The Gathering Storm Part 19

PART II.

First Lord's Minutes September, 1939 October, 1939 November, 1939 December, 1939 January, 1940 February, 1940 March, 1940 April, 1940 Some Questions About Personnel

Appendix A, Book I

A CONVERSATION WITH COUNT GRANDI.

September 28, 1935. 28, 1935.Mr. Churchill to Sir Robert Vansittart.Though he pleaded the Italian cause with much address, he of course realises the whole position....I told him that since Parliament rose, there had been a strong development of public opinion. England, and indeed the British Empire, could act unitedly on the basis of the League of Nations, and all parties thought that that instrument was the most powerful protection against future dangers wherever they might arise. He pointed out the injury to the League of Nations by the loss of Italy. The fall of the regime in Italy would inevitably produce a pro-German Italy. He seemed prepared for economic sanctions. They were quite ready to accept life upon a communal basis. However poor they were, they could endure. He spoke of the difficulty of following the movements of British public opinion. I said that no foreign amba.s.sador could be blamed for that, but the fact of the change must be realised. Moreover, if fighting began in Abyssinia, cannons fired, blood was shed, villages were bombed, etc., an almost measureless rise in the temperature must be expected. He seemed to contemplate the imposition of economic sanctions which would at first be ineffective, but gradually increase until at some moment or other an event of war would occur.I said the British Fleet was very strong, and, although it had to be rebuilt in the near future, it was good and efficient at the present moment, and it was now completely ready to defend itself; but I repeated that this was a purely defensive measure in view of our Mediterranean interests, and did not in any way differentiate our position from that of other members of the League of Nations. He accepted this with a sad smile.I then talked of the importance of finding a way out: "He that ruleth his spirit is greater than he that taketh a city." He replied that they would feel that everywhere except in Italy. They had to deal with two hundred thousand men with rifles in their hands. Mussolini's dictators.h.i.+p was a popular dictators.h.i.+p, and success was the essence of its strength. Finally, I said that I was in favour of a meeting between the political chiefs of the three countries.... The three men together could carry off something that one could never do by himself. After all, the claims of Italy to primacy in the Abyssinian sphere and the imperative need of internal reform [in Abyssinia] had been fully recognised by England and France. I told him I should support such an idea if it were agreeable. The British public would be willing to try all roads to an honourable peace. I think there should be a meeting of three. Any agreement they reached would of course be submitted to the League of Nations. It seems to me the only chance of avoiding the destruction of Italy as a powerful and friendly factor in Europe. Even if it failed, no harm would have been done, and at present we are heading for an absolute smash.

Appendix B, Book I

MY NOTE ON THE FLEET AIR ARM.

WRITTEN FOR S SIR T THOMAS I INSKIP, MINISTER FOR THE C CO-ORDINATION OF D DEFENCE, IN IN 1936 1936.

1. It is impossible to resist an admiral's claim that he must have complete control of, and confidence in, the aircraft of the battle fleet, whether used for reconnaissance, gun-fire or air attack on a hostile fleet. These are his very eyes. Therefore the Admiralty view must prevail in all that is required to secure this result.

2. The argument that similar conditions obtain in respect of Army co-operation aircraft cannot be countenanced. In one case the aircraft take flight from aerodromes and operate under precisely similar conditions to those of normal independent air force action. Flight from wars.h.i.+ps and action in connection with naval operations is a totally different matter. One is truly an affair of cooperation only; the other an integral part of modern naval operations.

3. A division must therefore be made between the air force controlled by the Admiralty and that controlled by the Air Ministry. This division does not depend upon the type of the undercarriage of the aircraft, nor necessarily the base from which it is flown. It depends upon the function. Is it predominantly a naval function or not?

4. Most of these defence functions can clearly be a.s.signed. For instance, all functions which require aircraft of any description (whether with wheels, floats, or boats; whether reconnaissance, spotters or fighters, bombers or torpedo seaplanes) to be carried regularly in wars.h.i.+ps or in aircraft carriers, naturally fall to the naval sphere.

