The Great War and How It Arose Part 2

_(I.)--Attempt to Extend Time-Limit of Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to Serbia._

On July 25, in reply to the Anglo-Russian efforts, to extend the forty-eight hour "time-limit" of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia, the Russian Charge d'Affaires at Vienna telegraphed that he had been officially informed that "the Austro-Hungarian Government refuse our proposal to extend the time-limit of the Note."[17] How Austria-Hungary was aided and abetted by Germany in this refusal is made plain in the despatch from the Russian Charge d'Affaires at Berlin on the same day:--

"The (German) Minister for Foreign Affairs ... tells me that the British Government have likewise urged him to advise Vienna to extend the time limit of the ultimatum, ... but he fears that in the absence of Berchtold" (Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs) "who has left for Ischl, and in view of the lack of time, his telegrams may have no result. Moreover, he has doubts as to the wisdom of Austria yielding at the last moment, and he is inclined to think that such a step on her part might increase the a.s.surance of Serbia."[18]

_(II.)--The Question of Delay of Hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia._

When the extension of the time-limit of the Ultimatum to Serbia was refused by Austria, Sir Edward Grey thought the question of preventing or delaying hostilities might serve as a basis for discussion. The Austrian Amba.s.sador explained that:--

"the Austrian Note should not be regarded as an Ultimatum; it should be regarded as a step which, in the event of no reply, or in the event of an unsatisfactory reply within the time fixed, would be followed by a rupture of diplomatic relations, and the immediate departure of the Austro-Hungarian Minister from Belgrade, without, however, entailing the immediate opening of hostilities."[19]

As Sir Edward Grey said in his Despatch to the British Charge d'Affaires at Berlin, July 24, 1914:--

"The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into Serbia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help Serbia; it would be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and partic.i.p.ate in such action at Vienna. You should inform Secretary of State."[20]

The following day (July 25, 1914), Sir Edward Grey wrote to the British Charge d'Affaires in Berlin:--

"The Austrian Amba.s.sador has been authorised to inform me that the Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time limit would be to break off diplomatic relations and commence military preparations, but not military operations. In informing the German Amba.s.sador of this, I said that it interposed a stage of mobilisation before the frontier was actually crossed, which I had urged yesterday should be delayed."[21]

But here again Germany was lukewarm, to say the least of it, as will be seen in the Despatch from the British Charge d'Affaires at Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 26, 1914:--

"Under-Secretary of State has just telephoned to me to say that German Amba.s.sador at Vienna has been instructed to pa.s.s on to Austro-Hungarian Government your hopes that they may take a favourable view of Serbian reply if it corresponds to the forecast contained in Belgrade telegram of 25th July.

"Under-Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they a.s.sociate themselves to a certain extent with your hope. German Government do not see their way to going beyond this."[22]

_(III.)--Suggested Mediation by the Four Powers._

On July 24, 1914, Sir Edward Grey suggested to the German Amba.s.sador that the only chance he could see of a mediating or moderating influence being effective was:--

"that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France and ourselves should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia becoming threatening."[23]

Finding that Russia consented to this idea, Sir Edward telegraphed to our representatives at Paris, Berlin and Rome on July 26, 1914, to the following effect:--

"Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Amba.s.sador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself, to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications?

You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Belgrade, Vienna and St. Petersburg should be authorised to request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference."[24]

The Powers, _with the exception of Germany_, consented. Germany again proclaimed herself the disturbing element, as is shown in the following Despatch from the British Amba.s.sador at Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 27, 1914:--

"(German) Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration, and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace.

I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable."[25]

Again, on July 29, 1914, the British Amba.s.sador at Berlin reported:--

"I was sent for again to-day by the Imperial Chancellor, who told me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that events had marched too rapidly and that it was therefore too late to act upon your suggestion that the Serbian reply might form the basis of discussion."[26]

_(IV.)--Germany asked to State any Form which Mediation between Russia and Austria-Hungary might take._

How Germany endeavoured to shuffle out of the suggested mediation by the four Powers on the plea that the "form" was not one which Austria-Hungary could accept, is set forth in a Telegram from Sir Edward Grey to the British Amba.s.sador in Berlin, dated July 29, 1914:--

"The German Government ... seemed to think the particular method of conference, consultation or discussion, or even conversations a quatre in London too formal a method. I urged that the German Government should suggest _any method_ by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by _any method that Germany could suggest_ if mine was not acceptable. _In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would 'press the b.u.t.ton' in the interests of peace._"[27]

Here again Germany evaded the point, as is shown in the Telegram from the British Amba.s.sador in Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 30, 1914:--

"The Chancellor told me last night that he was 'pressing the b.u.t.ton' as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than otherwise."[28]

Sir Edward Grey's telegram was sent off about 4 p.m. on July 29. His appeal was followed almost immediately by a strange response. About midnight a telegram arrived at the Foreign Office from His Majesty's Amba.s.sador at Berlin.[29] The German Chancellor had sent for him late at night. He had asked if Great Britain would promise to remain neutral in a war, provided Germany did not touch Holland and took nothing from France but her colonies. He refused to give any undertaking that Germany would not invade Belgium, but he promised that, if Belgium remained pa.s.sive, no territory would be taken from her.

