History of the Origin, Formation, and Adoption of the Constitution of the United States Volume I Part 20

It was under such auspices and with such views that the Convention a.s.sembled at Philadelphia, on the fourteenth day of May in the year seventeen hundred and eighty-seven.

At that time, the world had witnessed no such spectacle as that of the deputies of a nation, chosen by the free action of great communities, and a.s.sembled for the purpose of thoroughly reforming its const.i.tution, by the exercise, and with the authority, of the national will. All that had been done, both in ancient and in modern times, in forming, moulding, or modifying const.i.tutions of government, bore little resemblance to the present undertaking of the States of America. Neither among the Greeks nor the Romans was there a precedent, and scarcely an a.n.a.logy. The ancient leagues of some of the cities or republics of Greece did not amount to const.i.tutions, in the sense of modern political science; and the Roman republic was but the domination of a single race of the inhabitants of a single city.

In modern Europe, we find no trace of political science until after the nations were divided, and partial limits set to the different orders and powers of the state. The feudal system, which acknowledged no relations in society but those of lord and serf, necessarily forbade all consideration of any forms of government which were not essentially founded on that relation; and it was not until that relation had been in some degree broken in upon, that there began to be any thing like theoretical inquiries into natural rights. When this took place,--at the end, or towards the end, of the Middle Ages,--the peculiar forms of the European governments gave rise to inquiries into the relation of sovereign and subject. From the beginning of the fifteenth down to the end of the seventeenth century, there were occasional discussions on the Continent, growing out of particular events, of such questions as the right of the people to depose bad princes, and how far it was lawful to resist oppression. But questions of const.i.tutional form, or of the right of the people to arrange and distribute the different powers of government, or the best mode of doing it, did not arise at all.

In England, from the time of the Conquest, until Magna Charta had gone far towards destroying the system, a feudal monarchy had precluded all questions touching the form or the spirit of government. The chief traits of the present const.i.tution, which arose in a great measure from the circ.u.mstance that the lower orders of the n.o.bility became gradually so much amalgamated with the people as to give rise to the distinct power of the commons, have all along been inconsistent with the enactment of new forms of civil polity; although from the time of the Reformation to the Revolution of 1688, the active principles of English freedom have, at different junctures, made advances of the utmost importance. The foundations on which the Stuarts sought to establish their throne were directly at variance with the spirit and principles of the Reformation, which totally denied the doctrine of pa.s.sive and unlimited obedience, and which led to the struggles that gave birth to the Puritans. Those severe reformers, whose church const.i.tution was purely republican, naturally sought to carry its principles into the state. The result was the Parliamentary troubles of James the First, the execution of Charles the First under the forms of judicial proceeding, and the despotism of Cromwell under the forms of a commonwealth. Charles the Second returned, untaught by all that had happened, to attempt the reestablishment of the Stuart principles of unlimited obedience; and James the Second, who naturally united to them the Catholic religion, being driven from his kingdom, the question arose of a vacant throne, and how it should be filled. In all these events, however, from the death of Elizabeth to the great discussions which followed the abdication of James the Second, the idea of calling upon the people of England to frame a government of their own choice, and to define the limits and powers of its various departments, never arose. The Convention Parliament discussed, and were summoned to discuss, but a single fundamental question,--that involving the disposal of the crown.

Still, the political troubles of England gave rise to many theoretical discussions of natural right, and of the origin and structure of society. As soon as Charles the First was executed, this discussion arose abroad, from his friends, who wrote, or influenced others to write, in defence of the divine right of kings. Hobbes and Filmer followed, in England, on the same side, and Milton, Locke, and Algernon Sidney vindicated the natural and inalienable rights of the subject and the citizen. In the works of these great writers, the foundations of society are examined with an acuteness which has left little to be done in the merely speculative part of political inquiry. But the practical effect of their theories never went farther than the promotion, to a greater or less extent, of the particular views which they desired to inculcate concerning the existing const.i.tution, or the particular events out of which the discussions arose.

Nor should we forget what had been done in France, by the wise and cautious Montesquieu, or by the vehement and pa.s.sionate Rousseau, and the writers of his school. The former, drawing all his views from history and experience, undertook to show, from the antecedents of each state, the character of its const.i.tution, to explain and develop its peculiar properties, and thence to determine the principles on which its legislation should proceed. The latter, starting from an entirely opposite point, and designing to write a treatise on Politics in the widest sense of the term, became a mere theorist, and produced only certain brilliant speculations upon the social compact, of a purely democratic character, as fragments of a work which he never finished.

