Washington Rules Part 5

By 2007, even the president had abandoned any expectations of presiding over such a regional (or civilizational) transformation. The Bush administration's post-9/11 domino theory-its reliance on American power to remove regimes hostile to American values-had misfired. Instead of toppling forward, the dominoes were now threatening to fall backward, fostering the further spread of violent jihadism rather than its elimination. U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan wished for nothing more than to prop the dominoes up again and depart.

So the bold talk of eliminating tyranny disappeared. The president's minions ceased to lecture foreign leaders in places like Egypt and Saudi Arabia on their duty to implement American-style liberal reforms. Apart from bitterenders bunkered in the editorial offices of the Weekly Standard Weekly Standard or the or the National Review National Review, even devout right wingers were increasingly hard-pressed to take the Freedom Agenda seriously. "Everyone wants to go to Baghdad," they had once chanted. "Real men want to go to Tehran."6 By 2007, simply keeping Tehran out of Baghdad seemed a sufficiently ambitious goal. By 2007, simply keeping Tehran out of Baghdad seemed a sufficiently ambitious goal.

In reality, the operative rationale for continuing the struggle in Iraq no longer extended beyond that country's borders. In a global war that had become devoid of discernible purpose, the surge now served as the administration's subst.i.tute for strategy. Nowhere was the absence of overarching strategic purpose more apparent than with respect to Afghanistan, the "forgotten war," orphaned as a direct result of an ever-intensifying preoccupation with Iraq. Unlike Saddam Hussein, the Afghan Taliban had actually provided support and sanctuary to Al Qaeda in the run-up to 9/11; yet in a war that ostensibly aimed to destroy Al Qaeda, members of Bush's inner circle continued to obsess about Iraq, while allowing Afghanistan to languish. to Afghanistan, the "forgotten war," orphaned as a direct result of an ever-intensifying preoccupation with Iraq. Unlike Saddam Hussein, the Afghan Taliban had actually provided support and sanctuary to Al Qaeda in the run-up to 9/11; yet in a war that ostensibly aimed to destroy Al Qaeda, members of Bush's inner circle continued to obsess about Iraq, while allowing Afghanistan to languish.

Among die-hard boosters of the global war on terror, the appeal of Bush's course change in Iraq derived in considerable part from the opportunity it offered to change the topic. To describe the surge as a strategy was to distract attention from the extent to which strategy as such had ceased to exist.

So it was deja vu all over again. As in the early 1960s, counterinsurgency-armed nation building to preserve a weak state beset with internal violence-took Was.h.i.+ngton by storm as the latest embodiment of military fas.h.i.+on. The administration quietly shelved expectations for an Information Age version of blitzkrieg enabling it to liberate-or impose its will on-the Islamic world. The surge did not const.i.tute a new blueprint for eliminating global jihadism: President Bush did not contemplate U.S. forces employing COIN to pacify the Greater Middle East neighborhood by neighborhood and village by village. He was merely attempting to prevent the Iraq War from ending in the sort of outright defeat that might call attention to the defects of the Was.h.i.+ngton rules.

KING DAVID.

Given the Republican Party's professed aversion to anything that even remotely smacks of social engineering, the Bush administration's revival of counterinsurgency qualifies as astonis.h.i.+ng. That the original impetus for that revival came from within the officer corps makes it more astonis.h.i.+ng still. astonis.h.i.+ng. That the original impetus for that revival came from within the officer corps makes it more astonis.h.i.+ng still.

At the outset of the Long War, members of the officer corps had harbored about as much interest in counterinsurgency as in trench warfare. Although U.S. troops had repeatedly clashed with insurgents over the course of American history, little of that experience, ranging from the ethnic cleansing of Native Americans who impeded westward expansion to suppressing Asian or Latin American opposition to the rising American empire, had been positive. By their very nature, counterinsurgencies tended to be drawn-out, dirty affairs. They taxed the patience of the American people and rarely did much to improve the standing or well-being of military inst.i.tutions. Seldom did they yield anything approximating clear-cut victory. The biggest of all American counterinsurgencies-the agonizing Vietnam War-had ended in abject humiliation.

Despite this unpromising record, an officer corps that found itself mired in Iraq and Afghanistan decided that counterinsurgency deserved a fresh look. The mounting frustrations of the Long War persuaded influential figures in the army and marine corps-most navy and air force officers tended to a different view-that the post-Vietnam military had grotesquely misconstrued the true nature of contemporary warfare. In the struggle against violent jihadism, the methods employed in Iraq and Afghanistan not only didn't work, but were making things worse. Only a wholesale revision of military methodology could correct the problem.

This insight triggered a campaign within the officer corps to displace military practices devised for wars between armies in favor of techniques suitable for what some had begun to call "war amongst the people"-a phrase coined by Gen. Sir Rupert Smith, a British officer who had commanded NATO forces in the Balkans. "Our conflicts tend to be timeless," Smith wrote in his book by Gen. Sir Rupert Smith, a British officer who had commanded NATO forces in the Balkans. "Our conflicts tend to be timeless," Smith wrote in his book The Utility of Force The Utility of Force, "even endless."7 Sir Rupert thereby put his finger on one key element of the gradually emerging conventional wisdom in the U.S. military: An officer corps that had once resolved to avoid protracted war at all costs now contemplated an era of conflict without end. Sir Rupert thereby put his finger on one key element of the gradually emerging conventional wisdom in the U.S. military: An officer corps that had once resolved to avoid protracted war at all costs now contemplated an era of conflict without end.

The commitment of the post-Vietnam officer corps to the sacred trinity had been contingent on expectations that political leaders, having a.s.similated the "lessons" of Vietnam, would employ armed force prudently, even sparingly. As those expectations went by the board and as peace became the exception and war the rule, from within the officer corps itself came an urge to counterinsurge.

Chief among the proponents of this intraservice insurgency was Gen. David Petraeus, an ambitious soldier who first came to public attention as a media-savvy, politically adroit, and very successful division commander during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. (En route to Baghdad, confiding in a receptive Was.h.i.+ngton Post Was.h.i.+ngton Post reporter, Petraeus posed what proved to be the most elusive yet emblematic question of the decade: "Tell me how this ends.") reporter, Petraeus posed what proved to be the most elusive yet emblematic question of the decade: "Tell me how this ends.")8 Petraeus was a gifted officer, identified early in his career as someone meant for big things. Among his most prominent gifts were those of a courtier: The young Petraeus displayed a considerable talent for cultivating influential figures, both in and out of uniform, who might prove useful in advancing his own prospects. And he was nothing if not smart. On his way to the top, he had acquired a Princeton Ph.D., choosing as the subject of his dissertation "The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam." Writing in the mid-1980s, Major Petraeus hewed to the then-existing military consensus, and so questioned the wisdom of any U.S. "involvement in counterinsurgencies unless specific, perhaps unlikely, circ.u.mstances obtain-i.e., domestic public support, the promise of a brief campaign, and freedom to employ whatever force is necessary to achieve rapid victory." consensus, and so questioned the wisdom of any U.S. "involvement in counterinsurgencies unless specific, perhaps unlikely, circ.u.mstances obtain-i.e., domestic public support, the promise of a brief campaign, and freedom to employ whatever force is necessary to achieve rapid victory."

