The Gathering Storm Part 16

On the a.s.sumption that the prisoners were in a pitiable condition from starvation and confinement, we directed ambulances, doctors, the press, and photographers to the port of Leith to receive them. As, however, it appeared that they were in good health, had been well looked after on the destroyers, and came ash.o.r.e in a hearty condition, no publicity was given to this aspect. Their rescue and Captain Vian's conduct aroused a wave of enthusiasm in Britain almost equal to that which followed the sinking of the Graf Spee. Graf Spee. Both these events strengthened my hand and the prestige of the Admiralty. "The Navy's here!" was pa.s.sed from lip to lip. Both these events strengthened my hand and the prestige of the Admiralty. "The Navy's here!" was pa.s.sed from lip to lip.

Every allowance must be made for the behaviour of the Norwegian Government, which was, of course, quivering under the German terror and exploiting our forbearance. They protested vehemently against the entry of their territorial waters. Mr. Chamberlain's speech in the House of Commons contained the essence of the British reply:

According to the views expressed by Professor Koht [the Norwegian Prime Minister], the Norwegian Government see no objection to the use of Norwegian territorial waters for hundreds of miles by a German wars.h.i.+p for the purpose of escaping capture on the high seas and of conveying British prisoners to a German prison camp. Such a doctrine is at variance with international law as His Majesty's Government understand it. It would in their view legalise the abuse by German wars.h.i.+ps of neutral waters and create a position which His Majesty's Government could in no circ.u.mstances accept.

Hitler's decision to invade Norway had, as we have seen, been taken on December 14, and the staff work was proceeding under Keitel. The incident of the Altmark Altmark no doubt gave a spur to action. At Keitel's suggestion on February 20, Hitler summoned urgently to Berlin General Falkenhorst, who was at that time in command of an army corps at Coblenz. Falkenhorst had taken part in the German campaign in Finland in 1918, and upon this subject the interview with the Fuehrer opened. The General described the conversation at the Nuremberg Trials. no doubt gave a spur to action. At Keitel's suggestion on February 20, Hitler summoned urgently to Berlin General Falkenhorst, who was at that time in command of an army corps at Coblenz. Falkenhorst had taken part in the German campaign in Finland in 1918, and upon this subject the interview with the Fuehrer opened. The General described the conversation at the Nuremberg Trials.

Hitler reminded me of my experience in Finland, and said to me, "Sit down and tell me what you did." After a moment, the Fuehrer interrupted me. He led me to a table covered with maps. "I have a similar thing in mind," he said: "the occupation of Norway; because I am informed that the English intend to land there, and I want to be there before them."Then marching up and down he expounded to me his reasons. "The occupation of Norway by the British would be a strategic turning movement which would lead them into the Baltic, where we have neither troops nor coastal fortifications. The success which we have gained in the East and which we are going to win in the West would be annihilated because the enemy would find himself in a position to advance on Berlin and to break the backbone of our two fronts. In the second and third place, the conquest of Norway will ensure the liberty of movement of our Fleet in the Bay of Wilhelmshaven, and will protect our imports of Swedish ore." ... Finally he said to me, "I appoint you to the command of the expedition."

That afternoon Falkenhorst was summoned again to the Chancellery to discuss with Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl the detailed operational plans for the Norwegian expedition. The question of priorities was of supreme importance. Would Hitler commit himself in Norway before or after the execution of "Case Yellow" the attack on France? On March 1, he made his decision: Norway was to come first. The entry in Jodl's diary for March 3 reads, "The Fuehrer decides to carry out 'Weser Exercise' before 'Case Yellow' with a few days' interval."

A vexatious air attack had recently begun on our s.h.i.+pping all along the east coast. Besides ocean-going vessels destined for the large ports, there were on any given day about three hundred and twenty s.h.i.+ps of between five hundred and two thousand tons either at sea or in harbour on the coast, many engaged in coal transport to London and the south. Only a few of these small vessels had yet been provided with an antiaircraft gun, and the enemy aircraft, therefore, concentrated upon this easy prey. They even attacked the lights.h.i.+ps. These faithful servants of the seamen, moored in exposed positions near the shoals along our coasts, were of use to all, even the marauding U-boat itself, and had never been touched in any previous war. Several were now sunk or damaged, the worst case being off the Humber, where a fierce machine-gun attack killed eight out of the lights.h.i.+p's crew of nine.

As a defence against air attack, the convoy system proved as effective as it had against the U-boats, but everything was now done to find some kind of weapon for each s.h.i.+p. In our dearth of ack-ack guns all sorts of contrivances were used. Even a life-saving rocket brought down an air bandit. The spare machine-guns from the Home Fleet were distributed with naval gunners to British and Allied merchant s.h.i.+ps on the east coast. These men and their weapons were s.h.i.+fted from s.h.i.+p to s.h.i.+p for each voyage through the danger zone. By the end of February, the Army was able to help, and thus began an organisation later known as the Maritime Royal Artillery. At the height of the war in 1944, more than thirty-eight thousand officers and men from the regular forces were employed in this task, of which fourteen thousand were found by the Army. Over considerable sections of the east coast convoy route, air fighter protection from the nearest airfields could soon be given on call. Thus the efforts of all three services were combined. An increasing toll was taken of the raiders. Shooting-up ordinary defenceless s.h.i.+pping of all countries turned out to be more costly than had been expected, and the attacks diminished.

Not all the horizon was dark. In the outer seas there had been no further signs of raider activity since the destruction of the Graf Spee Graf Spee in December, and the work of sweeping German s.h.i.+pping from the seas continued. During February, six German s.h.i.+ps left Spain in an attempt to reach Germany. Only one succeeded; of the remainder three were captured, one scuttled herself, and one was wrecked in Norway. Seven other German s.h.i.+ps attempting to run the blockade were intercepted by our patrols during February and March. All except one of these were scuttled by their captains. Altogether by the beginning of April, 1940, seventy-one s.h.i.+ps of three hundred and forty thousand tons had been lost to the Germans by capture or scuttling, while two hundred and fifteen German s.h.i.+ps still remained cooped in neutral ports. Finding our merchant s.h.i.+ps armed, the U-boats had abandoned the gun for the torpedo. Their next descent had been from the torpedo to the lowest form of warfare the undeclared mine. We have seen how the magnetic-mine attack had been met and mastered. Nevertheless, more than half our losses in January were from this cause and more than two-thirds of the total fell on neutrals. in December, and the work of sweeping German s.h.i.+pping from the seas continued. During February, six German s.h.i.+ps left Spain in an attempt to reach Germany. Only one succeeded; of the remainder three were captured, one scuttled herself, and one was wrecked in Norway. Seven other German s.h.i.+ps attempting to run the blockade were intercepted by our patrols during February and March. All except one of these were scuttled by their captains. Altogether by the beginning of April, 1940, seventy-one s.h.i.+ps of three hundred and forty thousand tons had been lost to the Germans by capture or scuttling, while two hundred and fifteen German s.h.i.+ps still remained cooped in neutral ports. Finding our merchant s.h.i.+ps armed, the U-boats had abandoned the gun for the torpedo. Their next descent had been from the torpedo to the lowest form of warfare the undeclared mine. We have seen how the magnetic-mine attack had been met and mastered. Nevertheless, more than half our losses in January were from this cause and more than two-thirds of the total fell on neutrals.