The crowd of writers, too, who preceded, and in part created the French Revolution, which was just commencing its destructive activity as our Const.i.tution was formed, really contributed nothing of practical value to the solution of such great questions as the mode of forming, vesting, and distributing the various branches of sovereign power.

Thus there was little for American statesmen of that day to look to, in the way of theories which had been practically proved to be sound and useful. The const.i.tution of England, it is true, presented to them certain great maxims, the application of which was not unsuited to the circ.u.mstances and habits of a people whose laws and inst.i.tutions had been derived from their English ancestors and their English blood. But the const.i.tution of England, embracing the three estates of King, Lords, and Commons, had become what it was, only by the extortion from the crown of the rights and privileges of the two orders of the people. The American Revolution, on the other hand, had settled, as the fundamental principle of American society, that all sovereignty resides originally in the people; that they derive no rights by way of grant from any other source; and consequently, that no powers or privileges can exist in any portion of the people as distinct from the whole. The English const.i.tution could, therefore, furnish only occasional a.n.a.logies for particular details in the structure of departments, which might after all really require to be founded on different fundamental principles.

But the great problem to be solved--for which English experience was of no value--was, so to parcel out those portions of original sovereignty, which the people of the States might be willing to withdraw from their State inst.i.tutions, as to const.i.tute an efficient federal republic, which yet would not control and absorb the powers that might be reserved. But to comprehend the results that were accomplished, and to understand the true nature of the system bequeathed to us, it is indispensable to examine in detail the means and processes by which it was formed. Before we turn, however, to this great subject, the characters of the princ.i.p.al framers of the Const.i.tution demand our attention.

FOOTNOTES:

[351] "The war, as you have very justly observed," General Was.h.i.+ngton wrote to James Warren of Ma.s.sachusetts, in October, 1785, "has terminated most advantageously for America, and a fair field is presented to our view; but I confess to you, my dear Sir, that I do not think we possess wisdom or justice enough to cultivate it properly.

Illiberality, jealousy, and local policy mix too much in all our public counsels for the good government of the Union. In a word, the Confederation appears to me to be little more than a shadow without the substance, and Congress a nugatory body, their ordinances being little attended to. To me it is a solecism in politics; indeed, it is one of the most extraordinary things in nature, that we should confederate as a nation, and yet be afraid to give the rulers of that nation (who are the creatures of our own making, appointed for a limited and short duration, and who are amenable for every action and may be recalled at any moment, and are subject to all the evils which they may be instrumental in producing) sufficient powers to order and direct the affairs of the same. By such policy as this, the wheels of government are clogged, and our brightest prospects, and that high expectation which was entertained of us by the wondering world, are turned into astonishment; and, from the high ground on which we stood, we are descending into the vale of confusion and darkness.

"That we have it in our power to become one of the most respectable nations upon earth, admits, in my humble opinion, of no doubt, if we would but pursue a wise, just, and liberal policy towards one another, and keep good faith with the rest of the world. That our resources are ample and increasing, none can deny; but while they are grudgingly applied, or not applied at all, we give a vital stab to public faith, and shall sink, in the eyes of Europe, into contempt.

"It has long been a speculative question among philosophers and wise men, whether foreign commerce is of real advantage to any country; that is, whether the luxury, effeminacy, and corruptions which are introduced along with it are counterbalanced by the convenience and wealth which it brings. But the decision of this question is of very little importance to us. We have abundant reason to be convinced that the spirit of trade which pervades these States is not to be repressed. It behooves us, then, to establish just principles; and this cannot, any more than other matters of national concern, be done by thirteen heads differently constructed and organized. The necessity, therefore, of a controlling power, is obvious; and why it should be withheld is beyond my comprehension." Writings, IX. 139-141.

[352] They are named in this order, because it represents the order in which they respectively acted upon the enlargement of the federal powers.

