Berlin 1961 Part 10

Kennedy sent cables to his closest allies informing them of the upcoming meeting, knowing particularly the Germans and the French would be skeptical of his plan. To the distrustful Adenauer, he wrote, aI would a.s.sume you would share my view that since I have not previously met Khrushchev, such an encounter would be useful in the present international situation. If the meeting in fact takes place, I would expect to inform you of the content of these discussions with Khrushchev, which I antic.i.p.ate will be quite general in character.a Preparations went into high gear for what everyone knew would be a historic meetinga"the first such summit of the television age. Despite Kennedyas efforts to avoid the Berlin issue, his foreign policy team was coming to accept that it would define the presidentas first year in office far more than Cuba, Laos, a nuclear test ban, or any other issue.

On May 17, State Department Policy Planning staff member Henry Owen captured the growing consensus of the administration. aOf all the problems the administration faces, Berlin seems to me the most pregnant with disaster.a He suggested putting more money into the fiscal year 1963 budget for conventional arms and the defense of Europe, ato enhance our capability to deal witha"and thus perhaps detera"a Berlin Crisis.a Two days later, on May 19, the Kennedy administration officially announced what the press had been reporting from leaks for several days: The president would meet with Khrushchev in Vienna on June 3 and 4 after seeing de Gaulle in Paris.

Western European and U.S. commentators worried that a weakened president was heading to Vienna at a disadvantage. The intellectual weekly Die Zeit compared Kennedy to a traveling salesman whose business had fallen on bad times and who was hoping to improve his prospects by negotiating directly with the compet.i.tion. In its review of European opinion, the Wall Street Journal said Kennedy was projecting the astrong impressionaof a faltering America desperately trying to regain leaders.h.i.+p of the West in the Cold War.a The influential Swiss daily Neue Zrcher Zeitung despaired that the summit was being badly prepared by the Americans, and that Kennedy had abandoned his prerequisite that the Kremlin demonstrate a changed att.i.tude before any such meeting take place.

Although Vienna was technically neutral ground, European diplomats still considered Austria to be far closer to the Russian sphere of influence than the alternative of Stockholm. aThus there is an impression of Kennedy going to see Khrushchev at a place as well as a time of Khrushchevas choosing,a said the Neue Zrcher Zeitung. It saw a damaged U.S. president arus.h.i.+ng about to patch up his alliances and coming meekly to Austria to meet the powerful Russian leader face-to-face.a EAST BERLIN.

FRIDAY, MAY 19, 1961.

Sensing the wind s.h.i.+ft in his favor, East German leader Walter Ulbricht moved with greater confidence in Berlin. The Soviet amba.s.sador in East Germany, Mikhail Pervukhin, complained to Foreign Minister Gromyko that Ulbricht, without Kremlin approval, was ratcheting up pressure on West Berlin through heightened ident.i.ty controls of civilians.

aOur friends,a said the amba.s.sador, employing the term used by Moscow for its East German allies, awould now like to establish such control on the sectoral border between Democratic West Berlin which would allow them to, as they say, close athe door to the West,a reduce the exodus of the population from the Republic, and weaken the influence of economic conspiracy against the GDR, which is carried out directly from West Berlin.a He reported that Ulbricht wanted to slam shut the Berlin sectoral border, in contradiction to Soviet policy.

Khrushchev worried Ulbricht might go so far that he would prompt the Americans to cancel the Vienna Summit, so he asked Pervukhin to restrain his increasingly impatient and insolent East German client.

WAs.h.i.+NGTON, D.C.

SUNDAY, MAY 21, 1961.

President Kennedy began to fear he was walking into a trap.

Two weeks ahead of the summit, Robert Kennedy again reached out to Bolshakov, this time on a Sunday when their meeting would be less noticed. The attorney general invited the Soviet spy to Hickory Hill, his brick country house in McLean, Virginia, for a two-hour conversation.