5. The question thus reduces itself to the a.s.signment of any type operating over the sea from sh.o.r.e bases. This again can only be decided in relation to the functions and responsibilities placed upon the Navy. Aircraft borne afloat could discharge a considerable function of trade protection. This would be especially true in the broad waters, where a squadron of cruisers with their own scouting planes or a pair of small aircraft carriers could search upon a front of a thousand miles. But the Navy could never be required nor has it ever claimed to maintain an air strength sufficient to cope with a concentrated attack upon merchant s.h.i.+pping in the Narrow Waters by a large hostile air force of great power. In fact, the maxim must be applied of air force versus versus air force and Navy air force and Navy versus versus Navy. When the main hostile air force or any definite detachment from it is to be encountered, it must be by the British Royal Air Force. Navy. When the main hostile air force or any definite detachment from it is to be encountered, it must be by the British Royal Air Force.

6. In this connection it should not be forgotten that a s.h.i.+p or s.h.i.+ps may have to be selected and adapted for purely air-force operations, like a raid on some deep-seated enemy base, or vital centre. This is an air-force operation and necessitates the use of types of aircraft not normally a.s.sociated with the Fleet. In this case the roles of the Admiralty and the Air Ministry will be reversed, and the Navy would swim the s.h.i.+p in accordance with the tactical or strategic wishes of the Air Ministry. Far from becoming a baffle, this special case exemplifies the logic of the "division of command according to function."

7. What is conceded to the Navy should, within the limits a.s.signed, be fully given. The Admiralty should have plenary control and provide the entire personnel of the Fleet air arm. Officers, cadets, petty officers, artificers, etc., for this force would be selected from the Royal Navy by the Admiralty. They would then acquire the art of flying and the management of aircraft in the Royal Air Force training-schools to which perhaps naval officers should be attached but after acquiring the necessary degree of proficiency as air chauffeurs and mechanics they would pa.s.s to sh.o.r.e establishments under the Admiralty for their training in Fleet air arm duties, just as the pilots of the Royal Air Force do to their squadrons at armament schools to learn air fighting. Thus, the personnel employed upon fleet air functions will be an integral part of the Navy, dependent for discipline and advancement as well as for their careers and pensions solely upon the Admiralty. This would apply to every rank and every trade involved, whether afloat or ash.o.r.e.

8. Coincident with this arrangement whereby the Fleet air arm becomes wholly a naval Service, a further rearrangement of functions should be made, whereby the Air Ministry becomes responsible for active anti-aircraft defence. This implies, in so far as the Navy is concerned, that, at every naval port, sh.o.r.e anti-aircraft batteries, lights, aircraft, balloons and other devices will be combined under one operational control, though the officer commanding would, of course, with his command be subordinate to the fortress commander.

9. In the same way, the control of the air defences of London and of such other vulnerable areas as it may be necessary to equip with anti-air defences on a considerable scale should also be unified under one command and placed under the Air Ministry. The consequent control should cover not only the operations, but as far as may conveniently be arranged, the training, the raising and administration of the entire personnel for active air defence.

10. The Air Ministry have as clear a t.i.tle to control active anti-air defence as have the Navy to their own "eyes." For this purpose a new department should be brought into being in the Air Ministry, to be called "Anti-Air," to control all guns, searchlights, balloons and personnel of every kind connected with this function, as well as such portion of the Royal Air Force as may from time to time be a.s.signed to it for this duty. Under this department there will be air force officers, a.s.sisted by appropriate staffs, in command of all active air defences in specified localities and areas.

11. It is not suggested that the Air Ministry or Air Staff are at present capable of a.s.suming unaided this heavy new responsibility. In the formation of the anti-air command recourse must be had to both the older services. Well-trained staff officers, both from the Army and the Navy, must be mingled with officers of the existing Air Staff.

N.B. The question of the recruitment and of the interior administration of the units handed over to the anti-air command for operations and training need not be a stumbling-block. They could be provided from the present sources unless and until a more convenient solution was apparent. The question of the recruitment and of the interior administration of the units handed over to the anti-air command for operations and training need not be a stumbling-block. They could be provided from the present sources unless and until a more convenient solution was apparent.