[353] One of the necessary and immediate effects of the Revolution of course was, the loss of the exclusive commercial advantages which this country had enjoyed with Great Britain and her dependencies; and the prohibitory acts and impositions, which fell with their full weight on the American trade, after the peace, were particularly disastrous to the trade of Ma.s.sachusetts. The whale fishery, a business of great importance, had brought into the Province, before the war, 172,000 guineas per annum, giving employment to American seamen, and not requiring the use of any foreign materials, except a small quant.i.ty of cordage. A duty was now laid on whale oil in England of 18 per tun. In addition to the loss thus sustained, the exportation of lumber and provisions in American bottoms to the West Indies was entirely prohibited. Another great inconvenience, which came in fact to be intolerable, was the vast influx of British goods, consigned to English factors for sale, depriving the native merchants, manufacturers, and artisans of the market. At the same time, the revenue of the State, derived from impost and excise duties and a tax on auctions of one per cent., fell short of the annual interest on the private debt of the State, 30,000 pounds (currency) per annum, and a tax of 20,000 pounds (currency) was computed to be necessary to cancel the debt, princ.i.p.al and interest, in fifteen years, and pay the ordinary charges of the government. Besides this, the State's proportion of the federal debt was to be provided for. It was in this state of things that two remarkable popular meetings were held in Boston, in the spring of 1785, to act upon the subject of trade and navigation, and to call the attention of Congress to the necessity for a national regulation of commerce. The first was a meeting of the merchants and tradesmen, convened at Faneuil Hall on the 18th of April. They appointed a committee to draft a pet.i.tion to Congress, representing the embarra.s.sments under which the trade was laboring, and took measures to cause the legislature to call the attention of the delegation in Congress to the importance of immediate action upon the subject. They also established a committee of correspondence with the merchants in the other seaports of the United States, to induce a similar action; and they entered into a pledge not to purchase any goods of the British merchants and factors residing in Boston, who had made very heavy importations, which tended to drain the specie of the State. The other meeting was an a.s.sembly of the artisans and mechanics, held at the Green Dragon Tavern, on the 28th of April, at which similar resolutions were adopted. It is quite apparent, from these proceedings, that all branches of industry were threatened with ruin; and in the efforts to counteract the effects of the great influx of foreign commodities, we trace the first movements of a popular nature towards a national control over commerce.

[354] Governor Bowdoin's first Message to the Legislature, May 31, 1785.

[355] July 1, 1785.

[356] The delegation at that time consisted of Elbridge Gerry, Samuel Holten, and Rufus King. Their "Reasons a.s.signed for suspending the delivery to Congress of the Governor's letter for revising and altering the Confederation" may be found in the Life of Hamilton, II. 353. See also Boston Magazine for 1785, p. 475.

[357] November 25, 1785.

[358] Letter of Messrs. Gerry, Holten, and King, delegates in Congress, to the Governor of Ma.s.sachusetts, a.s.signing reasons for suspending the delivery of his letter to Congress, dated September 3, 1785. Life of Hamilton, II. 353, 357. "We are apprehensive," said they, "and it is our duty to declare it, that such a measure would produce throughout the Union an exertion of the friends of an aristocracy to send members who would promote a change of government; and we can form some judgment of the plan which such members would report to Congress. But should the members be altogether republican, _such have been the declamations of designing men_ against the Confederation generally, against the rotation of members, which, perhaps, is the best check to corruption, and against the mode of altering the Confederation by the unanimous consent of the legislatures, which effectually prevents innovations in the articles by intrigue or surprise, that we think there is great danger of a report which would invest Congress with powers that the honorable legislature have not the most distant intention to delegate."

[359] November 30th, 1785.

[360] The resolution introduced on the 30th of November was agreed to in the Delegates, but before it was carried up to the Senate, it was reconsidered and laid upon the table. Elliot's Debates, I. 114, 115.

Letter of Mr. Madison to General Was.h.i.+ngton, of December 9, 1785, Was.h.i.+ngton's Works, IX. 508.

[361] What direct agency General Was.h.i.+ngton had in suggesting or promoting this scheme, does not appear; although it seems to have originated, or to have been agreed upon, at his house. His published correspondence contains no mention of the visit of the commissioners; but Chief Justice Marshall states that such a visit was made, and in this statement he is followed by Mr. Sparks. (Marshall, V. 90; Sparks, I. 428.) Mr. Madison, writing to General Was.h.i.+ngton in December, 1785, refers to "the proposed appointment of commissioners for Virginia and Maryland, _concerted at Mount Vernon_, for keeping up harmony in the commercial regulations of the two States," and says that the meeting of commissioners from all the States, which had then been proposed, "seems naturally to grow out of it." (Was.h.i.+ngton's Writings, IX. 509.)