Bolshakov laid out the Soviet position, having memorized with great skill five pages of detailed briefing notes before his meeting. His recall was remarkable, and his informal manner masked the fact that his conduit role was still unfamiliar terrain.

Bobby made clear he was speaking for the president. He told Bolshakov to call him only from a pay phone when making contact, and to name himself only to his secretary and his press spokesman Ed Guthman. On occasions when Bolshakov didnat want to risk telephoning himself, Holeman did so for him, saying to Guthman, aMy guy wants to see your guy.a Bobby told Bolshakov that only his brother knew of their meetingsa"and that he approved of them.

By contrast, Bolshakovas role was now becoming known to a larger circle of Soviet officials. The GRU relayed all Bolshakovas reports to Anatoly Dobrynin, the foreign ministry official who headed the group of Soviet advisers for the Vienna talks. One of Bolshakovas Moscow bosses wrote with astonishment about the May 21 meeting with Bobby Kennedy, aThe situation when a member of the U.S. government meets with our man, and secretly, is without precedent.a Moscow was sending directions to its emba.s.sy and its intelligence operatives on how to ensure that the meetings were kept secret from the U.S. press and the FBI.

Bobby told Bolshakov he had been disappointed that Khrushchev had not had more to say in his letter to the president about the possibility of a nuclear test ban treaty. He offered a concession to Bolshakov: Was.h.i.+ngton would accept the troika of inspectors that the Kremlin wanteda"representing the Soviet, Western, and nonaligned worlda"but Russia could have no veto over what could be inspected.

Bolshakov encouraged Bobby to think he had been given more leeway to negotiate than actually was the case. He said the Soviets would accept fifteen unmanned detection stations on Soviet soil, which came closer to what had become the American demand of nineteen.

Seeking a further bond with Khrushchev, Bobby said he and his brother agreed in principle with the Soviets on what they regarded as the historic German problem and sympathized with their fear of German revanchists. He said the president shared Soviet opposition to the notion of a nuclear Germany trying to recover its eastern territories. aMy brother fought them as enemies,a Bobby told Bolshakov. The two sides only disagreed on the remedies, he said.

Bolshakov and Bobby Kennedy continued their meetings as close to a week before the Vienna Summit. Perhaps for that reason it took only a day for Moscow to respond to President Kennedyas request that the two leaders include more tte--ttes at the summit, attended only by interpreters.

However, it would not be until two days after the final Bolshakov meeting before the Vienna Summit that Khrushchev would send the clearest message of all regarding how determined he was to negotiate Berlinas future.

For that, he would use the official channel of Amba.s.sador Thompson in Moscow. He wanted no one to mistake his intention to force the issue.

PALACE OF SPORTS, MOSCOW.

TUESDAY, MAY 23, 1961.

By coincidence, Khrushchev would make clear that he intended to bring the Berlin matter to a head in the same sports field house where he had launched the Berlin Crisis two and a half years earlier before an audience of Polish communists.

Within minutes of Amba.s.sador Thompsonas arrival with his wife in Khrushchevas box at a guest performance of the American Ice Capades, the Soviet leader complained that he had seen enough ice shows to last a lifetime. So he escorted the Thompsons to a private room for dinner, explaining that his invitation to them had all along been an excuse to discuss Vienna.

Thompson did not take notes, but he would have no trouble afterward recalling the conversation in a cable to Was.h.i.+ngton. Against the background sound of American music, skates sc.r.a.ping on ice, and the crowdas applause, Khrushchev delivered an unmistakable message. Without a new agreement on Berlin, he told Thompson, he would take unilateral action by fall or winter to give control of the city to the East Germans and end all Allied occupation rights.

Khrushchev dismissed Kennedyas focus on nuclear disarmament, which he said would be impossible as long as the Berlin problem existed. If the U.S. used force to interfere with Soviet aims in Berlin, he said, then it would be met with force. If the U.S. wanted war, it would get war. Thompson had seen this saber-rattling side of Khrushchev before, but coming just days ahead of the Vienna meeting it was more unsettling.

