The Works of George Berkeley Part 12

(M174) If men would lay aside words in thinking, 'tis impossible they should ever mistake, save only in matters of fact. I mean it seems impossible they should be positive & secure that anything was true wch in truth is not so. Certainly I cannot err in matter of simple perception. So far as we can in reasoning go without the help of signs, there we have certain knowledge. Indeed, in long deductions made by signs there may be slips of memory.

(M175) From my doctrine there follows a cure for pride. We are only to be praised for those things which are our own, or of our own doing; natural abilitys are not consequences of our volitions.

(M176) Mem. Candidly to take notice that Locke holds some dangerous opinions; such as the infinity and eternity of s.p.a.ce and the possibility of Matter's thinking(142).

(M177) Once more I desire my reader may be upon his guard against the fallacy of words. Let him beware that I do not impose on him by plausible empty talk, that common dangerous way of cheating men into absurditys. Let him not regard my words any otherwise than as occasions of bringing into his mind determin'd significations. So far as they fail of this they are gibberish, jargon, & deserve not the name of language. I desire & warn him not to expect to find truth in my book, or anywhere but in his own mind.

Wtever I see myself 'tis impossible I can paint it out in words.

(M178) N. B. To consider well wt is meant by that wch Locke saith concerning algebra-that it supplys intermediate ideas. Also to think of a method affording the same use in morals &c. that this doth in mathematiques.

(M179) _h.o.m.o_ is not proved to be _vivens_ by means of any intermediate idea. I don't fully agree wth Locke in wt he says concerning sagacity in finding out intermediate ideas in matter capable of demonstration & the use thereof; as if that were the onely means of improving and enlarging demonstrative knowledge.

(M180) There is a difference betwixt power & volition. There may be volition without power. But there can be no power without volition. Power implyeth volition, & at the same time a connotation of the effects following the volition(143).

(M181) We have a.s.suredly an idea of substance. 'Twas absurd of Locke(144) to think we had a name without a meaning. This might prove acceptable to the Stillingfleetians.

(M182) The substance of Body we know(145). The substance of Spirit we do not know-it not being knowable, it being a _purus actus_.

(M183) Words have ruin'd and overrun all the sciences-law, physique, chymistry, astrology, &c.

(M184) Abstract ideas only to be had amongst the learned. The vulgar never think they have any such, nor truly do they find any want of them. Genera & species & abstract ideas are terms unknown to them.

(M185) Locke's out(146)-the case is different. We can have an idea of body without motion, but not of soul without thought.

(M186) G.o.d ought to be wors.h.i.+p'd. This easily demonstrated when once we ascertain the signification of the words G.o.d, wors.h.i.+p, ought.

(M187) No perception, according to Locke, is active. Therefore no perception (i.e. no idea) can be the image of, or like unto, that which is altogether active & not at all pa.s.sive, i.e. the Will.

(M188) I can will the calling to mind something that is past, tho' at the same time that wch I call to mind was not in my thoughts before that volition of mine, & consequently I could have had no uneasiness for the want of it.

(M189) The Will & the Understanding may very well be thought two distinct beings.

(M190) Sed quia voluntas raro agit nisi ducente desiderio. V. Locke, Epistles, p. 479, ad Limburgum.

You cannot say the m. t. [minimum tangibile] is like or one with the m. v.

[minimum visibile], because they be both minima, just perceiv'd, and next door to nothing. You may as well say the m. t. is the same with or like unto a sound, so small that it is scarce perceiv'd.

Extension seems to be a mode of some tangible or sensible quality according as it is seen or felt.

(M191) The spirit-the active thing-that wch is soul, & G.o.d-is the Will alone. The ideas are effects-impotent things.

(M192) The concrete of the will & understanding I might call mind; not person, lest offence be given. Mem. Carefully to omit defining of person, or making much mention of it.

(M193) You ask, do these volitions make _one_ Will? Wt you ask is meerly about a word-unity being no more(147).