That Was.h.i.+ngton foresaw that the plan agreed upon at his house in March would lead to a general a.s.sembly of representatives of all the States, seems altogether probable, from the opinions which he entertained and expressed to his correspondents, during that summer, upon the subject of conferring adequate commercial powers upon Congress. (See his Letters to Mr. McHenry and Mr. Madison of August 22d and November 30th, Writings, IX. 121, 145.)

[362] This resolution, pa.s.sed January 21, 1786, was in these words: "_Resolved_, That Edmund Randolph, James Madison, Jr., Walter Jones, St.

George Tucker, Meriweather Smith, David Ross, William Ronald, and George Mason, Esquires, be appointed commissioners, who, or any five of whom, shall meet such commissioners as may be appointed by the other States in the Union, at a time and place to be agreed on, to take into consideration the trade of the United States; to examine the relative situation and trade of the said States; to consider how far a uniform system in their commercial regulations may be necessary to their common interest and their permanent harmony; and to report to the several States such an act relative to this great object, as, when unanimously ratified by them, will enable the United States in Congress a.s.sembled effectually to provide for the same; that the said commissioners shall immediately transmit to the several States copies of the preceding resolution, with a circular letter respecting their concurrence therein, and proposing a time and place for the meeting aforesaid."

[363] Rhode Island, Maryland, and Georgia.

[364] "The committee," said the Report, "have thought it their duty candidly to examine the principles of this system, and to discover, if possible, the reasons which have prevented its adoption; they cannot learn that any member of the Confederacy has stated or brought forward any objections against it, and the result of their impartial inquiries into the nature and operation of the plan has been a clear and decided opinion, that the system itself is more free from well-founded exceptions, and is better calculated to receive the approbation of the several States, than any other that the wisdom of Congress can devise.

In the course of this inquiry, it most clearly appeared that the requisitions of Congress for eight years past have been so irregular in their operation, so uncertain in their collection, and so evidently unproductive, that a reliance on them in future, as a source from whence moneys are to be drawn to discharge the engagements of the Confederacy, definite as they are in time and amount, would be not less dishonorable to the understandings of those who entertain such confidence, than it would be dangerous to the welfare and peace of the Union. The committee are therefore seriously impressed with the indispensable obligation that Congress are under of representing to the immediate and impartial consideration of the several States, the utter impossibility of maintaining and preserving the faith of the federal government by temporary requisitions on the States, and the consequent necessity of an early and complete accession of all the States to the revenue system of the 18th of April, 1783." (Journals of Congress, XI. 35, 36. February 15, 1786.)

[365] Life of Hamilton, II. 374, 375

[366] The legislature of New York were willing to grant the duties to Congress, but insisted upon reserving the power of levying and collecting them; and, instead of making the collectors amenable to and removable by Congress, they made them removable by the State, on conviction for default or neglect of duty in the State courts. This was a material departure from the plan recommended by Congress, and was entirely inconsistent with the grants already made by several of the States. See the Report and proceedings in Congress on the New York Act, July 27-August 23, 1786. Journals, XI. 153, 184, 197, 200.

[367] New York was represented by Alexander Hamilton and Egbert Benson; New Jersey by Abraham Clark, William C. Houston, and James Schureman; Pennsylvania by Tench c.o.xe; Delaware by George Read, John d.i.c.kinson, and Richard Ba.s.sett; Virginia by Edmund Randolph (Governor), James Madison, Jr., and St. George Tucker.

[368] General Knox, writing to General Was.h.i.+ngton under date of January 14, 1787, says: "You ask what prevented the Eastern States from attending the September meeting at Annapolis. It is difficult to give a precise answer to this question. Perhaps torpidity in New Hamps.h.i.+re; faction and heats about their paper money in Rhode Island; and jealousy in Connecticut. Ma.s.sachusetts had chosen delegates to attend, who did not decline until very late, and the finding of other persons to supply their places was attended with delay, so that the convention had broken up by the time the new-chosen delegates had reached Philadelphia."

Writings of Was.h.i.+ngton, IX. 513.

[369] Report of the Annapolis Convention, Elliot's Debates, I. 116; Hamilton's Works, II. 336.

[370] Article XIII.

[371] Report, ut supra.

[372] See his letter to James Duane, written in 1780, Life, I. 284-305.