On the Navy estimates at the end of February, I reviewed the salient features of the war at sea. The Germans, I surmised, had lost half the U-boats with which they had entered the war. Contrary to expectation, few new ones had yet made their appearance. Actually, as we now know, sixteen U-boats had been sunk and nine added up to the end of February. The enemy's main effort had not yet developed. Our programme of s.h.i.+pbuilding, both in the form of escort vessels and in replacement of merchant s.h.i.+ps, was very large. The Admiralty had taken over control of merchant s.h.i.+pbuilding, and Sir James Lithgow, the Glasgow s.h.i.+pbuilder, had joined the Board for this purpose. In the first six months of this new war our net loss had been less than two hundred thousand tons compared with four hundred and fifty thousand tons in the single deadly month of April, 1917. Meanwhile, we had continued to capture more cargoes in tonnage destined for the enemy than we had lost ourselves.

Each month [I said in ending my speech] there has been a steady improvement in imports. In January the Navy carried safely into British harbours, despite U-boats and mines and the winter gales and fog, considerably more than four-fifths of the peace-time average for the three preceding years.... When we consider the great number of British s.h.i.+ps which have been withdrawn for naval service or for the transport of our armies across the Channel or of troop convoys across the globe, there is nothing in these results to put it mildly which should cause despondency or alarm.

11.

Before the Storm March, 1940

The Fleet Returns to Scapa Flow - Our Voyage Through the Minches - "Mines Reported in the Fairway" - An Air Alarm - Improvements at Scapa - - Hitler's Plans as Now Known - Desperate Plight of Finland Hitler's Plans as Now Known - Desperate Plight of Finland - - M. Daladier's Vain Efforts - The Russo-Finnish Armistice Terms - New Dangers in Scandinavia - "Operation Royal Marine" - The Fluvial Mines Ready - M. Daladier's Opposition - The Fall of the Daladier Government - My Letter to the New Premier, M. Reynaud - Meeting of Supreme War Council, March M. Daladier's Vain Efforts - The Russo-Finnish Armistice Terms - New Dangers in Scandinavia - "Operation Royal Marine" - The Fluvial Mines Ready - M. Daladier's Opposition - The Fall of the Daladier Government - My Letter to the New Premier, M. Reynaud - Meeting of Supreme War Council, March 28 - 28 - Mr. Chamberlain's Survey Mr. Chamberlain's Survey - - Decision to Mine the Norwegian Leads at Last - Seven Months' Delay - Various Offensive Proposals and Devices - Mr. Chamberlain's Speech of April Decision to Mine the Norwegian Leads at Last - Seven Months' Delay - Various Offensive Proposals and Devices - Mr. Chamberlain's Speech of April 5, 1940 - 5, 1940 - Signs of Impending German Action. Signs of Impending German Action.

MARCH 12 was the long-desired date for the reoccupation and use of Scapa as the main base of the Home Fleet. I thought I would give myself the treat of being present on this occasion in our naval affairs, and embarked accordingly in Admiral Forbes' flags.h.i.+p at the Clyde. 12 was the long-desired date for the reoccupation and use of Scapa as the main base of the Home Fleet. I thought I would give myself the treat of being present on this occasion in our naval affairs, and embarked accordingly in Admiral Forbes' flags.h.i.+p at the Clyde.

The Fleet comprised five capital s.h.i.+ps, a cruiser squadron, and perhaps a score of destroyers. The twenty-hour voyage lay through the Minches. We were to pa.s.s the Northern Straits at dawn and reach Scapa about noon. The Hood Hood and other s.h.i.+ps from Rosyth, moving up the east coast, would be there some hours before us. The navigation of the Minches is intricate, and the northern exit barely a mile wide. On every side are rocky sh.o.r.es and reefs, and three U-boats were reported in these enclosed waters. We had to proceed at high speed and by zigzag. All the usual peace-time lights were out. This was, therefore, a task in navigation which the Navy keenly appreciated. However, just as we were about to start after luncheon, the Master of the Fleet, navigating officer of the flags.h.i.+p, on whom the prime direct responsibility lay, was suddenly stricken by influenza. So a very young-looking lieutenant who was his a.s.sistant came up onto the bridge to take charge of the movement of the Fleet. I was struck by this officer, who without any notice had to undertake so serious a task requiring such perfect science, accuracy, and judgment. His composure did not entirely conceal his satisfaction. and other s.h.i.+ps from Rosyth, moving up the east coast, would be there some hours before us. The navigation of the Minches is intricate, and the northern exit barely a mile wide. On every side are rocky sh.o.r.es and reefs, and three U-boats were reported in these enclosed waters. We had to proceed at high speed and by zigzag. All the usual peace-time lights were out. This was, therefore, a task in navigation which the Navy keenly appreciated. However, just as we were about to start after luncheon, the Master of the Fleet, navigating officer of the flags.h.i.+p, on whom the prime direct responsibility lay, was suddenly stricken by influenza. So a very young-looking lieutenant who was his a.s.sistant came up onto the bridge to take charge of the movement of the Fleet. I was struck by this officer, who without any notice had to undertake so serious a task requiring such perfect science, accuracy, and judgment. His composure did not entirely conceal his satisfaction.

I had many things to discuss with the Commander-in-Chief, and it was not until after midnight that I went up onto the bridge. All was velvet black. The air was clear, but no stars were to be seen, and there was no moon. The great s.h.i.+p ploughed along at about sixteen knots. One could just see the dark ma.s.s astern of the following battles.h.i.+p. Here were nearly thirty vessels steaming in company and moving in order with no lights of any kind except their tiny stern-lights, and constantly changing course in accordance with the prescribed anti-U-boat ritual. It was five hours since they had had any observation of the land or the heavens. Presently the Admiral joined me, and I said to him: "Here is one of the things I should be very sorry to be made responsible for carrying out. How are you going to make sure you will hit the narrow exit from the Minches at daylight?" "What would you do, sir," he said, "if you were at this moment the only person who could give an order?" I replied at once: "I should anchor and wait till morning. 'Anchor, Hardy,' as Nelson said." But the Admiral answered: "We have nearly a hundred fathoms of water beneath us now." I had, of course, complete confidence, gained over many years, in the Navy, and I only tell this tale to bring home to the general reader the marvellous skill and precision with which what seem to landsmen to be impossible feats of this kind are performed when necessary as a matter of course.

