The Works of George Berkeley Part 11

(M132) To say the mind exists without thinking is a contradiction, nonsense, nothing.

(M133) Folly to inquire wt determines the Will. Uneasiness, &c. are ideas, therefore unactive, therefore can do nothing, therefore cannot determine the Will(121).

(M134) Again, wt mean you by determine?

(M135) (M136) For want of rightly understanding time, motion, existence, &c., men are forc'd into such absurd contradictions as this, viz. light moves 16 diameters of earth in a second of time.

(M137) 'Twas the opinion that ideas could exist unperceiv'd, or before perception, that made men think perception(122) was somewhat different from the idea perceived, i.e. yt it was an idea of reflection; whereas the thing perceiv'd was an idea of sensation. I say, 'twas this made 'em think the understanding took it in, receiv'd it from without; wch could never be did not they think it existed without(123).

(M138) Properly speaking, idea is the picture of the imagination's making.

This is ye likeness of, and refer'd to the real idea, or (if you will) thing(124).

(M139) To ask, have we an idea of Will or volition, is nonsense. An idea can resemble nothing but an idea.

(M140) If you ask wt thing it is that wills, I answer, if you mean idea by the word thing, or anything like any idea, then I say, 'tis no thing at all that wills(125). This how extravagant soever it may seem, yet is a certain truth. We are cheated by these general terms, thing, is, &c.

(M141) Again, if by is you mean is perceived, or does perceive, I say nothing wch is perceived or does perceive wills.

(M142) The referring ideas to things wch are not ideas, the using the term "idea of(126)," is one great cause of mistake, as in other matters, so also in this.

(M143) Some words there are wch do not stand for ideas, viz. particles, will, &c. Particles stand for volitions and their concomitant ideas.

(M144) There seem to be but two colours wch are simple ideas, viz. those exhibited by the most and least refrangible rays; [the others], being the intermediate ones, may be formed by composition.

(M145) I have no idea of a volition or act of the mind, neither has any other intelligence; for that were a contradiction.

N. B. Simple ideas, viz. colours, are not devoid of all sort of composition, tho' it must be granted they are not made up of distinguishable ideas. Yet there is another sort of composition. Men are wont to call those things compounded in which we do not actually discover the component ingredients. Bodies are said to be compounded of chymical principles, which, nevertheless, come not into view till after the dissolution of the bodies-wch were not, could not, be discerned in the bodies whilst remaining entire.

(M146) All our knowledge is about particular ideas, according to Locke.

All our sensations are particular ideas, as is evident. Wt use then do we make of abstract general ideas, since we neither know nor perceive them?

(M147) 'Tis allow'd that particles stand not for ideas, and yet they are not said to be empty useless sounds. The truth really is, they stand for operations of the mind, i.e. volitions.

(M148) Locke says all our knowledge is about particulars. If so, pray wt is the following ratiocination but a jumble of words? "Omnis h.o.m.o est animal; omne animal vivit: ergo omnis h.o.m.o vivit." It amounts (if you annex particular ideas to the words "animal" and "vivit") to no more than this: "Omnis h.o.m.o est h.o.m.o; omnis h.o.m.o est h.o.m.o: ergo, omnis h.o.m.o est h.o.m.o." A mere sport and trifling with sounds.

(M149) We have no ideas of vertues & vices, no ideas of moral actions(127). Wherefore it may be question'd whether we are capable of arriving at demonstration about them(128), the morality consisting in the volition chiefly.

(M150) Strange it is that men should be at a loss to find their idea of Existence; since that (if such there be distinct from perception) it is brought into the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection(129), methinks it should be most familiar to us, and we best acquainted with it.

(M151) This I am sure, I have no idea of Existence(130), or annext to the word Existence. And if others have that's nothing to me; they can never make me sensible of it; simple ideas being incommunicable by language.

(M152) Say you, the unknown substratum of volitions & ideas is something whereof I have no idea. I ask, Is there any other being which has or can have an idea of it? If there be, then it must be itself an idea; which you will think absurd.