12. This memorandum has not hitherto dealt with materiel, materiel, but that is extremely simple. The Admiralty will decide upon the types of aircraft which their approved functions demand. The extent of the inroad which they require to make upon the finances and resources of the country must be decided by the Cabinet, operating through a priorities committee under the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence. At the present stage this Minister would, no doubt, give his directions to the existing personnel, but in the event of war or the intensification of the preparations for war he would give them to a Ministry of Supply. There could of course be no question of Admiralty priorities being allowed to override other claims in the general sphere of air production. All must be decided from the supreme standpoint. but that is extremely simple. The Admiralty will decide upon the types of aircraft which their approved functions demand. The extent of the inroad which they require to make upon the finances and resources of the country must be decided by the Cabinet, operating through a priorities committee under the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence. At the present stage this Minister would, no doubt, give his directions to the existing personnel, but in the event of war or the intensification of the preparations for war he would give them to a Ministry of Supply. There could of course be no question of Admiralty priorities being allowed to override other claims in the general sphere of air production. All must be decided from the supreme standpoint.

13. It is not intended that the Admiralty should develop technical departments for aircraft design separate from those existing in the Air Ministry or under a Ministry of Supply. They would however be free to form a nucleus technical staff to advise them on the possibilities of scientific development and to prescribe their special naval requirements in suitable technical language to the Supply Department.

14. To sum up, therefore, we have: First The Admiralty should have plenary control of the Fleet air arm for all purposes which are defined as naval.

Secondly A new department must be formed under the Air Ministry from the three Services for active anti-aircraft defence operations.

Thirdly The question of materiel materiel supply must be decided by a priorities committee under the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, and executed at present through existing channels, but eventually by a Ministry of Supply. supply must be decided by a priorities committee under the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, and executed at present through existing channels, but eventually by a Ministry of Supply.

Appendix C, Book I

A NOTE ON SUPPLY ORGANISATION.

JUNE 6, 1936 6, 1936.

1. The existing Office of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence comprises unrelated and wrongly grouped functions. The work of the Minister charged with strategic co-ordination is different, though not in the higher ranges disconnected, from the work of the Minister charged with: (a) securing the execution of the existing programmes, and (b) planning British industry to spring quickly into wartime conditions and creating a high control effective for both this and the present purpose.

2. The first step therefore is to separate the functions of strategic thought from those of material supply in peace and war, and form the organisation to direct this latter process. An harmonious arrangement would be four separate departments Navy, Army, Air Force, and Supply with the Co-ordinating Minister at the summit of the four having the final voice upon priorities.

3. No multiplication of committees, however expert or elaborate, can achieve this purpose. Supply cannot be achieved without command. A definite chain of responsible authority must descend through the whole of British industry affected. (This must not be thought to imply State interference in the actual functions of industry.) At the present time the three service authorities exercise separate command over their particular supply, and the fourth, or planning, authority is purely consultative, and that only upon the war need divorced from present supply. What is needed is to unify the supply command of the three service departments into an organism which also exercises command over the war expansion. (The Admiralty would retain control over the construction of wars.h.i.+ps and certain special naval stores.) 4. This unification should comprise not only the function of supply but that of design. The service departments prescribe in general technical terms their need in type, quality, and quant.i.ty, and the supply organisation executes these in a manner best calculated to serve its customers. In other words, the Supply Department engages itself to deliver the approved types of war stores of all kinds to the services when and where the latter require them.

5. None of this, nor the punctual execution of any of the approved programmes, can be achieved in the present atmosphere of ordinary peacetime preparation. It is neither necessary nor possible at this moment to take wartime powers and apply wartime methods. An intermediate state should be declared called (say) the period of emergency preparation.

6. Legislation should be drafted in two parts First, that appropriate to the emergency preparation stage, and second, that appropriate to a state of war. Part I should be carried out now. Part II should be envisaged, elaborated, the principles defined, the clauses drafted and left to be brought into operation by a fresh appeal to Parliament should war occur. The emergency stage should be capable of sliding into the war stage with the minimum of disturbance, the whole design having been foreseen.

7. To bring this new system into operation there should first be created a Minister of Supply. This Minister would form a Supply Council. Each member would be charged with the study of the four or five branches of production falling into his sphere. Thereafter, as soon as may be, the existing service sub-departments of supply, design, contracts, etc., would be transferred by instalments to the new authority, who alone would deal with the Treasury upon finance. (By "finance" is meant payments within the scope of the authorised programmes.)