It was eight o'clock before I woke, and we were in the broad waters north of the Minches, steering round the western extremity of Scotland towards Scapa Flow. We were perhaps half an hour's steaming from the entrance to Scapa when a signal reached us saying that several German aircraft had dropped mines in the main entrance we were about to use. Admiral Forbes thereupon decided that he must stand out to the westward for twenty-four hours until the channel had been reported clear, and on this the whole Fleet began to change its course. "I can easily put you ash.o.r.e in a destroyer if you care to transs.h.i.+p," he said. "The Hood Hood is already in harbour and can look after you." As I had s.n.a.t.c.hed these three days from London with difficulty, I accepted this offer. Our baggage was rapidly brought on deck; the flags.h.i.+p reduced her speed to three or four knots, and a cutter manned by twelve men in their life-belts was lowered from the davits. My small party was already in it, and I was taking leave of the Admiral when an air-raid alarm sounded, and the whole s.h.i.+p flashed into activity as all the ack-ack batteries were manned and other measures taken. is already in harbour and can look after you." As I had s.n.a.t.c.hed these three days from London with difficulty, I accepted this offer. Our baggage was rapidly brought on deck; the flags.h.i.+p reduced her speed to three or four knots, and a cutter manned by twelve men in their life-belts was lowered from the davits. My small party was already in it, and I was taking leave of the Admiral when an air-raid alarm sounded, and the whole s.h.i.+p flashed into activity as all the ack-ack batteries were manned and other measures taken.

I was worried that the s.h.i.+p should have had to slow down in waters where we knew there were U-boats, but the Admiral said it was quite all right, and pointed to five destroyers which were circling round her at high speed, while a sixth waited for us. We were a quarter of an hour rowing across the mile that separated us from our destroyer. It was like in the olden times, except that the sailors had not so much practice with the oars. The flags.h.i.+p had already regained her speed and was steaming off after the rest of her Fleet before we climbed on board. All the officers were at their action stations on the destroyer, and we were welcomed by the surgeon, who took us into the wardroom, where all the instruments of his profession were laid out on the table ready for accidents. But no air raid occurred, and we immediately proceeded at high speed into Scapa. We entered through Switha Sound, which is a small and subsidiary channel and was not affected by the mine-dropping. "This is the tradesmen's entrance," said Thompson, my Flag Commander. It was in fact the one a.s.signed to the stores.h.i.+ps. "It's the only one," said the destroyer lieutenant stiffly, "that the flotillas are allowed to use." To make everything go well, I asked him if he could remember Kipling's poem about "Mines reported in the fairway, warn all traffic and detain.

"Send up ...'"

and here I let him carry on, which he did correctly: Unity, Claribel, a.s.syrian, Stormc.o.c.k, and Golden Gain.

We soon found our way to the Hood, Hood, where Admiral Whit-worth received us, having gathered most of his captains, and I pa.s.sed a pleasant night on board before the long round of inspections which filled the next day. This was the last time I ever set foot upon the where Admiral Whit-worth received us, having gathered most of his captains, and I pa.s.sed a pleasant night on board before the long round of inspections which filled the next day. This was the last time I ever set foot upon the Hood, Hood, although she had nearly two years of war service to perform before her destruction by the although she had nearly two years of war service to perform before her destruction by the Bismarck Bismarck in 1941. in 1941.

More than six months of constant exertion and the highest priorities had repaired the peace-time neglect. The three main entrances were defended with booms and mines, and three additional blocks.h.i.+ps among others had already been placed in Kirk Sound through which Prien's U-boat had slipped to destroy the Royal Oak. Royal Oak. Many more blocks.h.i.+ps were yet to come. A large garrison guarded the base and the still-growing batteries. We had planned for over one hundred and twenty ack-ack guns with numerous searchlights and a balloon barrage to command the air over the Fleet anchorage. Not all these measures were yet complete, but the air defences were already formidable. Many small craft patrolled the approaches in ceaseless activity, and two or three squadrons of Hurricane fighters from the airfields in Caithness could be guided to an a.s.sailant in darkness or daylight by one of the finest radar installations then in existence. At last the Home Fleet had a home. It was the famous home from which in the previous war the Royal Navy had ruled the seas. Many more blocks.h.i.+ps were yet to come. A large garrison guarded the base and the still-growing batteries. We had planned for over one hundred and twenty ack-ack guns with numerous searchlights and a balloon barrage to command the air over the Fleet anchorage. Not all these measures were yet complete, but the air defences were already formidable. Many small craft patrolled the approaches in ceaseless activity, and two or three squadrons of Hurricane fighters from the airfields in Caithness could be guided to an a.s.sailant in darkness or daylight by one of the finest radar installations then in existence. At last the Home Fleet had a home. It was the famous home from which in the previous war the Royal Navy had ruled the seas.

Although, as we now know, May 10 was already chosen for the invasion of France and the Low Countries, Hitler had not yet fixed the actual date of the prior Norway onslaught. Much was to precede it. On March 14, Jodl wrote in his diary: The English keep vigil in the North Sea with fifteen to sixteen submarines; doubtful whether reason to safeguard own operations or prevent operations by Germans. Fuehrer has not yet decided what reason to give for Weser Exercise.

There was a hum of activity in the planning sections of the German war machine. Preparations both for the attack on Norway and the invasion of France continued simultaneously and efficiently. On March 20, Falkenhorst reported that his side of the "Weser" operation plan was ready. The Fuehrer held a military conference on the afternoon of March 16, and D-Day was provisionally fixed, apparently for April 9. Admiral Raeder reported to the conference: ... In my opinion the danger of a British landing in Norway is no longer acute at present.... The question of what the British will do in the North in the near future can be answered as follows: They will make further attempts to disrupt German trade in neutral waters and to cause incidents in order perhaps to create a pretext for action against Norway. One object has been and still is to cut off Germany's imports from Narvik. These will be cut off at least for a time, however, even if the Weser operation is carried out.Sooner or later Germany will be faced with the necessity of carrying out the Weser operation. Therefore, it is advisable to do so as soon as possible, by April 15 at the latest, since after that date the nights are too short; there will be a new moon on April 7. The operational possibilities of the Navy will be restricted too much if the Weser operation is postponed any longer. The submarines can remain in position only for two to three weeks more. Weather of the type favourable for "Operation Therefore, it is advisable to do so as soon as possible, by April 15 at the latest, since after that date the nights are too short; there will be a new moon on April 7. The operational possibilities of the Navy will be restricted too much if the Weser operation is postponed any longer. The submarines can remain in position only for two to three weeks more. Weather of the type favourable for "Operation Gelb Gelb" [Yellow] is not to be waited for in the case of the Weser operation; overcast, foggy weather is more satisfactory for the latter. The general state of preparedness of the naval forces and s.h.i.+ps is at present good.

