History of the Origin, Formation, and Adoption of the Constitution of the United States Volume I Part 19

The prominent defects in the Confederation, which have been described in the previous chapters, and which were so rapidly developed after the treaty of 1783, made it manifest, that a mere league between independent States, with no power of direct legislation, was not a government for a country like this, in a time of peace. They showed, that this compact between the States, without any central arbiter to declare or power to enforce the duties which it involved, could not long continue. It had, indeed, answered the great purpose of forming the Union, by bringing the States into relations with each other, the continuance of which was essential to liberty; since nothing could follow the rupture of those relations but the reestablishment of European power, or the native despotism which too often succeeds to civil commotion. By creating a corporate body of confederate States, and by enabling them to go into the money-markets of Europe for the means of carrying on and concluding the war, the Confederation had made the idea and the necessity of a Union familiar to the popular mind. But the purposes and objects of the war were far less complex and intricate than the concerns of peace. It was comparatively easy to borrow money. It was another thing to pay it.

The federal power, under the Confederation, had little else to do, before the peace, than to administer the concerns of an army in the field, and to attend to the foreign relations of the country, as yet not complicated with questions of commerce. But the vast duties, capable of being discharged by no other power, which came rapidly into existence before the creation of the machinery essential to their performance, exhibited the Confederation in an alarming att.i.tude.

It was found to be dest.i.tute of the essence of political sovereignty,--the power to compel the individual inhabitants of the country to obey its decrees. It was a system of legislation for States in their corporate and collective capacities, and not for the individuals of whom those States were composed. It could not levy a dollar by way of impost or a.s.sessment upon the property of a citizen. It had no means of annulling the action of a State legislature, which conflicted with the lawful and const.i.tutional requirements of Congress.

It made treaties, and was forced to stand still and see them violated by its own members, for whose benefit they had been made. It owed an enormous debt, and saw itself, year by year, growing more and more unable to liquidate even the annually increasing interest. It stood in the relation of a protector to the principles of republican liberty on which the inst.i.tutions of the States were founded, and on the first occurrence of danger, it stretched forward only a palsied arm, to which no man could look for succor. It undertook to rescue commerce from the blighting effects of foreign policy, and failed to achieve a single conspicuous and important advantage. Every day it lost something of respect abroad and of confidence at home, until all men saw, with Was.h.i.+ngton, that it had become a great shadow without the substance of a government; while few could even conjecture what was to rise up and supplant it.

Few men could see, amidst the decay of empire and the absolute negation of all the vital and essential functions of government, what was to infuse new life into a system so nearly effete. Yet the elements of strength existed in the character of the people; in the a.s.similation, which might be produced, in the lapse of years, by a common language, a common origin, and a common destiny;--in the almost boundless resources of the country;--and, above all, in the principles of its ancient local inst.i.tutions, that were capable, to an extent not then conceived, of expansion and application to objects of far greater magnitude than any which they had yet embraced. Through what progress of opinion the people of this country were enabled to grasp and combine these elements into a new system, which could satisfy their wants, we must now inquire.

In this inquiry, the student of political history should never fail to observe, that the great difficulty of the case, which made it so complex and embarra.s.sing, arose from the separate, sovereign, and independent existence of the States. The formation of new const.i.tutions, in countries not thus divided, involves only the adaptation of new inst.i.tutions and forms to the genius, the laws, and the habits of the people. The monarchy of France has, in our day, been first remodelled, and afterwards swept from the face of Europe, to be followed by a republican const.i.tution, which has in its turn been crushed and superseded. But France is a country that has long been subjected to as complete and powerful a system of centralization as has existed anywhere since the most energetic period of the Roman empire; and whether its inst.i.tutions of government have or have not needed to be changed, as they have been from time to time, those changes have been made in a country in which an entire political unity has greatly facilitated the operation.

In the United States, on the contrary, a federal government was to be created; and it was to be created for thirteen distinct communities;--a government that should not destroy the political sovereignties of the States, and should yet introduce a new sovereignty, formed by means of powers, whose surrender by the States, instead of weakening their present strength, would rather develop and increase it. This peculiar difficulty may be constantly traced, amidst all the embarra.s.sments of the period in which the fundamental idea of the Const.i.tution was at length evolved.