Appendix D, Book I

MY S STATEMENT ON THE O OCCASION OF THE D DEPUTATION OF C CONSERVATIVE M MEMBERS OF B BOTH H HOUSES TO THE P PRIME M MINISTER, JULY 28, 1936 28, 1936.

In time of peace the needs of our small Army, and to some extent of the air force and Admiralty, in particular weapons and ammunition, are supplied by the War Office, which has for this purpose certain Government factories and habitual private contractors. This organisation is capable of meeting ordinary peace-time requirements, and providing the acc.u.mulation of reserves sufficient for a few weeks of war by our very limited regular forces. Outside this there was nothing until a few months ago. About three or four months ago authority was given to extend the scope of War Office orders in certain directions to ordinary civil industry.

On the other hand, in all the leading Continental countries the whole of industry has been for some time solidly and scientifically organised to turn over from peace to war. In Germany, of course, above all others, this became the supreme study of the Government even before the Hitler regime. Indeed, under the impulse of revenge, Germany, forbidden by treaty to have fleets, armies, and an air force, concentrated with intense compression upon the perfecting of the transference of its whole industry to war purposes. We alone began seriously to examine the problem when everyone else had solved it. There was, however, still time in 1932 and 1933 to make a great advance. Three years ago when Hitler came into power we had perhaps a dozen officials studying the war organisation of industry as compared with five or six hundred working continuously in Germany. The Hitler regime set all this vast machinery in motion. They did not venture to break the treaties about Army, Navy, and air force until they had a head of steam on in every industry which would, they hoped, speedily render them an armed nation unless they were immediately attacked by the Allies.

What is being done now? Preparation cannot reach a stage of ma.s.s deliveries for at least eighteen months from the date of the order. If by ammunition is meant projectiles (both bombs and sh.e.l.ls) and cartridge-cases containing propellant, it will be necessary to equip the factories with a certain amount of additional special-purpose machine-tools, and to modify their existing lay-out. In addition jigs and gauges for the actual manufacture must be made.... The manufacture of these special machine-tools will have to be done in most cases by firms quite different from those to whom the output of projectiles is entrusted. After the delivery of the special machine-tools, a further delay is required while they are being set up in the producing factories, and while the process of production is being started. Then and only then, at first in a trickle, then in a stream, and finally in a flood, deliveries will take place. Not until then can the acc.u.mulation of war resources begin. This inevitably lengthy process is still being applied on a relatively minute scale. Fifty-two firms have been offered contracts. Fourteen had last week accepted contracts. At the present moment it would be no exaggeration to state that the German ammunition plants may well amount to four or five hundred, already for very nearly two years in full swing.

Turning now to cannon: by cannon I mean guns firing explosive sh.e.l.ls. The processes by which a cannon factory is started are necessarily lengthy, the special plants and machine-tools are more numerous, and the lay-out more elaborate. Our normal peace-time output of cannon in the last ten years has, apart from the Fleet, been negligible. We are therefore certainly separated by two years from any large deliveries of field guns or anti-aircraft guns. Last year it is probable that at least five thousand guns were made in Germany, and this process could be largely amplified in war. Surely we ought to call into being plant which would enable us, if need be, to create and arm a national army of a considerable size.

I have taken projectiles and cannon because these are the core of defence; but the same arguments and conditions, with certain modifications, apply over the whole field of equipment. The flexibility of British industry should make it possible to produce many forms of equipment, for instance, motor lorries and other kindred weapons such as tanks and armoured cars, and many slighter forms of material necessary for an army, in a much shorter time if that industry is at once set going. Has it been set going? Why should we be told that the Territorial Army cannot be equipped until after the Regular Army is equipped? I do not know what is the position about rifles and rifle ammunition. I hope at least we have enough for a million men. But the delivery of rifles from new sources is a very lengthy process.

Even more pertinent is the production of machine-guns. I do not know at all what is the programme of Browning and Bren machine-guns. But if the orders for setting up the necessary plant were only given a few months ago, one cannot expect any appreciable deliveries except by direct purchase from abroad before the beginning of 1938. The comparable German plants already in operation are capable of producing supplies limited only by the national manhood available to use them.

But this same argument can be followed out through all the processes of producing explosives, propellant, fuses, poison gas, gas-masks, searchlights, trench-mortars, grenades, air-bombs, and all the special adaptations required for depth-charges, mines, etc., for the Navy. It must not be forgotten that the Navy is dependent upon the War Office and upon an expansion of national industry for a hundred and one minor articles, a shortage in any one of which will cause grave injury. Behind all this again lies of course the supply of raw materials, with its infinite complications.

