The Great War and How It Arose Part 3

The possibility of peace was not thought hopeless by Sir Edward Grey, for, in a despatch to the British Amba.s.sador at Berlin, dated August 1, he says:--

"I still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war.

"The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested.

"Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension. His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters."[36]

That Austria was at last taking a more reasonable att.i.tude is shown by the despatch from the Russian Amba.s.sador in Paris, dated August 1, 1914:--

"The Austrian Amba.s.sador yesterday visited Viviani" (French Minister for Foreign Affairs), "and declared to him that Austria, far from harbouring any designs against the integrity of Serbia, was in fact ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances against Servia with the other powers. The French Government are much exercised at Germany's extraordinary military activity on the French frontier for they are convinced that under the guise of 'Kriegszustand,' mobilisation is, in reality, being carried out."[37]

Unfortunately at this point, when the Austro-Hungarian Government appeared ready to debate amicably with Russia, Germany stopped all efforts at peace by issuing an Ultimatum to Russia. News of this is given in a telegram to the Russian representatives abroad on August 1, in the following terms:--

"At midnight the German Amba.s.sador announced to me, on the instruction of his Government, that if within 12 hours, that is by midnight on Sat.u.r.day, we had not begun to demobilise, not only against Germany, but also against Austria, the German Government would be compelled to give the order for mobilisation. To my enquiry whether this meant war, the Amba.s.sador replied in the negative, but added that we were very near it."[38]

As Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Amba.s.sador in Vienna, tersely put it in his despatch, dated from London, September 1, 1914, to Sir Edward Grey:--

"Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. _A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history._"[39]

FOOTNOTES:

[17] Cd. 7626, No. 12.

[18] Cd. 7626, No. 14.

[19] Cd. 7626, No. 16.

[20] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 11.

[21] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 25.

[22] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 34.

[23] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 11.

[24] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 36.

[25] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 43.

[26] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 75.

[27] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 84.

[28] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 107.

[29] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, Nos. 85 and 101.

[30] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 43.

[31] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 84.

[32] Cd. 7626, No. 38.

[33] Cd. 7626, No. 45.

[34] Cd. 7626, No. 60.

[35] Cd. 7626, No. 67.

[36] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 131.

[37] Cd. 7626, No. 73.

[38] Cd. 7626, No. 70.

[39] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 161.

GERMAN MILITARISM WINS.

Thus Germany rejected all suggestions, while Austria, supported by Germany, was determined on war. The Serbian episode was clearly an excuse. Germany's alliance with Austria was "defensive." She was bound to join with Austria only in case of the latter being _attacked_ by Russia. Austria claimed that because Russia would not stand idle while Serbia was crushed, therefore Russia was the aggressor. Germany was a party to the Austrian attack on Serbia. The British Amba.s.sador at Vienna on July 30 says: "I have private information that the German Amba.s.sador (at Vienna) knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia _before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor_. I know from the German Amba.s.sador himself that he endorses every line of it."[40]

Germany, therefore, chose this moment to send a challenge to Russia knowing that Russia must fight unless she were willing to be humiliated and disgraced in the eyes, not only of men of the Slav race in the Balkans, but in the eyes of the whole world.

The French Foreign Minister, telegraphing on July 31 to the French Amba.s.sador in London as to Germany's aggressive steps on the Franco-German frontier, said: "All my information goes to show that the German preparations began on Sat.u.r.day (July 25)."[41] What has actually happened in the war goes to show that this must have been the case.

The precise situation at this point is well shown in the British Foreign Office introduction to _Great Britain and the European Crisis_:--

"At this moment, on Friday, the 31st, Germany suddenly despatched an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that she should countermand her mobilisation within twelve hours. Every allowance must be made for the natural nervousness which, as history has repeatedly shown, overtakes nations when mobilisation is under way. All that can be said is that, _according to the information in the possession of His Majesty's Government, mobilisation had not at the time proceeded as far in Russia as in Germany, although general mobilisation was not publicly proclaimed in Germany till the next day, the 1st August_. France also began to mobilise on that day.

The German Secretary of State refused to discuss a last proposal from Sir E. Grey for joint action with Germany, France, and Italy until Russia's reply should be received, and in the afternoon the German Amba.s.sador at St. Petersburg presented a declaration of war.

Yet on this same day, Sat.u.r.day, the 1st, Russia a.s.sured Great Britain that she would on no account commence hostilities if the Germans did not cross the frontier, and France declared that her troops would be kept 6 miles from her frontier so as to prevent a collision. This was the situation when very early on Sunday morning, the 2nd August, German troops invaded Luxemburg, a small independent State whose neutrality had been guaranteed by all the Powers with the same object as the similar guarantee of Belgium.

The die was cast. War between Germany, Russia, and France had become inevitable."

FOOTNOTES:

[40] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 95.

[41] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 105--Enclosure 3.

HOW FRANCE CAME IN.