From the beginning of the year, the Soviets had brought their main power to bear on the Finns. They redoubled their efforts to pierce the Mannerheim Line before the melting of the snows. Alas, this year the spring and its thaw, on which the hard-pressed Finns based their hopes, came nearly six weeks late. The great Soviet offensive on the Isthmus, which was to last forty-two days, opened on February 1, combined with heavy air-bombing of base depots and railway junctions behind the lines. Ten days of heavy bombardment from Soviet guns, ma.s.sed wheel to wheel, heralded the main infantry attack. After a fortnight's fighting, the line was breached. The air attacks on the key fort and base of Viipuri increased in intensity. By the end of the month, the Mannerheim defence system had been disorganised, and the Russians were able to concentrate against the Gulf of Viipuri. The Finns were short of ammunition and their troops exhausted.

The honourable correct.i.tude which had deprived us of any strategic initiative equally hampered all effective measures for sending munitions to Finland. We had been able so far only to send from our own scanty store contributions insignificant to the Finns. In France, however, a warmer and deeper sentiment prevailed, and this was strongly fostered by M. Daladier. On March 2, without consulting the British Government, he agreed to send fifty thousand volunteers and a hundred bombers to Finland. We could certainly not act on this scale, and in view of the doc.u.ments found on the German major in Belgium, and of the ceaseless Intelligence reports of the steady ma.s.sing of German troops on the Western Front, it went far beyond what prudence would allow. However, it was agreed to send fifty British bombers. On March 12, the Cabinet again decided to revise the plans for military landings at Narvik and Trondheim, to be followed at Stavanger and Bergen, as a part of the extended help to Finland into which we had been drawn by the French. These plans were to be available for action on March 20, although the need of Norwegian and Swedish permission had not been met. Meanwhile, on March 7, Mr. Paasikivi had gone again to Moscow; this time to discuss armistice terms. On the twelfth, the Russian terms were accepted by the Finns. All our plans for military landings were again shelved, and the forces which were being collected were to some extent dispersed. The two divisions which had been held back in England were now allowed to proceed to France, and our striking power towards Norway was reduced to eleven battalions.

Meanwhile, "Operation Royal Marine" had ripened. Five months of intensive effort with Admiralty priorities behind it had brought its punctual fruition. Admiral Fitzgerald and his trained detachments of British naval officers and marines, each man aflame with the idea of a novel stroke in the war, were established on the upper reaches of the Rhine, ready to strike when permission could be obtained. My detailed explanation of the plan will be found in Appendix L, Book II. In March all preparations were perfected and I at length appealed both to my colleagues and to the French. The War Cabinet were very ready to let me begin this carefully prepared offensive plan, and left it to me, with Foreign Office support, to do what I could with the French. In all their wars and troubles in my lifetime I have been bound-up with the French, and I believed that they would do as much for me as for any other foreigner alive. But in this phase of "twilight war" I could not move them. When I pressed very hard, they used a method of refusal which I never met before or since. M. Daladier told me with an air of exceptional formality that "The President of the Republic himself had intervened, and that no aggressive action must be taken which might only draw reprisals upon France." This idea of not irritating the enemy did not commend itself to me. Hitler had done his best to strangle our commerce by the indiscriminate mining of our harbours. We had beaten him by defensive means alone. Good, decent, civilised people, it appeared, must never strike themselves till after they have been struck dead. In these days the fearful German volcano and all its subterranean fires drew near to their explosion point. There were still months of pretended war. On the one side endless discussions about trivial points, no decisions taken, or if taken rescinded, and the rule "Don't be unkind to the enemy, you will only make him angry." On the other, doom preparing a vast machine grinding forward ready to break upon us!

The military collapse of Finland led to further repercussions. On March 18, Hitler met Mussolini at the Brenner Pa.s.s. Hitler deliberately gave the impression to his Italian host that there was no question of Germany launching a land offensive in the West. On the nineteenth, Mr. Chamberlain spoke in the House of Commons. In view of growing criticism he revived in some detail the story of British aid to Finland. He rightly emphasised that our main consideration had been the desire to respect the neutrality of Norway and Sweden, and he also defended the Government for not being hustled into attempts to succour the Finns which had offered little chance of success. The defeat of Finland was fatal to the Daladier Government, whose chief had taken so marked, if tardy, action, and who had personally given disproportionate prominence to this part of our anxieties. On March 21, a new Cabinet was formed under M. Reynaud, pledged to an increasingly vigorous conduct of the war.

My relations with M. Reynaud stood on a different footing from any I had established with M. Daladier. Reynaud, Mandel, and I had felt the same emotions about Munich. Daladier had been on the other side. I therefore welcomed the change in the French Government, and I also hoped that my fluvial mines would now have a better chance of acceptance.

Mr. Churchill to M. Reynaud. March 22, 1940.

I cannot tell you how glad I am that all has been accomplished so successfully and speedily, and especially that Daladier has been rallied to your Cabinet. This is much admired over here, and also Blum's self-effacing behaviour.I rejoice that you are at the helm, and that Mandel is with you, and I look forward to the very closest and most active co-operation between our two Governments. I share, as you know, all the anxieties you expressed to me the other night about the general course of the war, and the need for strenuous and drastic measures; but I little thought when we spoke that events would soon take a decisive turn for you. We have thought so much alike during the last three or four years that I am most hopeful that the closest understanding will prevail, and that I may contribute to it.I now send you the letter which I wrote to Gamelin upon the business which brought me to Paris last week, and I beg you to give the project your immediate sympathetic consideration. Both the Prime Minister and Lord Halifax have become very keen upon this operation ["Royal Marine"], and we were all three about to press it strongly upon your predecessor. It seems a great pity to lose this valuable time. I have now upwards of six thousand mines ready and moving forward in an endless flow alas, only on land and of course there is always danger of secrecy being lost when delays occur.I look forward to an early meeting of the Supreme Council, where I trust concerted action may be arranged between French and English colleagues colleagues for that is what we are. for that is what we are.Pray give my kind regards to Mandel, and believe me, with the warmest wishes for your success, in which our common safety is deeply involved.