The progress of opinion and feeling in this country, on the subject of its government, from the peace of 1783 to the year 1787, may properly be introduced by a brief statement of the political tendencies of two princ.i.p.al cla.s.ses of men. All contemporary evidence a.s.sures us that this was a period of great pecuniary distress, arising from the depreciation of the vast quant.i.ties of paper money issued by the Federal and State governments; from rash speculations; from the uncertain and fluctuating condition of trade; and from the great amount of foreign goods forced into the country as soon as its ports were opened. Naturally, in such a state of things, the debtors were disposed to lean in favor of those systems of government and legislation which would tend to relieve or postpone the payment of their debts; and as such relief could come only from their State governments, they were naturally the friends of State rights and State authority, and were consequently not friendly to any enlargement of the powers of the Federal Const.i.tution. The same causes which led individuals to look to legislation for irregular relief from the burden of their private contracts, led them also to regard public obligations with similar impatience. Opposed to this numerous cla.s.s of persons were all those who felt the high necessity of preserving inviolate every public and private obligation; who saw that the separate power of the States could not accomplish what was absolutely necessary to sustain both public and private credit; and they were as naturally disposed to look to the resources of the Union for these benefits, as the other cla.s.s were to look in an opposite direction.

These tendencies produced, in nearly every State, a struggle, not as between two organized parties, but one that was all along a contest for supremacy between opposite opinions, in which it was at one time doubtful to which side the scale would turn.[351]

The three most important centres of opinion in the Union, before the formation of the Const.i.tution, were Ma.s.sachusetts, Virginia, and New York.[352] The public proceedings of each of them, in the order of time, on the subject of enlarging the federal powers, are, therefore, important to a just understanding of the course of events which ended in the calling of the Convention.

The legislature of Ma.s.sachusetts was a.s.sembled in the summer of 1785.

The proposal of Congress, made to the States in 1784, to grant the power of regulating trade, had been responded to by only four of the States, and the negotiations in Europe were failing from the want of it. Great uneasiness and distress pervaded all the commercial cla.s.ses, and extended to every other cla.s.s capable of being affected by a state of things in which a large balance, occasioned by the extravagant importation and use of foreign manufactures, was thrown against the country. The money of the State was rapidly drawn off to meet this balance, which its other exhausted means of remittance could not satisfy. It was impossible for the State to recover its former prosperity, while Great Britain and other nations continued the commercial systems which they had adopted. It had become plain to the comprehension of all intelligent persons concerned in trade, that nothing could break up those systems so long as the United States were dest.i.tute of the same power to regulate their foreign trade, by admitting or excluding foreign vessels and cargoes according to their interests; and it needed only the popular expression of this palpable truth, enforced by a clear and decided executive message, to induce the legislature to act upon it.[353] Governor Bowdoin gave the necessary impulse, and suggested the appointment of special delegates from the States to settle and define the powers with which Congress ought to be invested.[354]

This message caused the adoption of the first resolution, pa.s.sed by the legislature of any State, declaring the Articles of Confederation to be inadequate to the great purposes which they were originally designed to effect, and recommending a convention of delegates from all the States, for the purpose of revising them, and reporting to Congress how far it might be necessary to alter or enlarge the powers of the Federal Union, in order to secure and perpetuate its primary objects. Congress was requested by these resolves to recommend such a convention. A letter, urging the importance of the subject, was addressed by the Governor of Ma.s.sachusetts to the President of Congress, and another to the executive of each of the other States. The resolves were also inclosed to the delegates of the State in Congress, with instructions to lay them before that body at the earliest opportunity, and to make every exertion to carry them into effect.[355]

They were, however, never presented to Congress. That body was wholly unprepared for such a step, and the delegation of Ma.s.sachusetts were entirely opposed to it, as premature. It had been all along the policy of Congress to obtain only a grant of temporary power over commerce, and to this policy they were committed by their proposition, now pending with the legislatures of the States, and by the instructions of the commissioners whom they had sent to Europe to negotiate commercial treaties. The prevalent idea in Congress was, that at the expiration of fifteen years,--the period for which they had asked the States to grant them power over commerce,--a new commercial epoch would commence, when the States would have a more clear and comprehensive view of their interests, and of the best means for promoting them, whether by treaties abroad, or by the delegation and exercise of greater power at home. It was argued, also, that the most safe and practicable course was, to grant temporary power in the first instance, and to leave the question of its permanent adoption as a part of the Confederation to depend on its beneficial effects. Another objection, which afterwards caused serious difficulty, was, that the Articles of Confederation contained no provision for their amendment by a convention, but that changes should originate in Congress and be confirmed by the State legislatures, and that, if the report of a convention should not be adopted by Congress, great mischiefs would follow.

But a deep-seated jealousy in Congress of the radical changes likely to be made in the system of government lay at the foundation of these objections. There was an apprehension that the Convention might be composed of persons favorable to an aristocratic system; or that, even if the members were altogether republican in their views, there would be great danger of a report which would propose an entire remodelling of the government. The delegation from Ma.s.sachusetts, influenced by these fears, retained the resolutions of the State for two months, and then replied to the Governor's letter, a.s.signing these as their reasons for not complying with the directions given to them.[356] The legislature of Ma.s.sachusetts thereupon annulled their resolutions recommending a Convention.[357]

It is manifest from this occurrence, that Congress in 1785 were no more in a condition to take the lead and conduct the country to a revision of the Federal Const.i.tution, than they were in 1783, when Hamilton wished to have a declaration made of its defects, and found it impracticable.

