The Works of George Berkeley Part 68

M146 I.

M147 S.

M148 Mo.

M149 Mo.

127 Does he not allow that we have _meaning_, if not _ideas_, when we use the terms virtue and vice and moral action?

128 As Locke says we are.

M150 E.

129 "_Existence_ and _unity_ are ideas that are suggested to the understanding by every object without and every idea within. When ideas are in our minds, we consider that _they_ exist." Locke's _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 7. sect. 7.

M151 E.

130 i.e. of Existence in the abstract-unperceived and unperceiving-realised neither in percipient life nor in moral action.

M152 S.

M153 S.

M154 S.

M155 S. E.

M156 G.

131 This suggests that G.o.d knows sensible things without being sentient of any.

M157 N. Mo.

M158 Mo.

M159 I.

M160 I.

132 Cf. _Principles_, Introd., sect. 1-5.

M161 I.

133 Cf. Preface to _Principles_; also to _Dialogues_.

M162 S.

M163 I.

M164 Mo.

134 i.e. that ethics was a science of phenomena or ideas.

M165 S.

M166 I.

135 i.e. of the _independent_ existence of Matter.

M167 M.

136 'bodies'-i.e. sensible things-not unrealised Matter.

M168 I. &c.

137 Cf. _Principles_, Introduction, sect. 13.

M169 I.

138 Locke died in October, 1704.

M170 S.

139 "without the mind," i.e. abstracted from all active percipient life.

M171 Mo.

M172 Mo.

M173 P. S.

140 e.g. secondary qualities of sensible things, in which pleasure and pain are prominent.

141 e.g. primary qualities, in which pleasure and pain are latent.

M174 I.

M175 Mo.

M176 M.

142 See Locke's _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 13. -- 21, ch. 17. -- 4; also Bk. IV.

ch. 3. -- 6; also his controversy with Bishop Stillingfleet regarding the possibility of Matter thinking. With Berkeley real s.p.a.ce is a finite creature, dependent for realisation on living percipient Spirit.

M177 I.

M178 Mo.

M179 Mo.

M180 S.

143 But what of the origination of the volition itself?

M181 M. S.

_ 144 Essay_, Bk. I. ch. iv. -- 18. See also Locke's _Letters_ to Stillingfleet.

M182 M. S.

145 It is, according to Berkeley, the steady union or co-existence of a group of sense-phenomena.

M183 I.

M184 I.

M185 S.

_ 146 Essay_, Bk. II. ch. i. -- 10-where he argues for interruptions of consciousness. "Men think not always."

M186 Mo.