Khrushchev shrugged, however, saying that he did not expect conflict. aOnly a madman would want war and Western leaders were not mad, although Hitler had been,a he said. Khrushchev pounded the table and talked of the horrors of war, which he knew so well. He could not believe Kennedy would bring on such a catastrophe because of Berlin.

Thompson countered that it was Khrushchev, not Kennedy, who was creating the danger by threatening to alter the Berlin situation.

Though that might be true, Khrushchev said, if hostilities were to break out, it would be the Americans and not the Soviets who would have to cross the frontier of Eastern Germany to defend Berlin and thus begin the war.

Time and again during their dinner, Khrushchev said that it had been sixteen years since the Great War had been won, and that it was time to put an end to Berlinas occupation. Khrushchev reminded Thompson that in his original 1958 Berlin ultimatum he had demanded satisfaction within six months. aThirty months have now pa.s.sed,a he said, fuming at Thompsonas suggestion that matters could be left as they currently stood in Berlin. The U.S. was trying to damage Soviet prestige, and this could not be allowed to continue, Khrushchev said.

Thompson conceded that the U.S. could not stop Khrushchev from signing a peace treaty with East Germany, but the important question was whether the Soviet leader would use that moment to interfere with the U.S. right-of-access to Berlin. While Khrushchev was floating a trial balloon for the Vienna Summit of a tougher approach on Berlin, Thompson as well was testing what was likely to be Kennedyas response.

Thompson also said U.S. prestige everywhere in the world was at stake in its commitments to Berliners. Moreover, Was.h.i.+ngton feared that if it gave in to Soviet pressure and sacrificed Berlin, West Germany and Western Europe would be the next to fall. aThe psychological effect would be disastrous to our position,a he told Khrushchev.

Khrushchev scoffed at Thompsonas words, repeating what had become his frequent refrain: Berlin was really of little importance to either America or the Soviet Union, so why should they get so worked up about changing the cityas status?

If Berlin were of such little significance, retorted Thompson, he doubted that Khrushchev would take such an enormous risk to gain the upper hand in the city.

Khrushchev then put forward the proposal that he planned to present in Vienna: Nothing would prevent the U.S. from continuing to have troops in the afree citya of West Berlin. All that would change was that Was.h.i.+ngton in the future would have to negotiate those rights with East Germany, he said.

Thompson probed, asking what elements of the problem troubled Khrushchev most, suggesting it might be the refugee problem. Khrushchev brushed aside that notion and said simply, aBerlin is a festering sore which has to be eliminated.a Khrushchev told Thompson that German reunification was impossible and that in fact no one really wanted it, including de Gaulle, Macmillan, and Adenauer. He said de Gaulle had told him not only that Germany should remain divided, but that it would be even better if it were divided into three parts.

The soft-spoken Thompson saw no option but to return Khrushchevas threat or be misinterpreted as giving him the green light on Berlin. aWell, if you use force,a said Thompson, aif you want to cut off our access and connections by force, then we will use force against force.a Khrushchev responded calmly and with a smile. Thompson had misunderstood him, he said. The mercurial Soviet said he didnat plan to use force. He would simply sign the treaty and put an end to the rights the United States had won as athe conditions of capitulation.a Thompsonas later cable to Was.h.i.+ngton on his ice rink face-off reflected little of the importance of what he had just heard. For Khrushchev, it had been a dress rehearsal for what would follow. Thompson, however, played down Khrushchevas bl.u.s.ter. He wrote that the Soviet leader was outlining in detail for the first time how a permanent division of the city might take place without violating American rights. Thompson repeated his conviction that Khrushchev would not force the Berlin issue until after his October Party Congress. In Vienna, Thompson reckoned, Khrushchev would aslide over the Berlin problem in a sweetness-and-light atmosphere.a Thompson nevertheless suggested that Kennedy in Vienna offer Khrushchev a Berlin formula that would enable both sides to save face, as the problem would likely come to a head later in the year. Otherwise, he wrote, awar would hang in the balance.a On the same day, Kennedy was getting a different reading from Berlin. The head of the U.S. Mission there, diplomat E. Allan Lightner Jr., said Moscow could alive with Berlin status quo for some time,a and that Khrushchev had no timetable for action. Thus, argued Lightner, Kennedy could deter Khrushchev in Vienna by sending a sharp message that the U.S. was determined to defend the cityas freedom, and that athe Soviets should keep their hands off Berlin.a Lightner wanted to ensure that Kennedy knew the consequences of showing weakness in Vienna. aAny indication the President is willing to discuss interim solutions, compromises, or a modus vivendi,a he said, awould reduce the impact of warning Khrushchev of the dire consequences of his miscalculating our resolve.a WAs.h.i.+NGTON, D.C.