There were seldom present more than five-and-twenty members; and, at the time when Ma.s.sachusetts proposed to call upon them to act upon this momentous subject, the whole a.s.sembly embraced as little eminent talent as had ever appeared in it. They were not well placed to observe that something more than "the declamation of designing men" was at work, loosening the foundations of the system which they were administering.[358] They saw some of its present inconveniences; but they did not see how rapidly it was losing the confidence of the country, of which the following year was destined to deprive it altogether.

Before the year 1785 had closed, however, Virginia was preparing to give the weight of her influence to the advancing cause of reform.

A proposition was introduced into the House of Delegates of Virginia, to instruct the delegates of the State in Congress to move a recommendation to all the States to authorize Congress to collect a revenue by means of duties uniform throughout the United States, for a period of thirteen years.[359] The absolute necessity for such a system was generally admitted; but, as in Ma.s.sachusetts, the opinions of the members were divided between a permanent grant of power and a grant for a limited term. The advocates of the limitation, arguing that the utility of the measure ought to be tested by experiment, contended, that a temporary grant of commercial powers might be and would be renewed from time to time, if experience should prove its efficacy. They forgot that the other powers granted to the Union, on which its whole fabric rested, were perpetual and irrevocable; and that the first sacrifices of sovereignty made by the States had been the result of circ.u.mstances which imperatively demanded the surrender, just as the situation of the country now demanded a similar surrender of an irrevocable power over commerce. The proposal to make this grant temporary only, was a proposal to engraft an anomaly upon the other powers of the Confederacy, with very little prospect of its future renewal; for the caprice, the jealousy, and the diversity of interests of the different States, were obstacles which the scheme of a temporary grant could only evade for the present, leaving them still in existence when the period of the grant should expire. But the arguments in favor of this scheme prevailed, and the friends of the more enlarged and liberal system, believing that a temporary measure would stand afterwards in the way of a permanent one, and would confirm the policy of other countries founded on the jealousies of the States, were glad to allow the subject to subside, until a new event opened the prospect for a more efficient plan.[360]

The citizens of Virginia and Maryland, directly interested in the navigation of the rivers Potomac and Pocomoke, and of the Bay of Chesapeake, had long been embarra.s.sed by the conflicting rights and regulations of their respective States; and, in the spring of 1785, an effort at accommodation was made, by the appointment of commissioners on the part of each State to form a compact between them for the regulation of the trade upon those waters. These commissioners a.s.sembled at Alexandria in March, and while there made a visit at Mount Vernon, where a further scheme was concerted for the establishment of harmonious commercial regulations between the two States.[361] This plan contemplated the appointment of other commissioners, having power to make arrangements, with the a.s.sent of Congress, for maintaining a naval force in the Chesapeake, and also for establis.h.i.+ng a tariff of duties on imports, to be enacted by the legislatures of both the States. A report, embracing this recommendation, was accordingly made by the Alexandria commissioners to their respective governments. In the legislature of Virginia this report was received while the proposition for granting temporary commercial powers to Congress was under consideration; and it was immediately followed by a resolution directing that part of the plan which respected duties on imports to be communicated to all the States, with an invitation to send deputies to the meeting. In a few days afterwards, the celebrated resolution of Virginia, which led the way to the Convention at Annapolis, was adopted by the legislature, directing the appointment of commissioners to meet with the deputies of all the other States who might be appointed for the same purpose, to consider the whole subject of the commerce of the United States.[362] The circular letter which transmitted this resolution to the several States proposed that Annapolis in the State of Maryland should be the place, and that the following September should be the time of meeting.

The fate of this measure now turned princ.i.p.ally upon the action of the State of New York. The power of levying a national impost, proposed in the revenue system of 1783, had been steadily withheld from Congress by the legislature of that State. Ever since the peace, the State had been divided between two parties, the friends of adequate powers in Congress, and the adherents of State sovereignty; and the belief that the commercial advantage of the State depended upon retaining the power to collect their own revenues, had all along given to the latter an ascendency in the legislature. In 1784, they established a custom-house and a revenue system of their own. In 1785, a proposition to grant the required powers to Congress was lost in the Senate; and in 1786, it became necessary for Congress to bring this question to a final issue.