"In light of such criteria," Petraeus wrote, "committing U.S. units to counterinsurgencies appears to be a very problematic proposition, difficult to conclude before domestic support erodes and costly enough to threaten the well-being of all America's military forces (and hence the country's national security), not just those involved in the actual counterinsurgency."9 For Petraeus, then, the key lesson of Vietnam reduced to this: When the United States went to war, time-the overriding necessity of securing a decisive outcome in short order-was of the essence. The American people demanded prompt results and American political leaders were hard-pressed to resist such demands. Petraeus put it this way: "Recognizing the perishability of public support for military action abroad, the post-Vietnam military have come to regard time as the princ.i.p.al limit in limited wars."10 Domestic support for Vietnam had eroded because the public sensed that things were going badly, a perception that hardened as violence escalated from one year to the next. When, in the wake of the 1968 Tet Offensive, President Johnson himself bought into that perception, all was lost. Whether or not the United States had succeeded militarily in thwarting the communist offensive was beside the point. "Perceptions of reality," wrote Petraeus, "more so than objective reality, are crucial to the decisions of statesmen. What policy makers believe to have taken place in any particular case is what matters more than what actually occurred."11 In In Was.h.i.+ngton, Tet was widely seen as a disastrous setback. Once established, this impression proved difficult to dislodge. Was.h.i.+ngton, Tet was widely seen as a disastrous setback. Once established, this impression proved difficult to dislodge.

Yet perceptions were not necessarily immutable, the young Petraeus surmised. Changing the way that a war was perceived-whether within the inner circle of power or in the eyes of the public-could be tantamount to changing reality itself. In a time of crisis, the soldier who demonstrated a capacity to alter perceptions might well parlay military authority into influence extending well beyond the narrow realm of military affairs. This describes the central achievement of General Petraeus in Iraq some twenty years after Major Petraeus claimed his Princeton degree.

In 2005, as a three-star general commanding the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Petraeus found himself in a position to act on the insights derived from his study of Vietnam. The CAC commander is to the army what the Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith is to the Roman Catholic Church: the chief guardian of orthodoxy, charged with ensuring conformity to Truth. Yet Petraeus consciously set out to overturn orthodoxy and promulgate an alternative version of truth, consisting of ideas long regarded as rank heresy. More specifically, in collaboration with Lt. Gen. James Mattis, a like-minded marine, he launched a crash program to revise and republish the army's counterinsurgency manual, offering it as the corrective to all the frustrations that soldiers and marines were encountering in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In Was.h.i.+ngton, Rumsfeld was still counseling patience. Out on the plains of Kansas, Petraeus had concluded that patience patience was just another word for incremental, inexorable failure. was just another word for incremental, inexorable failure.

FM 3-24, to employ the army's designation for the new manual, appeared in December 2006. Rarely has a military publication garnered such instantaneous and widespread public attention. Within weeks of publication it had been downloaded 1.5 million times.12 In a matter of months, a prestigious university press rushed into print a paperback edition, adding for the benefit of civilian readers an interpretive commentary elucidating on the significance of this doctrinal rediscovery. Petraeus himself provided a glowing blurb for what was, in effect, his own book: "Surely a manual that's on the bedside table of the president, vice president, secretary of defense, 21 of 25 members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and many others deserves a place at your bedside too." In a matter of months, a prestigious university press rushed into print a paperback edition, adding for the benefit of civilian readers an interpretive commentary elucidating on the significance of this doctrinal rediscovery. Petraeus himself provided a glowing blurb for what was, in effect, his own book: "Surely a manual that's on the bedside table of the president, vice president, secretary of defense, 21 of 25 members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and many others deserves a place at your bedside too."13 What was all the fuss about?

"This publication's purpose," FM 3-24 began, "is to help prepare Army and Marine Corps leaders to conduct COIN operations anywhere in the world." Although acknowledging that insurgencies have been around for centuries, Petraeus's manual argued that an especially malignant variant, "one that seeks to impose revolutionary change worldwide," afflicted the present age. Al Qaeda, which "seeks to transform the Islamic world," offered but one example of an insurgent movement fired by vast global aspirations. Countering this threat demanded a comparably expansive riposte, "a global strategic response, one that addresses the array of linked resources and conflicts that sustain these movements while tactically addressing the local grievances that feed them." In short, when the manual referred to the "conduct of COIN operations anywhere in the world," the word anywhere anywhere was synonymous with was synonymous with everywhere everywhere.14 No doubt the manual's authors intended this statement to be taken at face value, even though FM 3-24 offered no estimates on the cost or duration of the proposed global response. Yet Petraeus's purpose in revising U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine was not to evaluate COIN but to sell it. to be taken at face value, even though FM 3-24 offered no estimates on the cost or duration of the proposed global response. Yet Petraeus's purpose in revising U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine was not to evaluate COIN but to sell it.

As such, the text was conducive to multiple interpretations. At one level, FM 3-24 could serve as a handbook. At a deeper level, it was an exercise in deconstruction, dismantling hallowed conceptions of warfare while contriving a subst.i.tute suited to the exercise of great power politics in the twilight of modernity. In the postmodern age, after all, what matters most is not originality but novelty, not intrinsic value but marketing, not product but packaging. FM 3-24 was suffused with the spirit of the age in which it was written.

Trafficking in the standard array of postmodernist tropes-irony, paradox, bricolage, and sly self-referential jokes-Petraeus's manual was all about subverting conventions. Yet where it pretended to speak most authoritatively, it managed to say next to nothing. There was lots of foam, but not much beer.

Consider the "Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency" that formed the centerpiece of FM 3-24's first chapter.15 "Sometimes," the manual counseled, "the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be." At other times, by implication, the reverse could well be true. Similarly, "Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is," a precept suggesting that on occasion, more force might do the trick. Further, "[s]ometimes doing nothing is the best reaction." So less could be more, more could be less, and nothing could be most of all-sometimes.