The French Ministers came to London for a meeting of the Supreme War Council on March 28. Mr. Chamberlain opened with a full and clear description of the scene as he saw it. To my great satisfaction he said his first proposal was that "a certain operation, generally known as the 'Royal Marine,' should be put into operation immediately." He described how this project would be carried out and stated that stocks had been acc.u.mulated for effective and continuous execution. There would be complete surprise. The operation would take place in that part of the Rhine used almost exclusively for military purposes. No similar operation had ever been carried out before, nor had equipment previously been designed capable of taking advantage of river conditions and working successfully against the barrages and types of craft found in rivers. Finally, owing to the design of the weapon, neutral waters would not be affected. The British antic.i.p.ated that this attack would create the utmost consternation and confusion. It was well known that no people were more thorough than the Germans in preparation and planning; but equally no people could be more completely upset when their plans miscarried. They could not improvise. Again, the war had found the German railways in a precarious state, and therefore their dependence on their inland waterways had increased. In addition to the floating mines, other weapons had been designed to be dropped from aircraft in ca.n.a.ls within Germany itself, where there was no current. He urged that surprise depended upon speed. Secrecy would be endangered by delay, and the river conditions were about to be particularly favourable. As to German retaliation, if Germany thought it worth while to bomb French or British cities, she would not wait for a pretext. Everything was ready. It was only necessary for the French High Command to give the order.

He then said that Germany had two weaknesses: her supplies of iron ore and of oil. The main sources of supply of these were situated at the opposite ends of Europe. The iron ore came from the North. He unfolded with precision the case for intercepting the German iron-ore supplies from Sweden. He dealt also with the Rumanian and Baku oilfields, which ought to be denied to Germany, if possible by diplomacy. I listened to this powerful argument with increasing pleasure. I had not realised how fully Mr. Chamberlain and I were agreed.

M. Reynaud spoke of the impact of German propaganda upon French morale. The German radio blared each night that the Reich had no quarrel with France; that the origin of the war was to be found in the blank cheque given by Britain to Poland; that France had been dragged into war at the heels of the British; and even that she was not in a position to sustain the struggle. Goebbels' policy towards France seemed to be to let the war run on at the present reduced tempo, counting upon growing discouragement among the five million Frenchmen now called-up and upon the emergence of a French Government willing to come to compromise terms with Germany at the expense of Great Britain.

The question, he said, was widely asked in France, "How can the Allies win the war?" The number of divisions, "despite British efforts," was increasing faster on the German side than on ours. When, therefore, could we hope to secure that superiority in man-power required for successful action in the West? We had no knowledge of what was going on in Germany in material equipment. There was a general feeling in France that the war had reached a deadlock, and that Germany had only to wait. Unless some action were taken to cut the enemy's supply of oil and other raw material, "the feeling might grow that blockade was not a weapon strong enough to secure victory for the Allied cause." About the operation "Royal Marine," he said that, though good in itself, it could not be decisive, and that any reprisals would fall upon France. However, if other things were settled, he would make a special effort to secure French concurrence. He was far more responsive about cutting off supplies of Swedish iron ore, and he stated that there was an exact relation between the supplies of Swedish iron ore to Germany and the output of the German iron and steel industry. His conclusion was that the Allies should lay mines in the territorial waters along the Norwegian coast and later obstruct by similar action ore being carried from the port of Lulea to Germany. He emphasised the importance of hampering German supplies of Rumanian oil.

It was at last decided that, after addressing communications in general terms to Norway and Sweden, we should lay minefields in Norwegian territorial waters on April 5, and that, subject to the concurrence of the French War Committee, subject to the concurrence of the French War Committee, "Royal Marine" should be begun by launching the fluvial mines in the Rhine on April 4, and on April 15 upon the German ca.n.a.ls from the air. It was also agreed that if Germany invaded Belgium the Allies should immediately move into that country without waiting for a formal invitation; and that if Germany invaded Holland, and Belgium did not go to her a.s.sistance, the Allies should consider themselves free to enter Belgium for the purpose of helping Holland. "Royal Marine" should be begun by launching the fluvial mines in the Rhine on April 4, and on April 15 upon the German ca.n.a.ls from the air. It was also agreed that if Germany invaded Belgium the Allies should immediately move into that country without waiting for a formal invitation; and that if Germany invaded Holland, and Belgium did not go to her a.s.sistance, the Allies should consider themselves free to enter Belgium for the purpose of helping Holland.

Finally, as an obvious point on which all were at one, the communique stated that the British and French Governments had agreed on the following solemn declaration: That during the present war they would neither negotiate nor conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement.

This pact later acquired high importance.

On April 3, the British Cabinet implemented the resolve of the Supreme War Council, and the Admiralty was authorised to mine the Norwegian Leads on April 8. I called the actual mining operation "Wilfred," because by itself it was so small and innocent. As our mining of Norwegian waters might provoke a German retort, it was also agreed that a British brigade and a French contingent should be sent to Narvik to clear the port and advance to the Swedish frontier. Other forces should be dispatched to Stavanger, Bergen, and Trondheim, in order to deny these bases to the enemy.

It is worth while looking back on the stages by which at last the decision to mine the Leads was reached.1 I had asked for it on September 29, 1939. Nothing relevant had altered in the meanwhile. The moral and technical objections on the score of neutrality, the possibility of German retaliation against Norway, the importance of stopping the flow of iron ore from Narvik to Germany, the effect on neutral and world-wide opinion all were exactly the same. But at last the Supreme War Council was convinced, and at last the War Cabinet were reconciled to the scheme, and indeed resolved upon it. Once had they given consent and withdrawn it. Then their minds had been overlaid by the complications of the Finnish War. On sixty days "Aid to Finland" had been part of the Cabinet agenda. Nothing had come of it all. Finland had been crushed into submission by Russia. Now after all this vain boggling, hesitation, changes of policy, arguments between good and worthy people unending, we had at last reached the simple point on which action had been demanded seven months before. But in war seven months is a long time. Now Hitler was ready, and ready with a far more powerful and well-prepared plan. One can hardly find a more perfect example of the impotence and fatuity of waging war by committee or rather by groups of committees. It fell to my lot in the weeks which followed to bear much of the burden and some of the odium of the ill-starred Norwegian campaign, the course of which will presently be described. Had I been allowed to act with freedom and design when I first demanded permission, a far more agreeable conclusion might have been reached in this key theatre, with favourable consequences in every direction. But now all was to be disaster. I had asked for it on September 29, 1939. Nothing relevant had altered in the meanwhile. The moral and technical objections on the score of neutrality, the possibility of German retaliation against Norway, the importance of stopping the flow of iron ore from Narvik to Germany, the effect on neutral and world-wide opinion all were exactly the same. But at last the Supreme War Council was convinced, and at last the War Cabinet were reconciled to the scheme, and indeed resolved upon it. Once had they given consent and withdrawn it. Then their minds had been overlaid by the complications of the Finnish War. On sixty days "Aid to Finland" had been part of the Cabinet agenda. Nothing had come of it all. Finland had been crushed into submission by Russia. Now after all this vain boggling, hesitation, changes of policy, arguments between good and worthy people unending, we had at last reached the simple point on which action had been demanded seven months before. But in war seven months is a long time. Now Hitler was ready, and ready with a far more powerful and well-prepared plan. One can hardly find a more perfect example of the impotence and fatuity of waging war by committee or rather by groups of committees. It fell to my lot in the weeks which followed to bear much of the burden and some of the odium of the ill-starred Norwegian campaign, the course of which will presently be described. Had I been allowed to act with freedom and design when I first demanded permission, a far more agreeable conclusion might have been reached in this key theatre, with favourable consequences in every direction. But now all was to be disaster.