Three other States, as we have seen, stood in the same category with New York, having decided in favor of no part of the plan which Congress had so long and so repeatedly urged upon their adoption.[363] Declaring, therefore, that the crisis had arrived when the people of the United States, by whose will and for whose benefit the federal government was inst.i.tuted, must decide whether they would support their work as a nation, by maintaining the public faith at home and abroad, or whether, for want of a timely exertion in establis.h.i.+ng a general revenue system, and thereby giving strength to the Confederacy, they would hazard the existence of the Union and the privileges for which they had contended,--Congress left the responsibility of the decision with the legislatures of the States.[364]

It was now that the influence of Hamilton upon the destinies of this country began to be favored by the events which had brought its affairs to the present juncture. To his sagacious and watchful forecast, the proposal of a commercial convention, emanating from Virginia, presented the opportunity which he had long desired, to effect an entire change in the system of the federal government; while, at the same time, the final appeal made by Congress for the establishment of the revenue system gave him an occasion to bring the State of New York into the movement which had been originated by Virginia. He determined that this system should be again presented to the legislature, for distinct approval or rejection, and that, if it should be rejected, the State should still send a representation to the Convention at Annapolis. He therefore caused the revenue system, as proposed by Congress, to be again brought before the legislature, where it was again rejected; and he and his friends then threw their whole influence in favor of the appointment of commissioners to attend the commercial convention, and succeeded,--Hamilton himself being appointed one of them.[365]

This great step having been taken, the course of the State of New York upon the revenue system of 1783, which brought her at length to an open controversy with Congress, tended strongly to aid the plans of Hamilton, and finally gave him the ascendency in the State itself. The legislature, in May, 1786, pa.s.sed an act for granting imposts and duties to the United States, and soon afterwards adjourned. It was immediately p.r.o.nounced by Congress not to be a compliance with their recommendation, and the Governor was earnestly requested to rea.s.semble the legislature.

This he declined to do, upon the ground of a want of const.i.tutional power. Congress again urged the summoning of the legislature, for the purpose of granting the system of impost in such a manner as to enable them to carry it into effect, and the Governor again refused.[366]

Arrived at Annapolis, Hamilton found there the representatives of five States only.[367] He had come with the determination that the Convention should lay before the country the whole subject of the condition of the States and the want of an efficient federal government. But the avowed purpose of the meeting was solely to consider the means of establis.h.i.+ng a uniform system of commercial regulations, and not to reform the existing government of the Union. New Jersey alone, of the five States represented, had empowered her commissioners to consider of "other important matters," in addition to the subject of commercial regulations. Four other States had appointed commissioners, none of whom had attended; and the four remaining States had made no appointments at all.[368]

Under these circ.u.mstances, it was certainly a matter of great delicacy for the commissioners of five States only to pa.s.s upon the general situation of the Union, and to p.r.o.nounce its existing government defective and insufficient. Hamilton, however, felt that this opportunity, once lost, might never occur again; and although willing to waive his original purpose of a full exposition of the defects of the Confederation, he did not deem it expedient that the Convention should adjourn without proposing to the country some measure that would lead to the necessary reforms. He modified his original plan, therefore, and laid before his colleagues a report, which formally proposed to the several States the a.s.sembling of a general convention, to take into consideration the situation of the United States.

In this doc.u.ment, it was declared that the regulation of trade, which had been made the object of the meeting at Annapolis, could not be effected alone, for the power of regulating commerce would enter so far into the general system of the federal government, that it would require a corresponding adjustment of the other parts of the system. That the system of the general government was seriously defective; that those defects were likely to be found greater on a close inspection; that they were the cause of the embarra.s.sments which marked the state of public affairs, foreign and domestic; and that some mode by which they could be peaceably supplied was imperatively demanded by the public necessities,--were propositions which the country was then prepared to receive. A convention of deputies from the different States, for the special and sole purpose of investigating the defects of the national government, seemed to be the course ent.i.tled to preference over all others.[369]

It was indeed the only method by which the object of the great statesman who drafted this report could have been reached. The Articles of Confederation had provided, that they should be inviolably observed by every State; that the Union should be perpetual; and that no alteration should be made in any of the Articles, unless agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and confirmed by the legislature of every State.[370]

To have left the whole subject to the action of Congress would have insured, at most, only a change in some of the features of the existing government, instead of the great reform which Hamilton believed to be essential,--the subst.i.tution of a totally different system. At the same time, the cooperation and a.s.sent of Congress were necessary to the success of the plan of a convention, in order that it might not seem to be a violent departure from the provisions of the Articles of Confederation, and also for the sake of their influence with the States.