"Tactical success," the manual opines, "guarantees nothing"-as if discovering a genuine pearl of wisdom. Yet it never has: Consider what German tactical prowess achieved in two world wars. Or consider the performance of Israeli forces in any number of conflicts with the Arabs. in two world wars. Or consider the performance of Israeli forces in any number of conflicts with the Arabs.

"If a tactic works this week, it might not work next week; if it works in this province, it might not work in the next"-a truism applicable to any war, small or large, conventional or unconventional.

"Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot"-a contention that applies equally to weapons generally. It was, after all, precisely this argument that Curtis LeMay employed in the 1950s: Give me more bombs and more bombers for SAC and I'll keep the peace.

Finally, there was this: "Many important decisions are not made by generals." When was this ever not obviously the case, except perhaps in the eyes of generals and their groupies?

Yet implicit in the "Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency" and in FM 3-24 generally was this subversive proposition: As an autonomous instrument of statecraft, armed force had lost its viability. Bluntly, war as such-war as traditionally defined by the officer corps itself-no longer worked.

Since time immemorial, the purpose of armies has been to fight battles, thereby enabling nations to win wars. Through battle an army imposes its will on the enemy, thereby restoring peace. Inherent in this a.s.sertion are two further claims: that war (if undertaken to restore peace) can be morally justifiable, and that warriors (uniquely charged with responsibility for waging war) occupy a special niche in society. These two claims also provide the essential rationale for creating a distinctive military profession. Society accords physicians an exalted status in deference to their presumably unique ability to diagnose and heal. Political leaders and society in general accord members of the officer corps respect and singular responsibilities based on the a.s.sumption that only within its ranks is found the expertise needed to win battles. within its ranks is found the expertise needed to win battles.

Petraeus's manual tacitly rendered each of these propositions null and void. FM 3-24 expanded and blurred the definition of warfare, describing it not as a contest between opposing armed forces, but as a "violent clash of interests between organized groups." In modern war, the army's primary purpose was no longer to fight. The manual's detailed and lengthy index contained not a single entry for "battle" or "battlefield" and made only pa.s.sing reference to "combat."

In 1997, Petraeus had written an article subt.i.tled "Never Send a Man When You Can Send a Bullet."16 He now took precisely the opposite view. Indeed, his manual warned pointedly against the mistake of "overemphasizing killing and capturing the enemy." Rather than vainly attempting to destroy an adversary, counterinsurgent forces should concentrate instead on "securing and engaging the populace," at first compensating for the absence of safety and basic services and then resurrecting (or creating from scratch) "host nation" inst.i.tutions capable of providing them. "Counterinsurgents," FM 3-24 boldly declared, "take upon themselves responsibility for the people's well-being in all its manifestations." He now took precisely the opposite view. Indeed, his manual warned pointedly against the mistake of "overemphasizing killing and capturing the enemy." Rather than vainly attempting to destroy an adversary, counterinsurgent forces should concentrate instead on "securing and engaging the populace," at first compensating for the absence of safety and basic services and then resurrecting (or creating from scratch) "host nation" inst.i.tutions capable of providing them. "Counterinsurgents," FM 3-24 boldly declared, "take upon themselves responsibility for the people's well-being in all its manifestations."17 The ultimate aim was not primarily to dismantle or defeat an insurgency, but to "foster effective governance" in an environment where governance was notably absent. "Legitimacy is the main objective," the manual declared.18 Yet legitimacy is a notoriously slippery concept, difficult to define, much less measure. To designate the creation of legitimacy as a primary wartime goal is equivalent to designating the pursuit of wealth as a primary goal in life. In effect, you have embarked upon an infinitely expansible Yet legitimacy is a notoriously slippery concept, difficult to define, much less measure. To designate the creation of legitimacy as a primary wartime goal is equivalent to designating the pursuit of wealth as a primary goal in life. In effect, you have embarked upon an infinitely expansible enterprise. When is a government sufficiently legitimate? When is a tyc.o.o.n sufficiently rich? Who decides? According to what criteria? The endpoint of such a venture is necessarily arbitrary, subject to redefinition, and revocable. enterprise. When is a government sufficiently legitimate? When is a tyc.o.o.n sufficiently rich? Who decides? According to what criteria? The endpoint of such a venture is necessarily arbitrary, subject to redefinition, and revocable.

Furthermore, the promotion of legitimacy is not a sphere in which the officer corps can claim unique or even notable competency. In a counterinsurgency, military expertise becomes one skill set among many that have to be mobilized, deployed, and integrated. FM 3-24 concedes as much, emphasizing that COIN is a collaborative undertaking involving not simply military forces but a wide range of other government agencies, along with private contractors, international ent.i.ties like the United Nations, and nongovernmental organizations that may or may not even share U.S. policy objectives.

Why senior military officers should preside over such enterprise is by no means clear. When it comes to enhancing "host nation" capacity, functionaries drawn from entirely different professional backgrounds might have as much or more to offer than four-star generals unschooled in law enforcement, economic development, or inst.i.tution building.19 When it comes to providing for "the people's well-being," a successful big-city mayor, police chief, or director of social services is likely to possess experience more relevant than that accrued over the course of a career devoted to soldiering. When it comes to providing for "the people's well-being," a successful big-city mayor, police chief, or director of social services is likely to possess experience more relevant than that accrued over the course of a career devoted to soldiering.

In sum, an officer corps that accepts FM 3-24 as its guide has abandoned war as its princ.i.p.al raison d'etre. In doing so, it forfeits any claim to singularity. Rather than exercising exclusive control over a specific, clearly distinguishable realm of human activity, the army becomes but one inst.i.tution among many attempting to temper the world's most grievous political and economic failures. Having dispensed with the pursuit of victory, such an army devotes itself to social work with guns. As with such work undertaken in places like Los Angeles or Chicago, the social work inherent in FM 3-24's call for a "global strategic response" to the problem of global insurgency promises to be a project literally without end. with the pursuit of victory, such an army devotes itself to social work with guns. As with such work undertaken in places like Los Angeles or Chicago, the social work inherent in FM 3-24's call for a "global strategic response" to the problem of global insurgency promises to be a project literally without end.

For the U.S. military, war among peoples-not really war but something more akin to imperial policing combined with the systematic distribution of alms-now became de rigueur. Here is Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell, Petraeus's successor at Fort Leavenworth, holding forth on the military future with all the confidence and certainty of the senior officers who, just years earlier, had touted the wonders of shock and awe.