Sir E. Grey's answer was a peremptory refusal, but he added an exhortation and an offer. The business of Europe was to work for peace.

That was the only question with which Great Britain was concerned. If Germany would prove by her actions now that she desired peace, Great Britain would warmly welcome a future agreement with her whereby the whole weight of the two nations would be thrown permanently into the scale of peace in years to come.

_(V.)--Russia Suggests Direct Negotiations with Austria-Hungary._

Another excuse given by Germany for refusing mediation by the four Powers was the possibility of direct negotiations between Russia and Austria-Hungary. The British Amba.s.sador in Berlin on July 27, in recording Germany's excuses, said that the German Secretary of State--

"added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonof" (Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs) "to exchange views with Count Berchtold" (Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs). "He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best before doing anything else to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments."[30]

It is worth noting that, in reply to this Despatch from the British Amba.s.sador in Berlin, Sir Edward Grey wrote on July 29:--

"I told the German Amba.s.sador that an agreement arrived at direct between Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution. I would press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that, but my information this morning was that the Austrian Government have declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the Austrian Amba.s.sador at St. Petersburg should be authorised to discuss directly with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the means of settling the Austro-Serbian conflict."[31]

Russia had done her best to open these negotiations, and endeavoured to get the German Government to advise Austria to continue negotiations thus opened. How the proposal was received by Germany is found in the following Despatch from the Russian Charge d'Affaires in Berlin, dated July 27, 1914:--

"I begged the Minister for Foreign Affairs to support your proposal in Vienna that Szapary" (Austro-Hungarian Amba.s.sador in Russia) "should be authorised to draw up, by means of a private exchange of views with you, a wording of the Austro-Hungarian demands which would be acceptable to both parties. Jagow" (German Foreign Secretary of State) "answered that he was aware of this proposal and that he agreed with Pourtales" (German Amba.s.sador in Russia) "that as Szapary had begun this conversation, he might as well go on with it. He will telegraph in this sense to the German Amba.s.sador at Vienna. I begged him to press Vienna with greater insistence to adopt this conciliatory line; Jagow answered that _he could not advise Austria to give way_."[32]

The result of Germany's hostile att.i.tude to the plan was at once made apparent the next day in Vienna, where the Russian Amba.s.sador reported on July 28, 1914:--

"Count Berchtold" (Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs) "replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and of the advantages of a frank explanation with the St. Petersburg Cabinet. He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government, who had only decided, much against their will, on the energetic measures which they had taken against Serbia, could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion of the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note."[33]

_(VI.)--Russia's Final Attempt at Peace._

Finally, on July 30, 1914, another attempt at peace by Russia is indicated in the Despatch from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Russian Amba.s.sadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome, in the following terms:--

"The German Amba.s.sador, who has just left me, has asked whether Russia would not be satisfied with the promise which Austria might give--that she would not violate the integrity of the Kingdom of Serbia--and whether we could not indicate upon what conditions we would agree to suspend our military preparations. I dictated to him the following declaration to be forwarded to Berlin for immediate action: 'If Austria, recognising that the Austro-Serbian question has become a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum such points as violate the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia undertakes to stop her military preparations.'

"Please inform me at once by telegraph what att.i.tude the German Government will adopt in face of this fresh proof of our desire to do the utmost possible for a peaceful settlement of the question, for we cannot allow such discussions to continue solely in order that Germany and Austria may gain time for their military preparations."[34]

And subsequently this was amended according to the following Despatch from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Russian Amba.s.sadors abroad, dated July 31, 1914, Petrograd:--

"Please refer to my telegram of 17 (30) July. The British Amba.s.sador, on the instructions of his Government, has informed me of the wish of the London Cabinet to make certain modifications in the formula which I suggested yesterday to the German Amba.s.sador. I replied that I accepted the British suggestion. I accordingly send you the text of the modified formula, which is as follows:--

"'If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Serbian territory; if, recognising that the dispute between Austria and Serbia has become a question of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and decide what satisfaction Serbia could afford to the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting att.i.tude."[35]