The proposal of the report was therefore cautious. It did not suggest the summoning of a convention to frame a new const.i.tution of government, but "to devise such further provisions as might appear to be necessary to render the const.i.tution of the federal government adequate to the exigencies of the Union." It proposed also, that whatever reform should be agreed on by the convention should be reported to Congress, and, when agreed to by them, should be confirmed by the _legislatures_ of all the States. In this manner, the proposal avoided any seeming violence to the Articles of Confederation, and suggested the convention as a body to prepare for the use of Congress a plan to be adopted by them for submission to the States.[371]

At the same time, Hamilton undoubtedly contemplated more than any amendment of the existing const.i.tution. In 1780, he had a.n.a.lyzed the defects of the general government, sketched the outline of a Federal Const.i.tution, and suggested the calling of a convention to frame such a system.[372] The idea of such a convention was undoubtedly entertained, by many persons, before the meeting at Annapolis. It had been recommended by the legislature of New York in 1782, and by that of Ma.s.sachusetts in 1785. But Hamilton had foreseen its necessity in 1780, more than seven years before the meeting at Annapolis; and, although he may not have been the author of the first public proposal of such a measure, his private correspondence contains the first suggestion of it, and proves that he had conceived the main features of the Const.i.tution of the United States, even before the Confederation itself was established.[373]

The recommendation of the Annapolis commissioners was variously received. In the legislature of Virginia it met with a cordial approval, and an act was pa.s.sed during the autumn to provide for the appointment of delegates to the proposed convention. In Congress, it was received at first with little favor. Doubts were entertained there whether any changes in the federal government could be const.i.tutionally made, unless they were to originate in Congress and were then to be adopted by the legislatures of the States, pursuant to the mode provided by the Articles of Confederation. The legislatures, it was argued, could not adopt any scheme that might be proposed by a convention; and if it were submitted to the people, it was not only doubtful what degree of a.s.sent on their part would make it valid, but it was also doubtful whether they could change the Federal Const.i.tution by their own direct action.

To these difficulties was to be added the further hazard, that, if the report of the convention should be made to Congress, as proposed, they might not finally adopt it, and if it should be rejected, that fatal consequences would ensue.[374]

The report of the Annapolis commissioners was, however, taken into consideration; and in the course of the following winter a report upon it was made in Congress, which conceded the fact that the Confederation required amendments, and that the proposed convention was the most eligible mode of effecting them.[375] But this report had to encounter the objection, entertained by many members, that the measure proposed would tend to weaken the federal authority, by lending the sanction of Congress to an extra-const.i.tutional proceeding. Others considered that a more summary mode of proceeding was advisable, in the form of a direct appeal to the people of every State to inst.i.tute State conventions, which should choose delegates to a general convention, to revise and amend, or change, the federal system, and to publish the new const.i.tution for general observance, without any reference to the States, for their acceptance or confirmation.[376] There were still others, who preferred that Congress should take up the defects of the existing system, point them out to the legislatures of the States, and recommend certain distinct alterations to be adopted by them.[377]

It was no doubt true, that a convention originating with the State legislatures was not a mode pointed out by the Articles of Confederation for effecting amendments to that instrument. But it was equally true, that the mere amendment of that instrument was not what the critical situation of the country required. On the other hand, a convention originating with the people of the States would undoubtedly rest upon the authority of the people, in its inception; but, if the system which it might frame were to go into operation without first being adopted by the people, it would as certainly want the true basis of their consent.

These difficulties were felt in and out of Congress. But it does not seem to have occurred to those who raised them, that the source from which the convention should derive its powers to frame and recommend a new system of government was of far less consequence, than that the mode in which the system recommended should be adopted, should be one that would give it the full sanction and authority of the people themselves.

A const.i.tution might be framed and recommended by any body of individuals, whether inst.i.tuted by the legislatures or by the people of the States; but if adopted and ordained by the States in their corporate capacities, it would rest on one basis, and if adopted and ordained by the people of the States, acting upon it directly and primarily, it would obviously rest upon another, a different, and a higher authority.

The latter mode was not contemplated by Congress when they acted upon the recommendation of the Annapolis commissioners. Accustomed to no other idea of a union than that formed by the States in their corporate capacities as distinct and sovereign communities; belonging to a body const.i.tuted by the States, and therefore officially related rather to the governments than to the people of the States; and entertaining a becoming and salutary fear of departing from a const.i.tution which they had been appointed to administer,--the members of the Congress of 1786-87 were not likely to go beyond the Annapolis recommendation, which in fact proposed that the new system should be confirmed by the legislatures of the States.

But the course of events tended to a different result,--to an actual, although a peaceable revolution, by the quiet subst.i.tution of a new government in place of the old one, and resting upon an entirely different basis. While Congress were debating the objections to a convention, the necessity for action became every day more stringent.