He who will not when he may, When he will, he shall have Nay.

It may here be right to set forth the various offensive proposals and devices which in my subordinate position I put forward during the "Twilight War." The first was the entry and domination of the Baltic, which was the sovereign plan if it were possible. It was vetoed by the growing realisation of the air power. The second was the creation of a close-action squadron of naval tortoises not too much afraid of the air-bomb or torpedo, by the reconstruction of the Royal Sovereign Royal Sovereign cla.s.s of battles.h.i.+ps. This fell by the way through the movement of the war and the priorities which had to be given to aircraft carriers. The third was the simple tactical operation of laying mines in the Norwegian Leads to cut off the vital German iron-ore supplies. Fourthly comes "Cultivator Number 6": cla.s.s of battles.h.i.+ps. This fell by the way through the movement of the war and the priorities which had to be given to aircraft carriers. The third was the simple tactical operation of laying mines in the Norwegian Leads to cut off the vital German iron-ore supplies. Fourthly comes "Cultivator Number 6": 2 2 namely, a long-term means for breaking a deadlock on the French Front without a repet.i.tion of the slaughter of the previous war. This was superseded by the onrush of German armour turning our own invention of tanks to our undoing, and proving the ascendancy of the offensive in this new war. The fifth was the "Operation Royal Marine," namely, the paralysing of traffic on the Rhine by the dropping and discharge of fluvial mines. This played its limited part and proved its virtue from the moment when it was permitted. It was, however, swept away in the general collapse of the French resistance. In any case it required prolonged application to cause major injury to the enemy. namely, a long-term means for breaking a deadlock on the French Front without a repet.i.tion of the slaughter of the previous war. This was superseded by the onrush of German armour turning our own invention of tanks to our undoing, and proving the ascendancy of the offensive in this new war. The fifth was the "Operation Royal Marine," namely, the paralysing of traffic on the Rhine by the dropping and discharge of fluvial mines. This played its limited part and proved its virtue from the moment when it was permitted. It was, however, swept away in the general collapse of the French resistance. In any case it required prolonged application to cause major injury to the enemy.

To sum up: in the war of armies on the ground I was under the thrall of defensive fire-power. On the sea I strove persistently within my sphere to a.s.sert the initiative against the enemy as a relief from the terrible ordeal of presenting our enormous target of sea commerce to his attack. But in this prolonged trance of the "Twilight" or "Phoney" war, as it was commonly called in the United States, neither France nor Britain was capable of meeting the German vengeance thrust. It was only after France had been flattened out that Britain, thanks to her island advantage, developed out of the pangs of defeat and the menace of annihilation a national resolve equal to that of Germany.

Ominous items of news of varied credibility now began to come in. At the meeting of the War Cabinet on April 3, the Secretary of State for War told us that a report had been received at the War Office that the Germans had been collecting strong forces of troops at Rostock with the intention of taking Scandinavia if necessary. The Foreign Secretary said that the news from Stockholm tended to confirm this report. According to the Swedish Legation in Berlin, two hundred thousand tons of German s.h.i.+pping were now concentrated at Stettin and Swinemunde with troops on board which rumour placed at four hundred thousand. It was suggested that these forces were in readiness to deliver a counter-stroke against a possible attack by us upon Narvik or other Norwegian ports, about which the Germans were said to be still nervous.

Soon we learnt that the French War Committee would not agree to the launching of "Royal Marine." They were in favour of mining the Norwegian Leads, but opposed to anything that might draw retaliation on France. Through the French Amba.s.sador Reynaud expressed his regret. Mr. Chamberlain, who was much inclined to aggressive action of some kind at this stage, was vexed at this refusal, and in a conversation with M. Corbin he linked the two operations together. The British would cut off the ore supplies of Germany as the French desired, provided that at the same time the French allowed us to retaliate by means of "Royal Marine" for all the injuries we had suffered and were enduring from the magnetic mine. Keen as I was on "Royal Marine," I had not expected him to go so far as this. Both operations were methods of making offensive war upon the enemy, and bringing to an end the twilight period from the prolongation of which I now believed Germany was the gainer. However, if a few days would enable us to bring the French into agreement upon the punctual execution of the two projects, I was agreeable to postponing "Wilfred" for a few days.

The Prime Minister was so favourable to my views at this juncture that we seemed almost to think as one. He asked me to go over to Paris and see what I could do to persuade M. Daladier, who was evidently the stumbling-block. I met M. Reynaud and several others of his Ministers at dinner on the night of the fourth at the British Emba.s.sy, and we seemed in pretty good agreement. Daladier had been invited to attend, but professed a previous engagement. It was arranged that I should see him the next morning. While meaning to do my utmost to persuade Daladier, I asked permission from the Cabinet, to make it clear that we would go forward with "Wilfred" even if "Royal Marine" was vetoed.

I visited Daladier at the Rue St. Dominique at noon on the fifth, and had a serious talk with him. I commented on his absence from our dinner the night before. He pleaded his previous engagement. It was evident to me that a considerable gulf existed between the new and the former Premier. Daladier argued that in three months' time the French aviation would be sufficiently improved for the necessary measures to be taken to meet German reactions to "Royal Marine." For this he was prepared to give a firm date in writing. He made a strong case about the defenceless French factories. Finally he a.s.sured me that the period of political crises in France was over, and that he would work in harmony with M. Reynaud. On this we parted.