THURSDAY, MAY 25, 1961.

Like an author seeing the first unsatisfying drafts of his presidency, Kennedy opted to deliver a second State of the Union speech on May 25a"aa Special Address to the Nation on Urgent National Needsaa"just twelve weeks after the first. It reflected his recognition that before Vienna and after the Bay of Pigs, he needed to set the stage by sending Khrushchev an unmistakable message of resolve.

Bobby Kennedy had used one of his Bolshakov meetings to forewarn Khrushchev that although the presidentas rhetoric in the speech would be harsh, this didnat lessen his brotheras desire to cooperate. However, the Bolshakov channel was not a sufficient means to convey a message of strength that was intended as much for a domestic audience as for Khrushchev.

Standing before a joint session of Congress and a national television audience, Kennedy explained that American presidents had on occasion during aextraordinary timesa provided a second State of the Union during a single year. These were such times, he said. As the United States was responsible for freedomas cause in the world, he declared that he was going to unveil aa freedom doctrine.a The presidentas forty-eight-minute midday speech was interrupted by applause seventeen times. He stressed the need to maintain a healthy American economy, and he celebrated the end of the recession and beginning of recovery. He spoke of the worldas southern hemisphere as the alands of the rising peoplesaa"Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Mideasta"where the adversaries of freedom had to be countered on athe worldas great battleground.a Kennedy called for a defense spending increase of some $700 million to expand and modernize the military, to overtake the Soviets in the arms race, and to reorganize civil defense with a threefold increase in money for fallout shelters. He wanted to enlist 15,000 more Marines and put a greater focus on fighting guerrilla wars in the Third World by expanding the supply of howitzers, helicopters, armored personnel carriers, and battle-ready reserve units. Most important, he declared that the United States by the end of the decade would put a man on the moon and return him to Earth. It was a race he was determined to win against the Soviets, who had put the first satellite and man into s.p.a.ce.

With the Vienna Summit just nine days off, his message to the American people was that the world was growing more dangerous by the hour, that America had a global responsibility as freedomas champion, and that it thus must accept the sacrifices required. He set the bar low for what could be achieved with so difficult an adversary, saving just one paragraph for discussion of the Vienna meeting.

aNo formal agenda is planned and no negotiations will be undertaken,a he said.

MOSCOW.

FRIDAY, MAY 26, 1961.

Directly responding to what he perceived as Kennedyas shot across his bow, Khrushchev called together his most critical const.i.tuency, the Communist Partyas ruling Presidium. As usual, his decision to bring the stenographer to the meeting was a sign to its attendees that he intended to say something significant.

He told his Presidium colleagues that Kennedy was aa son of a b.i.t.c.h.a Despite that, he attached great significance to the Vienna Summit because he would use it to bring to a head what he referred to as athe German question.a He outlined the solution that he would propose, using much the same description that he had employed with Amba.s.sador Thompson.

Could the steps he was proposing to change Berlinas status prompt nuclear war? he asked his fellow Soviet leaders. Yes, he answered, and then he outlined why he considered such a conflict to be 95 percent unlikely.