N. B. To use utmost caution not to give the least handle of offence to the Church or Churchmen.

(M194) Even to speak somewhat favourably of the Schoolmen, and shew that they who blame them for jargon are not free of it themselves. Introd.

Locke's great oversight seems to be that he did not begin with his third book; at least that he had not some thought of it at first. Certainly the 2d & 4th books don't agree wth wt he says in ye 3d(148).

(M195) If Matter(149) is once allow'd to exist, clippings of weeds and parings of nails may think, for ought that Locke can tell; tho' he seems positive of the contrary.

Since I say men cannot mistake in short reasoning about things demonstrable, if they lay aside words, it will be expected this Treatise will contain nothing but wt is certain & evident demonstration, & in truth I hope you will find nothing in it but what is such. Certainly I take it all for such. Introd.

(M196) When I say I will reject all propositions wherein I know not fully and adequately and clearly, so far as knowable, the thing meant thereby, this is not to be extended to propositions in the Scripture. I speak of matters of Reason and Philosophy-not Revelation. In this I think an humble, implicit faith becomes us (when we cannot comprehend or understand the proposition), such as a popish peasant gives to propositions he hears at ma.s.s in Latin. This proud men may call blind, popish, implicit, irrational. For my part I think it is more irrational to pretend to dispute at, cavil, and ridicule holy mysteries, i.e. propositions about things that are altogether above our knowledge, out of our reach. When I shall come to plenary knowledge of the meaning of any fact, then I shall yield an explicit belief. Introd.

Complexation of ideas twofold. Ys refers to colours being complex ideas.

Considering length without breadth is considering any length, be the breadth wt it will.

(M197) I may say earth, plants, &c. were created before man-there being other intelligences to perceive them, before man was created(150).

(M198) There is a philosopher(151) who says we can get an idea of substance by no way of sensation or reflection, & seems to imagine that we want a sense proper for it. Truly if we had a new sense it could only give us a new idea. Now I suppose he will not say substance, according to him, is an idea. For my part, I own I have no idea can stand for substance in his and the Schoolmen's sense of that word. But take it in the common vulgar sense, & then we see and feel substance.

(M199) N. B. That not common usage, but the Schoolmen coined the word Existence, supposed to stand for an abstract general idea.

Writers of Optics mistaken in their principles both in judging of magnitudes and distances.

(M200) 'Tis evident yt wn the solitary man should be taught to speak, the words would give him no other new ideas (save only the sounds, and complex ideas which, tho' unknown before, may be signified by language) beside wt he had before. If he had not, could not have, an abstract idea before, he cannot have it after he is taught to speak.

(M201) "h.o.m.o est h.o.m.o," &c. comes at last to Petrus est Petrus, &c. Now, if these identical propositions are sought after in the mind, they will not be found. There are no identical mental propositions. 'Tis all about sounds and terms.

(M202) Hence we see the doctrine of certainty by ideas, and proving by intermediate ideas, comes to nothing(152).

(M203) We may have certainty & knowledge without ideas, i.e. without other ideas than the words, and their standing for one idea, i.e. their being to be used indifferently.

(M204) It seems to me that we have no certainty about ideas, but only about words. 'Tis improper to say, I am certain I see, I feel, &c. There are no mental propositions form'd answering to these words, & in simple perception 'tis allowed by all there is no affirmation or negation, and consequently no certainty(153).

(M205) The reason why we can demonstrate so well about signs is, that they are perfectly arbitrary & in our power-made at pleasure.

(M206) The obscure ambiguous term _relation_, which is said to be the largest field of knowledge, confounds us, deceives us.

(M207) Let any man shew me a demonstration, not verbal, that does not depend on some false principle; or at best on some principle of nature, which is ye effect of G.o.d's will, and we know not how soon it may be changed.

(M208) Qu. What becomes of the _aeternae veritates_? Ans. They vanish(154).