I reported by telephone to the War Cabinet, who were agreed that "Wilfred" should go forward notwithstanding the French refusal of "Royal Marine," but wished this to be the subject of a formal communication. At their meeting on April 5, the Foreign Secretary was instructed to inform the French Government that notwithstanding the great importance we had throughout attached to carrying out the "Royal Marine" operation at an early date, and simultaneously with the proposed operation in Norwegian territorial waters, we were nevertheless prepared as a concession to their wishes to proceed with the latter alone. The date was thus finally fixed for April 8.

On Friday, April 5, 1940, the Prime Minister addressed the Central Council of the National Union of Conservative and Unionist a.s.sociations in a spirit of unusual optimism: After seven months of war I feel ten times as confident of victory as I did at the beginning.... I feel that during the seven months our relative position towards the enemy has become a great deal stronger than it was.Consider the difference between the ways of a country like Germany and our own. Long before the war Germany was making preparations for it. She was increasing her armed forces on land and in the air with feverish haste; she was devoting all her resources to turning out arms and equipment and to building up huge reserves of stocks; in fact, she was turning herself into a fully armed camp. On the other hand, we, a peaceful nation, were carrying on with our peaceful pursuits. It is true that we had been driven by what was going on in Germany to begin to build up again those defences which we had so long left in abeyance, but we postponed as long as any hope of peace remained we continually postponed those drastic measures which were necessary if we were to put the country onto a war footing.The result was that when war did break out, German preparations were far ahead of our own, and it was natural then to expect that the enemy would take advantage of his initial superiority to make an endeavor to overwhelm us and France before we had time to make good our deficiencies. Is it not a very extraordinary thing that no such attempt was made? Whatever may be the reason whether it was that Hitler thought he might get away with what he had got without fighting for it, or whether it was that after all the preparations were not sufficiently complete however, one thing is certain: he missed the bus.And so the seven months that we have had have enabled us to make good and remove our weaknesses, to consolidate, and to tune up every arm, offensive and defensive, and so enormously to add to our fighting strength that we can face the future with a calm and steady mind whatever it brings.Perhaps you may say, "Yes, but has not the enemy, too, been busy?" I have not the slightest doubt he has. I would be the last to underrate the [his] strength or determination to use that strength without scruple and without mercy if he thinks he can do so without getting his blows returned with interest. I grant that. But I say this too: the very completeness of his preparations has left him very little margin of strength still to call upon.

This proved an ill-judged utterance. Its main a.s.sumption that we and the French were relatively stronger than at the beginning of the war was not reasonable. As has been previously explained, the Germans were now in the fourth year of vehement munition manufacture, whereas we were at a much earlier stage, probably comparable in fruitfulness to the second year. Moreover, with every month that had pa.s.sed, the German Army, now four years old, was becoming a mature and perfected weapon, and the former advantage of the French Army in training and cohesion was steadily pa.s.sing away. The Prime Minister showed no premonition that we were on the eve of great events, whereas it seemed almost certain to me that the land war was about to begin. Above all, the expression "Hitler missed the bus" was unlucky.

All lay in suspense. The various minor expedients I had been able to suggest had gained acceptance; but nothing of a major character had been done by either side. Our plans, such as they were, rested upon enforcing the blockade by the mining of the Norwegian corridor in the North, and by hampering German oil supplies from the Southeast. Complete immobility and silence reigned behind the German Front. Suddenly, the pa.s.sive or small-scale policy of the Allies was swept away by a cataract of violent surprises. We were to learn what total war means.

12.

The Clash at Sea April, 1940

Lord Chatfield's Retirement - The Prime Minister Invites Me to Preside over the Military Co-ordination Committee - An Awkward Arrangement - "Wilfred" - Oslo - The German Seizure of Norway - Tragedy of Neutrality - All the Fleets at Sea - The "Glowworm" - The "Renown" Engages the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" - - The Home Fleet off Bergen - Action by British Submarines - Warburton-Lee's Flotilla at Narvik - Supreme War Council Meets in London, April The Home Fleet off Bergen - Action by British Submarines - Warburton-Lee's Flotilla at Narvik - Supreme War Council Meets in London, April 9 - 9 - Its Conclusions - My Minute to the First Sea Lord, April Its Conclusions - My Minute to the First Sea Lord, April 10 10 - - Anger in England Anger in England - - Debate in Parliament, April Debate in Parliament, April 11 11 - - The "Warspite" and Her Flotilla Exterminate the German Destroyers at Narvik - Letter from the King. The "Warspite" and Her Flotilla Exterminate the German Destroyers at Narvik - Letter from the King.

BEFORE RESUMING THE NARRATIVE, I must explain the alterations in my position which occurred during the month of April, 1940.

Lord Chatfield's office as Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence had become redundant, and on the third, Mr. Chamberlain accepted his resignation, which he proffered freely. On the fourth, a statement was issued from Number 10 Downing Street that it was not proposed to fill the vacant post, but that arrangements were being made for the First Lord of the Admiralty, as the senior Service Minister concerned, to preside over the Military Co-ordination Committee. Accordingly I took the chair at its meetings, which were held daily, and sometimes twice daily, from the eighth to the fifteenth of April.

I had, therefore, an exceptional measure of responsibility but no power of effective direction. Among the other Service Ministers, who were also members of the War Cabinet, I was "first among equals." I had, however, no power to take or to enforce decisions. I had to carry with me both the Service Ministers and their professional chiefs. Thus, many important and able men had a right and duty to express their views of the swiftly changing phases of the battle for battle it was which now began.

The Chiefs of Staff sat daily together after discussing the whole situation with their respective Ministers. They then arrived at their own decisions, which obviously became of dominant importance. I learned about these either from the First Sea Lord, who kept nothing from me, or by the various memoranda or aides-memoires aides-memoires which the Chiefs of Staff Committee issued. If I wished to question any of these opinions, I could of course raise them in the first instance at my Coordinating Committee, where the Chiefs of Staff, supported by their departmental Ministers whom they had usually carried along with them, were all present as individual members. There was a copious flow of polite conversation, at the end of which a tactful report was drawn up by the secretary in attendance and checked by the three service departments to make sure there were no discrepancies. Thus we had arrived at those broad, happy uplands where everything is settled for the greatest good of the greatest number by the common sense of most after the consultation of all. But in war of the kind we were now to feel, the conditions were different. Alas, I must write it: the actual conflict had to be more like one ruffian bas.h.i.+ng the other on the snout with a club, a hammer, or something better. All this is deplorable, and it is one of the many good reasons for avoiding war and having everything settled by agreement in a friendly manner, with full consideration for the rights of minorities and the faithful recording of dissentient opinions. which the Chiefs of Staff Committee issued. If I wished to question any of these opinions, I could of course raise them in the first instance at my Coordinating Committee, where the Chiefs of Staff, supported by their departmental Ministers whom they had usually carried along with them, were all present as individual members. There was a copious flow of polite conversation, at the end of which a tactful report was drawn up by the secretary in attendance and checked by the three service departments to make sure there were no discrepancies. Thus we had arrived at those broad, happy uplands where everything is settled for the greatest good of the greatest number by the common sense of most after the consultation of all. But in war of the kind we were now to feel, the conditions were different. Alas, I must write it: the actual conflict had to be more like one ruffian bas.h.i.+ng the other on the snout with a club, a hammer, or something better. All this is deplorable, and it is one of the many good reasons for avoiding war and having everything settled by agreement in a friendly manner, with full consideration for the rights of minorities and the faithful recording of dissentient opinions.