What is the conclusion? It is that we are separated by about two years from any appreciable improvement in the material process of national defence, so far as concerns the whole volume of supplies for which the War Office has. .h.i.therto been responsible, with all the reactions that entails, both on the Navy and the War Office. But upon the scale on which we are now acting, even at the end of two years, the supply will be petty compared either with our needs in war, or with what others have already acquired in peace.

Surely if these facts are even approximately true and I believe they are mostly understatements how can it be contended that there is no emergency; that we must not do anything to interfere with the ordinary trade of the country; that there is no need to approach the trade unions about dilution of trainees; that we can safely trust to what the Minister of Co-ordination of Defence described as "training the additional labour as required on the job"; and that nothing must be done which would cause alarm to the public, or lead them to feel that their ordinary habit of life was being deranged?

Complaint is made that the nation is unresponsive to the national need; that the trade unions are unhelpful; that recruiting for the Army and the Territorial Force is very slack, and even is obstructed by elements of public opinion. But as long as they arc a.s.sured by the Government that there is no emergency these obstacles will continue.

I was given confidentially by the French Government an estimate of the German air strength in 1935. This tallies almost exactly with the figures I forecast to the Committee of Imperial Defence in December last. The Air Staff now think the French estimate too high. Personally I think it is too low. The number of machines which Germany could now put into action simultaneously may be nearer two thousand than fifteen hundred. Moreover, there is no reason to a.s.sume that they mean to stop at two thousand. The whole plant and lay-out of the German air force is on an enormous scale, and they may be already planning a development far greater than anything yet mentioned. Even if we accept the French figures of about fourteen hundred, the German strength at this moment is double that of our Metropolitan air force, judged by trained pilots and military machines that could go into action and be maintained in action. But the relative strength of two countries cannot be judged without reference to their power of replenis.h.i.+ng their fighting force. The German industry is so organised that it can certainly produce at full blast a thousand a month and increase the number as the months pa.s.s. Can the British industry at the present time produce more than three hundred to three hundred and fifty a month? How long will it be before we can reach a war-potential output equal to the Germans? Certainly not within two years. When we allow for the extremely high rate of war wastage, a duel between the two countries would mean that before six months were out our force would be not a third of theirs. The preparation for war-time expansion at least three times the present size of the industry seems urgent in the highest degree. It is probable however that Germany is spending not less than one hundred and twenty millions on her Air Force this year. It is clear therefore that so far as this year is concerned we are not catching up. On the contrary, we are falling farther behind. How long will this continue into next year? No one can tell.

It has been announced that the programme of one hundred and twenty squadrons and fifteen hundred first-line aircraft for home defence would be completed by April 1, 1937. Parliament has not been given any information how this programme is being carried out in machines, in personnel, in organisation, or in the ancillary supplies. We have been told nothing about it at all. I do not blame the Government for not giving full particulars. It would be too dangerous now. Naturally, however, in the absence of any information at all, there must be great anxiety and much private discussion.... I doubt very much whether by July next year we shall have thirty squadrons equipped with the new types. I understand that the deliveries of the new machines will not really begin to flow in large numbers for a year or fifteen months. Meanwhile we have very old-fas.h.i.+oned and obsolete tackle.

There is a second question about these new machines: When they begin to flow out of the factories in large numbers fifteen months hence, will they be equipped with all necessary appliances? Take, for instance, the machine-guns. If we are aiming at having a couple of thousand of the latest machines, i.e., fifteen hundred and five hundred in reserve in eighteen months from now, what arrangements have been made for their machine-guns? Some of these modern fighting machines have no fewer than eight machine-guns in their wings. Taking only an average of four with proper reserves, that would require ten thousand machine-guns. Is it not a fact that the large-scale manufacture of the Browning and Bren machine-guns was only decided upon a few months ago?