[373] Ibid. The first public proposal of a continental convention is a.s.signed by Mr. Madison to one Pelatiah Webster, whom he calls "an able, though not conspicuous citizen," and who made this suggestion in a pamphlet published in May, 1781. Recent researches have not added to our knowledge of this writer. In the summer of 1782, the legislature of New York, under the suggestion of Hamilton, pa.s.sed resolutions recommending such a convention. On the 1st of April, 1783, Hamilton, in a debate in Congress, expressed his desire to see a general convention take place.

In 1784, the measure was a good deal talked of among the members of Congress, and in the winter of 1784-85, Noah Webster, an eminent political writer in Connecticut, suggested "a new system of government, which should act, not on the States, but directly on individuals, and vest in Congress full power to carry its laws into effect." In 1786, the subject was again talked of among members of Congress, before the meeting at Annapolis. (Madison. Elliot, V. 117, 118.) But Hamilton's letter to James Duane, in 1780, although not published at the time, was of course earlier than any of these suggestions. In that letter, after showing that the fundamental defect of the then existing system was a want of power in Congress, he thus a.n.a.lyzes in advance the Articles of Confederation, which had not then taken effect:--"But the Confederation itself is defective, and requires to be altered. It is neither fit for war nor peace. The idea of an uncontrollable sovereignty, in each State, over its internal police, will defeat the other powers given to Congress, and make our Union feeble and precarious. There are instances, without number, where acts necessary for the general good, and which rise out of the powers given to Congress, must interfere with the internal police of the States; and there are as many instances in which the particular States, by arrangements of internal police, can effectually, though indirectly, counteract the arrangements of Congress.

You have already had examples of this, for which I refer to your own memory. The Confederation gives the States, individually, too much influence in the affairs of the army; they should have nothing to do with it. The entire foundation and disposal of our military forces ought to belong to Congress. It is an essential element of the Union; and it ought to be the policy of Congress to destroy all ideas of State attachment in the army, and make it look up wholly to them. For this purpose, all appointments, promotions, and provisions whatsoever ought to be made by them. It may be apprehended, that this may be dangerous to liberty. But nothing appears more evident to me, than that we run much greater risk of having a weak and disunited federal government, than one which will be able to usurp upon the rights of the people. Already some of the lines of the army would obey their States in opposition to Congress, notwithstanding the pains we have taken to preserve the unity of the army. If any thing would hinder this, it would be the personal influence of the general,--a melancholy and mortifying consideration.

The forms of our State const.i.tutions must always give them great weight in our affairs, and will make it too difficult to blind them to the pursuit of a common interest, too easy to oppose what they do not like, and to form partial combinations, subversive of the general one. There is a wide difference between our situation and that of an empire under one simple form of government, distributed into counties, provinces, or districts, which have no legislatures, but merely magistratical bodies to execute the laws of a common sovereign. There the danger is that the sovereign will have too much power, and oppress the parts of which it is composed. In our case, that of an empire composed of confederate states, each with a government completely organized within itself, having all the means to draw its subjects to a close dependence on itself, the danger is directly the reverse. It is, that the common sovereign will not have power sufficient to unite the different members together, and direct the common forces to the interest and happiness of the whole....

The Confederation, too, gives the power of the purse too entirely to the State legislatures. It should provide perpetual funds in the disposal of Congress, by a land-tax, poll-tax, or the like. All imposts upon commerce ought to be laid by Congress, and appropriated to their use; for without certain revenues, a government can have no power; that power which holds the purse-strings absolutely, must rule. This seems to be a medium which, without making Congress altogether independent, will tend to give reality to its authority. Another defect in our system is, want of method and energy in the administration. This has partly resulted from the other defect; but in a great degree from prejudice and the want of a proper executive. Congress have kept the power too much in their own hands, and have meddled too much with details of every sort.

Congress is properly a deliberative corps, and it forgets itself when it attempts to play the executive. It is impossible that a body, numerous as it is, constantly fluctuating, can ever act with sufficient decision, or with system. Two thirds of the members, one half the time, cannot know what has gone before them, or what connection the subject in hand has to what has been transacted on former occasions. The members who have been more permanent will only give information that promotes the side they espouse, in the present case, and will as often mislead as enlighten. The variety of business must distract, and the p.r.o.neness of every a.s.sembly to debate must at all times delay. Lastly, Congress, convinced of these inconveniences, have gone into the measure of appointing boards. But this is, in my opinion, a bad plan. A single man, in each department of the administration, would be greatly preferable.

