The Works of George Berkeley Part 67

M107 S.

M108 S.

M109 S.

M110 S.

M111 N.

105 They reappear in _Siris_.

M112 M.

106 In one of Berkeley's letters to Johnson, a quarter of a century after the _Commonplace Book_, when he was in America, he observes that "the mechanical philosophers pretend to demonstrate that matter is proportional to gravity. But their argument concludes nothing, and is a mere circle"-as he proceeds to show.

107 In the _Principles_, sect. 1-33, he seeks to fulfil the expository part of this intention; in sect. 33-84, also in the _Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous_, he is "particular in answering objections."

M113 S.

M114 M.

108 If Matter is arbitrarily credited with omnipotence.

M115 S.

M116 S.

M117 S.

M118 S.

M119 S.

M120 S.

109 On freedom as implied in a moral and responsible agent, cf. _Siris_, sect. 257 and note.

M121 N.

110 Is not this one way of expressing the Universal Providence and constant uniting agency of G.o.d in the material world?

111 Here _idea_ seems to be used in its wider signification, including _notion_.

M122 G.

112 "infinitely greater"-Does infinity admit of imaginable degrees?

M123 G.

113 'embrangled'-perplexed-involved in disputes.

114 See _Principles_, Introduction, sect. 24.

M124 S.

115 "h.o.m.onymy," i.e. equivocation.

116 Voluntary or responsible activity is not an idea or datum of sense, nor can it be realised in sensuous imagination. He uses "thing" in the wide meaning which comprehends persons.

M125 S.

117 Voluntary or responsible activity is not an idea or datum of sense, nor can it be realised in sensuous imagination. He uses "thing" in the wide meaning which comprehends persons.

M126 S.

M127 E.

M128 T.

M129 S.

118 Is this consistent with other entries?

M130 S.

_ 119 Essay_, Bk. II. ch. i. sect. 9-19.

M131 S.

120 This is one way of meeting the difficulty of supposed interruptions of conscious or percipient activity.

M132 S.

M133 S.

121 This seems to imply that voluntary action is mysteriously self-originated.

M134 S.

M135 N.

M136 T.

M137 S.

122 "perception." He does not include the percipient.

123 "without," i.e. unrealised by any percipient.

M138 M.

124 This would make _idea_ the term only for what is imagined, as distinguished from what is perceived in sense.

M139 S.

M140 S.

125 In a strict use of words, only _persons_ exercise will-not _things_.

M141 S.

M142 S.

126 As we must do in imagination, which (unlike sense) is representative; for the mental images represent original data of sense-perception.

M143 S.

M144 S.

M145 S.