab caliph or sultan. Ottoman society resembled China at the time of the contemporaneous Ming Dynasty insofar as it combined a strong, centralized state with relatively weak and unorganized social actors outside the state. (It differed from China, however, insofar as political power was limited by law.) The inst.i.tutions of the Ottoman state were a curious mixture of modern and patrimonial, and it decayed when the patrimonial elements entrenched themselves at the expense of the modern ones. The Ottomans perfected the military slave system of the Mamluks, but they too eventually succ.u.mbed to the natural human desire of their elites to pa.s.s on status and resources to their children.

A ONE-GENERATION ARISTOCRACY.

The administrative system described by Machiavelli, whereby the Turkish monarch could appoint administrators to rule each province and remove them at will, had its origins in the fact that the Ottoman state was a relatively recent conquest dynasty that had not inherited ancient inst.i.tutions but could start afresh in creating new ones. The Mongol conquests of the thirteenth century had pushed a series of Turcoman tribes out of Central Asia and the Middle East, and into a frontier region of western Anatolia where they were sandwiched between the Byzantine Empire to the west and the Seljuk sultanate (from 1243, a va.s.sal state of the Mongol Ilkhanids) to the east. These frontier tribes organized themselves to wage gaza gaza, or war, against the Byzantines. One of these gazi leaders, Osman, succeeded in defeating a Byzantine army at Baphaeon in 1302, thus establis.h.i.+ng his fame and elevating him above all of the other frontier lords who then flocked to his banner. Thus the Osmanli, or Ottoman, dynasty was established as a parvenu frontier state that could borrow inst.i.tutions from the established states surrounding it as it conquered new territory to the east and west.2 The Ottoman system of provincial administration as it developed in the fifteenth century was based on a cavalryman, the sipahi, and the appanage he was given, the timar timar (which means horse grooming). The smallest timars consisted of a village or villages with tax revenues sufficient to support a single cavalryman with horse and equipment. A larger appanage called a (which means horse grooming). The smallest timars consisted of a village or villages with tax revenues sufficient to support a single cavalryman with horse and equipment. A larger appanage called a zeamet zeamet was given to middle-ranking officers known as was given to middle-ranking officers known as zaims zaims, while senior officers received an estate called a has has. Each sipahi or zaim lived on his estate and collected taxes in kind from the local peasantry, usually a wagonload of wood and fodder and half a wagonload of hay per peasant per year. This system was used by the Byzantines and simply adopted by the Ottomans. Like the manor lord in Europe, the timar holder provided local government functions like security and the dispensing of justice. It was the responsibility of the sipahi to convert the in-kind payments he received into cash and to use the money to equip himself and journey to the front in time for the campaigning season. Holders of large estates were required to produce a second mounted soldier together with grooms and equipment. The whole system was known as dirlik dirlik, or livelihood, indicating its function: in an only partially monetized economy, the sultan's army could be sustained without having to raise tax revenues to pay the troops.3 Provincial-level government was organized around the sanjak, a district encompa.s.sing several thousand square miles and perhaps a population of one hundred thousand. As new territories were conquered, they were organized into sanjaks and subjected to detailed provincial cadastral surveys, which meticulously listed human and economic resources, village by village. The purpose of these surveys was to establish the tax base and to divide up land for distribution as timars. At first, the regulations applied to each province differed according to the province's circ.u.mstances, but as time went on and new territories were rapidly added, a more uniform system of laws and regulations was applied.4 The beys who acted as governors of the sanjak were not recruited locally but were appointed by the central administration in Istanbul and, like the Chinese prefects, rotated to new a.s.signments after serving tours of three years. The beys who acted as governors of the sanjak were not recruited locally but were appointed by the central administration in Istanbul and, like the Chinese prefects, rotated to new a.s.signments after serving tours of three years.5 The The sanjakbey sanjakbey was the officer who led the cavalry of his district into battle. was the officer who led the cavalry of his district into battle. 6 6 Above the level of sanjaks was a higher level of administration known as the Above the level of sanjaks was a higher level of administration known as the beylerbeyilik beylerbeyilik, which const.i.tuted the major regions of the empire.