The future is not one of major battles and engagements fought by armies on battlefields devoid of population; instead, the course of conflict will be decided by forces operating among the people of the world. Here, the margin of victory will be measured in far different terms from the wars of our past. The allegiance, trust, and confidence of populations will be the final arbiters of success.20 The entire military reform project of the post-Vietnam era-indeed of the entire era since Hiros.h.i.+ma-had sought to restore the concept of war as an instrument of decision and the exclusive purview of soldiers. The proponents of counterinsurgency effectively declared that effort a failure. Winning hearts and minds had now become the essence of the soldier's calling. This describes the revolution in military thought engineered by David Petraeus, a revolution to which George W. Bush signed on when he gave up on victory in Iraq without giving up on war. which George W. Bush signed on when he gave up on victory in Iraq without giving up on war.

THE SURGE.

In his Princeton Ph.D. dissertation, Petraeus quoted Col. Harry Summers, a noted military commentator, reflecting on the counterinsurgency doctrine devised during the Vietnam era: "Reading it today sounds more like a description of a new liturgy than a discussion of strategic doctrine." For the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, the manual reviving that liturgy, with the mud from rice paddies wiped clean, now became holy writ.

Tapped by Bush to turn around the failing effort in Iraq, Petraeus took his bible to Baghdad and used it to implement "the surge." In pulling Iraq back from the abyss, the general vaulted to rock star status, acquiring in Was.h.i.+ngton a reputation for infallibility not unlike that claimed by the Bishop of Rome.

The cult of personality that soon enveloped Petraeus served to obscure this reality: Despite innumerable claims to the contrary, the campaign he directed in Iraq in 20072008 fell well short of success. The surge did avert Iraq's outright collapse, a not inconsiderable achievement. It also provided a modic.u.m of breathing s.p.a.ce for a deeply divided Iraqi political establishment. Yet it did not deliver the promised reconciliation of the various factions vying for power. If it substantially reduced the incidence of terrorist attacks in Baghdad and other cities, violence, targeting both symbols of authority and the civilian population, persisted at levels that would elsewhere have been deemed evidence of impending state failure.

In Baghdad, the New York Times New York Times reported, mayhem reported, mayhem remained a constant companion, "with attackers able to plant and detonate bombs across the city seemingly with impunity." remained a constant companion, "with attackers able to plant and detonate bombs across the city seemingly with impunity."21 The surge did weaken the insurgency threatening the Iraqi government. Yet it failed to destroy that insurgency, as Gen. Raymond Odierno, Petraeus's successor in Baghdad, bluntly acknowledged. Two and a half years after the surge began, a reporter pressed Odierno to say when he expected armed resistance to the Iraqi government finally to subside. "It's not going to end, OK?" Odierno snapped. "There'll always be some sort of low-level insurgency in Iraq for the next 5, 10, 15 years." The surge did weaken the insurgency threatening the Iraqi government. Yet it failed to destroy that insurgency, as Gen. Raymond Odierno, Petraeus's successor in Baghdad, bluntly acknowledged. Two and a half years after the surge began, a reporter pressed Odierno to say when he expected armed resistance to the Iraqi government finally to subside. "It's not going to end, OK?" Odierno snapped. "There'll always be some sort of low-level insurgency in Iraq for the next 5, 10, 15 years."22 Exactly who or what deserved credit for the gains achieved during Petraeus's tenure in Baghdad was less clear than the general's legions of fans let on. In reality, improvements in Iraqi security during the period derived from a complex array of factors. Among them were the increased U.S. troop commitment ordered by President Bush, the abandonment of heavy-handed coalition tactics that alienated Iraqis during the occupation's first three years, and Iraq's violent effective part.i.tion along ethnic and sectarian lines, largely accomplished prior to Petraeus's arrival.

Most important of all were the effects of the so-called Sunni Awakening, which Petraeus did not instigate but upon which he shrewdly capitalized. In the wake of the 2003 invasion, Sunni tribal chiefs in the crucially important Anbar Province of western Iraq had forged an anti-American alliance with Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), an especially brutal jihadist movement that the invasion itself had ushered into existence. By September 2006, having concluded that AQI posed a threat to their own authority, the Sunni chieftains called off that alliance, turned on their erstwhile partners, and offered a marriage of convenience to the Americans. In essence, Sunnis who had been in the forefront of the insurgency resisting the American occupation signaled a willingness to be bought. The U.S. military accommodated that request. In another context, this might have been called appeas.e.m.e.nt. Petraeus's supporters preferred to call it brilliant. insurgency resisting the American occupation signaled a willingness to be bought. The U.S. military accommodated that request. In another context, this might have been called appeas.e.m.e.nt. Petraeus's supporters preferred to call it brilliant.

Meanwhile, Petraeus's contributions notwithstanding, the larger purposes that had ostensibly impelled the United States to invade Iraq remained unfulfilled. U.S. forces never did find the weapons of ma.s.s destruction that had imbued the invasion with such purported urgency. The promised doc.u.mentation linking Saddam Hussein to the jihadists who had plotted the 9/11 attacks never materialized. Expectations that the liberation of Iraq would trigger a wave of democratic change across the Islamic world remained a pipe dream. No road to peace in Jerusalem was ever discovered in downtown Baghdad. The presence of U.S. forces in Iraq failed to cow the mullahs ruling neighboring Iran. If anything, Operation Iraqi Freedom boosted Iranian influence. Members of the s.h.i.+te-dominated government installed in Baghdad, some of whom had fled Saddam Hussein's Iraq to find sanctuary in Iran, proved remarkably sympathetic to the Islamic government in Tehran.

Based on the justifications advanced for the war by its architects and supporters, in other words, Operation Iraqi Freedom remained as unsuccessful (not to mention unnecessary) after Petraeus's tenure in command as it had been before he arrived.

These were facts, stubborn and incontrovertible. Yet in a dazzling demonstration of how perceptions skillfully manipulated can trump reality, an audaciously revised Iraq story line rendered facts irrelevant.

FM 3-24 contains this nugget, almost a parody of postmodernism: The central mechanism through which [insurgent] ideologies are expressed and absorbed is the narrative. A narrative is an organizational scheme expressed in story form.... Stories are often the basis for strategies and actions, as well as for interpreting others' intentions.23 In the wake of the surge, insurgents in Was.h.i.+ngton intent on installing counterinsurgency as the new new new American way of war wasted no time in constructing their own narrative. Lionizing "King David," as they had lionized Stormin' Norman Schwarzkopf in 1991 and Tommy Franks in 2003, a claque of semiwarriors replotted the entire Iraq War. They enshrined the surge as the war's defining moment, with full credit a.s.signed to Petraeus himself. new American way of war wasted no time in constructing their own narrative. Lionizing "King David," as they had lionized Stormin' Norman Schwarzkopf in 1991 and Tommy Franks in 2003, a claque of semiwarriors replotted the entire Iraq War. They enshrined the surge as the war's defining moment, with full credit a.s.signed to Petraeus himself.