The insurrection in Ma.s.sachusetts, which had followed the meeting of the commissioners at Annapolis and had reached a dangerous crisis when their report was before Congress, had alarmed the people of the older States by the dangers of an anarchy with which the existing national government would be obviously unable to cope. The peril of losing the navigation of the Mississippi, and with it the Western settlements, through the inefficiency of Congress, was also at that moment impending; while, at the same time, the commerce of the country was nearly annihilated by a course of policy pursued by England, which Congress was utterly unable to encounter. Under these dangers and embarra.s.sments, a state of public opinion was rapidly developed, in the winter of 1787, which drove Congress to action. The objections to the proposal before them yielded gradually to the stern requirements of necessity, and a convention was at last accepted, not merely as the best, but as the only practicable, mode of reaching the first great object by which an almost despairing country might be rea.s.sured of its future welfare.

The final change in the views of Congress in regard to a convention was produced by the action of the legislature of New York. In that body, as we have seen, the impost system had been rejected, in the session of 1786, and the Governor of the State had even refused to rea.s.semble the legislature for the reconsideration of this subject. A new session commenced in January, 1787, in the city of New York, where Congress was also sitting. A crisis now occurred, in which the influence of Hamilton was exerted in the same manner that it had been in the former session, and with a similar result. On that occasion he had followed up the rejection of the impost system with a resolve for the appointment of commissioners to attend the meeting at Annapolis. It was now his purpose, in case the impost system should be again rejected, to obtain the sanction of Congress to the recommendation of a convention, made by the Annapolis commissioners. This, he was aware, could be effected only by inducing the legislature of New York to instruct the delegates of their State in Congress to move and vote for that decisive measure. The majority of the members of Congress were indisposed to adopt the plan of a convention; and although they might be brought to recommend it at the instance of a State, they were not inclined to do so spontaneously.[378]

The crisis required, therefore, all the address of Hamilton and of the friends of the Union, to bring the influence of one of these bodies to bear upon the other.

The reiterated recommendation by Congress of the impost system, now addressed solely to the State of New York, who remained alone in her refusal, necessarily occupied the earliest attention of the new legislature.[379] A warm discussion upon a bill introduced for the purpose of effecting the grant as Congress had asked for it, ended, on the 15th of February, in its defeat. The subject of a general convention of the States, according to the plan of the Annapolis commissioners, was then before Congress, on the report of a grand committee;[380] and Congress were hesitating upon its expediency. At this critical juncture, Hamilton carried a resolution in the legislature of New York, instructing the delegates of that State in Congress to move for an act recommending the States to send delegates to a convention for the purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation, which, four days afterwards, was laid before Congress.[381]

Virginia and North Carolina had already chosen delegates to the Convention, in compliance with the recommendation from Annapolis; and Ma.s.sachusetts was about to make such an appointment, under the influence of her patriotic Bowdoin. In this posture of affairs, although the proposition of the New York delegation failed to be adopted,[382] the fact that she had thus solicited the action of Congress was of decisive influence, when the members from Ma.s.sachusetts followed it immediately by a resolve more acceptable to a majority of the a.s.sembly.[383]

The recommendation, as it went forth from Congress, was strictly limited to a revision of the Articles of Confederation, by a convention of delegates, and the alterations and new provisions were to be reported to Congress, and were to be agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the States. Thus the resolution pursued carefully the mode of amendment and alteration provided by the Articles of Confederation, except that it interposed a convention for the purpose of originating the changes to be proposed in the existing form of government; adding, however, the great general purpose of rendering the Federal Const.i.tution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the Union.

The point thus gained was of vast and decisive importance. That Congress should forego the right of originating changes in the system of government;[384] that it should advise the States to confer that power upon another a.s.sembly; and that it should sanction a general revision of the Federal Const.i.tution, with the express declaration of its present inadequacy,--were all preliminaries essential to a successful reform.

Feeble as it had become from the overgrown vitality of State power, and from the lack of numbers and talent upon its roll, it was still the government of the Union; the Congress of America; the lineal successors of that renowned a.s.sembly which had defied the power of England, and brought into existence the thirteen United States. If it stood but the poor shadow of a great name, it was still a name with which to do more than conjure; for it bore a const.i.tutional relation to the States, still reverenced by the wise and thoughtful, and still necessary to be regarded by all who desired the security of const.i.tutional liberty. The risk of immediate attempts to establish a monarchical form of government was not inconsiderable. The risk that civil confusion would follow a longer delay to provide for the pressing wants of the country was greater. Dejection and despondency had taken hold of many minds of the highest order; while the great body of the people were desiring a change which they could not define, and which they feared, while they invited its approach. In such a state of things, considerate men were naturally unwilling to turn entirely away from Congress, or to exclude its agency altogether from the processes of reform, and to embark upon the uncertain sea of political experiment, without chart or rule to guide their course; for no man could tell what projects, what schemes, and what influences might arise to jeopard those great principles of republican liberty on which the political fabric had rested from the Declaration of Independence to the present hour of danger and distress.