Let us now try the airplane fleet we have built and are building by the test of bombing-power as measured by weight and range. Here I must again make comparison with Germany. Germany has the power at any time henceforward to send a fleet of airplanes capable of discharging in a single voyage at least five hundred tons of bombs upon London. We know from our war statistics that one ton of explosive bombs killed ten people and wounded thirty, and did fifty thousand pounds worth of damage. Of course, it would be absurd to a.s.sume that the whole bombing fleet of Germany would make an endless succession of voyages to and from this country. All kinds of other considerations intervene. Still, as a practical measure of the relative power of the bombing fleets of the two countries, the weight of discharge per voyage is a very reasonable measure. Now, if we take the German potential discharge upon London at a minimum of five hundred tons per voyage of their entire bombing fleet, what is our potential reply? They They can do this from now on. What can we do? First of all: How could we retaliate upon Berlin? We have not at the present time a single squadron of machines which could carry an appreciable load of bombs to Berlin. What shall we have this time next year? I submit for your consideration that this time next year, when it may well be that the potential discharge of the German fleet is in the neighbourhood of a thousand tons, we shall not be able to discharge in retaliation more than sixty tons upon Berlin. can do this from now on. What can we do? First of all: How could we retaliate upon Berlin? We have not at the present time a single squadron of machines which could carry an appreciable load of bombs to Berlin. What shall we have this time next year? I submit for your consideration that this time next year, when it may well be that the potential discharge of the German fleet is in the neighbourhood of a thousand tons, we shall not be able to discharge in retaliation more than sixty tons upon Berlin.

But leave Berlin out of the question. Nothing is more striking about our new fleet of bombers than their short range. The great bulk of our new heavy and medium bombers cannot do much more than reach the coasts of Germany from this Island. Only the nearest German cities would be within their reach. In fact the retaliation of which we should be capable this time next year from this Island would be puerile judged by the weight of explosive dropped, and would be limited only to the fringes of Germany.

Of course, a better tale can be told if it is a.s.sumed that we can operate from French and Belgian jumping-off grounds. Then very large and vital industrial districts of Germany would be within reach of our machines. Our air force will be incomparably more effective if used in conjunction with those of France and Belgium than it would be in a duel with Germany alone.

I now pa.s.s to the next stage. Our defence, pa.s.sive and active, ground and air, at home. Evidently we might have to endure an ordeal in our great cities and vital feeding-ports such as no community has ever been subjected to before. What arrangements have been made in this field? Take London and its seven or eight million inhabitants. Nearly two years ago I explained in the House of Commons the danger of an attack by thermite bombs. These small bombs, little bigger than an orange, had even then been manufactured by millions in Germany. A single medium airplane can scatter five hundred. One must expect in a small raid literally tens of thousands of these bombs which burn through from storey to storey. Supposing only a hundred fires were started and there were only ninety fire brigades, what happens? Obviously the attack would be on a far more formidable scale than that. One must expect that a proportion of heavy bombs would be dropped at the same time, and that water, light, gas, telephone systems, etc., would be seriously deranged. What happens then? Nothing like it has ever been seen in world history. There might be a vast exodus of the population, which would present to the Government problems of public order, of sanitation and food-supply which would dominate their attention, and probably involve the use of all their disciplined forces.

What happens if the attack is directed upon the feeding-ports, particularly the Thames, Southampton, Bristol, and the Mersey, none of which are out of range? What arrangements have been made to bring in the food through a far greater number of subsidiary channels? What arrangements have been made to protect our defence centres? By defence centres I mean the centres upon which our power to continue resistance depends. The problem of the civil population and their miseries is one thing; the means by which we could carry on the war is another. Have we organised and created an alternative centre of Government if London is thrown into confusion? No doubt there has been discussion of this on paper, but has anything been done to provide one or two alternative centres of command with adequate deep-laid telephone connections, and wireless from which the necessary orders can be given by some coherent thinking-mechanism? ...

Appendix E, Book I

Appendix A, Book II

TABLES OF NAVAL STRENGTH.

SEPTEMBER 3, 1939 3, 1939.

BRITISH AND G GERMAN F FLEETS.

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UNITED STATES.

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FRANCE.

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ITALY.

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j.a.pAN.

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Appendix B, Book II

PLAN "CATHERINE"

Minute of September 12, 1939 12, 1939 PART I.