To celebrate his genius was to bask in his reflected glory. Military a.n.a.lysts Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan could scarcely contain themselves. "Great commanders often come in pairs," they announced: "Eisenhower and Patton, Grant and Sherman, Napoleon and Davout, Marlborough and Eugene, Caesar and Labienus. Generals David Petraeus and Raymond Odierno can now be added to the list."24 Or as another member of the Petraeus fan club put it: "G.o.d has apparently seen fit to give the U.S. Army a great general in this time of need." Or as another member of the Petraeus fan club put it: "G.o.d has apparently seen fit to give the U.S. Army a great general in this time of need."25 This was myth making of a high order. Just as Americans had once pointed to Andrew Jackson's victory at the Battle of New Orleans as proof that the United States had defeated Great Britain in the (already concluded) War of 1812, so now many came to see the surge as proof that U.S. forces, led by the redoubtable Petraeus with his gift for counterinsurgency, had emerged victorious in Iraq.

Myth making in relation to war is never innocent. Those keen to install Petraeus in the pantheon of great captains alongside Ulysses S. Grant and Napoleon Bonaparte did so to advance a specific agenda. For both military practice and basic national security policy, the implications of proclaiming the surge a historic victory on a par with, say, Gettysburg or Stalingrad loomed large indeed. Energetically hawked by various national security a.n.a.lysts, retired generals, and jingoistic pundits, the legacy of the revised Iraq narrative consisted of four elements. keen to install Petraeus in the pantheon of great captains alongside Ulysses S. Grant and Napoleon Bonaparte did so to advance a specific agenda. For both military practice and basic national security policy, the implications of proclaiming the surge a historic victory on a par with, say, Gettysburg or Stalingrad loomed large indeed. Energetically hawked by various national security a.n.a.lysts, retired generals, and jingoistic pundits, the legacy of the revised Iraq narrative consisted of four elements.

First, with Petraeus lionized for all but single-handedly redeeming a lost cause, the surge tilted the balance of civil-military authority back in favor of the top bra.s.s. Listening to General Petraeus and giving him a free hand had, so the story went, enabled George W. Bush to bring the Iraq War to a successful conclusion. With the professional malpractice perpetrated by the several commanders who had preceded Petraeus in Baghdad erased from memory, the reputation of American generals.h.i.+p rebounded.

Yet not all senior officers accrued additional clout. The inst.i.tutional influence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff remained at an all-time low: Through the Long War's first decade, there was no major issue on which the Chiefs collectively can be said to have had a major impact. True before the surge, this remained no less so afterward. The JCS chairman, nominally occupying the uppermost rung of the military profession, wielded about as much influence as a moderately prominent a.s.sistant secretary of defense. As for the service chiefs, charged with building and maintaining the various uniformed services, they had long since been banished from the inner circle of power.

The princ.i.p.al beneficiaries of the postsurge s.h.i.+ft in civil-military relations were senior field commanders. Self-styled warfighters now became figures to reckon with, their influence extending well beyond mere operational matters. In Was.h.i.+ngton, their views carried great weight. For the foreseeable future, therefore, politicians presuming to trust their own judgment over that of whoever happened to be commanding U.S. forces in Baghdad or Kabul did so at considerable risk. extending well beyond mere operational matters. In Was.h.i.+ngton, their views carried great weight. For the foreseeable future, therefore, politicians presuming to trust their own judgment over that of whoever happened to be commanding U.S. forces in Baghdad or Kabul did so at considerable risk.

Second, the surge became the occasion when the officer corps kicked its own Vietnam syndrome. A determination to avoid protracted conflict had been a core conviction for the generation of officers who had served in Vietnam. According to Gen. Colin Powell, the best-known member of that generation, wars should occur infrequently. For Powell the supreme value was not warfighting but preparedness: A force holding itself ready to fight would deter others, thereby reducing the actual prevalence of war. When conflict did occur, Powell favored the employment of overwhelming force to end the fighting quickly and achieve decisive results.

The generation of officers represented by Petraeus now reached different conclusions. They came to view war as commonplace, a quasi-permanent aspect of everyday reality. Moreover, their experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan persuaded them to see armed conflict as an open-ended enterprise. To be a soldier was either to be serving in a war zone or to be recently returned-in which case preparations for the next combat deployment were already under way or soon would be. Wars no longer ended. At best, they subsided, a semblance of order replacing disorder and a semblance of stability displacing instability-with even this limited achievement requiring many years of struggle.

Generals Schwarzkopf and Franks had enjoyed their brief star turns because each had seemingly demonstrated an ability to deliver definitive (and relatively cheap) battlefield victory. When events exposed those victories as specious, each general's reputation suffered a sharp reverse. En route to achieving even greater celebrity, General Petraeus had abandoned the very pretense that combat might yield quick and decisive outcomes. The use of violence to impose one's will on the enemy no longer described the central activity for which soldiers prepared themselves. Instead of winning battles, they now sought to pacify populations. specious, each general's reputation suffered a sharp reverse. En route to achieving even greater celebrity, General Petraeus had abandoned the very pretense that combat might yield quick and decisive outcomes. The use of violence to impose one's will on the enemy no longer described the central activity for which soldiers prepared themselves. Instead of winning battles, they now sought to pacify populations.

Third, the surge reduced the significance of time as a constraint in the planning and conduct of war. Counterinsurgency demands enormous patience. "COIN campaigns are often long and difficult," as FM 3-24 put it. "Progress can be hard to measure."26 From his study of Vietnam, Petraeus had concluded that the American public and their elected representatives do not possess great stores of patience. In implementing the surge, he set out to change that. "The Was.h.i.+ngton clock is moving more rapidly than the Baghdad clock," he remarked during the course of a television interview several weeks after taking over as commander in Iraq. "So we're obviously trying to speed up the Baghdad clock a bit and to produce some progress on the ground that can, perhaps ... put a little more time on the Was.h.i.+ngton clock."27 The surge achieved that and more. Remarkably, the Was.h.i.+ngton clock stopped altogether. In Iraq, even after Petraeus had reaped his own "mission accomplished" rewards, war continued, but the American people and their elected representatives-among them Democrats who had denounced the war only so long as doing so yielded a partisan advantage-ceased to pay it much attention.