For the wise precedent, thus established, of placing the formation of a new government under the direct sanction of the old one, the people of this country are indebted chiefly to Hamilton. Nothing can be more unfortunate, in any country, than the necessity or the rashness which sweeps away an established const.i.tution, before a subst.i.tute has been devised. Whether the interval be occupied by provisional arrangements or left to a more open anarchy, it is an unfit season for the creation of new inst.i.tutions. At such a time, the crude projects of theorists are boldly intruded among the deliberations of statesmen; despotism lies in wait for the hazards by which liberty is surrounded; the mult.i.tude are unrestrained by the curb of authority; and society is exposed to the necessity of accepting whatever is offered, or of submitting to the first usurper who may seize the reins of government, because it has nothing on which to rest as an alternative. True liberty has gained nothing, in any age or country, from revolutions, which have excluded the possibility of seeking or obtaining the a.s.sent of existing power to the reforms which the progress of society demands.

In the days when the Confederation was tottering to its fall; when its revenues had been long exhausted; and when its Congress embraced, in actual attendance, less than thirty delegates from only eleven of the States, it would have been the easy part of a demagogue to overthrow it by a sudden appeal to the pa.s.sions and interests of the hour, as the first step to a radical change.[385] But the great man, whose mature and energetic youth, trained in the school of Was.h.i.+ngton, had been devoted to the formation and establishment of the Union, knew too well, that, if its golden cord were once broken, no human agency could restore it to life. He knew the value of habit, the respect for an established, however enfeebled authority; and while he felt and insisted on the necessity for a new const.i.tution, and did all in his power to make the country perceive the defects of the old one, he wisely and honestly admitted that the a.s.sent of Congress must be gained to any movement which proposed to remedy the evil.

But the reason for not moving the revision of the system of government by Congress itself was one that could not be publicly stated. It was, that the highest civil talent of the country was not there. The men to whom the American people had been accustomed to look in great emergencies,--the men who were called into the Convention, and whose power and wisdom were signally displayed in its deliberations,--were then engaged in other spheres of public life, or had retired to the repose which they had earned in the great struggle with England. Had the attempt been made by Congress itself to form a const.i.tution for the acceptance of the States, the controlling influence and wisdom of Was.h.i.+ngton, Franklin's wide experience and deep sagacity, the unrivalled capacities of Hamilton, the brilliant powers of Gouverneur Morris, Pinckney's fertility, and Randolph's eloquence, with all the power of their eminent colleagues and all the strength of principle and of character which they brought to the Convention, would have been withheld from the effort. One great man, it is true, was still there. Madison was in Congress; and Madison's part in the framing of the Const.i.tution was eminently conspicuous and useful. But without the concentration of talent which the Convention drew together, representing every interest and every part of the Union, nothing could have been presented to the States, by the Congress of 1787, which would have commanded their a.s.sent. The Const.i.tution owed as much, for its acceptance, to the weight of character of its framers, as it did to their wisdom and ability, for the intrinsic merits which that weight of character enforced.

It was fortunate, also, that Congress did nothing more than to recommend the Convention, without undertaking to define its powers. The doubts concerning its legality, which led many persons of great influence to hesitate in sanctioning it, were thus removed, and the States were left free to join in the movement, as an expedient to discover and remedy the defects of the federal government, without fettering their delegates with explicit instructions.[386] In this way the Convention, although experimental and anomalous, derived its influence from the sources in which it originated, and was enabled, though not without difficulty, to meet the crisis in which the country was placed. That crisis was one of a singular character; for the continued existence of the Union, and the fate of republican governments, were both involved. It was felt and admitted by the wisest men of that day, that if the Convention should fail in devising and agreeing upon some system of government, at once capable of pervading the country with an efficient control, and essentially republican in its form, the Federal Union would be at an end. But its dissolution, in the state in which the country then was, must have been followed by an attempt to establish monarchical government; because the State inst.i.tutions were dest.i.tute of the strength necessary to encounter the agitation which would have followed the downfall of the federal power, and yet some subst.i.tute for that power must have been found. But without civil war, and the most frightful social convulsions, nothing in the nature of monarchy could ever have been established in this country after the Revolution. "Those who lean to a monarchical government," said Was.h.i.+ngton, "have either not consulted the public mind, or they live in a region which (the levelling principles in which they were bred being entirely eradicated) is much more productive of monarchical ideas than is the case in the Southern States, where, from the habitual distinctions which have always existed among the people, one would have expected the first generation and the most rapid growth of them. I am also clear, that, even admitting the utility, nay, necessity, of the form, the period is not arrived for adopting the change without shaking the peace of this country to its foundation. That a thorough reform of the present system is indispensable, no one, who has a capacity to judge, will deny; and with hand and heart I hope the business will be essayed in a full convention.