Ottoman Empire in the 1500s

The single most important difference between the dirlik system and European feudalism was, as Machiavelli recognized, the fact that unlike in Europe, the Turkish appanages could not be turned into heritable property and given to the sipahi's descendants. Owing to the fact that most land in the empire had been recently conquered by an upstart dynasty, the vast bulk of it-some 87 percent in 1528-remained state owned and was granted to the timar holder only for his lifetime. Timars were granted in return for military service; they could be taken away if that service wasn't performed, but only by the sultan himself. The holders of large estates could not subinfeudate their lands, as in Europe. When the sipahi grew too old to serve or died, his land reverted to the state and could be rea.s.signed to a new cavalryman. Indeed, the status sipahi itself was not heritable; the children of military men had to return to the civilian population.7 The peasants working the land for the timar and zeamet holders, by contrast, had only usufructuary rights to their land, but unlike their lords, they could pa.s.s these rights down to their children. The peasants working the land for the timar and zeamet holders, by contrast, had only usufructuary rights to their land, but unlike their lords, they could pa.s.s these rights down to their children.8 The Ottoman state thus created a one-generation aristocracy, preventing the emergence of a powerful landed aristocracy with its own resource base and inherited privileges. The Ottoman state thus created a one-generation aristocracy, preventing the emergence of a powerful landed aristocracy with its own resource base and inherited privileges.9 There were other practical factors that prevented the emergence of a territorially rooted n.o.bility. The Ottomans were constantly at war, and each cavalryman was expected to report for duty during the summer months. The local lord was thus away for several months each year, relieving the peasantry of some of its burdens and attenuating the tie between the sipahi and his land. Sometimes the cavalryman was required to take up winter quarters elsewhere than in his timar. His wife and children back at home were left to fend for themselves, and the soldier often took on new consorts and opportunities offered by camp life. All of this served to break the link between aristocrat and land that was so critical in European development.10 MILITARY SLAVERY PERFECTED.

The dirlik system rested on the system of military slavery, without which it could not be properly managed. The Ottomans built on the military slave systems created by the Abbasids and Mamluks, as well as those used by other Turkish rulers, but eliminated many of the features that made the Mamluk system so dysfunctional.

First and most important was that there now was a clear distinction between civilian and military authority, and a strict subordination of the latter to the former. The military slaves emerged initially as an outgrowth of the sultan's household, as in the case of the Ayyubid Mamluks. Unlike the latter, however, the Ottoman ruling house remained in control of the slave hierarchy until much later in the empire. The dynastic principle applied only within the Ottoman ruling family; no slave, no matter how high ranking or talented, could aspire to become sultan himself or hope to found his own minidynasty within the military inst.i.tution. As a result, the civilian authorities could establish clear rules for recruitment, training, and promotion that focused on building an effective military and administrative inst.i.tution, without having to worry constantly about that inst.i.tution trying to seize power in its own name.

The effort to prevent dynasties from forming within the military led to strict rules regarding children and inheritance. The sons of Janissaries were not allowed to become Janissaries, and indeed, in the early days of the empire, Janissaries were not allowed to marry and have families. The sons of the elite sipahis of the Porte were allowed to enter the corps of sipahioghlans as pages, but their grandsons were rigidly excluded. The Ottomans from the beginning seemed to understand the logic of military slavery as designed to prevent the emergence of an entrenched hereditary elite. Recruitment and promotion in the slave system were based on merit and service, for which the slaves were rewarded with tax exemptions and estates.11 Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, amba.s.sador of Holy Roman Emperor Charles V to the court of Suleiman the Magnificent, noted that the lack of a blood n.o.bility allowed the sultan to pick his slaves and advance them according to their abilities. "The shepherd who rose to become an ill.u.s.trious grand vezir was a figure that never ceased to fascinate European observers." Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, amba.s.sador of Holy Roman Emperor Charles V to the court of Suleiman the Magnificent, noted that the lack of a blood n.o.bility allowed the sultan to pick his slaves and advance them according to their abilities. "The shepherd who rose to become an ill.u.s.trious grand vezir was a figure that never ceased to fascinate European observers."12 The Ottomans improved on the Mamluk system by maintaining a strict distinction between the people recruited into the ruling inst.i.tution as non-Muslim slaves-the askeri askeri-and the rest of the empire's Muslim and non-Muslim citizens, the reaya reaya. A member of the reaya could have a family, own property, and bequeath his property and rights to land to his children and all later descendants. The reaya could also organize themselves into semiautonomous, self-governing communities based on sectarian affiliation known as millets millets. But none among the reaya could aspire to become a member of the ruling elite, to bear arms, or to serve as a soldier or bureaucrat in the Ottoman administration. The cadres of the askeri had to be constantly renewed from year to year by new Christian recruits who had broken all of their ties to their families and were loyal to the Ottoman state. There were no guilds, factions, or self-governing a.s.sociations among the askeri; they were supposed to have loyalties to the ruling dynasty alone.13 THE OTTOMAN STATE AS A GOVERNING INSt.i.tUTION.

There is evidence to suggest that the Ottomans in their prime did not seek to extract taxes at the maximum rate but rather saw their role as preserving a certain basic level of taxation, while protecting the peasantry from exactions by other elites who were more likely to behave like organi