The agreed-upon post-surge narrative offered little explanation for the bombs that continued to detonate in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. So even when reported, these developments remained essentially inexplicable. Hearing of some b.l.o.o.d.y incident in a mosque, marketplace, or government ministry, Americans shrugged their shoulders or averted their eyes, while carefully avoiding the question of what it all might mean: Even to permit such a question was to expose the flimsiness of the claim that Petraeus had engineered a triumph in the manner of the Emperor Napoleon. The general's most noteworthy achievement was actually this: that in the Age of Petraeus, American soldiers and the American people tacitly endorsed Rupert Smith's proposition-modern wars had indeed become "endless." remained essentially inexplicable. Hearing of some b.l.o.o.d.y incident in a mosque, marketplace, or government ministry, Americans shrugged their shoulders or averted their eyes, while carefully avoiding the question of what it all might mean: Even to permit such a question was to expose the flimsiness of the claim that Petraeus had engineered a triumph in the manner of the Emperor Napoleon. The general's most noteworthy achievement was actually this: that in the Age of Petraeus, American soldiers and the American people tacitly endorsed Rupert Smith's proposition-modern wars had indeed become "endless."

Ironically, the surge thereby served to vindicate Robert McNamara. Back in 1965 McNamara had believed that Vietnam's "greatest contribution" was that it was teaching the United States "to go to war without arousing the public ire." Persuading the public to tune out, he believed, was "almost a necessity in our history, because this is the kind of war we'll likely be facing for the next fifty years."28 McNamara had misread the temperament of his countrymen during the 1960s; yet his error proved to be merely one of timing. By the time he died in 2009, Americans had learned to tune out their wars. McNamara had misread the temperament of his countrymen during the 1960s; yet his error proved to be merely one of timing. By the time he died in 2009, Americans had learned to tune out their wars.

Finally, and most important, Petraeus's putative success made it seemingly unnecessary to inquire further into exactly how the United States had bollixed things up so badly in the first place. If the collapse of Bush's Freedom Agenda had cracked open a window for debating policy fundamentals, the surge slammed that window shut. In salvaging something from the wreckage of the Iraq War, Petraeus also managed to salvage the Was.h.i.+ngton consensus itself.

"Korea came along and saved us," former secretary of state Dean Acheson once cynically observed, alluding to the way the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 ended political resistance to a controversial U.S. military buildup Acheson had been advocating. way the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 ended political resistance to a controversial U.S. military buildup Acheson had been advocating.29 Advocates of the Long War and of the militarized approach to policy from which it derived could say much the same thing: In their darkest hour, the surge had come along and saved them. Advocates of the Long War and of the militarized approach to policy from which it derived could say much the same thing: In their darkest hour, the surge had come along and saved them.

The campaign to choose a successor to President Bush in 2008 told the tale. As is usually the case in U.S. elections, the contestants portrayed their differences as fundamental, notably so with regard to national security. Yet what actually ensued was a contest between different species of hawks. In one camp were those like Republicans John McCain and Sarah Palin who insisted that the Iraq War, having always been necessary and justified, was now-thanks to the surge-successful as well. In the other camp were those like Barack Obama and Joseph Biden who derided the Iraq War as disastrous, but pointed to Afghanistan as a war that needed to be won. No prominent figure in either party came within ten feet of questioning the logic of configuring U.S. forces for global power projection or the wisdom of maintaining a global military presence. When it came to the use of force, the various candidates vied with one another to demonstrate their bellicosity. Inevitably in such a contest, the hawks won.

By early 2009, when Bush handed the reins of power to Barack Obama, the Was.h.i.+ngton rules had once more been restored. In expressing his determination to s.h.i.+ft the weight of U.S. military efforts from Iraq to Afghanistan-"This is not a war of choice. This is a war of necessity."-President Obama put his own seal of approval on that restoration.30 The promise of change that had formed the centerpiece of Obama's run for the presidency left the American credo and The promise of change that had formed the centerpiece of Obama's run for the presidency left the American credo and the sacred trinity untouched. In Iraq, the outcome remained uncertain. In Was.h.i.+ngton, the verdict was in: Here is where General Petraeus had left his mark. the sacred trinity untouched. In Iraq, the outcome remained uncertain. In Was.h.i.+ngton, the verdict was in: Here is where General Petraeus had left his mark.

GCOIN: SON OF SURGE.

The onset of the Obama era found members of the Petraeus lobby eager to press on. They had big ideas.

Prominent among those interpreting the significance of the surge was John Nagl, former soldier, counterinsurgency expert, and sometime Petraeus adviser. According to Nagl, although population security population security might well const.i.tute "the first requirement of success in counterinsurgency," it was by no means the only requirement. Indeed, it was only the beginning. might well const.i.tute "the first requirement of success in counterinsurgency," it was by no means the only requirement. Indeed, it was only the beginning.

Economic development, good governance, and the provision of essential services, all occurring within a matrix of effective information operations, must all improve simultaneously and steadily over a long period of time if America's determined insurgent enemies are to be defeated.

The key, according to COIN advocates like Nagl, was for the United States to mount a "global counterinsurgency campaign."31 With the world besieged by ideologically driven insurgents, and with events in Iraq having supposedly demonstrated the efficacy of FM 3-24, Nagl was among those promoting counterinsurgency as perhaps the only plausible response to the threat posed by violent anti-Western jihadism. With the world besieged by ideologically driven insurgents, and with events in Iraq having supposedly demonstrated the efficacy of FM 3-24, Nagl was among those promoting counterinsurgency as perhaps the only plausible response to the threat posed by violent anti-Western jihadism.

As Obama entered the White House in January 2009, global counterinsurgency-GCOIN some were already calling it-showed every sign of emerging as an Idea Whose Time Had Come. Senator John Kerry of Ma.s.sachusetts went on record calling for the conversion of the global war on terror into "the global counterinsurgency campaign it always should have been-namely, a battle for hearts and minds." calling it-showed every sign of emerging as an Idea Whose Time Had Come. Senator John Kerry of Ma.s.sachusetts went on record calling for the conversion of the global war on terror into "the global counterinsurgency campaign it always should have been-namely, a battle for hearts and minds."32 In the month of Obama's inauguration, Bruce Hoffman, a well-known terrorism expert, was promoting GCOIN as the basis for "the development and execution of long-term 'hearts and minds' programs." In the month of Obama's inauguration, Bruce Hoffman, a well-known terrorism expert, was promoting GCOIN as the basis for "the development and execution of long-term 'hearts and minds' programs."33 Army Brig. Gen. Bennet Sacolick concurred. A career special operations officer, Sacolick opined that "eradicating terrorists alone will not win the war on terror; frankly, it won't even put a dent in" the problem. The United States needed to send troops into countries that served as "the breeding ground for terrorism" in order to address head-on the conditions giving rise to anti-American violence. The key task was now "nation-building."34 Meanwhile, the journal of the U.S. Army War College published an article with the imposing t.i.tle "Global Counterinsurgency: Strategic Clarity for the Long War." GCOIN, wrote its author, Col. Daniel S. Roper, provided the correct "intellectual framework" to repair the strategic confusion that had prevailed during much of the Bush era. Meanwhile, the journal of the U.S. Army War College published an article with the imposing t.i.tle "Global Counterinsurgency: Strategic Clarity for the Long War." GCOIN, wrote its author, Col. Daniel S. Roper, provided the correct "intellectual framework" to repair the strategic confusion that had prevailed during much of the Bush era.35 Proponents of GCOIN, in other words, did not view Iraq as a one-off event. Facing the prospect of defeat, President Bush launched the surge in an act of desperation. In the eyes of Nagl and other members of the Petraeus lobby, Iraq in 20072008 had served as a feasibility study. In the broken quarters of the world, many more Iraqs waited.