The Defence Committee of the War Cabinet sat almost every day to discuss the reports of the Military Co-ordination Committee and those of the Chiefs of Staff; and their conclusions or divergences were again referred to frequent Cabinets. All had to be explained and re-explained; and by the time this process was completed, the whole scene had often changed. At the Admiralty, which is of necessity in wartime a battle headquarters, decisions affecting the Fleet were taken on the instant, and only in the gravest cases referred to the Prime Minister, who supported us on every occasion. Where the action of the other services was involved, the procedure could not possibly keep pace with events. However, at the beginning of the Norway campaign the Admiralty in the nature of things had three-quarters of the executive business in its own hands.

I do not pretend that, whatever my powers, I should have been able to take better decisions or reach good solutions of the problems with which we were now confronted. The impact of the events about to be described was so violent and the conditions so chaotic that I soon perceived that only the authority of the Prime Minister could reign over the Military Co-ordination Committee. Accordingly, on the fifteenth, I requested Mr. Chamberlain to take the chair, and he presided at practically every one of our subsequent meetings during the campaign in Norway. He and I continued in close agreement, and he gave his supreme authority to the views which I expressed. I was most intimately involved in the conduct of the unhappy effort to rescue Norway when it was already too late. The change in chairmans.h.i.+p was announced to Parliament by the Prime Minister in reply to a question as follows: "I have agreed, at the request of the First Lord of the Admiralty, to take the chair myself at the meetings of the Coordination Committee when matters of exceptional importance relating to the general conduct of the war are under discussion."

Loyalty and good will were forthcoming from all concerned. Nevertheless, both the Prime Minister and I were acutely conscious of the formlessness of our system, especially when in contact with the surprising course of events. Although the Admiralty was at this time inevitably the prime mover, obvious objections could be raised to an organisation in which one of the Service Ministers attempted to concert all the operations of the other services, while at the same time managing the whole business of the Admiralty and having a special responsibility for the naval movements. These difficulties were not removed by the fact that the Prime Minister himself took the chair and backed me up. But while one stroke of misfortune after another, the results of want of means or of indifferent management, fell upon us, almost daily, I nevertheless continued to hold my position in this fluid, friendly, but unfocused circle.

On the evening of Friday, April 5, the German Minister in Oslo invited distinguished guests, including members of the Government, to a film show at the Legation. The film depicted the German conquest of Poland, and culminated in a crescendo of horror scenes during the German bombing of Warsaw. The caption read: "For this they could thank their English and French friends." The party broke up in silence and dismay. The Norwegian Government was, however, chiefly concerned with the activities of the British. Between 4.30 and 5 A.M A.M. on April 8, four British destroyers laid our minefield off the entrance to West Fiord, the channel to the port of Narvik. At 5 A.M A.M. the news was broadcast from London, and at 5.30 a note from His Majesty's Government was handed to the Norwegian Foreign Minister. The morning in Oslo was spent in drafting protests to London. But later that afternoon, the Admiralty informed the Norwegian Legation in London that German wars.h.i.+ps had been sighted off the Norwegian coast proceeding northwards, and presumably bound for Narvik. About the same time reports reached the Norwegian capital that a German troops.h.i.+p, the Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, had been sunk off the south coast of Norway by the Polish submarine had been sunk off the south coast of Norway by the Polish submarine Orzel, Orzel, that large numbers of German soldiers had been rescued by the local fishermen, and that they said they were bound for Bergen to help the Norwegians defend their country against the British and French. More was to come. Germany had broken into Denmark, but the news did not reach Norway until after she herself was invaded. Thus she received no warning. Denmark was easily overrun after a formal resistance in which a few soldiers of the King of Denmark's Guard were killed. that large numbers of German soldiers had been rescued by the local fishermen, and that they said they were bound for Bergen to help the Norwegians defend their country against the British and French. More was to come. Germany had broken into Denmark, but the news did not reach Norway until after she herself was invaded. Thus she received no warning. Denmark was easily overrun after a formal resistance in which a few soldiers of the King of Denmark's Guard were killed.

That night German wars.h.i.+ps approached Oslo. The outer batteries opened fire. The Norwegian defending force consisted of a minelayer, the Olav Tryggvason, Olav Tryggvason, and two minesweepers. After dawn two German minesweepers entered the mouth of the fiord to disembark troops in the neighbourhood of the sh.o.r.e batteries. One was sunk by the and two minesweepers. After dawn two German minesweepers entered the mouth of the fiord to disembark troops in the neighbourhood of the sh.o.r.e batteries. One was sunk by the Olav Tryggvason, Olav Tryggvason, but the German troops were landed and the batteries taken. The gallant minelayer, however, held off two German destroyers at the mouth of the fiord and damaged the cruiser but the German troops were landed and the batteries taken. The gallant minelayer, however, held off two German destroyers at the mouth of the fiord and damaged the cruiser Emden. Emden. An armed Norwegian whaler mounting a single gun also went into action at once and without special orders against the invaders. Her gun was smashed and the Commander had both legs shot off. To avoid unnerving his men, he rolled himself overboard and died n.o.bly. The main German force, led by the heavy cruiser An armed Norwegian whaler mounting a single gun also went into action at once and without special orders against the invaders. Her gun was smashed and the Commander had both legs shot off. To avoid unnerving his men, he rolled himself overboard and died n.o.bly. The main German force, led by the heavy cruiser Bluecher, Bluecher, now entered the fiord, making for the narrows defended by the fortress of Oskarborg. The Norwegian batteries opened, and two torpedoes fired from the sh.o.r.e at five hundred yards scored a decisive strike. The now entered the fiord, making for the narrows defended by the fortress of Oskarborg. The Norwegian batteries opened, and two torpedoes fired from the sh.o.r.e at five hundred yards scored a decisive strike. The Bluecher Bluecher sank rapidly, taking with her the senior officers of the German Administrative Staff and detachments of the Gestapo. The other Ger