Only Anastas Mikoyan among his party chieftains dared differ with the Soviet leader. He argued that Khrushchev underestimated the American willingness and ability to engage in conventional war over Berlin. s.h.i.+fting from previous attacks that focused more on West Germany and Adenauer as the threat, Khrushchev told those gathered that the United States was the most dangerous of all countries to the Soviets. In his love-hate relations.h.i.+p with America, he had turned the needle back to loathing in preparation for the Vienna Summit, a clear indication to his leaders.h.i.+p of what outcome he expected.

Khrushchev repeated his increasingly obsessive view that although he was meeting with Kennedy, it was the Pentagon and the CIA that ran the United States, something he said that he had already experienced during his dealings with Eisenhower. He said it was for this reason one could not trust that American leaders could make decisions based on logical principles. aThatas why certain forces could emerge and find a pretext to go to war against us,a he said.

Khrushchev told his comrades that he was prepared to risk war and that he also knew how best to avoid it. He said Americaas European allies and world public opinion would restrain Kennedy from responding with nuclear weapons to any change in Berlinas status. He said de Gaulle and Macmillan would never support an American lurch toward war because they understood that the Sovietsa primary nuclear targets, given the range of Moscowas missiles, would be in Europe.

aThey are intelligent people, and they understand this,a he said.

Khrushchev then laid out exactly how the Berlin situation would unfold after the six-month ultimatum he would issue in Vienna. He would sign a peace treaty unilaterally with the East German government, and then he would turn over to it all the access routes to West Berlin. aWe do not encroach on West Berlin, we do not declare a blockade,a he said, thus providing no pretext for military action. aWe show that we are ready to permit air traffic but on the condition that Western planes land at airports in the GDR [not West Berlin]. We do not demand a withdrawal of troops. However, we consider them illegal, though we wonat use any strong-arm methods for their removal. We will not cut off delivery of foodstuffs and will not sever any other lifelines. We will adhere to a policy of noninfringement and noninvolvement in the affairs of West Berlin. Therefore, I donat believe that because the state of war and the occupational regime are coming to an end it would unleash a war.a Mikoyan was alone in warning Khrushchev that the probability of war was higher than the Soviet leader estimated. Out of respect for Khrushchev, however, he put it at only a slightly greater 10 percent rather than Khrushchevas 5 percent. aIn my opinion, they could initiate military action without atomic weapons,a he said.

Khrushchev shot back that Kennedy so feared war that he would not react militarily. He told the Presidium they perhaps would have to compromise in Laos, Cuba, or the Congo, where the conventional balance was less clear, but around Berlin the Kremlinas superiority was unquestionable.

To ensure this became even more so, Khrushchev ordered Defense Secretary Rodion Malinovsky, Soviet Army Chief of Staff Matvei Zakharov, and Warsaw Pact Commander Andrei Grechkoa"who sat before hima"ato thoroughly examine the correlation of forces in Germany and to see what is needed.a He was willing to spend the rubles required, he told them. Their first move had to be increasing artillery and basic weapons, and then they had to be ready to reposition more weaponry if the Soviet Union was provoked further. He wanted a report from his commanders in two weeksa time about how they would plan to execute a Berlin operation, and he expected within six months to be able to match his tough words in Vienna with an improved military capability.

Mikoyan countered that Khrushchev was backing Kennedy into a dangerous position where he would have no option but to respond militarily. Mikoyan suggested that Khrushchev continue to allow air traffic to arrive in West Berlin, which might make his Berlin solution more palatable to Kennedy.

Khrushchev disagreed. He reminded his comrades that East Germany was imploding. Thousands of professionals were fleeing the country each week. A failure to take firm action to stop this would not only make Ulbricht anxious but raise doubts among its Warsaw Pact allies, who would asense in this action our inconsistency and uncertainty.a Not only would Khrushchev be willing to shut down the air corridor, he said, looking toward Mikoyan, but he would also shoot down any Allied plane that tried to land in West Berlin. aOur position is very strong, but we will have, of course, to really intimidate them now. For example, if there is any flying around, we will have to bring aircraft down. Could they respond with provocative acts? They coulda. If we want to carry out our policy, and if we want it to be acknowledged, respected and feared, it is necessary to be firm.a Khrushchev ended his war council with a discussion of whether he should exchange gifts with Kennedy in Vienna, according to the usual protocol.