Across the Greater Middle East hundreds of millions of people were in dire need of "economic development, good governance, and the provision of essential services." GCOIN offered the way to meet those needs and thereby nip terrorism in the bud. offered the way to meet those needs and thereby nip terrorism in the bud.

Yet any GCOIN campaign worthy of the name would necessarily require the pacification of Afghanistan (population 28.4 million, in an area approximately the size of Texas) and of Pakistan (176.2 million, roughly twice the size of California), both facing imminent insurgent threats. Then there was Somalia (9.8 million, slightly smaller than Texas) and Yemen (23.8 million, more than twice as large as Wyoming), both known as countries in which the recruitment and training of violent jihadists were commonplace. Lurking in the wings were Iran (66.4 million, slightly smaller than Alaska), widely condemned for underwriting terrorist activity, and perhaps even Egypt (83.1 million, three times larger than New Mexico), a simmering caldron of radical Islamist sentiment.36 Only counterinsurgency on an epic scale could possibly satisfy the needs of all these people. Only counterinsurgency on an epic scale could possibly satisfy the needs of all these people.

The road ahead promised to be long and arduous. Yet for American soldiers, relieved to put Iraq in their rearview mirror, the immediate requirement was not to move ahead but to reverse course. Making a sharp about-face, they headed back to Afghanistan.

RESET.

At his inauguration on January 20, 2009, President Barack Obama immediately became a wartime commander in chief, responsible for not one, but two ongoing conflicts. Obama's opposition to the Iraq War had provided much of the initial impetus for his candidacy. Once in office, the new president happily, if not quite explicitly, endorsed the verdict that the surge had achieved a notable success: Doing so offered a readily available rationale for winding down direct U.S. military involvement in Iraq, something that as a candidate he had vowed to do. surge had achieved a notable success: Doing so offered a readily available rationale for winding down direct U.S. military involvement in Iraq, something that as a candidate he had vowed to do.

In Afghanistan, Obama faced a more difficult problem. To protect himself from the charge of being a national security wimp, candidate Obama had vowed, if elected, to reenergize the military effort there. Within weeks of taking office, he signaled his intention to make good on that promise. Just shy of a month after becoming president, Obama ordered an additional twenty-one thousand troops into the war zone. "This increase is necessary to stabilize a deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, which has not received the strategic attention, direction and resources it urgently requires," the president announced.37 Getting things back on track was going to require more than just troops, however. Taliban fighters were on the march. Both literally and figuratively, the United States and its allies were losing ground. The new administration wanted "fresh thinking" and "fresh eyes." So in May, Obama unceremoniously fired the commander immediately responsible for operations in Afghanistan. Deemed too stodgy and too conventional, Gen. David McKiernan was out. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, a career special operations officer close to Petraeus and specializing in counterterrorism-that is, targeted a.s.sa.s.sination-now reinvented himself as an expert in COIN.38 Commentators had wasted little time in dubbing Afghanistan "Obama's War." McChrystal's job was to figure out how to bring that war to a successful conclusion. Under the tutelage of Petraeus-appointed by the outgoing President Bush to command U.S. Central Command and therefore McChrystal's immediate boss-the new commander set out to do just that, undertaking a crash reevaluation of U.S. and allied efforts. set out to do just that, undertaking a crash reevaluation of U.S. and allied efforts.

The revived cult of generals.h.i.+p endowed McChrystal with instant celebrity. Journalists wasted no time in designating Prince Stanley heir to King David. A gus.h.i.+ng profile in the New York Times Magazine New York Times Magazine made the case succinctly: "And so if it was Petraeus who saved Iraq from cataclysm, it now falls to McChrystal to save Afghanistan." made the case succinctly: "And so if it was Petraeus who saved Iraq from cataclysm, it now falls to McChrystal to save Afghanistan."39 Newsweek Newsweek likewise depicted McChrystal in quasi-messianic terms, describing him as a "Zen warrior," who "eats one meal a day, works out obsessively every morning at 5, and is so free of body fat that he looks gaunt." likewise depicted McChrystal in quasi-messianic terms, describing him as a "Zen warrior," who "eats one meal a day, works out obsessively every morning at 5, and is so free of body fat that he looks gaunt."40 Tall, lanky, earnest, and "fit as a tuning fork" was Tall, lanky, earnest, and "fit as a tuning fork" was Time Time's description, noting with approval that McChrystal's Kindle included "serious tomes on Pakistan, Lincoln and Vietnam."41 Here, according to a raft of press accounts, was no mere mortal, but something close to a superman. Here, according to a raft of press accounts, was no mere mortal, but something close to a superman.

After "consulting" with various civilian experts who had helped market the Petraeus surge in Iraq,42 McChrystal completed his a.s.sessment on August 30, 2009. Within three weeks, his report had leaked, landing in the lap of the McChrystal completed his a.s.sessment on August 30, 2009. Within three weeks, his report had leaked, landing in the lap of the Was.h.i.+ngton Post Was.h.i.+ngton Post's Bob Woodward. The entire sixty-six-page doc.u.ment, intended for the president and his most senior advisers, promptly became available to anyone with Internet access. The impact was instantaneous: General McChrystal's views now framed the ensuing Afghanistan debate. Would the president support his field commander? Or would he deny McChrystal the tools needed to get the job done?

The COIN experts to whom McChrystal had looked for advice promptly took to the op-ed pages and airways to demand that Obama accede to his general's request. Max Boot called on Obama "to back General McChrystal who is a terrific general who has a great team with him, and has done a very careful study of the situation." done a very careful study of the situation."43 In the In the Weekly Standard Weekly Standard, Frederick Kagan contemplated "the cost of dithering," castigating Obama for not promptly giving McChrystal the green light. The White House had "deliberately refused even to review" McChrystal's recommendations, instead wasting time conducting "a series of seminars on Afghanistan and the region."44 Kagan was tired of talk. He wanted action. Kagan was tired of talk. He wanted action.