(M153) There is somewhat active in most perceptions, i.e. such as ensue upon our volitions, such as we can prevent and stop: e.g. I turn my eyes toward the sun: I open them. All this is active.

(M154) Things are twofold-active or inactive. The existence of active things is to act; of inactive to be perceiv'd.

(M155) Distinct from or without perception there is no volition; therefore neither is there existence without perception.

(M156) G.o.d may comprehend all ideas, even the ideas wch are painfull & unpleasant, without being in any degree pained thereby(131). Thus we ourselves can imagine the pain of a burn, &c. without any misery or uneasiness at all.

(M157) Truth, three sorts thereof-natural, mathematical, & moral.

(M158) Agreement of relation onely where numbers do obtain: of co-existence, in nature: of signification, by including, in morality.

(M159) Gyant who shakes the mountain that's on him must be acknowledged.

Or rather thus: I am no more to be reckon'd stronger than Locke than a pigmy should be reckon'd stronger than a gyant, because he could throw off the molehill wch lay upon him, and the gyant could onely shake or shove the mountain that oppressed him. This in the Preface.

(M160) Promise to extend our knowledge & clear it of those shamefull contradictions which embarra.s.s it. Something like this to begin the Introduction in a modest way(132).

(M161) Whoever shall pretend to censure any part, I desire he would read out the whole, else he may perhaps not understand me. In the Preface or Introduction(133).

(M162) Doctrine of ident.i.ty best explain'd by taking the Will for volitions, the Understanding for ideas. The difficulty of consciousness of wt are never acted surely solv'd thereby.

(M163) I must acknowledge myself beholding to the philosophers who have gone before me. They have given good rules, though certainly they do not always observe them. Similitude of adventurers, who, tho' they attained not the desired port, they by their wrecks have made known the rocks and sands, whereby the pa.s.sage of aftercomers is made more secure & easy.

Preface or Introduction.

(M164) The opinion that men had ideas of moral actions(134) has render'd the demonstrating ethiques very difficult to them.

(M165) An idea being itself unactive cannot be the resemblance or image of an active thing.

(M166) Excuse to be made in the Introduction for using the word _idea_, viz. because it has obtain'd. But a caution must be added.

Scripture and possibility are the onely proofs(135) with Malbranch. Add to these what he calls a great propension to think so: this perhaps may be questioned. Perhaps men, if they think before they speak, will not be found so thoroughly persuaded of the existence of Matter.

(M167) On second thoughts I am on t'other extream. I am certain of that wch Malbranch seems to doubt of, viz. the existence of bodies(136).

(M168) Mem. To bring the killing blow at the last, e.g. in the matter of abstraction to bring Locke's general triangle in the last(137).

(M169) They give good rules, tho' perhaps they themselves do not always observe them. They speak much of clear and distinct ideas, though at the same time they talk of general abstract ideas, &c. I'll [instance] in Locke's opinion of abstraction, he being as clear a writer as I have met with.

Such was the candour of this great man that I perswade myself, were he alive(138), he would not be offended that I differ from him: seeing that even in so doing I follow his advice, viz. to use my own judgement, see with my own eyes, & not with another's. Introduction.

(M170) The word thing, as comprising or standing for idea & volition, usefull; as standing for idea and archetype without the mind(139), mischievous and useless.

(M171) To demonstrate morality it seems one need only make a dictionary of words, and see which included which. At least, this is the greatest part and bulk of the work.

(M172) Locke's instances of demonstration in morality are, according to his own rule, trifling propositions.

(M173) Qu. How comes it that some ideas are confessedly allow'd by all to be onely in the mind(140), and others as generally taken to be without the mind(141), if, according to you, all are equally and only in the mind?

Ans. Because that in proportion to pleasure or pain ideas are attended with desire, exertion, and other actions which include volition. Now volition is by all granted to be in spirit.