It would give us a chance of more knowledge, more activity, more responsibility, and, of course, more zeal and attention. Boards partake of the inconveniences of larger a.s.semblies; their decisions are slower, their energy less, their responsibility more diffused. They will not have the same abilities and knowledge as an administration by single men. Men of the first pretensions will not so readily engage in them, because they will be less conspicuous, of less importance, have less opportunity of distinguis.h.i.+ng themselves. The members of boards will take less pains to inform themselves and arrive at eminence, because they have fewer motives to do it. All these reasons conspire to give a preference to the plan of vesting the great executive departments of the state in the hands of individuals. As these men will be, of course, at all times under the direction of Congress, we shall blend the advantages of a monarchy in one const.i.tution.... I shall now propose the remedies which appear to me applicable to our circ.u.mstances, and necessary to extricate our affairs from their present deplorable situation. The first step must be to give Congress powers competent to the public exigencies.

This may happen in two ways: one, by resuming and exercising the discretionary powers I suppose to have been originally vested in them for the safety of the States, and resting their conduct on the candor of their countrymen and the necessity of the conjuncture; the other, _by calling immediately a convention of all the States_, with full authority to conclude finally upon a general confederation, stating to them beforehand explicitly the evils arising from a want of power in Congress, and the impossibility of supporting the contest on its present footing, that the delegates may come possessed of proper sentiments, as well as proper authority, to give efficacy to the meeting. _Their commission should include a right of vesting Congress with the whole or a proportion of the unoccupied lands, to be employed for the purpose of raising a revenue, reserving the jurisdiction to the States by whom they are granted._ The Confederation, in my opinion, should give Congress a complete sovereignty; except as to that part of internal police which relates to the rights of property and life among individuals, and to raising money by internal taxes. It is necessary that every thing belonging to this should be regulated by the State legislatures.

Congress should have complete sovereignty in all that relates to war, peace, trade, finance; and to the management of foreign affairs; the right of declaring war, of raising armies, officering, paying them, directing their motions in every respect; of equipping fleets, and doing the same with them; of building fortifications, a.r.s.enals, magazines, &c.; of making peace on such conditions as they think proper; of regulating trade, determining with what countries it shall be carried on; granting indulgences; laying prohibitions on all the articles of export or import; imposing duties, granting bounties and premiums for raising, exporting, or importing; and applying to their own use the product of these duties, only giving credit to the States on whom they are raised in the general account of revenues and expense; inst.i.tuting admiralty courts, &c.; of coining money, establis.h.i.+ng banks on such terms, and with such privileges, as they think proper; appropriating funds, and doing whatever else relates to the operations of finance; transacting every thing with foreign nations; making alliances offensive and defensive, and treaties of commerce, &c.... The second step I would recommend is, that Congress should instantly appoint the following great officers of state: a Secretary for Foreign Affairs; a President of War; a President of Marine; a Financier; a President of Trade.... These officers should have nearly the same powers and functions as those in France a.n.a.logous to them, and each should be chief in his department, with subordinate boards, composed of a.s.sistants, clerks, &c., to execute his orders." (Life of Hamilton, I. 284-305.)

[374] Abstract of an Address made to the Legislature of Ma.s.sachusetts, by the Hon. Rufus King, in October, 1786. Boston Magazine for the year 1786, p. 406.

[375] Mr. Madison's Notes of Debates in the Congress of the Confederation. Elliot, V. 96.

[376] This was the opinion of Mr. Jay. He thought that no alterations should be attempted, unless deduced from the only source of just authority, the people. He seems to have considered that, if the people of the States, acting through their primary conventions, were to send delegates to a general convention, with authority to alter the Articles of Confederation, the new system would rest upon the authority of the people, without further sanction. See his letter to General Was.h.i.+ngton, of date January 7, 1787. Writings of Was.h.i.+ngton, IX. 510.

[377] Letter of General Knox to General Was.h.i.+ngton, January 14, 1787.

Writings of Was.h.i.+ngton, IX. 513.

[378] Madison. Elliot, V. 96.

[379] It was brought before them by the speech of the Governor (Clinton), informing them of the resolutions of Congress, which had requested an immediate call of the legislature to consider the revenue system, "a subject," he observed, "which had been repeatedly submitted to them, and must be well understood."

[380] Journals, XII. 15. February 21, 1787.