To save Afghanistan, General McChrystal proposed to save its people, consistent with the methods detailed in FM 3-24. "Success," he wrote, "demands a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign," one that "earns the support of the Afghan people and provides them with a secure environment." Gaining the support of Afghans meant that Western armies in their country had to acquire "a better understanding of the people's choices and needs." A major impediment was the existing mind-set of U.S. and allied occupiers: "Our conventional warfare culture is part of the problem." Western forces were "inexperienced in local languages and culture" and "poorly configured for COIN."45 To grasp the true nature of Afghan culture, the prevailing Western military culture itself needed to undergo a wholesale transformation. "We must do things dramatically differently-even uncomfortably differently-to change how we operate, and also how we think." Implicit in the McChrystal plan was an a.s.sumption that cultural sensitivity is like marksmans.h.i.+p: a skill in which soldiers can be trained. (Despite innumerable references to culture, the plan was oddly silent on the issue of religion, addressing neither Islam's significance as a factor shaping Afghan ident.i.ty nor the post-Christian milieu in which most American and other allied soldiers had been formed.) According to McChrystal, the task of securing the Afghan people broke down into two requirements, each to be pursued simultaneously. One was to defeat a "resilient and growing insurgency"; the other, to remedy a widespread "crisis of confidence." The roots of this crisis were complex and included "the weakness of [Afghan political] inst.i.tutions, the unpunished abuse of power by corrupt officials and powerbrokers, a widespread sense of political disenfranchis.e.m.e.nt, and a longstanding lack of economic opportunity."

The comprehensive counterinsurgency program devised by McChrystal would provide an antidote to each of these afflictions. Because properly resourcing that campaign would entail more money and more boots on the ground, McChrystal requested an additional forty thousand troops beyond the reinforcements that President Obama had already approved.

McChrystal ventured no estimates on how much his proposed counterinsurgency campaign was likely to cost. The commander's reticence was perhaps understandable: The numbers, whether measured in dollars expended or lives lost, were almost certain to be daunting. One optimistic retired four-star general put the bill at approximately $600 billion: "In 10 years of $5 billion a month and with a significant front-end security component, we can leave an Afghan national army and police force and a viable government and roads and universities."46 Nor did General McChrystal say how long saving Afghanistan was likely to take, choosing instead to emphasize that the months just ahead were sure to prove pivotal. "Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term," he wrote, "risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible." The United States could not afford to tarry. The imperative was to act, the sooner the better. States could not afford to tarry. The imperative was to act, the sooner the better.

On one point McChrystal was adamant: To reject his advice was to ensure failure. Asked during a presentation at London's International Inst.i.tute of Strategic Studies whether a more modest approach with more modest goals (reportedly suggested by Vice President Joe Biden) could possibly work, McChrystal minced no words. "The short answer is: no. A strategy that does not leave Afghanistan in a stable position is probably a short-sighted strategy."47 Or as he put it during an interview for a PBS doc.u.mentary: "There is no alternative." Or as he put it during an interview for a PBS doc.u.mentary: "There is no alternative."48 MISSING THE OFF-RAMP.

How to save Afghanistan now displaced all other issues atop the U.S. national security agenda. Whether or not Afghans wished to be saved and how exactly they viewed salvation were matters that attracted scant attention. Virtually all of Was.h.i.+ngton agreed on two points: With Iraq now largely forgotten, Afghanistan posed an urgent problem, and it was inc.u.mbent upon the United States to fix that problem forthwith.

In at least a nominal sense, the final decision on how to proceed was left to the commander in chief. Yet even though the president's national security team went through the motions of presenting him with a range of choices, the options actually on offer amounted to variations on a single theme. All involved extending and deepening U.S. military involvement in an eight-year-old conflict that the previous administration had treated as a stepchild. One option, of course, remained conspicuously "off the table": getting out.

The weeks between the McChrystal report leak and a presidential speech at West Point in which he announced his decision provided an extraordinary demonstration of how Was.h.i.+ngton both rules and enforces its rules. Through the fall of 2009, the world waited for the "most powerful man in the world" to reveal how he intended to proceed in Afghanistan. Obama's critics chided him for "dithering." His supporters commended his careful deliberation. Parties on all sides agreed that whichever way the president came down, the implications were sure to be momentous.

In fact, however, even as Obama pondered the question of whether to send ten thousand or twenty thousand or thirty thousand or forty thousand additional reinforcements to Afghanistan, the actual ability to exercise choice had already pa.s.sed from his hands. In essence, the president found himself in the position of a man shopping for a new suit who is told that he can pick any color so long as it's some shade of khaki.

The issues that should properly have claimed presidential attention in light of the failure of President Bush's Freedom Agenda-evaluating the Long War's purpose and prospects while identifying the principles that could form the basis for a realistic response to violent jihadism (and then applying those principles to Afghanistan)-never seemingly made it to his desk. The issue actually allotted to the president, selecting the right approach to pacifying Afghanistan, was the one he was least qualified to make. It was as if Franklin Roosevelt had spent World War II planning amphibious invasions, while a.s.suming that the formulation of overall strategy would take care of itself.

On December 1, just days before traveling to Oslo to accept the n.o.bel Peace Prize, Obama announced that he was ordering an additional thirty thousand troops to Afghanistan. (By the next day, that number had risen to thirty-three thousand; with seven thousand in additional NATO reinforcements promised, McChrystal got his forty thousand exactly.) By escalating the U.S. military commitment there the president in effect ratified the Long War. In doing so, he made it all but certain that Obama's War would become a central theme of his presidency. Whatever the talk of "off-ramps" and "exit strategies," the president had effectively forfeited his opportunity to undertake a serious rea.s.sessment of the basic approach to national security formulated over the course of the preceding six decades.

Obama would not challenge the tradition that Curtis LeMay and Allen Dulles had done so much to erect. In the counsels of government, the views and voices of the semiwarriors would continue to command respect-indeed, the heirs of McGeorge Bundy and Robert McNamara applauded Obama's determination to see things through in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the warriors themselves-Generals Petraeus and McChrystal taking the place of generals like Maxwell Taylor-provided the rationale for why fixing Helmand Province should take precedence over fixing Cleveland and Detroit. As it had with the lessons of Vietnam, Was.h.i.+ngton now successfully absorbed (and trivialized) the lessons of Iraq so as to ensure that nothing of importance would be learned and little would change. The essential elements of the Was.h.i.+ngton consensus were thereby preserved.

Given the record of Was.h.i.+ngton's devotion to that consensus, Obama's decision to affirm the status quo hardly qualifies as a surprise. Yet given the hopes of real change to which his election had given rise, many of the president's most devoted supporters found his decision disheartening. Real change would