Foreign Ministry officials suggested he give President Kennedy twelve cans of the finest black caviar and phonographic records of Soviet and Russian music. Among other gifts, his aides had a silver coffee service in mind for Mrs. Kennedy. They wanted Khrushchevas approval.

aOne can exchange presents even before a war,a Khrushchev responded.

HYANNIS PORT, Ma.s.sACHUSETTS.

SAt.u.r.dAY, MAY 27, 1961.

Kennedy lifted off in a rainstorm aboard Air Force One from Andrews Air Force Base, bound for Hyannis Port. In just three days he would land in Paris and meet de Gaulle, and in just one weekas time he would be in Vienna with Khrushchev. His father had decorated the presidentas sleeping quarters with pictures of voluptuous womena"a practical joke from a fellow womanizer just before his sonas forty-fourth birthday.

Kennedy was retreating to the family compound to briefly celebrate and bury himself in his briefing books on issues ranging from the nuclear balance to Khrushchevas psychological makeup. What U.S. intelligence services painted was a picture of a man who would try to charm him one moment and bully him the next; a gambler who would test him; a true-believing Marxist who wanted to coexist but compete; a crude and insecure leader of peasant upbringing and cunning who above all was unpredictable.

The president could only hope that Khrushchevas background briefings on U.S. leaders.h.i.+p were less revealing. His back pain was as bad as at any time in his administration, made worse by an injury he had suffered during the ceremonial planting of a tree in Canada a few days earlier. Alongside his paperwork, he would pack anesthetic procaine for his back, cortisone for his Addisonas disease, and a c.o.c.ktail of vitamins, enzymes, and amphetamines for flagging energy and other maladies.

He was using crutches, though never in public, limping around like an already injured athlete preparing for a champions.h.i.+p match.

10.

VIENNA: LITTLE BOY BLUE MEETS AL CAPONE.

So weare stuck in a ridiculous situation. It seems silly for us to be facing an atomic war over a treaty preserving Berlin as the future capital of a reunified Germany when all of us know that Germany will probably never be reunified. But weare committed to that agreement, and so are the Russians, so we canat let them back out of it.

President Kennedy to his aides as he soaked in his bathtub, June 1, 1961, Paris.

The U.S. is unwilling to normalize the situation in the most dangerous spot in the world. The USSR wants to perform an operation on this sore spota"to eliminate this thorn, this ulcera"without prejudicing the interests of any side, but rather to the satisfaction of all peoples of the world.

Premier Khrushchev to President Kennedy, June 4, 1961, Vienna.

PARIS.

WEDNESDAY, MAY 31, 1961.

For all the adoring French crowds, grand Gallic meals, and media hype generated by a thousand correspondents covering his trip, President Kennedyas favorite moments in Paris were spent submerged in a giant, gold-plated bathtub in the aKingas Chambera of a nineteenth-century palace on the Quai daOrsay.

aG.o.d, we ought to have a tub like this in the White House,a the president said to his troubleshooter Kenny OaDonnell, as he soaked himself in the deep, steaming waters to relieve his excruciating back pain. OaDonnell reckoned the vessel was about as long and wide as a Ping-Pong table. Aide David Powers suggested that if the president aplayed his cards right,a de Gaulle might give it to him as a souvenir.

So began what the three men would come to refer to as their atub talksa in the vast suite of rooms of the Palais des Affaires trangres, where de Gaulle had put up Kennedy for his three-day stay in Paris en route to Vienna. During the breaks in the presidentas packed schedule, Kennedy would soak and share his latest experiences with his two closest friends in the White House, veterans both of World War II and his political campaigns. By t.i.tle, OaDonnell was White House appointments secretary, but his long relations.h.i.+p with the Kennedys had begun when he was Bobbyas roommate at Harvard. Powers was Kennedyas affable man Friday who kept him amused, on schedule, and well supplied with s.e.xual partners.