After which, if more powers and more decision are not found in the existing form, if it still wants energy and that secrecy and despatch (either from the non-attendance or the local views of its members) which are characteristic of good government, and if it shall be found (the contrary of which, however, I have always been more afraid of than the abuse of them) that Congress will, upon all proper occasions, exert the powers which are given with a firm and steady hand, instead of frittering them back to the States, where the members, in place of viewing themselves in their national character, are too apt to be looking,--I say, after this essay is made, if the system proves inefficient, conviction of the necessity of a change will be disseminated among all cla.s.ses of the people. Then, and not till then, in my opinion, can it be attempted without involving all the evils of civil discord."[387]

There were other difficulties besides those which may be called legal, or technical, attending this effort to revise the system of the federal government. The failure of that system, as it had been put in operation in 1781, had, to a great extent, chilled the hopes of many of the best statesmen of America. It had been established under auspices which seemed to promise far different fruits from those it had actually produced. Its foundations were laid in the patriotism and national feeling of the States. The concessions which had been made to secure a union of republics, having various, and, in some respects, conflicting interests, seemed at first to guarantee the prompt and faithful performance of its obligations. But this fair promise had melted into most unsubstantial performance. The Confederation was framed upon a principle which never has enabled, and probably never will enable, a government to become effective and permanent,--the principle of a league.

Another and a very serious cause for discouragement was the sectional jealousy and State pride which had been constantly growing, from the Declaration of Independence to the time when the States were called upon to meet each other upon broader grounds, and to make even larger sacrifices than at any former period. It is difficult to trace to all its causes the feeling which has at times arrayed the different extremities of this Union against each other. It was very early developed, after the different provinces were obliged to act together for their great mutual objects of political independence; but, even in its highest paroxysms, it has always at last found an antidote in the deeper feelings and more sober calculations of a consistent patriotism.

Perhaps its prevalence and activity may with more truth be ascribed, in every generation, to the ambition of men who find in it a convenient instrument of local influence, rather than to any other cause. It is certain, that, when it has raged most violently, this has been its chief aggravating element. The differences of neither manners, inst.i.tutions, climate, nor pursuits would at any time have been sufficient to create the perils to which the Union of the States has occasionally been exposed, without the mischievous agency of men whose personal objects are, for the time, subserved by the existence of such peculiarities. The proof of this is to be found in the fact, that the seasonable sagacity of the people has always detected the motives of those who have sought to employ their pa.s.sions, and has compelled them at last to give way to that better order of men who have appealed to their reason.

The difficulty of getting the a.s.sent of all the States to radical changes in the federal system, and the uncertainty as to the mode in which such changes could be effectively adopted, were also among the reasons which led many persons to regard the Convention as an experiment of doubtful expediency. The States had hitherto acted only in their corporate capacities, in all that concerned the formation and modification of the Union. The idea of a Union founded on the direct action of the people of the States, in a primary sense, and proceeding to establish a federal government, of limited powers, in the same manner in which the people of each State had established their local const.i.tutions, had not been publicly broached, and was not generally entertained. Indeed, there was no expectation on the part of any State, when the delegates to the Convention were appointed, that any other principle would be adopted as the basis of action, than that by which the Articles of Confederation contemplated that all changes should be effected by the action of the States a.s.sembled in Congress, confirmed by the unanimous a.s.sent of the different State legislatures.

The prevailing feeling, among the higher statesmen of the country, was, that the Convention was an experiment of doubtful tendency, but one that must nevertheless be tried. Was.h.i.+ngton, Madison, Jay, Knox, Edmund Randolph, have all left upon record the evidence of their doubts and their fears, as well as of their convictions of the necessity for this last effort in favor of the preservation of a republican form of government.[388] Hamilton advanced to meet the crisis, with perhaps less hesitation than any of the Revolutionary statesmen. His great genius for political construction; his large knowledge of the means by which a regulated liberty may be secured; and the long study with which he had contemplated the condition of the country, led him to enter the Convention with more of eagerness and hope than most of its members. He saw, with great clearness, that the difficulty which embarra.s.sed nearly all his contemporaries--the question of the mode of enacting a new const.i.tution--was capable of solution. He did not propound that solution in advance of the a.s.sembling of the Convention; for it was eminently necessary that the States should not be alarmed by the suggestion of a principle so novel and so unlike the existing theory of the Union. But he was fully prepared to announce it, so soon as it could be received and acted upon.