The Works of George Berkeley Part 13

(M209) But, say you, I find it difficult to look beneath the words and uncover my ideas. Say I, Use will make it easy. In the sequel of my Book the cause of this difficulty shall be more clearly made out.

(M210) To view the deformity of error we need onely undress it.

(M211) "Cogito ergo sum." Tautology. No mental proposition answering thereto.

(M212) Knowledge, or certainty, or perception of agreement of ideas-as to ident.i.ty and diversity, and real existence, vanisheth; of relation, becometh merely nominal; of co-existence, remaineth. Locke thought in this latter our knowledge was little or nothing. Whereas in this only real knowledge seemeth to be found(155).

(M213) We must wth the mob place certainty in the senses(156).

'Tis a man's duty, 'tis the fruit of friends.h.i.+p, to speak well of his friend. Wonder not therefore that I do wt I do.

(M214) A man of slow parts may overtake truth, &c. Introd. Even my shortsightedness might perhaps be aiding to me in this matter-'twill make me bring the object nearer to my thoughts. A purblind person, &c. Introd.

(M215) Locke to Limborch, &c. Talk of _judicium intellectus_ preceding the volition: I think _judicium_ includes volition. I can by no means distinguish these-_judicium_, _intellectus_, _indifferentia_, uneasiness to many things accompanying or preceding every volition, as e.g. the motion of my hand.

(M216) Qu. Wt mean you by my perceptions, my volitions? Both all the perceptions I perceive or conceive(157), &c. are mine; all the volitions I am conscious to are mine.

(M217) h.o.m.o est agens liberum. What mean they by _h.o.m.o_ and _agens_ in this place?

(M218) Will any man say that brutes have ideas of Unity & Existence? I believe not. Yet if they are suggested by all the ways of sensation, 'tis strange they should want them(158).

(M219) It is a strange thing and deserves our attention, that the more time and pains men have consum'd in the study of philosophy, by so much the more they look upon themselves to be ignorant & weak creatures. They discover flaws and imperfections in their faculties wch other men never spy out. They find themselves under a necessity of admitting many inconsistent, irreconcilable opinions for true. There is nothing they touch with their hand, or behold with their eyes, but has its dark sides much larger and more numerous than wt is perceived, & at length turn scepticks, at least in most things. I imagine all this proceeds from, &c.

Exord. Introd.(159)

(M220) These men with a supercilious pride disdain the common single information of sense. They grasp at knowledge by sheafs & bundles. ('Tis well if, catching at too much at once, they hold nothing but emptiness & air.) They in the depth of their understanding contemplate abstract ideas.

It seems not improbable that the most comprehensive & sublime intellects see more m.v.'s at once, i.e. that their visual systems are the largest.

Words (by them meaning all sorts of signs) are so necessary that, instead of being (wn duly us'd or in their own nature) prejudicial to the advancement of knowledge, or an hindrance to knowledge, without them there could in mathematiques themselves be no demonstration.

Mem. To be eternally banis.h.i.+ng Metaphisics, &c., and recalling men to Common Sense(160).

(M221) We cannot conceive other minds besides our own but as so many selves. We suppose ourselves affected wth such & such thoughts & such and such sensations(161).

(M222) Qu. whether composition of ideas be not that faculty which chiefly serves to discriminate us from brutes? I question whether a brute does or can imagine a blue horse or chimera.

Naturalists do not distinguish betwixt cause and occasion. Useful to enquire after co-existing ideas or occasions.

(M223) Morality may be demonstrated as mixt mathematics.

(M224) Perception is pa.s.sive, but this not distinct from idea. Therefore there can be no idea of volition.

Algebraic species or letters are denominations of denominations. Therefore Arithmetic to be treated of before Algebra.

2 crowns are called ten s.h.i.+llings. Hence may appear the value of numbers.

Complex ideas are the creatures of the mind. Hence may appear the nature of numbers. This to be deeply discuss'd.

I am better informed & shall know more by telling me there are 10,000 men, than by shewing me them all drawn up. I shall better be able to judge of the bargain you'd have me make wn you tell me how much (i.e. the name of ye) money lies on the table, than by offering and shewing it without naming. I regard not the idea, the looks, but the names. Hence may appear the nature of numbers.

Children are unacquainted with numbers till they have made some progress in language. This could not be if they were ideas suggested by all the senses.

Numbers are nothing but names-never words.

Mem. Imaginary roots-to unravel that mystery.

Ideas of utility are annexed to numbers.

In arithmetical problems men seek not any idea of number. They only seek a denomination. This is all can be of use to them.

Take away the signs from Arithmetic and Algebra, and pray wt remains?

These are sciences purely verbal, and entirely useless but for practice in societies of men. No speculative knowledge, no comparing of ideas in them(162).

Qu. whether Geometry may not properly be reckon'd amongst the mixt mathematics-Arithmetic & Algebra being the only abstracted pure, i.e.

entirely nominal-Geometry being an application of these to points(163)?

(M225) Locke of Trifling Propositions. [b. 4. c. 8] Mem. Well to observe & con over that chapter.

(M226) Existence, Extension, &c. are abstract, i.e. no ideas. They are words, unknown and useless to the vulgar.

(M227) Sensual pleasure is the _summum bonum_. This the great principle of morality. This once rightly understood, all the doctrines, even the severest of the Gospels, may clearly be demonstrated.

(M228) Sensual pleasure, qua pleasure, is good & desirable by a wise man(164). But if it be contemptible, 'tis not qua pleasure but qua pain, or cause of pain, or (which is the same thing) of loss of greater pleasure.

(M229) Wn I consider, the more objects we see at once the more distant they are, and that eye which beholds a great many things can see none of them near.

(M230) By _idea_ I mean any sensible or imaginable thing(165).

(M231) To be sure or certain of wt we do not actually perceive(166) (I say perceive, not imagine), we must not be altogether pa.s.sive; there must be a disposition to act; there must be a.s.sent, wch is active. Nay, what do I talk; there must be actual volition.

What do we demonstrate in Geometry but that lines are equal or unequal?

i.e. may not be called by the same name(167).

(M232) I approve of this axiom of the Schoolmen, "Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu."(168) I wish they had stuck to it. It had never taught them the doctrine of abstract ideas.

(M233) "Nihil dat quod non habet," or, the effect is contained in the cause, is an axiom I do not understand or believe to be true.