Between 500,000 and 1 million people had lined the streets to welcome the worldas most famous couple that morning, depending on who was counting the crowd (the French police being more conservative than the White House press office). Considering de Gaulleas frosty relations.h.i.+p with Kennedyas predecessors Eisenhower and Roosevelt, his warm reception for Kennedy was a departure. De Gaulle suspected that all U.S. leaders wanted to undermine French leaders.h.i.+p of Europe and supplant it with their own. That said, he was happy to bask in the celebrity of the First Couple, whose images adorned the covers of all the major French magazines. The difference in age also helped, allowing de Gaulle to play his preferred role of the wise, legendary man of history taking this young, promising American under his wing.

At Orly Airport at ten that morning, de Gaulle had welcomed Kennedy on a giant scarlet carpet, flanked by fifty black Citrons and a mounted honor guard of Republican Guards. All six feet, four inches of Le Gnral rose from his car in his double-breasted business suit as the band played aThe Ma.r.s.eillaise.a aSide by side,a reported the New York Times, athe two men moved all day through Parisa"age beside youth, grandeur beside informality, mysticism beside pragmatism, serenity beside eagerness.a The cheers grew so loud as the two men drove along Boulevard Saint-Michel on the Left Bank of the Seine that de Gaulle persuaded the U.S. president to rise in the rear seat of their open-top limo, eliciting an even greater roar. Despite a chill wind, Kennedy rode bareheaded and with only a light topcoat. He dressed no more warmly that afternoon as rain drenched the two men in their sweep up the Champs-lyses, an indignity de Gaulle bore without complaint.

Behind all that misleading theater was a U.S. president who was entering the most important week of his presidency as a weary, wounded commander in chief who was inadequately prepared and insufficiently fit for what would face him in Vienna. Khrushchev would be scanning for Kennedyas vulnerabilities after the Bay of Pigs, and there were plenty for the picking.

At home, Kennedy was facing violent racial confrontations that had broken out in the American South as African Americans grew more determined to end two centuries of oppression. The immediate problem revolved around the aFreedom Riders,a whose efforts to desegregate interstate transportation had won only tepid support from the Kennedy administration and were opposed by nearly two-thirds of Americans.

Abroad, Kennedyas failure in Cuba, unresolved conflict in Laos, and tensions building around Berlin made his Parisa"Vienna trip all the more fraught with risk. Kennedy was making the mental connection to Berlin even while wrestling with racial affairs at home. When Father Theodore Hesburgh, a member of his Civil Rights Commission, questioned the presidentas reluctance to take bolder steps to desegregate the United States, Kennedy said, aLook, Father, I may have to send the Alabama National Guard to Berlin tomorrow, and I donat want to do it in the middle of a revolution at home.a It seemed just another of his presidencyas early misfortunes that Kennedy had seriously reinjured his back muscles while planting a ceremonial tree in Ottawa, and the pain had grown worse on the long flight to Europe. It had been the first time since his spinal fusion surgery in 1954 that he was hobbling around on crutches. To protect his image, he refused to use the props in public, but that only aroused more pain when he was in France, by putting even greater pressure on his back.

Kennedyas personal physician, Janet Travell, who accompanied him to Paris, was concerned about his heightened suffering and the impact his treatments might have on everything from mood to endurance during the trip. The president had already been taking five baths or hot showers a day to ease his pain. Though Americans didnat know it, the real purpose of his famous Oval Office rocking chair was that it helped relieve the throbbing of his lower back, into which doctors had been shooting procaine, a potent cousin of novocaine, for nearly a decade. Travell was also treating him for chronic adrenal ailments, high fevers, elevated cholesterol levels, sleeplessness, and stomach, colon, and prostate problems.