(1) For a particular operation special tools must be constructed. D.N.C. thinks it would be possible to hoist an "R" [a battles.h.i.+p of the Royal Sovereign Royal Sovereign cla.s.s] nine feet, thus enabling a certain channel where the depth is only twenty-six feet to be pa.s.sed. There are at present no guns commanding this channel, and the States on either side are neutral. Therefore there would be no harm in hoisting the armour belt temporarily up to the water level. The method proposed would be to fasten caissons [bulges] in two layers on the sides of the "R," giving the s.h.i.+p the enormous beam of one hundred and forty feet. No insuperable difficulty exists in fixing these, the inner set in dock and the outer in harbour. By filling or emptying these caissons the draught of the vessel can be altered at convenience, and, once past the shallow channel, the s.h.i.+p can be deepened again so as to bring the armour belt comfortably below the waterline. The speed when fully hoisted might perhaps be sixteen knots, and when allowed to fall back to normal draught, thirteen or fourteen. These speeds could be accepted for the operation. They are much better than I expected. cla.s.s] nine feet, thus enabling a certain channel where the depth is only twenty-six feet to be pa.s.sed. There are at present no guns commanding this channel, and the States on either side are neutral. Therefore there would be no harm in hoisting the armour belt temporarily up to the water level. The method proposed would be to fasten caissons [bulges] in two layers on the sides of the "R," giving the s.h.i.+p the enormous beam of one hundred and forty feet. No insuperable difficulty exists in fixing these, the inner set in dock and the outer in harbour. By filling or emptying these caissons the draught of the vessel can be altered at convenience, and, once past the shallow channel, the s.h.i.+p can be deepened again so as to bring the armour belt comfortably below the waterline. The speed when fully hoisted might perhaps be sixteen knots, and when allowed to fall back to normal draught, thirteen or fourteen. These speeds could be accepted for the operation. They are much better than I expected.

It is to be noted that the caissons afford admirable additional protection against torpedoes; they are in fact super-blisters.

It would also be necessary to strengthen the armour deck so as to give exceptional protection against air bombing, which must be expected.

(2) The caissons will be spoken of as "galoshes" and the strengthening of the deck as the "umbrella."

(3) When the ice in the theatre concerned melts (?) about March, the time for the operation would arrive. If orders are given for the necessary work by October 1, the designs being made meanwhile, we have six months, but seven would be accepted. It would be a great pity to waste the summer; therefore the highest priority would be required. Estimates of time and money should be provided on this basis.

(4) In principle two "Rs" should be so prepared, but of course three would be better. Their only possible antagonists during the summer of 1940 would be the Scharnhorst Scharnhorst and and Gneisenau. Gneisenau. It may be taken for certain that neither of these s.h.i.+ps, the sole resource of Germany, would expose themselves to the fifteen-inch batteries of the "Rs," which would shatter them. It may be taken for certain that neither of these s.h.i.+ps, the sole resource of Germany, would expose themselves to the fifteen-inch batteries of the "Rs," which would shatter them.

(5) Besides the "Rs" thus prepared, a dozen mine-b.u.mpers should be prepared. Kindly let me have designs. These vessels should be of sufficiently deep draught to cover the "Rs" when they follow, and be worked by a small engine-room party from the stern. They would have a heavy fore-end to take the shock of any exploding mine. One would directly precede each of the "Rs." Perhaps this requirement may be reduced, as the s.h.i.+ps will go line ahead. I can form no picture of these mine-b.u.mpers, but one must expect two or three rows of mines to be encountered, each of which might knock out one. It may be that ordinary merchant s.h.i.+ps could be used for the purpose, being strengthened accordingly.

(6) Besides the above, it will be necessary to carry a three months' reasonable supply of oil for the whole expeditionary fleet. For this purpose turtle-back blistered tankers must be provided capable of going at least twelve knots. Twelve knots may be considered provisionally as the speed of the pa.s.sage, but better if possible.

PART II.

(1) The objective is the command of the particular theatre [the Baltic], which will be secured by the placing [in it] of a battle squadron which the enemy heavy s.h.i.+ps dare not engage. Around this battle squadron the light forces will act. It is suggested that three 10,000-ton eight-inch-gun cruisers and two six-inch should form the cruiser squadron, together with two flotillas of the strongest combat destroyers, a detachment of submarines, and a considerable contingent of ancillary craft, including, if possible, depot s.h.i.+ps, and a fleet repair vessel.